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1.1 Introduction
The aim of my research is to examine issues relating to the supply of credit to small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) using a unique UK dataset containing loans and overdrafts
from a major UK bank to its small business clients from 1998 until 20001.
The small business sector is of vital importance to the UK economy because it provides the
seedbed that is necessary for nurturing the industries of the future (Bolton Report, 1971).
Apart from helping secure the continuity of UK industry, the small business sector, as I will
go on to demonstrate, provides a large proportion of UK employment and contributes
towards GDP (Acs, Audretsch and Evans, 1991).
The dependence of this sector on banks for start up finance has been examined in the past
(Bannock and Doran, 1991; National Economic Research Associates (NERA), 1990). This
reliance on banks for finance emanates from the high risk of start-ups because they are
considered too high risk for equity investors (Bank of England, 2001). Just under 20 percent
of start-ups fail in their first year of trading and over 60 percent in the first 5 years (Barclay's
Bank Information Service, 2000).
This reliance on the banking sector, in addition to the lack of a track record of business start¬
ups, gives rise to a myriad of problems. A well documented problem and one that surfaces
repeatedly throughout my analysis, is the issue of how to evaluate the credit risk of business
start-ups in view of their lack of a track record. A related question is how the bank
formulates loan terms such as collateral and interest margins in such a way to ameliorate
high risk, given the fact that start-ups lack a track record.
My analysis into the evaluation of credit risk is a timely one. The NERA report (1990)
emphasised the need for better risk appraisal by banks. If the UK banking system moves in
the same direction as the US Equal Opportunity Credit Act, it will become imperative in the
future to use transparent and objective credit risk assessment instead of judgmental
procedures if loan sanctioners need to defend their decisions before a court of law. Evidence
by Deakins, Hussain and Ram (1992) for the UK and Overstreet and Kemp (1986) for the
US, points to a disparity in the subjective decisions reached by loan sanctioners2.
1 I define a Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) using the European employment definition.
According to this definition this category of business contains micro (1-9 employees), small and
medium sized (10-50 employees) (Bank of England, 2001).
2 This subjectivity was reflected in comments made by Dr. Charles Munn of the Chartered Institute of
Bankers in Scotland attending the 1999 Credit Scoring and Credit Control Conference in Edinburgh.
He indicated that before the advent of credit scoring, if the applicant had taken the time to polish his
shoes, his chances of securing a loan were higher. Applicants wearing suede shoes were more likely to
be rejected!
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This is the basic context of my research; namely the supply of credit by the banks to small
businesses, focusing on business start-ups, given the short or non-existent track record
displayed by a business start up.
In this chapter I hope to present the context for my research into the supply of credit to
SMEs. I will focus on the UK policy background and statistics where possible because my
research uses UK data. I will show that issues such as the attenuation of the risk in lending to
start-ups represent genuine UK policy concerns. The reduction of lending risk involved in
bank lending to start-ups and the lack of adequate previous research into SME scorecards,
provides a motivation for my development of a scorecard for first time business borrowers. I
will also discuss the development of the UK debate into whether start-ups suffer from under¬
investment or a finance gap and explain in general terms why such under-investment is
expected to arise. This debate provides the background for my research into why small
business loans are turned down by a bank and whether preferential collateral and interest rate
margins are given to second-period borrowers.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I will outline the motivations for
my research and explain why such research is needed. In the section following this, I explain
how my research has addressed issues presented in the first section and what contribution my
research makes towards our understanding of bank finance to small businesses. The final
section provides the structure of my overall research.
1.2 Why investigate the supply of bank credit to SMEs?
In this section I will give the motivations for my research and outline why the issue of bank
lending to SMEs is worth exploring.
It is useful to set the context by providing some summary statistics on the value of the SME
sector to the UK economy. Essentially, a healthy SME base is a positive indicator of the
wellbeing of domestic industry. The Bolton Report (1971) refers to the 'seedbed' function of
small businesses where a healthy small business base is necessary in order to ensure that the
stock of large indigenous firms grows.
A healthy SME base is also essential for job creation. Acs, Audretsch and Evans (1991), in
an international survey, reported that the increase in self-employment since the 1960's
continued to grow steadily in the UK.
Recent statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry are shown in Table 1.1.
According to these statistics for the UK, the SME sector is responsible for 99 percent of all
enterprises, 44 percent of all employment in industry and 37 percent of corporate turnover.
Small businesses are therefore a very important component of the UK economy.
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Small businesses are not only a vital component of the UK economy but they are also very
reliant on their banks for the provision of finance (Bannock and Doran, 1991; NERA Report,
1990). According to Bannock and Doran (1991), reporting the number of venture capital
investments for the major UK venture capital provider 3i, 3i indicated that only 35 of the 989
investments in venture capital were for business start-ups. This means that the vast majority
of start-ups must recourse to a bank or some other financial source such as family or
business angel for finance. This is corroborated by a recent Bank of England Report stating
that banks represented the single largest source of finance for business, high-technology
start-ups where 61 percent of start-up capital originates from bank funds (Bank of England,
2001). Venture capital represents a mere 1 percent of the start-up finance of these businesses.
There would not be a great difficulty lending to SMEs if these small businesses were well
endowed with initial wealth to offer as collateral, in which case the bank would have its
investment fully covered in the event of default. If for instance, business start-ups did not
have sufficient initial collateralisible wealth, the result would be under-investment by banks
and therefore business projects would be carried out in a sub-optimal way.
There is conflicting evidence as to whether there is under-investment in small businesses.
Tentative evidence from Hughes (1992) suggests that under-investment is manifested by
smaller UK businesses. He investigated the breakdown of finance for UK limited companies.
According to Hughes, smaller companies had a lower ratio of fixed to total assets compared
to larger companies (31.5 percent viz. 44.4 percent). They also had comparatively more of
their assets is tied up in trade debts and other debtors than larger companies (37.9 percent
viz. 23.6 percent). The implication of their different asset structure means that they have
comparatively fewer assets to offer as collateral to a creditor. This could lead to
underfunding of the small business sector. Also they are more likely than large companies to
experience shortages in working capital because a comparatively higher proportion of their
assets are tied up in trade and other debtors. The conjecture that small businesses experience
working capital problems is seen in the fact that 35.3 percent of their current liabilities are
owing to trade and other creditors, compared with 23.6 percent of the current liabilities of
their larger counterparts. Petersen and Rajan (1994) have pointed out that trade credit is the
most expensive form of business funding.
The NERA report (1990) dismisses the notion that UK start-ups are underfunded. Their task
was to evaluate the Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) that was introduced in 1981 on the
recommendation of the Wilson Committee (1979).
The LGS was created to address the perceived gap in the availability of loan finance for
smaller firms. Under the LGS the government provides a guarantee to the banks of loans to
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potentially viable small firms that would otherwise not receive debt finance on commercial
terms because they lack adequate assets to offer as collateral. Only 0.6 percent of all small
firms were assisted by this facility (Storey, 1994).
The NERA report concluded that the increase in bank lending to small businesses by the end
of the 1980's meant that the role of the LGS was becoming more unnecessary. They urged
banks to try reducing their small business default rates instead, via better appraisal of loans.
This view that banks need to refine their appraisal systems rather than increase the amount of
lending to SME as suggested by the NERA report is echoed by Storey (1994).
He states that;
'The central issue is the making of good decisions, and not either the scale of resources
provided to the small business sector, or the fact that some businesses are excluded
(probably quite correctly)from access to loans'3.
A policy shift is evident from the Government taking responsibility for a perceived lack of
start-up assets towards a plea for business lenders to improve their risk appraisal procedures.
This latter policy would favour better appraisal systems in the form of more efficient credit
scoring. It also puts the onus on the bank to improve its information on small businesses but
does not suggest how this is to be achieved.
This need to improve the risk appraisal of loans to business start-ups, represents one thrust of
my research. Due to the inapplicability of the existing credit scoring models to the scoring of
small business start-ups, there is a research gap in this area that my analysis attempts to fill.
The process of evaluating small business loans using credit-scoring techniques is still
relatively under developed. Progress here is not as advanced as the scoring of consumers for
credit or store cards. The latter two applications of scoring have been in existence since the
1980's (Thomas, 1998). Despite the development of the zeta-score by Altman (1977) for the
scoring of large businesses, this scoring system is not appropriate for SMEs for a number of
reasons. Firstly, the quality of accounting information required to construct financial ratios is
of a standard many business start-ups cannot hope to supply. Nayek and Greenfield (1994)
examined 200 micro-businesses in the UK West Midlands and were struck by the lack of
financial awareness of the entrepreneurs questioned in their survey. Only 34 percent used
any form of budgeting while the majority of respondents kept a mental note only of financial
information. In fact, in businesses with less than 10 employees (micro-enterprises) the
formal monitoring of profits takes place in only a third. Moreover, 16 percent of enterprises
with debtors kept no debtor records.
3 P.246 Storey, D., 1994. 'Understanding the small business sector'. Routledge: London
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For example, cash flow variables, require a highly developed in-house accounting system.
These have been shown to be predictive in numerous business failure studies, (Bahnson and
Bartley, 1992; Gilbert et al., 1990; Piatt and Piatt, 1990; Piatt et al., 1994, Schellenger and
Cross, 1994; Taffler, 1999) but if the findings of Nayek and Greenfield (1994) are indicative,
the likelihood of obtaining satisfactory cash-flow variables is low.
A more salient reason for the inapplicability of the zeta-score for small businesses, is its
concentration on financial information to the exclusion of what Cressy (1996c) refers to as
'human capital' characteristics. Such characteristics include variables such as the number of
years work experience the entrepreneur has.
In view of the need for better risk appraisal by banks as highlighted in the NERA report
(1990) and the inapplicability of existing business risk appraisal models to business start-ups,
my attempt to develop a scorecard for start up loans is both timely and appropriate.
However, in addition to looking at the appraisal of start-up loans, it is also useful to establish
whether banks are under investing in first-period business borrowers compared to second-
period borrowers. The issue of under-investment in first-period business borrowers arises
because first period borrowers lack a sufficiently long track record. If banks are more likely
to turn down businesses without a credit history when they apply for finance, all things"'
equal, then under-investment in business start-ups is a possible consequence of higher
rejection rates from ab initio borrowers. Another way of looking at this question is to
compare the collateral levels required from new and existing businesses in order to see
whether new businesses are required to provide more collateral when controlling for the size
of the loan. Finally, it is possible to formulate the track record question in terms of the cost
of credit. In other words, I set out to establish whether the bank charges second period
borrowers more for their finance than ab initio borrowers.
1.3 Contribution of my research to knowledge of SME bank finance
With this research aim of investigating the supply of credit to SMEs in mind, I constructed
several application scorecards that used the information generated from over 7,000 first time
applications by business start-ups. The aim of these scorecards was to predict the risk of
default of these businesses at least 6 months later using all in-house information about the
borrowers' credit histories4.
4 One way a bank can enhance its risk appraisal procedure and compensate for the lack of a business
start-up's track record is by using any in-house credit history it has about the borrower in its credit
scoring model. This information includes any credit history the bank has recorded on the
entrepreneur's current accounts, credit card accounts or other accounts conveying information about
the borrower's credit status.
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My study is the first to use a relatively large scale UK dataset to estimate the probability of
default for business start-ups. Up to now studies have merely estimated the probability of
bankruptcy for large, publicly quoted firms (Gilbert et al., 1990; Mossman, 1998; Laurence
and Arshadi, 1995; Bahnson and Bartley, 1992; Altman et. ah, 1994). The most similar
published study on small businesses is by Leonard (1992) but he uses a much smaller dataset
(283 applications) and estimates the probability that a small business has its loan application
accepted, rather than using a default proxy as the explanatory variable.
I find that it is possible to construct a business scorecard for first-period business loans but
that out-of-sample prediction is poor unless the cost of misclassifying a borrower who turns
out to be bad is very high.
The other focus of my research is on the way in which the bank formulates the credit terms
such as interest margin, collateral amount and the rejection rate. These issues are interesting
because while they are relatively well covered in the theoretical literature, there is a paucity
of appropriate data that researchers can use to test the predictions of the models5. For this
reason, empirical work concentrates on the US National Survey of Small Business Finance
dataset used by Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995) and Cole (1998). A non¬
public UK National Westminster Bank dataset used by Cressy in numerous analyses (Cressy,
1996a; Cressy, 1996b; Cressy, 1996c; Cressy and Toivanen, 1998) represents the other main
source of data for small business empirical analyses. The only other source of data is to be
found in the commercial databases of business data such as FAME6. Commercial datasets are
lacking however in potentially rich variables such as entrepreneur age and work experience
because they only contain the abbreviated financial statements of the contributing SMEs.
Commercial data are therefore highly aggregated and do not supply details regarding the
business principals.
The reason I have highlighted the scarcity of information on small businesses, is to underline
the fact that I was fortunate to have access to a private database of UK start up loans from a
major UK retail bank for my research. This permitted me to investigate several questions
relating to loan terms that have caused difficulty in the past because of data availability
problems.
5
Chapter 2 outlines these theoretical models by Besanko and Thakor (1987a and 1987b), Bester
(1985), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, Jaffee and Russell (1976), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Petersen
and Rajan (1995) and de Meza and Southey (1996)
6 FAME stands for Forecasting Analysis Modelling Environment and contains data on SMEs.
Compustat data is used in research by Gilbert et al. (1990), Piatt and Piatt (1987), Lo (1986) and
Mossman et al.( 1998) but since the businesses on the latter database are listed on the Stock Exchange
or are established firms, data from Compustat cannot be used for research on small or start-up
businesses.
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The first issue I analysed with regard to the formulation of loan terms was what factors
determine the interest margin on small business loans. In so doing, I was particularly
interested in determining whether businesses with previous credit histories were extended
finance on more favourable terms than businesses that had no credit history with the bank.
My contribution to the existing work in this area was to investigate whether small businesses
are 'informationally captured' i.e. they must pay more for second-period finance because
their credit history cannot be observed by another bank and is therefore private information
that is retained by the original lending bank. There is an existing literature in this area
focusing on large firms (Hoshi et al., 1990b; Shockley and Thakor, 1993; Billet, Flannery
and Garfinkel 1995). There is also literature dealing with the loan terms extended to US
firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). However, this is the first UK
analysis of its kind to look specifically at the cost of second period finance. I found that
second period finance is more expensive than first-period finance, where expense is
measured, in terms of the magnitude of the interest margin.
The next issue that my research aimed to address is which factors motivate a bank to reject a
small business loan. I also had limited data on business borrowers (for over 3,000 loans) who
had their loan applications turned down. Some of these rejected borrowers already had taken
out loans with the bank. The question I wanted to investigate was what caused the bank to
reject a loan, given that it could already have loaned to a business in the past. Leonard (1992)
and Cole (1998) tackled similar questions. The difference between my research and existing
research in this area, is that my research is the first UK analysis to use loan rejection as the
response variable. Unlike Cole (1998), I also endeavour to give an ex post explanation of my
findings that businesses who ask for more money and where less collateral is transferred to
the bank,
have a higher chance of being turned down. My simple 'E-T' model is intended to put the
loan rejection decision in a rationing context and to suggest a possible direction for future
research7.
The final contribution of my research is to investigate the difference in the collateral levels
of start-up businesses and of established businesses8. In so doing, I use data on over 9,000
existing businesses that banked with this UK lender. What is unique about this particular
analysis is that up to now it has been impossible, due to data restrictions, to measure the level
of collateral because collateral has taken the form of a binary 'yes-no' type variable. In other
7 Different theories of credit rationing can be interpreted simultaneously. Credit rationing theories tend
to describe one type of credit rationing and disregard any other types. My explanation of the loan
rejection decision suggests that two forms or more of credit rationing can operate simultaneously.
8 A version of this analysis is published in Small Business Economics, May 2002
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words, it has been possible to indicate whether collateral has been taken on a loan but the
level of collateral has remained unknown. I found that there is not much disparity in the
collateral terms charged business start-ups and existing businesses when possible anomalies
in the database had been considered taken into account'.
Overall, my research has aimed to use my unique data on UK small business loans to explore
issues concerning the supply of credit to small businesses, with particular emphasis on
start-ups.
It is unfortunate that I had not a sufficiently long time window that would have allowed me
construct some longitudinal analyses. I could then have taken general UK economic
conditions into account such as the exchange rate regime, seasonal variations in expenditure
or purchasing trends. The report by Barclay's Bank Information Service (2001) indicates
that economic conditions are a major factor behind small business default rates.
Additionally, a loan repayment performance period of more than 6-months would have
allowed me estimate the time to failure of start-ups using the data generated from borrower
application forms. However, in spite of the cross-sectional nature of the data and in the
knowledge that there is no available longitudinal data on small firms offering the same depth
of disagregated data, I have shown that I addressed several important issues relating to the
supply of credit to small UK businesses.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of three parts.
1.41 Part One: The literature
In this first part I review the literature of credit scoring and information asymmetries as
separate units. I have had to organise the mutually exclusive literatures relating to credit
scoring and information asymmetries into separate chapters. It was not possible to reconcile
these two literatures because the science of credit scoring is predictive and the theories of
lending are interpretative. However, where there was any overlap, I have tried to cross-
reference between the two. Chapter Two presents the literature of credit contracts
(information asymmetries and the role of the contract variables). Chapter Three outlines the
methods I use in constructing my scorecards and Chapter Four presents the credit scoring
literature.
9 A possibility for future research would be to investigate whether the distinction between start-ups
and existing businesses are equally blurred when controlling for the relative wealth of both types of
businesses. If start-ups had to post a comparatively higher level of their wealth in order to secure a
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1.42 Part Two: The data extraction
Chapter Five details the data extraction process. Due to the complexity of the data, I
thought it useful to include this chapter. By including this chapter I highlight certain
decisions I had to take regarding the aggregation of the data when converting the data from a
relational database to flat file format.
1.43 Part Three: The empirical chapters
Following the data extraction chapter are four self-contained empirical chapters. Each
chapter contains a brief overview of the relevant literature in order to highlight the research
question that the chapter addresses, before I outline and present my empirical results.
Chapter Six presents, compares and contrasts the results of several SME scorecards that I
estimated. Chapter Seven deals with the price of credit in the form of interest margins.
Chapter Eight investigates which variables influence the sanctioner's decision to accept or
reject a small business applicant. This research question is placed in a credit constraints
framework and emphasis is placed on the role of information asymmetries. Chapter Nine
represents an analysis on collateral. Chapter Ten concludes with a summary of my main
findings and the policy implications of my results.
loan than an existing business, it would not have the same proportion of residual collateral to secure
an additional loan with another or the same bank.
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Table 1.1 Number of Enterprises, Employment and Turnover in the private sector
(by size of enterprise and industry sector, 2000)
Values
Number of enterprises Employment Turnover
('000) (£ million)
SME* 3,690,780 9,650 756,607
Non-SME 31,830 12,482 1,277,122
All 3,722,610 22,132 2,033,728
Percent
Number of enterprises Employment Turnover
SME 99 44 37
Non-SME 1 56 63
All 100 100 100
* SME is defined as sole trader or business with up to 50 employees
Source: Own estimates from Department of Trade and Industry, 2001. 'http.Vwww.sbs.gov.uk/statistics'
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Chapter Two
The theoretical literature on small
business finance
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2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature providing the theoretical background to
issues relating to small business loan finance. This chapter therefore serves as a background
chapter to the subsequent empirical chapters Chapter 7, Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
One way of presenting the literature is to extract the most meaningful arguments from the
individual contributions (those that bear relevance to my empirical work). However,
extracting the meaningful arguments involves, to some degree, lifting these arguments from
the mathematical context in which they are presented. Since many of the arguments are
derived from mathematical models, there is a danger that lifting these conclusions without
providing enough of the mathematical background might reduce the impact of these
conclusions.
Therefore, the approach I use in this chapter is to explain first in a non-mathematical way
the findings of the scientific paper that have relevance for my research before presenting the
core algebraic arguments of these papers. To some extent, this approach means pre-empting
the conclusions of the papers before describing the context. However despite the flaws of
this approach, it permits me to present the literature in a more user friendly way and means
that the reader can relate this paper to the ones that have gone before.
I use this approach because it is not my aim to replicate these scientific papers. The aim of
my review of the literature is to interpret and find connections between different
contributors.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section provides basic background on
what is meant by a bank loan in the contract literature and introduces some basic
terminology. The next section reviews the literature on the significance of credit constraints
and business-bank relationships. The next section gives an overview of the literature. In the
section following this I provide a more exhaustive and mathematical review of the
individual models. The final section concludes with a summary of the main arguments.
2.2 Defining a loan contract
This section explains some of the fundamental concepts of bank lending to small firms
including what is meant by a loan contract, imperfect information and the reason a bank
would wish to maintain close, exclusive links with a business borrower.
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Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) refer to a loan contract as a promise of repayment. Because
payment occurs at a future time and promises can be broken, the lender cannot be certain
that he will be reimbursed.
If credit markets were like normal Walrasian markets with supply equalling demand at
equilibrium prices (interest rates) there would be little need for the literature on credit
rationing. However, the 'market for promises', as Jaffee and Stiglitz describe it, cannot be
described by the standard supply and demand model. This market is typically in
disequilibrium where applications for credit are frequently not satisfied. Jaffee and Stiglitz
argue that:
'The special nature of credit markets is most evident in the case of credit rationing, where
borrowers are denied credit even though they are willing to pay the market interest rate (or
more) while apparently similar borrowers do obtain credit'1.
What is the reason for the failure of the standard market model to explain the market for
credit? Jaffee and Stiglitz argue that the risk of borrower default is not a sufficient condition
for market failure because the uncertainty of repayment can be dealt with under the standard
model. What makes the market for credit inefficient is the possible existence of 'imperfect
information'. Imperfect information of any kind means that the borrower, lender or both
parties to the loan contract have unequal access to all the available information. The term
'asymmetric information' on the other hand, implies that one of the parties (usually the
borrower) has access to information that is unavailable to the lender.
Now we move on to defining the loan contract itself. The loan contract is characterised by
the fact that a bank can only claim back from the borrower what it has lent but that it has no
right to any of the excess profits arising from the successful outcome of the entrepreneur's
project. In other words, the most a bank can demand is his original loan principal plus the
interest on the principal while the borrower can enjoy all profits over and above the
borrowed capital. This is an important distinction to make because it shapes the borrower's
and lender's risk preference.
Storey (1994) defines the above as follows. The probability of the success of the start-up is
defined as p, the borrowed capital in the form of a loan is defined as L and the interest rate is
r. If the start-up is successful it will yield returns Y and if it fails it yields zero returns. The
expected gain to the firm which borrows from the bank is:
E (ftf = p [Y-(] + i)LJ
1 P.839 Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)
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where E (nf is the expected profit of the firm. On the other hand, the expected return to the
bank E (nf is only p [{I + i)L ]. This is because the bank is not an equity shareholder in the
business and therefore cannot hope to benefit from any excess profits.
Now assume that there are two discrete outcomes that the borrower can produce; a good
outcome, (YaJ that is higher than the bad outcome, (Yb). The probabilities P" and Pb denote
the likelihood of these outcomes arising where P° and P^ sum to 1. The expected value of
the bank loan is therefore E(L) = (P" * (Ya) + Pb * (Yb)).
Jaffee and Stiglitz assume that there is a mean preserving spread such that the expected
return from both these outcomes is the same. In other words, the higher return carries a
lower probability and the lower return carries a higher probability in such a way that the
expected return E(L) is the same.
Now that I have described the basic fundamentals of the loan contract, I am now going to
describe how the firm defaults using the same nomenclature. If the value of the repayments
to the bank, L, is less than the good outcome, Ya, then the loan is always repaid because the
borrower has always got the minimum amount with which to repay the bank. You will recall
that the good outcome, Ya, occurs with higher certainty but is less than the income generated
by the bad outcome, Yb. If the value of the loan repayments, L, is greater than the bad
outcome, Ya, then the borrower always defaults because he can never generate a high enough
return from his project with which to repay the bank. In other words, the bad outcome, Yb, is
the maximum amount he could expect to earn from his project. If the borrowed amount falls
between the bad outcome, Yb, and the good outcome, Ya, then the expected repayment is P"
(1 + r)L + P6 Yb . This implies that the full amount borrowed (1 + r)L is repaid with
probability Pa, and whatever the available funds from the project when the bad outcome
occurs are gained, with probability P6.
The format of the expected payment to the bank P" (1 + r)L + Pb Yb illustrates two points.
Firstly, as the interest rate r rises, ceteris paribus, the expected repayment to the bank rises
because the term Pa (1 + r)L increases. However, if uncertainty rises and the probability of
the bad outcome Pb increases because the entrepreneur focuses his attention on producing
the bad outcome, the expected repayment to the bank decreases. Consequently, the bank
prefers a higher interest rate and a project offering low uncertainty while the borrower
prefers a lower interest rate and high uncertainty.
I will now explain the risk preference of the bank and borrower using an example to make it
clearer. Imagine that the good outcome offers £20,000 and the bad outcome £50,000. Given
the assumption of the mean preserving spread, the good outcome has a 71.4 percent chance
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of occurring and the bad outcome a 28.6 percent chance. The expected return from both
projects is therefore approximately £14,3002. The entrepreneur has an incentive to prefer the
higher income risky project despite its less certain outcome because he can then retain all
profits in excess of the value of the loan repayments. Imagine that the bank sets the loan
value, L, at £15,000 with an interest rate of 20 percent. The loan repayments on a principal
of £15,000 would amount to £18,000. The entrepreneur knows that if he chooses the high-
risk strategy, b, he could earn £50,000 and thereby earn himself a net return of £32,000 after
repayments of £18,000 had been deducted. He would therefore have an incentive to take a
gamble and pursue the higher risk project. If, on the other hand, he pursued the low risk
project he could earn £20,000 which only leaves him a net return of £2,000 after the loan
repayments have been taken into account.
The bank would prefer a situation of low uncertainty and high interest rates in order to have
a higher likelihood of the good outcome arising and the high interest rate maximises its
expected return because its expected repayments (1 + r) L increase accordingly. On the
other hand, the borrower is prepared to gamble and would prefer a higher degree of
uncertainty accompanied by a lower interest rate. The bank therefore has to use some type of
incentive such as collateral to induce the borrower to work harder to produce the good
outcome. It is not enough for the lender to rely on the interest rate. As Jaffee and Stiglitz
point out, the lender must resort to using other non-price terms in order to reduce the
likelihood of borrower default of which collateral is the most important mechanism.
Another way besides collateral of reducing the risk of default is the use of exclusive
business-bank relationships. Business-bank relationships are explored more fully in the
empirical Chapter 7 on interest rates and Chapter 8 on the loan sanctioner's decision. The
reasons a bank would want to promote close ties with a borrower are manifold. Firstly, there
are fixed or 'sunk' appraisal costs in making a loan that a bank can only hope to recoup over
time. For example, application data and reports on the entrepreneur's creditworthiness
collected by a loan sanctioner at time, can be used at time,+i to inform decisions on the
borrower's creditworthiness for a rollover (follow-on) loan. This high overhead cost
incurred when making the initial loan can be amortised over subsequent loans. Also the
lender may specialise in certain industries where it has already acquired a portfolio of
similar firms. For example if a bank specialises in lending to the farming community it may
2
Because of rounding, an approximation is given. The low risk outcome actually has an expected
return of £14,280 and the high-risk outcome of £14,300
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be more aware of the financial pressures facing the farming sector. Therefore, a reason for
concentrating borrowing in the hands of one lender is the cost savings they entail.
A further reason why a bank would wish the borrower to concentrate bank borrowing in the
hands of one lender is that it allows the bank an overview of all the entrepreneur's
borrowings. According to Jaffee and Stiglitz, many loan contracts contain the clause that if
any one loan is in default, all the other loans should automatically be flagged as problem
loans. It follows that if the bank holds all the entrepreneur's borrowings, he is well informed
on each of the entrepreneur's loans and does not need to liase with other banks regarding the
borrower's creditworthiness.
Another justification for close ties with the borrower is the risk of adverse selection. Akerlof
(1970) documented this effect for the first time by using the analogy of the market for
second hand cars. In a business borrowing context, once a first-time business borrower has
been vetted by a bank and been granted a loan in one period, other competitor banks would
be wary if they were approached by the business for a second period loan. They cannot
observe the quality of the borrower but would infer that the motivation for the borrower
leaving his original lender must be due to his poor creditworthiness. If a borrower
approaches a second bank, it therefore sends a signal to the second bank that his quality is
poor and hence he was compelled to move his custom to another bank. There is therefore
more competition for a first-time borrower (ex ante competition) than for a second period
borrower (ex post competition) if the borrower's credit status cannot be observed (under
private information).
2.3 The nature of credit rationing
The literature on credit constraints dates back to the seminal paper by Jaffee and Russell
(1976). Since then there has been a variety of research into the theory behind credit
constraints, most of which derives from the 1980's.
The aim of this section is to provide the theoretical background for my empirical analyses
into issues such as the loan sanctioner's decision (Chapter 8), the role of a borrower's
reputation (Chapter 7) and the role of collateral (Chapter 9). These theoretical papers
have all influenced the important empirical papers in the literature and which I have
referenced in my empirical chapters. The same views shaping the seminal theoretical paper
by Petersen and Raj an (1995) are reflected in the empirical papers by Petersen and Raj an
(1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) both of which investigate the role of business-bank
relationships in influencing the price of credit. The Petersen and Rajan (1995) model also
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influences the empirical analysis by Cole (1998) into the availability of credit. These key
empirical papers are central to my analyses on the price of credit (Chapter 7) and the
availability of credit (Chapter 8). The theoretical paper by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) has
shaped much of the empirical and theoretical work by Cressy on credit constraints (Cressy,
1996a; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001; Cressy, 1996c) which are referred to in Chapter 8 and
Chapter 9.
In general, credit rationing takes place when information about the credit status of young or
small firms without a track record is low. Therefore the bank is forced to minimise its
exposure to such firms. Otherwise, the likely high default rates of such firms would bring
about high losses for the bank on its lending portfolio. The reason a bank would
nevertheless be keen to lend to such high-risk firms is that it must keep introducing new
business to its lending portfolio, even if this implies higher risk loans.
All theories agree on credit rationing being employed by banks as a risk reduction
instrument. How the bank goes about reducing its exposure to small business loans is a
separate issue. The bank can do this is two ways. It can decide to lend to all businesses but
only grant loans falling short of what the borrower has requested. The other way a bank can
reduce its exposure to a high-risk business sector is to have a higher rejection rate on high-
risk loans than it would otherwise have if there were more available information on the
quality of these firms. The bank can either hold a non-discriminative lottery or a
discriminative screening process in order to select firms for financing. It will therefore deem
some firms to be eligible for finance and reject the remaining firms. The bank rations the
credit it would otherwise have allocated and this credit rationing arises from imperfections
in the level or quality of information about these firms.
It should therefore be evident that there are therefore two ways in which a bank can reduce
its risk exposure to a high-risk sector. This is an important distinction because it is one
fundamental difference in the way past research has interpreted credit rationing.
There are several ways in which theorists can model or interpret credit rationing. Although
each model is unique and of course there are different assumptions among models from the
same broad group, there is a common denominator shared by groups of models. The
rationing theories can be broadly categorised as follows.
Some theories describe 'transitional', or Type I rationing, where the amount of first-period
finance extended to the entrepreneur is less than the amount demanded by the
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entrepreneur'3. Examples of papers that adopt a 'transitional' interpretation of rationing are
the papers by Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Petersen and Rajan (1995). The bank performs
this type of rationing in order to reduce its exposure to the firm. It anticipates that the
probability that the firm will repay its loan will be increased if the business has a relatively
small loan to repay. According to models depicting this type of rationing, the entrepreneur's
application for finance is not rejected. Instead, the bank decides to under invest in the firm
occurs in the first period and then comply with the full request for finance once the
borrower's credit status becomes known. 'Transitional' credit rationing is a two period
phenomenon where rationing occurs in the first period. Finance is essentially staggered over
both periods. In 'transitional credit rationing' the market for loans does not clear in the first
period when the loans are granted to the firms. The demand for loans exceeds the supply of
loans. It is only in the second period, when the creditworthiness of firms becomes known to
the bank, that good firms are supplied with the remainder of the loan that they requested. By
this time bad firms have already defaulted. By the time the first period has elapsed, the bank
is able to fully satisfy the demand for finance. Besanko and Thakor (1987a) describe this
type of credit rationing as follows;
'Rationing emerges (in transitional credit rationing models) because restricted loan sizes,
resulting in excess demand induce a lower fraction of defaults the rationing that occurs
is likely to be transitory since default is an ex post choice of the borrower and reputations
therefore develop'4.
Other theories describe 'equilibrium', or Type II, rationing where some loans are allocated
on a lottery basis while others are fully rejected (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985;
Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Besanko and Thakor, 1987b). A bank sometimes performs
'equilibrium' rationing in order to induce entrepreneurs to choose a combination of interest
margin and collateral that is compatible with their risk type. This strategy is known as 'self-
selection' by borrowers. For example, the bank may offer lower risk entrepreneurs lower
interest margins coupled with higher collateral requirements. In order to deter high-risk
entrepreneurs from choosing this contract, the bank rations loans that are directed at low-
risk borrowers5.
3
Cressy (1999) uses the terms Type I rationing to describe 'transitional rationing' and Type II
rationing to describe 'equilibrium rationing'
4 P.682 Besanko and Thakor (1987)
5 In my own simple model of credit constraints which draws from the two approaches 'equilibrium
credit rationing' models and 'transitional credit rationing' models, it is assumed that the amount of
the loan both influences the decision to accept or decline the loan ('equilibrium credit rationing').
Furthermore, the bank would like to minimise its exposure to first time borrowers by lending less than
the equilibrium amount until the borrower's credit grade becomes known ('transitional credit
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'Switching' theories concentrate on what factors motivate an entrepreneur to move to self-
employment from wage earning employment. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) were the first
contributors to investigate credit constraints in a 'switching' theory framework. However,
they were followed by Cressy (1996c). According to 'switching' theories, if the initial
wealth of an entrepreneur is correlated with his eventual business survival, rationing exists
because asset poor entrepreneurs suffer from under investment and hence are more likely to
fail.
Finally, theories describing illusory credit rationing, where rationing is based on the
entrepreneur's perceptions, show that banks do not under invest but rather over invest in
firms. Examples of papers that interpret rationing in this way are the contributions by de
Meza and Southey (1996) and Manove and Padilla (1999) and the empirical paper by de
Meza (1999). According to these models, banks over-invest rather than under-invest (ration
credit to firms) in firms. This is because an entrepreneur's perception of his own ability is
highly inflated and therefore his perception of the amount of finance that he needs for his
project is not commensurate with his own ability nor with the success likelihood of his
project.
Now that I have described the taxonomy of the credit constraints literature, I can give a brief
description of the core arguments presented in each group of papers.
'Transitional' credit rationing models
I first look at 'transitional' credit rationing models. The Jaffee and Russell (1976) model
from here on referred to as the J-R model, represents the first and best example of a
'transitional' rationing model. It posits that a bank lends a precautionary amount to a first-
time business borrower in order that the bank can, in the intervening period between the first
and second period, accumulate behavioural information on the borrower's creditworthiness.
It is only when the bank is satisfied with how the borrower has managed to repay his first
period balance that it commits to extending a second period loan the magnitude of which is
more in line with the borrower's expectations. Hence, supply equates demand only in the
second period. The market for loans is in temporary disequilibrium in the first period.
The most salient point about the J-R model, according to Berger and Udell (1995), is that the
amount loaned by the bank is a choice variable. In other words, the bank can choose to lend
a lower amount to the borrower than requested. This creates excess demand for loans. Since
rationing'). The common denominator in this synthesis of the two types of credit rationing is that the
amount borrowed is increasing in credit constraints.
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the demand for finance by the borrower outstrips the supply of finance by the bank, the
market is not in equilibrium. However, I have already mentioned that this lack of
equilibrium is a temporary phenomenon and confined to the first period of borrowing. After
a time, the creditworthiness of the borrower becomes known, as the borrower defaults or
fails to default on his repayments. It is assumed that under full information when the bank
has collected adequate information about the borrower that equilibrium is restored and the
bank has no longer any need for rationing6.
The model by Jaffee and Russell (J-R) is of particular relevance because their representation
of the borrowing situation appears to mirror what happens in reality. This model agrees with
circumstantial evidence from bankers who describe first time borrowers as being risky,
hence the need to reduce the exposure to them in the first period7. The implication of this
model is that a bank increases its knowledge of the entrepreneur over time. The model is
therefore dynamic to the extent that as knowledge increases, credit constraints can decrease.
The model describes the transition from asymmetric information to full-information as the
borrower status becomes known. The former case is synonymous with a regime of credit
constraints and the latter with a more efficient allocation of credit.
The Petersen and Rajan (1995) model, from here on referred to as the P-R model, exhibits
some characteristics of a 'transitional' rationing model in the sense that it suggests
spreading finance over two periods. However, the distinguishing feature of the
P-R model is that it focuses on the affect of relationship and the degree of competition in the
loan market on credit availability and interest rates. Not only does it focus on the effects of
banking competition on the market for loans, (the Besanko and Thakor (1987b) model also
does the same in its separate analysis for a monopolistic and perfectly competitive bank),
but it divides lending into two periods, in a way reminiscent of the J-R model. Therefore,
investment in a firm is staggered over two periods where investment in each period is
conditioned on the outcome of the previous period. It follows that the P-R model is more
explicitly a multi-period model than the J-R model8.
The outcome of the P-R model is that as the bank's market power increases, so also does the
probability that lower-quality, higher-risk entrepreneurs will receive finance. Therefore the
6 An assumption of the J-R model, as with many other models in the financial literature, is that the
bank's supply of funds from deposits is perfectly elastic and that the market for finance is purely
competitive.
7 For example, in data that I obtained from a UK retail bank, all first-period loans, without exception,
are assigned a risk level 'high-risk'.
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implication for credit constraints, is that the monopoly power by banks should increase the
availability of credit and reduce credit constraints.
This finding also has implications for bank-business relationships. A certain degree of bank
market power and indirectly business-bank relationships is viewed favourably by P-R who
argue that;
'...credit market competition imposes constraints on the ability of the firm and creditor to
intertemporally share surplus. This makes lending relationships less valuable to a firm
because it cannot expect to get help when most in need'9.
Bank-business relationships provide the theme for an important empirical paper by Petersen
and Rajan (1994). If bank monopoly power reduces credit constraints and close
entrepreneur-bank ties are positively correlated with monopoly power, it follows that
businesses cultivating strong relationships should be less likely to be credit constrained. The
authors Petersen and Rajan (1994), confirm this hypothesis regarding the positive effect of
monopoly power on credit constraints. They find that the main advantage of fostering close
ties with a main lender is to increase the availability, rather than the price of lending.
'Equilibrium' credit rationing models
One of the most frequently cited papers in the credit contracting literature, is the path
breaking paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), from here on referred to as the S-W model.
This follows chronologically on the J-R model described above. This paper belongs to the
set of 'equilibrium' credit rationing papers described earlier.
The basis of the S-W model is that the te
rms of the credit contract (interest rate and collateral) influence the subsequent behaviour of
the borrower. If the interest rate or collateral conditions exceed a certain threshold level,
higher risk borrowers, (those with greater dispersion of their mean returns from investing in
the project), will not be discouraged by the relatively higher cost of capital, while lower risk
borrowers will not undertake their projects. What the bank would have gained directly
through higher interest rates, it can lose through the indirect consequence of good borrowers
dropping out of the borrower group. Eventually, the latter loss can outweigh the former gain
to the extent that the bank earns negative returns on a portfolio of borrowers if the interest
8 The J-R model does not dwell on the implications of staggering lending over two periods other than
to use the two-period format to justify why good borrowers would bide their time until the second
period when the bank makes good any shortfall in first period finance.
9
P.408. Petersen and Rajan (1995)
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rate is too high. The outcome of credit constraints is to induce changes in the overall
portfolio risk of the pool of borrowers (adverse selection) or induce individual borrowers to
undertake higher risk projects in order to recoup their investment (moral hazard).
According to the S-W model therefore, rationing of the type outlined in the J-R model
would be counter-productive. I will now explain where this disagreement between the
models arises. The J-R model postulates that a bank can allocate sub-optimal funding in the
first period of borrowing in order to let the reputation of the borrower develop. However the
J-R model does not assume, unlike the S-W model, that this action of the bank raises the
probability that the applicants will default. Therefore, the bank inadvertently raises the risk
level of its portfolio of first-term business borrowers because it has financed them in a sub-
optimal way (Berger and Udell, 1995).
The implication of the S-W model is that 'transitional' credit rationing, of the kind
described by the J-R model, cannot work because it raises the risk profile of the applicants.
Therefore, by using the amount loaned as a choice variable as 'transitional credit rationing'
theories suggest, the bank is decreasing the probability of the good project outcome
occurring. Rationing the amount borrowed would have counter productive effects.
Bester's (1985) model is another 'equilibrium' rationing model. It differs most from the
three that have gone before in that while the J-R, S-W and P-R models consider interest rates
only in the context of credit rationing, Bester's model also considers collateral as an
additional risk instrument. In so doing it sets a precedent for including collateral that is also
reflected in the paper which succeeds it by Besanko and Thakor (1987b).
Like the S-W, J-R and P-R models, bankers cannot gauge the risk type of the borrower ex
ante. In other words, a regime of asymmetric information obtains for the bank/business
borrowing relationship.
The main point of Bester's model, is that a bank can create two contracts which are offered
to borrowers of both types. High-risk borrowers will select the contract which offers high
interest rates in return for low collateral, while low risk borrowers will signal their
creditworthiness by accepting the contract comprising high collateral in return for low
interest rates. Borrowers will make their risk type known through their choice of contract.
The concept of credit rationing is central to Bester's model, because we shall see later on
that no rationing would exist if a bank can set the terms of the loans in such a way that
borrowers can self-select themselves. Therefore, high-risk borrowers who have been denied
credit and who enter the pool of low-risk borrowers, will not accept the contract offered to
all borrowers in this pool. The bank will have tailored the loan terms according to the risk
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preferences of the low risk borrowers and therefore only the low risk borrowers will accept
the loan contract on these terms. The high-risk borrowers have no choice but to accept the
high-risk contract, since they are not tempted to accept the contract that the low risk
borrowers find acceptable.
Bester's model represents a departure from the other models because it introduces the idea
of self-selection. This model has more flexibility than the models presented by S-W and J-R
because it assumes that interest rates and collateral can be set simultaneously. The operation
of interest rates in conjunction with collateral, allows the bank to supply sets of interest rate
and collateral pairings. These mutually exclusive pairings allow the borrowers to self-select
into high and low risk pools. Thus high-risk borrowers favour higher interest rates and lower
collateral pairings than their low risk counterparts.
Bester points out that as long as borrowers are not constrained by their initial wealth (access
to collateral), no credit rationing should take place.
In summarising, the most important contribution of Bester's model is the inclusion of
collateral as a risk instrument, and its indication that high and low risk borrowers have
mutually exclusive risk preferences allowing them to self-select. Finally, he is the first
contributor to acknowledge that wealth constraints could play a role in credit rationing.
We now move on to describe the 'equilibrium' rationing models of Besanko and Thakor
(1987a and 1987b), from here on referred to as the B-T model. Other variations of this basic
model are outlined in Boot and Thakor (1994).
The B-T model is very important because it provides the cornerstone for much of the current
approach to signalling theories. It leads on directly from Bester's model because, while
Bester hinted that binding wealth constraints could cause the process of self-selection to
break down, the B-T model directly addresses the issue of binding wealth constraints. B-T
argue that binding collateral constraints prevent banks from enticing high and low risk
borrowers to self-select into appropriate collateral/interest rate pairings. In this case,
rationing credit becomes a useful means of achieving more efficient self-selection, mainly
by deterring high-risk borrowers from favouring the collateral/interest rate pairing which the
bank intend for low risk borrowers.
Credit rationing is a component of this theory, in so far as it is used to dissuade certain
borrowers from applying for a contract they would otherwise find appealing. Credit
rationing is therefore used as an additional risk instrument, in addition to collateral and
interest rates.
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The main outcome of the B-T model, which is relevant to credit rationing, is that under
asymmetric information with borrower wealth constraints, low risk borrowers will have their
loans rationed. By being rationed, the B-T model implies that low risk borrowers will have
their loans given out on a lottery basis. Unlike Bester's (1985) model, described earlier,
screening is not fully efficient and therefore credit rationing is an unwanted by-product of
efforts to separate high from low risk borrowers.
A model for illusory credit constraints
De Meza and Southey's (1996) model, from here on referred to as the DM-S model, is
unlike any of the models that have gone before because it does not deal with credit rationing
in the traditional sense. Rather it depicts credit constraints as illusory. It draws on the field
of psychology to predict what type of entrepreneur is more likely to successfully obtain
credit and how his risk profile compares with the type of entrepreneur who is typically
turned down for credit. This model has paved the way for articles such as that by Manove
and Padilla (1999).
The unique aspect of the DM-S model that we have not seen in any of the models presented
so far, is that an entrepreneur's rather than a bank's actions are instrumental in the decision
to allocate credit. So far all models have assumed that the bank unilaterally decides to
allocate a certain credit amount (J-R model), set interest rates (S-W model) or set the terms
in order that the borrowers self-select (Bester's model and the B-T model). However, no
models have focused on the demand side and considered how the entrepreneur can be
instrumental in obtaining a loan.
The DM-S model reverses the accepted theory of information. Prior to the appearance of the
DM-S model, the concept that the business start-up knows more about his financial
prospects than his bank, was regarded as a stylised fact. DM-S argue that the bank rather
than the business start-up knows more about the prospects of the business. This is because
the bank has the benefit of its collective lending experience and also has a whole portfolio of
similar loans with which to extrapolate the risk of the business. As opposed to this, the
entrepreneur has only his own individual experience to draw on and at the start-up stage this
body of experience is negligible. Not only this, but DM-S argue that only the least
conservative of individuals choose to become entrepreneurs. The implication of this
argument is that entrepreneurs are, by definition, high-risk individuals who are drawn into
business by the prospects of high returns. Because entrepreneurs are over-confident about
their success probability, their estimate of their own success probability is biased. Therefore,
Theoretical literature of small business finance Chapter Two Page 26
only the bank has an objective and comparatively accurate measure of the expected return
on a business project.
The DM-S model argues that credit rationing is a relative concept. What entrepreneurs
perceive as credit rationing, is only the bank's legitimate response to their high-risk.
The conclusion of the DM-S model is that the optimism model explains the unwillingness of
entrepreneurs to take out bank loans, better than the conventional moral hazard or adverse
selection models.
The way an optimism model explains the situation is as follows. Because a bank cannot
ascertain the individual borrower's creditworthiness, although it knows the default rate of
the population of borrowers, the bank formulates interest rates, collateral amounts and loan
amounts in such a way as to compensate itself for its uncertainty i.e. it pools the terms that it
offers to the low and high-risk borrowers. Due to the buoyant spirits of would-be
entrepreneurs, their over-confidence in their own ability and in their expected project
returns, ensures that the demand for loans exceeds the supply of loans. DM-S argue that the
average project could be a loss maker. This ensures that able pessimists are crowded out of
the market for finance since they would regard the terms offered by the bank as 'actuarially
unfair for their own characteristics'10. While standard models conclude that the bank lends
too little, the optimism model concludes that the bank is justified in the magnitude of its
lending. The authors argue that banks are entirely justified for being conservative in the
amount they lend to start-ups because their evaluation of projects and risk is more realistic
in general than the evaluation of the projects by many of the entrepreneurs themselves".
'Switching' models of rationing
The Evans and Jovanovic (1989), from here on referred to as the E-J model, represents the
first 'switching' model that shows the factors motivating entrepreneurs to switch from wage
to self-employment. In so doing, it sheds light on whether the entrepreneur is rationed or
not.
The core argument of the E-J model is that if a lower collateral/loan amount ratio were
introduced by the bank or if the entrepreneur had higher initial wealth, if credit rationing
exists, then these two phenomena would induce more entrepreneurs to switch from waged to
self employment.
10
P. 385. 'The borrower's curse; optimism, finance and entrepreneurship'.
11
Unfortunately, the DM-S model does not define the proportion of the entrepreneurial population that
it characterised by optimism but they set it at 50 percent in the model.
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An additional argument of the E-J model is that if better quality entrepreneurs demand more
capital at a given level of assets and banks lend in proportion to assets, then better quality
entrepreneurs will perceive themselves to be more credit constrained than lower quality
entrepreneurs. The more able entrepreneurs will find that their expected profits are lower
than they would hope for if they are given the same level of finance as less able
entrepreneurs. They do not find that the profits they expect to earn from self-employment
adequately compensate them for, i.e. are equal to the opportunity cost of switching from
wage-employment.
The main assumption of the E-J model is that entrepreneurs with higher skills levels expect
to receive comparatively more finance than their lower skilled counterparts in order to cover
their higher opportunity cost of making the switch to self-employment.
This argument of the E-J model that higher quality entrepreneurs perceive themselves to be
more constrained vis a viz. their lower quality counterparts, directly contradicts the
conclusion of the D-MS model that lower quality entrepreneurs feel themselves to be more
constrained12.
An advantage of the E-J model compared to other models, is that it is relatively easy to test
for the presence of credit constraints using its framework. The hypothesis that empiricists
testing for the existence of credit constraints should test, is whether there is a correlation
between assets and the level of start-ups. If an entrepreneur can borrow all he wants for a
fully capitalised business, there will be no relationship between assets and start-ups because
entrepreneurs are not limited by the initial wealth i.e. irrespective of the level of their start¬
up assets, high quality entrepreneurs receive adequate funding for their project.
There is a further test for the existence of credit constraints using the E-J model criteria that
was carried out by Cressy (1996c). Assets should be positively correlated with survival if
start-ups are credit rationed. The rationale for this test is based on the predicted correlation
between assets and the likelihood of obtaining the optimal level of finance requested, if
credit rationing operates. The corollary to this is that under-funded, higher quality firms are
less likely to survive if a bank fails to supply them with the amount of finance they need to
realise their business project13.
12
You will recall the arguments of the DM-S model presented above that more confident, higher-risk
entrepreneurs request higher levels of finance than less their pessimistic, lower-risk counterparts.
13
Cressy (1996) found that higher quality firms, in terms of human capital, were more likely to survive
and that these high quality firms were also more likely to receive finance. The bank could therefore
'pick winners'. Therefore, Cressy concludes that E-J rationing does not exist because a bank is able to
differentiate between high and low quality firms. Where human capital variables enter his regressions,
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2.4 The mathematical context of the credit constraints models
The sections below provide the mathematical detail of the models presented in the previous
section.
2.41 The Jaffee and Russell (1976) model
Jaffee and Russell describe all borrowers as being either 'honest' or 'dishonest'. The bank
cannot differentiate between the two categories ex ante.
The J-R model describes two periods. A loan, L, is taken out in the first period to
supplement first period consumption Ct. Income, Y, is generated both in the first period, Yh
as well as the second period Y2. Consumption in the second period, C2, is reduced by the
amount of the loan repayment. This loan repayment amounts to the loan principle L
multiplied by the interest rate factor R representing (1 + r) where r is the interest rate.
C,^L + Y, 41.1
C2=Y2-LR 41.2
Where C/, C2 = first period and second period consumption
L = the amount of the loan
Yh Y2 = first and second period income
The entrepreneur aims to maximise utility. Utility, in turn, depends positively on
consumption in the first and second period. Therefore total utility, U, is a function of
consumption over both periods, C/ and C2, and can be expressed as U - U(Ci, C2). Utility
should also always be positive. Intuitively, we know that individuals prefer higher to lower
and positive to negative utility. Therefore, the J-R model also postulates that utility in both
periods is positive with respect to consumption in both periods;
dU/dC, > 0, dU/dC2 > 0 41.3
Maximising utility U[L + Yh Y2- LR] with respect to L gives;
— =U,-UiR = 0 41.4
dL
leading to a loan demand function of the form
L* = L*[ft] 41.5
Assuming that dL*/clR is negative, the J-R model shows that higher values of L, (higher
loans), are associated with lower values of R (cost per unit of servicing the loan is lower).
they cancel out any relationship between asset levels and survival. High quality firms are more likely
to survive and they are also more likely to have higher levels of initial wealth.
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If default occurs, the penalty arising from default, measured by a constant Z, is subtracted
from income in the second period Y2. The penalty of default is the reduction in the earnings
capabilities of entrepreneurs as their lack of creditworthiness becoming known. It is
assumed that the penalty arises in the third period, although this is not explicitly stated.
Default is only disadvantageous for the borrower (lowers borrower utility), if the cost of
default, (forfeiture of future lending and loss of reputation), is higher than the value of loan
repayments outstanding. If the cost to the borrower of repaying the loan is lower than the
benefit to be gained from defaulting, a rational dishonest borrower will pay what it owes to
the bank.
Dishonest borrowers therefore, make a decision as to whether they can increase their utility
by defaulting or not. This decision is influenced by the size of the loan, where larger loans
increase the temptation to default because they increase the borrower's utility from
defaulting. A borrower adopting an honest strategy has consumption in the first and second
period of;
C, = Y, + L* 41.6
C2 = Y2-L*R 41.7
By following a dishonest strategy consumption in both periods is expressed as;
C, = Y, + L* 41.8
C2 = Y2-Z 41.9
where Z denotes the penalty arising from default. The two courses of action only differ in
the level of consumption for the second period C2, and dishonest entrepreneurs default when
Z < L*R. In other words, dishonest entrepreneurs default when the penalty of default is less
than the value of the loan repayments.
The J-R model postulates that honest borrowers would prefer a first period contract which
extends them less credit than they demand, in return for these long term gains. The model
can be explained graphically as in Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.1 the x-axis is labelled L to
represent the magnitude of borrowing undertaken by the firms and the y-axis labelled R, to
denote the corresponding interest rate factor. I denotes the level of the interest rate factor
below which it is uneconomical for the bank to lend. The bank has to cover its own cost of
borrowing. The indifference curves, / and II, (not to be confused with I// and Uu,
representing first and second period utility discussed above), show an ordering of utilities
where the utility over the curve I is less than the utility over the curve II.
The point S represents the intersection of the supply schedule and the demand schedule for
loans. However, the equilibrium point E lies on a higher utility curve, despite rationing
Theoretical literature of small business finance Chapter Two Page 30
occurring at this point (quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied at this point as the
demand curve lies to the right of E). According to Jaffee and Russell, the reason an honest
borrower would prefer to be rationed is as follows;
'Borrowers who are honest at contract S prefer the equilibrium with rationing at contract E.
The advantage of rationing is that fewer individuals default at the smaller loan size, and
under competition these gains are passed on to the honest borrowers'14.
The most important conclusion of the J-R model is that honest borrowers prefer to receive
less borrowing than they demand from the bank i.e. have the amount they requested on their
loan rationed, in return for a lower interest rate and some future payoff. This future payoff
arises because fewer borrowers will default on their loan if they have to repay less. Under
perfect competition the bank will pass on these future gains to the borrowers.
2.42 The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model
We have already seen that according to the J-R model, lending by the bank is staggered over
two periods. In the first period, the borrowers are sub-optimally financed and only in the
second period does the bank make good the shortfall. This theory is directly contrary to the
predictions of the Stiglitz (S-W) paper that I will discuss in this section.
The S-W paper has many dimensions. However, the one of most relevance to my current
analysis is the section dealing with credit rationing.
S-W assume that there is a mix of high and low risk projects in the population of borrowers,
all of which yield the same average return. However, the low risk borrowers have a lower
spread around their mean return.
Risk is denoted by 9, where a higher value for 9 denotes a higher risk. If an entrepreneur
cannot repay the full amount of borrowing plus interest, L(1 + r hat) from the returns, Y, on
his project, he stands to lose the value of his collateral C and any returns he has made. The
net return to the entrepreneur tc, is a function of the interest rate r hat and the returns Y he
makes from his project, where r hat denotes the interest rate charged to an individual
borrower.
The net return to the entrepreneur can be expressed in terms of two scenarios. In the first
scenario the entrepreneur earns a sufficiently high return, Y, to cover the cost of servicing
his debt. In the second scenario, he forfeits his collateral, C, because he has not generated a
sufficiently high return. The net return to the entrepreneur, n, can be written as;
14 P.661. Jaffee and Russell, 1976. 'Imperfect information, uncertainty and credit rationing'.
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A A
7zf Y, r ) = max(Y - (1 + r) L, - C) 42.1
The net return to the bank, p, is modelled likewise by two scenarios. Either the entrepreneur
does not generate enough funds on his project to repay his loan. In this case, the bank takes
the proceeds from the project, Y, and it also seizes any collateral, C, that the entrepreneur
commits to the bank. Alternatively, if the entrepreneur does not default on his loan and
hence earns enough of an income to repay his loan, the bank earns its normal return on the
money it loaned to the business in which case it gets L(l+ r hat).
S-W argue that net bank profits, p, increase to a certain threshold interest rate level, rIt but
that after this threshold is reached, the low risk borrowers drop out. Successive increases in
the interest rate, r hat, after rt% increase net bank profits p. This increase in p continues until
the positive effect of the interest rate hike, is neutralised by rising default levels, where
default rises as a result of increases in the level of risk associated with projects remaining in
the portfolio.
Figure 2.2 illustrates this relationship between interest levels and the level of profits earned
by the bank. In Figure 2.2 net profits to the bank, p, are associated with changes in the
interest rate, r hat. The returns curve is like a jagged line with two discontinuities. The first
discontinuity occurs at rl up to which both high and low risk firms apply for credit. The
returns curve plunges on interest rates reaching rh where the low risk firms drop out. The
curve rises more gradually after r, before plunging again at r2, when returns become zero as
rising default rates cancel out any returns that the bank generates from higher interest rates.
The S-W model deals directly with the issue of credit rationing. Their chain of reasoning is
as follows. Because adverse selection happens if the bank charges the equilibrium, (market
clearing), interest rate where only high-risk firms are left in the bank's portfolio, it makes
sense for the bank to charge an interest rate below the equilibrium interest rate. At this non-
market clearing interest rate, the demand for loans exceeds the supply of loans. However,
the bank is not prepared to raise the interest rate in order to clear the market. It earns higher
profits at this non-market clearing interest rate, simply because the low risk firms have
remained in the bank's portfolio. The low risk firms would be driven away if the bank raised
this non-market clearing interest rate. The result of raising the interest rate would be that the
bank's portfolio would contain a more homogeneous set of high-risk firms and low risk
firms would be deterred from applying. This comparatively high proportion of high-risk
firms in the bank's portfolio relative to low risk firms at the equilibrium interest rate, would
p(Y, r ) = min(Y + C, L(l+ r)) 42J
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undermine the bank's profits. The bank therefore chooses to charge a lower interest rate and
allocate credit on a randomised basis (if it cannot differentiate between the high and low risk
firms a priori).
It is worth mentioning here that S-W do not advocate the type of credit rationing, i.e.
staggered financing, proposed by J-R because they maintain that projects are 'not
divisible,15. The expression 'not-divisible', implies that if the entrepreneur does not get the
level of funding that he requests, that the project will not be undertaken at all. In other
words, partial financing of projects of the kind suggested by J-R cannot exist, according to
the assumptions of the S-W model.
Figure 2.3 shows the non-monotonic relationship between the interest rate that is charged to
borrowers and the expected return to the bank per £1 loaned, p bar. The interest rate, r hat,
is related to loan amount supplied, Ls, and simultaneously, in the bottom half of the graph, to
net bank returns, p bar. In the top half of the graph, it is seen that the supply of loans Ls
increases and then decreases, due to the adverse selection effects described earlier. As the
interest rate rises, lower risk firms drop out of the portfolio, causing reductions in overall
bank profits. The bank's supply function peaks at r* because at interest rates above r*,
diminishing returns to profits p bar set in. Accordingly, the maximum point on the supply
schedule corresponds to an interest rate of r* and the maximum level of net profits. After the
amount of finance, Ls, that the bank in prepared to supply peaks at the interest rate of r*, the
function becomes negative. The supply schedule Ls becomes negative after this point as the
bank is forced to impose tougher rationing procedures in order to deter high-risk borrowers
from applying at these higher interest rates.
There is excess demand at r* (LD exceeds Ls) and the market is not cleared. However, the
bank is quite happy to charge the non-market clearing interest rate, r* where its net profits,
pbar, are maximised. On the other hand, if the equilibrium rate of interest rm were charged
(Ld equals Ls), the bank's return pbar would not be maximised.
According to the S-W model, it makes sense for a bank to ration credit by denying some
borrowers finance under perfect information. Under imperfect information, the
characteristics of low and high-risk borrowers appear the same to the bank. Therefore the
bank cannot introduce effective screening procedures in order to differentiate between high
and low risk borrowers.
Now that the S-W model has been described, I now turn to the main implications of the
model and compare it with the J-R model described earlier.
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According to Stiglitz and Weiss, if the bank decides to lend less funds than a firm needs for
its project to succeed, the bank causes its portfolio to become riskier. Under-capitalised
firms have a higher likelihood of failing than firms that have been sufficiently capitalised.
This is why they reason that it is better to decline some projects and optimally finance the
remainder, rather than ration the amount of individual loans. The S-W model therefore
disagrees with the J-R model in this respect.
'Ifprojects either succeed orfail, and yield a zero return when they fail, then the increase in
the collateral requirement of loans will increase the riskiness of those loans'16.
A similar situation would arise if potential borrowers had different ab initio asset or wealth
levels. Borrowers with higher asset levels would not be as discouraged by the heightened
collateral requirements, as borrowers with lower asset levels. These borrowers might be less
risk adverse than borrowers who had fewer assets. In other words, the incentive effects
brought about by higher collateral requirements would be commensurate with the level of
initial wealth, W, of the firms. Those wealthier firms might be less risk adverse than
businesses having fewer assets. The bank rather than decreasing the risk of its portfolio,
would inadvertently increase the risk on its portfolio through the adverse selection of
borrowers17.
2.43 The Bester (1985) model
Bester presents two scenarios. In the first scenario the cost of providing collateral is zero. In
the second scenario the cost of providing collateral is greater than zero.
Bester's assumptions are similar to those of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The expected returns
of the riskier borrower b are the same as those of the less risky borrower a, where Ya denotes
the income of a low risk borrower and Yb denotes the income of a high-risk borrower.
E{YJ = E{Yb} 43.1
The expected value of the income generated by high-risk borrowers, E{Yb}, is the same as
the expected value of the income generated by low risk borrowers, E{Ya}. However, not
only is the income of the high-risk borrower, Yb, more uncertain by definition (greater
dispersion around the expected value) but overall, high-risk projects yield a higher return on
investment. This higher overall yield of the high-risk project would be seen if the equality
43.1 above were integrated. The difference between the high and low-risk project would still
15 P.396. 'Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information'
16 P.402 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
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have a positive value. In other words, imagine two distributions representing high- and low-
risk borrowers. The area under the curve describing the distribution of returns F, (Y)
(integrating the returns function) for the risky borrower, Fb ( Y), is greater than the area
under the returns curve for the less risky borrower, Fa( Y).
P [Fb(Y)-Fa(Y)J dY>0 43J
Jo
Entrepreneurs are compelled to borrow from a bank because their initial wealth endowment
W is not sufficient to finance their investment I. Therefore, W < I. They finance their project
by borrowing the amount L = I - W.
As described in section 2.2, the loan contract is described by an interest rate r. Bester's
model also includes collateral, C, in his model framework. As in the S-W model, bankruptcy
occurs if the returns to the business R and the value of the collateral C are not sufficient to
cover the cost of servicing the debt. In other words, bankruptcy occurs when C + Y < (1 + r)
L.
The expected profits to the entrepreneur by undertaking a credit contract Tt are similar to
those in the S-W model. The only difference between the two models at this stage is that
Bester assumes that there may be a cost to the firm of using collateral. This cost is assumed
to be proportional to the amount of collateral by a constant k.
The expected profits to the entrepreneur of taking up a loan contract /rare;
E(nf = E {max[Y - (1 + r) L-kC, -(l+k)CJ} 43.3
where in the first instance he manages to generate sufficient returns to repay his borrowing
and the interest on his borrowing in addition to the cost of using collateral kC. In the second
instance, he loses his collateral and incurs the cost of using it (1 +k) C.
On the other hand, the bank receives its expected rate of return consisting of (1 + r) L if the
business generates a return. Alternatively, the bank receives Y + C, indicating the
repossession of collateral and the retention of any returns, Y, generated by the business, if
the business is unable to repay its borrowing. The expected returns to the bank are written as
follows;
E (nf = E {min[(1 + r) E, Y + C]} 43.4
The main cornerstone of the Bester paper, is that the bank can devise a set of contracts such
that high and low risk borrowers will prefer one risk instrument (collateral or interest rates)
over the other. The marginal rate of substitution between collateral and the interest rate for
one group of borrowers will be different from the marginal rate of substitution for the other
17
Wette (1983) went on to prove that adverse selection does indeed take place if the bank increases its
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group. Therefore the two groups will choose contracts with different combinations of
collateral and interest rate. Bester defines a pair of loan contracts (na, 7lp) as being incentive
compatible if;
Ea (na) > Eb (np);Eb (np) > Eb(na) 43.5
In other words, the expected profits accruing to borrower a, Ea, from undertaking contract
are greater than the profits it would expect from undertaking contract £p and vice versa. The
bank then has to devise two sets of mutually exclusive contracts, allowing it to establish the
risk type of the business by its choice of contract. Through self-selection by entrepreneurs
for a particular contract, they reveal their risk category.
Figure 2.4 shows why these two types of entrepreneur exhibit different collateral/interest
rate preferences. These collateral/interest rate preferences are described by two different
boundary areas aa' and bb' for each borrower type for all projects offering positive net
profits. These boundary areas show where the two different types of collateral/interest
pairing contracts are located. In area II collateral, C, is less than the repayments on the
project (1 + r ) L. There is an incentive for risk-takers in area II to gamble on high-risk
projects because the collateral they would forfeit is less than the repayments they would
avoid by defaulting. Low-risk investors of type a will drop out of the market in area II. In
area I, all low-risk a investors demand a loan.
In agreement with the predictions of the S-W model, raising the interest rate is only going to
cause the mix of borrowers to become more risky, as type a borrowers drop out. In area II
only type b borrowers apply for finance. Adverse selection of the type described by S-W
occurs in area II. Since b borrowers yield lower expected net profits to the bank, a situation
where all b type borrowers were to apply for finance would be unacceptable to the bank.
There would be no adverse selection if a bank offered contracts only along the C = (1 + r)L
schedule. Along this line interest rate hikes are always accompanied by a simultaneous rise
in collateral requirements in such a way that the bank is covered against borrower default
because the value of the collateral taken is equal to the value of the loan plus interest
payments.
This is where Bester refers to credit rationing. He argues that an entrepreneur's project is
worth undertaking, from the entrepreneur's perspective, if the projects generates a high
enough expected return, £,{n), to cover the opportunity cost of using those assets W (which
he could offer as collateral on a loan). The opportunity cost of using his wealth W is
collateral requirements.
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interpreted as the return he could earn by liquidating them and depositing them at the safe
rate of interest i*. Bester argues that;
'Credit rationing is said to occur if some entrepreneur i faces a positive probability ofbeing
rejected at each contract it,* which maximises his expected profits and at the same time
Ejit) > (1 + i*)W18'.
In other words, if there is a positive expected return for the project over and above the
opportunity cost of the project, (1 + i*)W, and still the entrepreneur is turned down, then he
is credit rationed. If collateral is costless and the entrepreneur had limitless collateral, then
the bank could extend the entrepreneur a loan along the line C - (1 + )L. With costless
collateral all projects would be fully funded and undertaken. They would lie along the line
where collateral equalled the full loan value. However where C < (1 + r)L, the bank would
ration credit and therefore an entrepreneur would face a non-zero probability of having his
loan application turned down.
A further conclusion from Bester's model, that reflects the S-W concept of adverse
selection, is that high-risk area II entrepreneurs are self-selecting. They are less averse to
higher interest rates because the returns on their projects are higher. It is still worthwhile for
them to undertake their projects even at high interest rates. This is because their projects
exhibit a positive net present value even at high interest rates and exceed the opportunity
cost of undertaking the project. On the other hand, low risk entrepreneurs are less insensitive
towards high interest rates and prefer the low interest rate/ high collateral contract. This is
because they are not so deterred by the prospect of forfeiting their collateral (they are more
certain about the security of their investment and the probability of generating the return)
but high interest rates would greatly undermine the net present value of their projects.
The conclusion of Bester's model is that a bank can perfectly distinguish between high and
low risk borrowers using collateral and interest rate pairings. A bank could ration credit to
high-risk borrowers, if it chose to do so, since these borrowers would automatically prefer
high interest rates in lieu of increased collateral requirements. It would be possible to
perfectly separate the high-risk from low risk borrowers based on their different marginal
substitution rates of collateral for interest rates (indifference curves) at this pooling
equilibrium.
18 P.852 Bester, 1985
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2.44 The Besanko and Thakor (1987b) model
The Besanko and Thakor (1987b) models describe two scenarios. In the first scenario, the
bank is a price setting monopolist. In the second scenario, which is perhaps more realistic,
the bank is operating in a perfectly competitive market.
The key feature distinguishing this model from others, is the assumption it makes about the
returns R made by entrepreneurs on their loans. R is not a choice variable but a fixed
constant. This means, that a borrower does not choose to be a high or low risk borrower
depending on the interest rate regime or collateral requirements. What makes him high-risk,
is his lower probability of attaining the given returns R on a project. His likelihood of
getting a return R on his borrowing is P. Lower risk entrepreneurs have higher likelihoods
Pj of achieving a return of R. This is written as;
0 < P2 < Pi <1 44.1
where P2 is the probability of the higher risk borrower obtaining a return R on his borrowing
and Pi the corresponding probability for a low risk borrower.
Asymmetric information prevails in the market for credit because a borrower knows his
likelihood of obtaining a return R, while the bank cannot distinguish between borrowers
with different success probabilities. All the bank knows is that a fraction y of all
entrepreneurs are high-risk types (P = P2) and that the remainder (1- y) are low risk types (P
- Pi). In other words, the bank knows from past lending experience the proportion of
borrowers in its portfolio that turn out to be bad and the proportion that turn out to be
creditworthy. It just cannot distinguish between individuals ex ante. The B-T model
therefore is similar to the J-R, S-W and Bester models in its interpretation of asymmetric
information.
The other two constants apart from R are the initial wealth, W, of the entrepreneur (which
can be used as collateral C) and b, the percentage payoff if the entrepreneur deposits his
capital in non-risky, interest bearing assets e.g. bonds, b (a rate) is, therefore, the
opportunity cost to the entrepreneur of going into business and undertaking a comparatively
risky project.
The B-T model begins by making predictions for a monopolistic bank. The main prediction
is that no collateral is requested from the borrower. Since a monopolist takes all the surplus
or excess profits accruing to the borrower, and since collateral is not an efficient way of
claiming all these excess profits, collateral is not used as a way of screening borrowers
under monopoly. Therefore, no collateral is used in the credit contract.
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To see how the B-T model comes to this conclusion, consider a credit contract as a set of
three variables that the bank can change to attract entrepreneurs of certain risk types and
discourage others. The bank can change the interest rate factor (1 + r) on the loan which is
assumed to be £1. The bank can also change the collateral level C, and finally, it can change
its probability of granting credit n. Therefore, for entrepreneurs of risk type P t and P2, the
bank must choose the optimal {(1 + r,), C, , tz; } for i 6 {1,2}. The bank must formulate
the credit contract in such a way that the borrower will reveal or tell the truth about his
default probability. Secondly, the bank must choose a contract that yields the bank non-zero
profit levels.
In order to offer the two contracts to the two types of entrepreneurs in such a way that
entrepreneurs of one risk type do not covet the contract offered to the other risk type, the
contracts have to be carefully structured. In this way, the low risk types will prefer the low
risk contract and the high-risk types will prefer the high-risk contract. This self-selecting
mechanism described by the B-T model also operates in the Bester model.
This self-selecting mechanism works in the following way. The probability of granting
credit n2 to a lower risk borrower (P = Pi) is higher than the probability of granting credit n2
to a higher risk borrower (P = P2). In the equations below, the terms extended to a lower risk
borrower (1 + r2), Cj and Jtj are all tailored in such a way as to ensure that lower risk
borrowers will choose this contract. Then, the situation is reversed for the contract offered
to the higher risk borrower. The likelihood of granting credit n2 to a higher risk borrower
(P- P2) is higher and the terms of the contract (1 + r2), C2 and n2 induce higher risk
borrowers to choose this contract.
The decision an entrepreneur has to make when going into business is whether or not to
invest his initial wealth, W, in non-risky, interest bearing assets allowing him to earn W + b.
Alternatively he can use his wealth W as collateral, C, on a loan of £1 earning him a return
with probability P2 for lower risk borrowers and P2 for higher risk borrowers. The borrower
is assumed to know his return likelihood but the bank does not. The decision faced by the
entrepreneur when setting up business is described in the equations below. This is expressed
as entrepreneur's likelihood ^■ of receiving a loan multiplied by the expected yield on the
project (the return minus the cost of the capital P, /R - (1 + r}]. The interest rate the
entrepreneur would have earned on bonds b is subtracted from his project as is the expected
loss to the entrepreneur if he defaults [1 - Pi] C,.
n, {P, [R - (1 + n)J-[1 -P,]CI-b}>n2 {P,[R - (1 + r2) J-[1 - P,]C2 - b } 44.2
n2 {P2 [R - (1 + r2)J- [1 -P2]C2-b }>n,{P2[R-(l + r1)J-[l -P2JC,-b} 44.3
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The prediction of the B-T model for a monopolistic bank is that no collateral is supplied by
the borrower or required by the bank. In other words, C = 0. This outcome holds true both
for the situation where there is full information of the borrower's risk status and under
asymmetric information.
The reason B-T can justify this conclusion, is that collateral is an inefficient way of
providing the monopolistic bank with a tool for fully claiming all the excess profits earned
by the borrower. By keeping interest rates higher for the low risk borrower, the monopolist
is assured that he can extract all of the excess profits earned by the low risk borrower (in the
absence of asymmetric information). If collateral were used, the low risk borrower would be
tempted to offer more collateral in exchange for a reduction in the interest rate since he
knows he has a low likelihood of default and it will be therefore not likely that he will
forfeit his collateral. The monopolist does not want this situation to arise because he wants
to claim all the excess profits earned on the project via the higher interest rate.
In reality, these model predictions for monopoly appear unrealistic. In practice, collateral is
taken on borrower projects and the prediction that a bank does not use collateral seems
difficult to reconcile with the empirical evidence that banks use collateral (Berger and Udell,
1993). Therefore, perhaps the predictions of the B-T model for perfectly competitive lending
markets may be more in tandem with banking practice. Since entrepreneurs do have a choice
of banks, the monopolistic model is possibly unrealistic.
We therefore turn to the B-T model, as applied to the case of a perfectly competitive market
for finance. Similar to the reasoning behind the monopolistic market outlined above, banks
will maximise their net profits
Max yn,{P, [R-(l + rj) ]-[1 -P,]C,-b} +
(1 - y) tz2{&2 [R-(l + r2) J-[1 - P2]C2 - b} 44.4
where yis the fraction of borrowers he bank has known in the past to be low risk and ( 1 - y)
the fraction of borrowers the bank knows have been high risk. Jtj and n2 are the acceptance
probabilities of borrowers for the low- and high-risk contracts respectively.
Unlike the case of a monopoly market were the monopolist bank extracts all the excess
profits of the borrower, the assumption under a competitive market for finance is that the
bank makes profit levels equal to its deposit rate rD. In other words, a zero profit condition
applies.
P,(l + r,) + [1 - PJQ = rD i£ {1,2} 44.5
Finally, the B-T model looks at two initial wealth W scenarios. I choose to describe the
scenario where the level of collateral, C, is constrained by the wealth of the entrepreneur,
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because this is what most likely reflects reality. Entrepreneurs, particularly the owners of
start-ups and small SMEs, are not likely to have large amounts of free, collateralisable assets
to offer a bank. It seems therefore reasonable to confine the discussion to the case where
there are wealth constraints. In any case, the level of collateral demanded C cannot exceed
the wealth W of the entrepreneur;
0<Ci<W, ie {1,2} 44.6
According to the B-T model, under asymmetric information with binding wealth W
constraints, all high-risk borrowers will obtain a loan but low risk borrowers will have their
credits randomly allocated. The latter condition of randomly giving out credit to low risk
borrowers is necessary in order to discourage high-risk borrowers who are paying higher
interest rates, from coveting the contract offered to lower risk borrowers.
This conclusion is very similar to that obtained by Bester (1985), whereby high-risk
borrowers do not provide collateral and are charged higher interest rates than lower risk
borrowers. Additionally, lower risk borrowers are charged collateral. Unlike Bester (1985)
however, the B-T model predicts that there is rationing in equilibrium even with collateral,
because there are limits to which a low risk borrower can signal his creditworthiness using
collateral (binding wealth constraints apply).
The predictions of the B-T model are threefold and relate to the equilibrium interest rate (%,
collateral level, C„ and finally the likelihood of being offered a loan 7^. The predictions for
each borrower type Pj and P2 are as follows. The low risk contract carries a lower interest
rate than the high-risk contract. The lower risk contract implies that borrowers post all their
wealth as collateral. Finally, the low risk contract carries a positive likelihood that
borrowers are turned down because the acceptance probability is less than one.
(1 + r2) = rD /P2, (1 + r,) = [rD- (1 - P2) W] /P2 44.7
where rD is the interest rate on bonds, (1 + r2) the interest factor charged a high-risk
borrower and (1 + r2) the interest factor charged a low-risk borrower.
C2 = 0 C, = W
where C2 is the collateral charged a high risk borrower and C; the collateral charged a low
risk borrower;
n2 = 1
71, = [P2 (R-(l + r2) - bj/ [P2(R - (1 + r,)) -(1- P2)W - b] 44.8
where n2 is the proportion of high-risk loans that are accepted and 71] is the proportion of
low risk loans that are accepted.
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It is important to note that the bank would prefer if low risk borrowers were not rationed.
The only reason they are rationed is that the bank cannot ascertain their risk status ex ante.
As Besanko and Thakor note;
'If the bank can perfectly sort borrowers into distinct risk classes based on observable
differences alone, then there would not be any rationing'19.
In reality, what most likely happens is that banks sort borrowers into coarsely classified
groups based on their observable characteristics in order to reduce the influence of
asymmetric information. The coarsely classified groups contain borrowers of roughly
similar characteristics. In other words, there would be greater within-group or intra-group
homogeneity, than if the borrowers had not been coarsely classified. This minimises the
effect of credit rationing to good borrowers.
2.45 The De Meza and Southey (1996) model
The de Meza and Southey (DM-S) model differentiates itself from others that have gone
before because of its assumption that the entrepreneur's perception of his project returns are
biased and therefore only the bank can objectively evaluate a project's risk.
The expected income earned by a project TE are a function of the perceived probability of
the project's success PP, its actual success probability, P, and the entrepreneur's perceived
income if the project is successful YP. The actual success probability of the project is known
to the bank alone as a consequence of 'long experience and with the benefit of
detachment'20. Therefore, the expected income earned by a project is as follows;
Ye = Pp*P*Yp. 45.1
YP can in turn be rewritten as a perceived rate of return ( 1 + rP) on the capital employed, K ,
in the project. The DM-S model postulates that if only half of the population of
entrepreneurs comprises optimists, in equilibrium only optimists are active and the more
able pessimists will have dropped out of the applicant pool. The model set out to prove this
as follows. DM-S assume that there is not an opportunity cost to entrepreneurship and
therefore no safe rate of return unlike the safe rate of return, b, seen in the B-T model. All
entrepreneurs set out to maximise their expected return but their expected return is biased by
their perception of the success probability, PP, and internal rate of return ( 1 + rP) of the
project.
19 P.678 Besanko and Thakor (1987a)
20 P.378. The borrower's curse: optimism, finance and entrepreneurship'.de Meza and Southey.
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The loan, L, taken out by the business should cover the shortfall in the amount of capital, K,
needed to fund the project after the entrepreneur has invested a portion of his wealth, W,
equivalent to S in the project. Put another way, L-K-S.
The break even condition for the bank is that the probability of receiving the full amount of
the loan, LG, (arising if the project is successful) when added to the probability of receiving
nothing is the project fails, LB, equals the breakeven loan size, L. This is expressed as
follows;
PLg + (1- P)Lb = L 452
From the entrepreneur's point of view, the expected wealth from a project, WE, equals the
perceived income to the entrepreneur following the success of the project, minus his loss if
the project is unsuccessful plus whatever wealth he has left over after investing in the
project.
WE = PPP (YP - Lg) -(]- Pp)Lb -(W-S) 45J
where PP is the subjective probability of the project succeeding, YP the subjective expected
income generated by the project, LG the amount to be repaid to the bank if the project
succeeds, LB the amount to be repaid if the project fails and (W - S) the amount of initial
wealth remaining to the entrepreneur after he has invested an amount, S, in the project. In
order to find the equilibrium level of expected project wealth, DM-S substitute 45.2 into
45J (they also leave out the constants (W - S) in the subsequent equations).
The expected wealth, WE, from the project now becomes;
WE = PPP (YP - Lg) - (1 - PP)[(L - P Lg)/ (1 - P)J 45.4
Differentiating expected wealth with respect to the repayments to the bank in the successful
state gives the following;
SWE/ 8Lg = [P(l - PP)]/ (1 - P) < 0 45.5
An optimist will have a perceived probability of his project succeeding above unity with PP
> 1 because he is unrealistically upwardly biased. Therefore, if optimists operate in the
market, the above expression [ P(1 - PP)J / (1 - P) would have a negative sign and would
consequently be less than zero. Only optimists operate in the market for finance in
equilibrium. They will self-finance as much as possible in order to minimise the amount
they would have to repay, Lc, to the bank in the good state and select the smallest amount of
borrowing possible, representing the shortfall in their capital requirements K-W, and post
all their wealth as collateral.
There are several conclusions of the DM-S model that have implications for credit rationing.
Firstly, the bank places importance on collateral. The entrepreneur because of his biased
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expectations of future wealth WE is keen to over-invest in his project by investing an amount
of capital KH in excess of the necessary capital K*. Individuals with higher initial wealth,
Wh, can borrow enough from the bank to allow them reach the level of desired over¬
investment. However, individuals with initial wealth, W < WH cannot borrow as much from
the bank as they would like and can only invest K* in the project. These individuals with
less initial wealth will perceive themselves as credit constrained. Irrespective of the
willingness of 'undercapitalised entrepreneurs' to pay higher interest rate margins on their
finance, the bank will not respond by increasing the amount loaned. DM-S maintain that
entrepreneurs would be better off if investment were at the lower level K* but they will tend
towards over-investment on the basis of their inflated notions of the income generation
capacity of their projects.
In view of the mistaken tendency of entrepreneurs to be overly sanguine about the expected
profitability of their projects, DM-S argue that banks are correct to limit the flow of funds to
enterprise. The authors argue that far from being credit constrained, entrepreneurs are only
receiving actuarially fair amounts of funding for their projects.
2.46 The Petersen and Rajan (1995) model
The decision tree below best illustrates Petersen and Rajan's (1995) model (Figure 2.5).
There are two types of entrepreneur, good or bad. The projects of bad entrepreneurs are
doomed to fail. However, good entrepreneurs can choose to invest capital K0 in a safe
project yielding income of YIS at the end of the period. He will then be able to invest capital
of Kis on a rollover basis in another safe project yielding income of Y2S at the end of the
second period. Alternatively the entrepreneur could invest the same capital K0 in a risky
project yielding income of YIR at the end of the period with probability P. The downside of
taking this action is that this project could fail and yield zero profits with probability (1 - P).
The P-R model makes the following assumptions. Firstly, that the safe project has a positive
net present value while the risky project has a negative net present value. The net present
value of the safe project is expressed as the income generated by the project minus the
financial inputs into the project. This is expressed as follows;
A further assumption is that the expected value of the returns from undertaking either of the
two projects is the same. This is expressed as follows;
Y2S+ Y1S-(K1S + K0)>0
For the risky project the net present value is expressed as;
P(Y2R + YIR-KIR)-K0<0
46.1
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P(Y2R) - Y2S > P(K,r) - Kjs 46J
The final assumption made is that the entrepreneur needs bank finance to undertake projects
in the second period as the revenue generated in the first period is not enough to finance the
second period project.
Like all the models that have gone before with the exception of the DM-S model, the P-R
model deals with asymmetric information. This means that the entrepreneur knows more
about his probability of succeeding than does the bank although the bank knows the
percentage of entrepreneurs in the past who have failed and succeeded. This percentage of
past creditworthy firms is denoted by 0 and is the quality, risk type or ex ante failure
probability of the firm21.
The basis of the P-R model is that the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur is only revealed
after the initial investment of K0 has been made in either a safe or risky project and the first
period has elapsed. This model is most like the J-R model because it assumes 'transitional
credit rationing' where good firms would prefer take a lower loan in exchange for more
favourable interest rates in the second period. Once good firms know that the bank knows
they are creditworthy at the end of the first period;
'
goodfirms will borrow as little as possible at date 0 so that they can take advantage of the
lower rate at date 1 when the bad entrepreneurs have been exposed'22.
A central component of the P-R model is the measure of market power that they use. This is
the bank's expected rate of return yBANK. It is 1 if the bank maintains a zero interest rate, r,
under perfect competition and hence earns zero profits i.e. yBANK = (1 + r).
P-R assume that an entrepreneur must earn some positive return on the project surplus,
otherwise there would be no point in going into business. Therefore the return from
undertaking the safe project, Y2S/KiS, must be higher than the bank's return yBANK. This is
expressed as follows;
The P-R model draws on the S-W model where it indicates that the bank should not charge
such an interest rate in the first period that would encourage risk taking behaviour by the
firm (moral hazard problem). Otherwise the bank would be forced to ration credit if it could
21 9 is also used in the S-W model. The corresponding notation we used describing 0 in the DM-S
model is P but we cannot use P in the P-R model because P is also used as the probability that a risky
project will fail
22 P.411 Petersen and Rajan (1995)
Kis > Yir > Yis 46.4
Y2S/KIS>YBANK>1 46-5
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not structure its loan terms in such a way that firms self-select and take the low-risk
contract.
The firm only borrows capital Ko at date 0. If the safe project is chosen, then the firm must
borrow KIS - (YIS - L) to fund investment in the second period. KIS - (YjS - L) represents the
shortfall in second period investment, KiS, after the proceeds of the first period, YIS, are
ploughed into the business and L, loan repayments for first period investment, K0, have been
repaid.
The entrepreneur's expected profit from undertaking the safe project represent the income
generated by the second period project, Y2s minus the repayments on the loan used to
finance the second period project KIS - (YIS - L). The interest repayments on this second
period investment guarantee the bank's rate of return yBANK, Therefore, the expected profit to
the firm from undertaking second period investment in the safe project are as follows;
E(7t)SAFE = max [ Y2S - YBANK( K1S -(YIS- L)), 0] 46.6
The returns to the entrepreneur from undertaking the risky project where P is the probability
that the project fails, Y2R denotes second period income generated by the project, KIR
represents capital invested in order to generate second period income and ( KjR - (YIR - L)
represents the amount borrowed from the bank in the second period, is;
E(7l)mKY = max [P{Y2R - Y"ank( Kir - ( YIR - L))}, 0] 46.7
The entrepreneur has an incentive to choose the safe project if the difference in the expected
returns between the safe and risky projects divided by the likelihood of achieving zero return
on the risky project is at least equal to the value of the first period loan repayments, L. This
is expressed as follows;
[Y1S-P(Y1R)]/(1-P)>L 46.8
The bank must structure the loan contract in such a way that the entrepreneur will prefer to
undertake the safe project i.e. the bank uses the above inequality in order to formulate the
terms of the loan. However, there is another constraint that the bank is aware of when
formulating the loan terms. It must also recover its initial investment Ko. The bank will only
lend if it knows that it can earn positive profits when the income generated by second period
finance is recouped. This second period income is denoted by the amount of borrowed
capital needed to fund second period investment, (KIS- Y1S), multiplied by the bank's return
on the investment.
A further consideration is that the bank must also recover its first period loan plus
repayments Ko/0 yBANK.
L > [Ko tO Y*ank J- [ (Y8^ - // ybank) (Kis- Y,s) ] 46.9
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A way of understanding the above inequality is to imagine what would happen if I replaced
the terms with hypothetical values. For example, we would expect lending to become more
lucrative for the bank if it had enough monopoly power to charge high rates of interest on
second period borrowing. Hence the value for yBANK would be high making the first term Ko
Id yBANK lower. Higher values for the bank's expected return, yBANK, make the expression
^ank _ j/ yBANK^ tgn(j t-owarcis unity. The overall effect of high interest rates in second
period finance would be to make the right hand side of the inequality smaller and hence
make lending more lucrative for the bank.
Another way of interpreting the above inequality is to consider what would happen if the
entrepreneur were relatively more dependent on the bank for second period finance. This is
another way of measuring the monopoly power of the bank. If the business is more
dependent on the bank, it borrows considerably more in the second period because the gap
between the income it generated after the first period Yls and the capital it needs to invest in
the second period KIS is larger. Hence the greater disparity between the desired level of
second period investment KIS and the available cash to plough back into second period
investment YIS, the lower the value of the right hand side of the inequality and the more
likely is the bank to finance the firm.
If the entrepreneur's incentive constraint (to choose the safe project) is substituted into the
bank's profit constraint, the result is that only entrepreneurs with credit quality of at least 9
^yBANKj wj]j ggt fmanceci by the bank. The notation for this is as follows;
Q(YBANK) > [Ko(1_ P)]/ [ yBMK ( y^ _ p(yiR) + (YBANK J)(K]s _ y]s)(1 _ p)] 46 ]0
The main conclusion we can draw from the above is that as bank monopoly power increases,
as witnessed in higher values of yBANK, then the right hand side of the expression tends
towards zero. The result is that as bank monopoly power increases, lower quality
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurs with lower values of 6) tend to get financed. The implication
of this result for credit constraints is that the availability of credit and existence of credit
constraints should be decreasing in bank monopoly power.
2.47 The Evans and Jovanovic (1989) model
This 'switching' model is possibly the most elaborate of the models.
The main assumption of the E-J model is that the entrepreneur's demand for a loan, L, is a
function of his ability, 6, where higher skilled entrepreneurs have a higher demand for
finance. If finance, L, is unconstrained ,then the E-J model donates it as L*. This implies that
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the demand function for finance is described by the concave function L*(6) where L is
increasing in 9 (Figure 2.6). Profits, n, are also increasing in ability 9. They are negative at
low levels of ability 9 but cross the x-axis and become positive at higher levels of
entrepreneurial ability. The function 7t* (9) shown by the grey line in Figure 2.6 shows the
profit function when the loan amount, L, is not constrained.
The E-J model depicts the desire of the entrepreneur to switch from wage to self-mployment
as a density function, (p (9), where the area under the function represents the probability, P,
that an entrepreneur will make the switch. This probability depends on the profitability or
survival of his business. It is self-evident that if the business is destined to make losses, then
the entrepreneur will not consider self-employment as a viable option.
Now that I have described the main components of the E-J model; the demand for finance
L*(9), the profitability function, 7t* (9), and the switching function, <p(9). I turn to what
happens when finance is constrained. When finance is constrained, the bank extends only a
portion of the entrepreneur's demand for finance. This portion, b, is greater than zero and
can be either a fraction or integer. The bank lends in proportion to the firm's assets, C. An
entrepreneur with ability 9j will demand finance equivalent to bCj. Entrepreneurs of ability
ft will demand finance equal to bC2, and so on. The E-J model does not state where ft,
corresponding to a demand for finance of bC4, lies. However, we are informed that
entrepreneurs demanding this level of finance and having an ability level, ft, that is
commensurate with a demand for finance of this magnitude, are not constrained. Instead
they switch from wage to self-employment with probability P2 (where the profitability
function, 7t*(ft, intersects the x-axis).
The marginal entrepreneur who earns zero profits, has an ability of ft. The model
hypothesises what would happen if the bank offered this entrepreneur an amount of finance,
bC1, that is less than the finance demanded by this entrepreneur, bC2. In this case, the
entrepreneur is constrained because he cannot earn the level of profits commensurate with
his ability and must satisfy himself with a less than optimal level of finance. His probability
of switching from wage to self-employment decreases from P2 to Pi as a result.
The prediction of the E-J model following from the above is that if assets, C, are found to be
positively correlated with the level of start-ups, then credit constraints exist because what is
being measured is the propensity of the marginal entrepreneur, ft, to enter self-employment.
His probability of switching diminishes if he has a level of collateral, C, that does not permit
him to leverage his optimal level of finance, bC2 (analogous to the imposition of tougher
collateral to loan amount ratios). This credit gap or constraint should be reflected in a
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positive relationship between collateral (or assets) and the likelihood that marginal firms
will make the transition to self-employment.
2.5 Summary of the borrower reputation models
The issue of borrower reputation deserves a separate section because the influence of
borrower reputation on the price or availability of credit is a specific application of the
credit constraints models described above. We have seen in section 2.4 that a lender can
decide to reduce credit to borrowers as a result of information asymmetries. The reverse side
of the coin is that the lender can opt to relax the rules that operate where information about
the borrower is limited or asymmetric in the case where the borrower's credit history is
known. Borrower reputation models show the dichotomy arising when borrowers are treated
differently because the bank knows their creditworthiness. These models therefore
distinguish between first- and second-period borrowers where the bank knows more about
the creditworthiness of second-period borrowers23.
The literature, which predicts the effect that business-bank relationships have on the price of
credit, is divided into two opposing viewpoints. Some of the models predict that in the first
borrowing period, interest rates will be lower than in the second borrowing period
(Greenbaum et al, 1989; Sharpe, 1990). On the other hand, Boot and Thakor (1994) have
developed a model that predicts the completely opposite effect on interest rates whereby a
bank commences lending at a comparatively higher rate than in subsequent periods. We now
explain how these opposing conclusions have been arrived at.
All theorists make assumptions about two main environmental conditions. The first
assumption concerns how competitive the market for finance is. The second assumption
relates to the degree of information asymmetry in the lending market. This second
assumption has to do with how observable the creditworthiness of the borrower is in the first
and subsequent lending periods, respectively. In other words, can other banks observe the
creditworthiness of the borrower after the first bank has completed its initial investment in
the business?
All the models reviewed here assume that private information collected by the bank about
the borrower's creditworthiness cannot be passed on to other lenders in the second period.
Positive gains arising through reduced information-monitoring costs and reduced borrower
default risk accrue to the bank. The bank can either decide to pass these gains on to the
23 Another word for first-period borrowers that I use in Chapter 7, is 'through-the-door' borrowers.
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borrower or not in the second borrowing period, depending on the level of monopoly power
exerted by the bank and correspondingly the level of interbank-competition.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) assume that an environment of private information is
symptomatic of low levels of competition in the lending market. Boot and Thakor (1994),
Sharpe (1990) and Greenbaum et al. (1989) assume that a private information environment
prevails in the loan market in conjunction with high levels of interbank competition.
Diamond (1989) makes no assumption regarding the degree of competition.
I can now summarise the different predictions of the reputation models for interest rate
margins. The Boot and Thakor (1994) and Diamond (1989) models predict that interest rates
in the first period will be higher than interest rates in the second period. In other words, the
B-T and Diamond models predict that interest rates are negatively related to the length of a
business-bank relationship. On the other hand, the models by Greenbaum et al. (1989) and
Sharpe (1990) predict that interest rates are positively related to the length of a business-
bank relationship. In other words, that the interest rate for second-period finance is higher
than the interest rate charged for first-period finance. The Petersen and Rajan (1995) model
(that was also discussed in section 2.4), predicts that the rate charged for second-period
borrowing in a concentrated market is higher than the rate that would be charged for second-
period finance if the market were more competitive.
Each model emphasises a different feature of the lending contract. We first look at the
models that predict higher interest rates in the second period because they have some
similarity in their design.
The basic design of these models is to indicate that interest rates in the first period will be
low to attract new customers because, under competition, a business has a choice from
which bank to borrow. Information about the creditworthiness of the businesses is at a
minimum. Once the business has undertaken to borrow from a particular bank, the bank can
generate 'private information' on the borrower that cannot be observed by other banks. The
business's dependency on the bank therefore increases, thereby allowing the bank to recoup
some of its initial losses from first-period lending, in subsequent periods. The business
cannot escape from monopoly interest rates charged in subsequent lending periods because
it is in a sense 'informationally captured' by its lender (Sharpe, 1990). Even if other banks
wanted to make themselves attractive to 'informationally captured' borrowers, they would
run the risk of adverse selection. If the bank is able to exercise this market power, the market
for lending is inefficient.
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Now we come to what features differentiate the models that predict higher second term
interest rates. Petersen and Rajan deal primarily with bank concentration as a driver of these
inefficiencies. Sharpe focuses on implicit contracts as a way of circumventing the
inefficiencies above. On the other hand, Greenbaum et al. deal among other things, with the
exit costs which would be incurred by a second -period borrower. These costs would offset
the financial gains in the form of reduced interest rates from moving to a competing bank.
The Petersen and Rajan model focuses on market concentration where an absence of
competition between banks permits the bank to skim off the borrower surplus in subsequent
periods and thereby earn monopoly profits. Interest rates in the second period are therefore
higher than interest rates in the first period. The degree of banking concentration is an
exogenous variable which influences the magnitude of second-period interest rates. The
level of bank concentration also influences the extent to which the bank can use its
information monopoly on the borrower to drive up interest rates in the second period. While
other models assume that market concentration is ancillary to, or a by-product of, a lack in
lender competition, Petersen and Rajan highlight it as an important influence in its own
right.
The Petersen and Rajan model fails to allude to the circularity between market concentration
and information monopolies. If banks enjoy information monopolies, this prevents the
borrower from switching to other banks because the original lender exercises a monopoly
over the borrower. If the originally lender additionally enjoys a first-mover advantage over
other lenders in the market for credit, information monopolies will drive other lenders out of
the market and reinforce the level of banking concentration. Information monopolies and
market concentration are self-reinforcing, with the assumption of first mover advantage.
In the Sharpe model, the bank is more proactive in its retention of the customer. Rather then
let market forces decide the fate of the borrower as in the Petersen and Rajan model, the
original lender can attempt to create a contingent contract where second period interest rates
are conditioned on the performance of the borrower in the first period. This incentive
approach employed by the lender in the Sharpe model is analogous to the approach used by
Jaffee and Russell (1976), described in section 2.4. In J-R's model, it is the amount rather
than the interest rate, which in the second period is conditioned on borrower performance.
There is an incentive for the bank not to cheat on the contract. This incentive arises if the net
present value of retaining the customer and charging interest rates in excess of the marginal
cost of finance to the bank, is greater than the short run monopoly profit the bank would
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earn by reneging on its agreement. It would renege on its agreement by not reducing the
interest margin, despite the borrower proving himself to be creditworthy.
Sharpe acknowledges that in reality, contingent contracts are expensive and difficult to
operationalise. In addition, Sharpe argues that the original lender should make use of
implicit contracts (non-binding promises that the borrower will remain with the original
lender if the original lender recognises his loyalty through preferential interest rates).
Although, implicit contracts (ICs) represent a cheaper and less formal alternative to explicit
contracts, it is doubtful that they would reduce market inefficiencies from the current level
of inefficiencies in the absence of implicit contracts. A first-time business borrower would
have less experience evaluating a bank's ex ante honesty than a bank would have evaluating
that of a business. It is unclear how exactly the bank could establish its own reputation
because subsequent borrowers do not necessarily know how the bank treated their
predecessors. The success of ICs in counteracting market inefficiencies would likewise
suffer information asymmetries. The inability of a borrower to rate a lender is most likely
higher than the inability of a lender to evaluate the borrower.
The model by Greenbaum et al. that predicts that interest rates increase in the second
borrowing period, focuses on the exit costs for second period borrowers as being a major
factor in preventing second-period borrowers from reapplying elsewhere. Exit costs in this
model can be interpreted as the search and evaluation costs incurred by a borrower wishing
to switch banks. They argue that the price the lender bank charges on the bank loan is higher
than that charged by the competitors. This monopoly profit arises not just because of the
monopoly power conferred by private information but also due to the cost the borrower
would incur in searching for, and evaluating a loan proposal, from another bank.
The Greenbaum et al. model therefore differentiates itself from the other models by
considering borrower exit costs. However, there is a finite length to a bank borrower
relationship. The longer that a borrower is 'informationally capturedas Sharpe describes
the dependency of the business on the bank, the greater the incentive for the business to cut
itself free from the relationship. Therefore, the longer the relationship between the bank and
borrower, the higher the interest rate and the higher the likelihood that the borrower will
transfer to another bank.
The advantage of the Greenbaum model over the others predicting a positive association
between interest rates and relationship, is its inclusion of borrower exit costs into the model.
At some stage, the marginal benefit to the borrower of exiting the dependent relationship is
greater than the marginal cost of searching out an alternative source of finance. Unlike any
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of the other models, the Greenbaum model therefore sees the relationship as a finite one
with a certain time horizon. The marginal costs of remaining in the relationship increase
over time until it becomes no longer viable for the borrower to continue to pay above
average interest rates.
Finally, we evaluate the theoretical models that infer that there is a negative relationship
between the length of the bank borrower relationship and interest rates. Boot and Thakor
(1994) describe a repeated credit market game where all banks initially charge high interest
rates to first-time borrowers. It is only when the borrower has proved itself and survived
until the second borrowing-period that the lender relaxes the initially higher interest margin
and charges interest rates which are commensurate with the risk type of the business.
What induces the bank to pass on the benefits of lower borrower risk to the borrower in the
form of lower interest rates? The answer lies in the competitive banking environment. If the
bank does not lower interest rates in the second period, then the borrower will be tempted to
leave for a competing bank.
A difficulty with the B-T model arises when the model justifies borrower retention by
competitive forces. The model assumes that a borrower has the option in the second period
to move to another bank. However, the model does not consider that the other bank is not
privy to the private information generated by the original lender. Since the authors assume
private information, they do not indicate how the business can convey its creditworthiness to
the competing bank. For this reason, the B-T model is unrealistic if information generated
by the original bank is not transmitted to other banks following the successful amortisation
of the loan by the borrower. However, if survival and firm age are more important factors
driving the interest rate (external and verifiable attributes of the borrower), then the B-T
model is possibly the best model at describing the influence of the borrower-lender
relationship on interest rates.
The Diamond (1989) model, like the Boot and Thakor model, predicts that interest rates are
lower for second-period borrowers. Diamond assumes a multiperiod framework entailing a
game where it only pays a borrower to develop a reputation once a borrower has survived
the first period of borrowing with high interest rates. A core assumption of Diamond's
model is that a borrower develops a public reputation in the form of a credit rating that can
be accessed by competing banks. However, a difficulty with Diamond's model is that such
public information as that contained in a credit rating is not costless. Diamond does not take
into account therefore, that the original lender is still placed at a price advantage relative to
other banks because it already knows the credit rating of the borrower without having to pay
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a credit bureau for this information. Therefore, costless information about the borrower is
still unavailable to other banks after the first borrowing period and hence a 'private
information' environment still prevails.
To sum up this section on borrower reputation, on balance, the theory is equally divided as
to whether borrowing in the first period will be cheaper for a borrower compared to second-
period borrowing.
2,6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented and described the theoretical literature on bank lending. I
will now summarise the main conclusions we can draw from a review of the literature.
Firstly, rationing exists in several forms. Using the terminology first used by Besanko and
Thakor (1987a), 'transitional' rationing occurs when the amount loaned is staggered over
two periods and the second tranche of finance is extended by the bank when the borrower's
credit status becomes known. Papers suggesting this form of credit rationing are by Jaffee
and Russell (1976) and Petersen and Rajan (1995). 'Equilibrium' credit rationing also
occurs under conditions of asymmetric information but in this case borrowers have their full
borrowing requests turned down. This form of credit rationing is used as a deterrent in order
to dissuade borrowers of a certain risk type from applying for a credit contract not intended
for them by the bank. Papers indicating this type of credit rationing are by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987b).
These two alternative interpretations of credit rationing are mutually exclusive, Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) argue that 'transitional' credit rationing cannot work because if the bank
rations the amount of credit it gives to each individual firm, such under investment
exacerbates the frailty of the firm. 'Transitional' credit rationing is therefore argued to raise
rather than decrease the risk of default by making the firm more vulnerable.
Apart from the 'transitional' and 'equilibrium' models of credit rationing, the De Meza and
Southey model (1996) suggests that credit constraints are illusory and only arise because
entrepreneurs are excessively confident. They predict that low quality, high-risk
entrepreneurs (optimists) demand more finance than high quality, low-risk entrepreneurs
(pessimists). The DM-S paper reverses the information bias in favour of the bank rather than
the firm. Therefore, the type of credit constraints they depict are illusory because they are
due to the subjectivity of the entrepreneur's assessment of the amount of finance he requires
for his project. The 'switching' model by Evans and Jovanovic (1989), contrary to the
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predictions of the DM-S model, predicts that entrepreneurs of higher ability request
comparatively high levels of finance compared to their low ability counterparts.
The second main conclusion relates to the interplay of collateral and interest rates. All post
Stiglitz and Weiss papers recognise the contribution of the S-W model postulating that
because of moral hazard and adverse selection problems, raising interest rate margins is not
an effective way of pricing borrower risk. The S-W paper underpinned the role of collateral
in providing repayment incentives and in inducing borrowers to undertake lower risk
projects. Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987a, 1987b) and Evans and Jovanovic
(1989) include collateral in their model of credit constraints. However, the most recent
papers by de Meza and Southey (1996) and Petersen and Raj an (1995) concentrate on credit
constraints for uncollateralised borrowing.
The final conclusion of this chapter on the theoretical literature of asymmetric information
concerns the predictions of the models dealing with borrower reputation effects. The Boot
and Thakor (1994) and Diamond (1989) models predict that interest rates in the first period
will be higher than interest rates in the second period. On the other hand, the models by
Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990) predict that the interest rate for second-period
finance is higher than the interest rate charged for first-period finance. The Petersen and
Rajan (1995) model predicts that the rate charged for second-period borrowing in a
concentrated market is higher than the rate that would be charged for second-period finance
if the market were more competitive. On balance, the theory is equally divided as to whether
borrowing in the first period will be cheaper for a borrower compared to second-period
borrowing.
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Figure 2.1 J-R model; credit rationing at point E
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Figure 2.3 S-W model; determination of the market equilibrium
Figure 2.4 Bester (1985) model; equilibrium with costless C
c
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Figure 2.5 Petersen and Rajan model scheme
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3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to prepare the background for my subsequent empirical chapter
where I estimate a commercial scorecard predicting the likelihood that a small business
borrower is diagnosed by a bank's credit department to be irredeemably uncreditworthy.
I will explain what credit scoring is and how it is carried out and I also will attempt to
present and elaborate on some of the main issues in scoring commercial businesses that are
relevant to my subsequent research.
I should note a qualification here for readers with a theoretical background. Credit scoring is
a predictive and not a theoretical science. It does not set out to explain why certain variables
(characteristics as they are referred to in credit scoring) are seen to be closely related to the
response variable. This means that the literature of credit scoring does not contain
theoretical economic models nor scientific explanations of why certain phenomena act as
they do.
This term 'credit scoring' comes from the summated rating scale methods that are still
widely used in the industry (Hand, 1997). Credit scoring as a science has been widely
practised since the 1980's. While the practice of scoring large corporations based on a few
accounting indicators is widespread, there is little published work on how small businesses
are scored (Hand, 1997; Crook et al, 1992). However, I should draw a distinction between
the scoring of small businesses and the scoring of large corporations. In the latter case, there
is a vast literature dealing with the prediction of bankruptcy as pioneered by Altman (1977).
However, the aim of my research is not to perform a bankruptcy study. Rather my research
is a study, the first of its kind aiming to derive a credit card predicting severe borrower
default for first-time small business applicants. Rather than using financial ratios to predict
the response variable as bankruptcy studies do, I use the application characteristics of the
borrower, alongside straight accounting information, to predict default as proxied by credit
grade rather than bankruptcy.
A further reason for gaps in the area of research into credit scoring is the high levels of
secrecy observed by individuals who estimate scorecards on behalf of a bank or such
organisation. According to Crook et al (1992) much work is carried out by practitioners
rather than academics and according to Hand (1997) these practitioners observe high levels
of secrecy. The result of these two features of the credit scoring literature is that to date only
a few direct or indirect analyses of small business credit scoring exist (Altman et al. 1994;
Leonard, 1992; Srinivasan and Kim, 1987; Asch, 1995). This is not to say that scorecards
have not been estimated for small businesses. On the contrary, the scoring of small
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businesses is an everyday feature of lending in the highly competitive US market (Mester,
1997; Fair, Isaac and Co, 1999; Hanley, 2000). However, competitive pressures have meant
that little is known about the construction or efficiency of small business scorecards that use
application characteristics rather than a zeta score as the explanatory variables. Asch's study
is typical of the type of practitioner's analysis that is careful not to violate secrecy laws. He
discusses the US small business scorecard that was derived by the Fair Isaac Corporation
using a proprietary database (from Richard Morris Associates) without presenting the
significance levels of any of the variables used in the estimations. He also does not indicate
the default measure used in estimating the small business scorecard, show how it was
derived or how the data used in the estimations was aggregated.
One of the aims of my research is to address this deficiency in published work on small firm
scoring by estimating my own scorecard based on data from a UK small business database.
For the first time in the literature I discuss how the data was aggregated, which application
data was used and how problems such as missing values and low default and estimation
sample frequencies were addressed. I also present the explanatory variables that were found
to be most significantly correlated with default and attempt to explain why they are
important.
In this chapter I introduce the reader to the technique of credit scoring and explain how the
robustness of different scorecards is evaluated. This chapter contains, therefore, a generic
description of credit scoring without assuming how the scorecard is to be applied.
3.2 Background to credit scoring
In the following sub-sections, I will describe the basic principles of credit scoring. I will
highlight what I consider to be the most important aspects of credit scoring, where they
affect my own analysis. The most important issue in my opinion, concerns the evaluation of
how discriminative or good the scorecard is and the different tests that can be performed to
ensure that the scorecard is robust. This will be described at length because the validity of a
scorecard model is not influenced by any theoretical considerations but rather by how well it
discriminates between firms that default and firms that do not default.
3.21 What is credit scoring?
Credit scoring, in its simplest sense, is where a bank lending to a new applicant wants to
know the likelihood that the applicant will repay this new loan that the bank has granted.
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The bank infers its decision to grant the loan based on the correlation between the
probability that a similar loan is repaid and the application characteristics of other, similar
borrowers who have been granted first-time loans. By deriving this relationship between
repayment/default probability and the application characteristics of first-time borrowers,
that bank has an application scorecard. This type of scoring is known as application scoring
because applicant is applying for a first-time loan and the bank has no detailed history of
how the borrower has made repayments on a similar type of loan. Each response on an
application form is assigned a value and the sum of these values for an individual is that
individual's overall score. This value is compared with a threshold or cut-off value in order
that the bank is able to reject or accept the applicant.
On the other hand, the bank can score existing customers by extrapolating how likely these
borrowers are to exhibit default based on their current repayment behaviour (Hand and
Henley, 1997). For example, they may frequently use the full amount of their overdraft
(known as drawing down their full credit limit). If this behaviour is strongly correlated with
subsequent default, the bank will act on this information and contact the borrower to inquire
about his working capital situation. Such scoring is known as behavioural scoring1.
Since my analysis in Chapter 6 aims to derive an application rather than a behavioural
scorecard, the remainder of this discussion concerns itself with application scoring alone.
In reality, the distinction between application and behavioural scoring models is blurred
when combinations of both credit bureau data and application details are used in credit
scoring models. What differentiates the two techniques, is not so much the left-hand side
variables but the predictor variables i.e. the right-hand side variables. The question to ask is
whether the analyst needs the model to select new customers (application scoring) or to rate
existing ones (performance scoring) in order to provide them with a credit extension or to
adjust the terms of their loan.
An application credit scoring model without behavioural data lacks predictive ability and
this is the reason good credit bureau data is useful in constructing scoring models. Chandler
and Johnson (1991) correctly classify a maximum of 50 percent of cases using population
proportions. Using simple credit bureau data the overall prediction rises to approximately 70
percent. Wiginton (1980) reports similar results for a dataset that does not contain any
' An example of performance scoring is seen in the consumer credit analysis by Crook, Hamilton and
Thomas (1992). Here the likelihood of an account turning "At least three cycles delinquent" cycles
delinquent is estimated given that the accounts had already been "One and two but not three cycles
delinquent". Studies using credit bureau data have also a performance component because accounts
are rated based, inter alia, on their past repayment behaviour and credit rating.
Methodology of estimating credit scorecards Chapter Three Page 63
performance data. Wiginton finds that estimating a scorecard based on application data
alone achieves disappointing results. He argues that:
"..data typically obtained from credit applications and used to develop scoring models are
not sufficiently relevant to be of real value in making unaided credit-granting decisions"2.
3.22 Separation of creditworthy from uncreditworthy customers
We now look at the technical side of credit scoring. In Crook, Edelman and Thomas (1992),
the bank wants to establish whether the likely subsequent credit behaviour of the borrower
will be acceptable or unacceptable to the bank. If the likely subsequent borrower behaviour
is deemed acceptable it is classified as a good. The corollary to this is that a borrower is
deemed unacceptable and is classified as a bad.
It follows that if A is the set of all application form data, a credit scorer will want to split A
into two subsets AG and AB such that classifying applicants in AG as good and those in AB as
bad minimises the misclassification error. The misclassification error would arise if
applicants deemed by the bank to be good turned out to be bad (Type I error). Alternatively
misclassification would arise if applicants that were predicted to be bad turned out to be
good (Type II error).
A problem arises here concerning the type of estimation samples typically used in credit
scoring studies. The credit scorer can get a measure of Type I error in my example above
because this represents the percentage of default in the sample of applicants who were
granted loans. However, gaining an estimate of the percentage of applicants that were turned
down who subsequently turned out to be creditworthy is problematic. Therefore, Type II
error is difficult to estimate, although techniques such as reject inference attempt to correct
the model relating to accepted cases to account for this deficiency.
The reject inference issue arises in almost every scoring study. It does not arise when the
scoring model uses data that has not been precensored, as in Wiginton (1980). This
comparison of the predicted performance of logistic regression to discriminant analysis uses
unscreened data. Wiginton makes the point that this precludes sample bias unlike most data
used in scoring models that is already censored. In other words, by having been screened,
weaker firms are underrepresented, a fact which confounds models3.
2 P.758. ibid
J Korobow et al. (1976) provide another example of a scoring experiment, which uses unscreened data.
They monitor the probability that commercial banks exhibit a low enough liquidity level to warrant a
visit by US bank inspectors using logistic regressions. Their r2 value of greater than 0.9 in both periods
perhaps reflects the use of unscreened data but their research question i.e. monitoring existing banks is
not of the type to cause screening problems.
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Thomas (1998) and Cohen and Hammer (1966) suggest various methods that have been used
to attempt to reduce this bias. One method is "augmentation" which involves building a
linear function to discriminate between those that are accepted and rejected. For each score
estimated by the linear function the proportion of those with a certain score who have been
accepted by the bank is weighted proportionally to the inverse of their probability of
acceptance. The weighted sample is then used to estimate the linear function, which
differentiates between the goods and the bads. This weighting procedure assumes that the
probability of an observation being a good, given that it has a certain score, is the same for
accepted as for rejected applicants. In other words, that P (g /x) is the same for both the
accepts as well as the rejects. A full description of augmentation is contained in Banasik et
al. (2001).
In the same paper, Banasik et al. examine the predictive accuracy of a bivariate probit model
with selection (BVP) in order to overcome the problem of reject inference. This application
of a Heckman (1979) model basically allows for the fact that the rejected applicant's cannot
be observed in the data and attempts to correct for this bias in a 2-stage procedure. This
paper is the most recent contribution to the area of reject inference. Banasik et al. (2001)
find that their BVP model may improve accuracy if the loan officer has overridden a scoring
rule.
Cohen and Hammer's (1996) remedy for this type of bias is more intuitive but perhaps not
as practical. They suggest that the optimal way to deal with this bias is for the bank to lend
to all customers for a period and not discriminate a priori between customers who they
believe to be good and poor risks. The scorecard is then estimated on the unscreened
customer data. They justify the increased losses, which would be incurred by the bank
through increased default rates, by arguing that:
"The increased losses during this limited period should be regarded as part of the cost of
gathering data for the development ofan effective numerical credit scoring system4 .
Despite the problems arising from using pre-screened samples to estimate scorecards from
which the rejected applicants are omitted, Type I error is typically regarded as far more
serious than Type II error. In other words, it is more important for a bank to reduce the
percentage of its accepted applicants that eventually have their debt written off rather than to
forfeit business customers who would have been creditworthy. Although, it can be argued
that both types of loss are important, banks owe a duty to their depositors not to gamble with
4
P.130-131. Cohen K.J. and F.S Hammer, 1966. 'Analytical methods in banking'. Eds. K.J. Cohen
and F.S Hammer
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the money placed in their trust and therefore have to be seen to view Type I losses arising
through company bankruptcy and insolvency as very serious.
Weiss (1996) puts the costs of misclassifying a bad relative to a good, where the response
variable is bankruptcy, at 25/1. Altman et al. (1977) put the relative costs of misclassifying a
bad relative to a good, again where the response variable is bankruptcy, at 35/1. Altman et
al. therefore conclude that the cost of bankruptcy is even higher than the estimate provided
by Weiss (1996). Using the cost estimates provided by Altman et al., we can infer that 35
loans to firms which do not go bankrupt (Type II firms), can be traded off against each loan
to a bankrupt firm (Type I firm). Expressed another way, if a bank lends £100 to a firm that
goes bankrupt, the bank loses £70 of the value of the loan principal. However, if the bank
denies a loan of £100 to a borrower who would have repaid his loan, the bank incurs an
opportunity cost of £2 (equivalent to the interest margin plus the underwriting fees). Weiss
(1996) points out that this estimate by Altman et al., does not take into account the disparity
in size of different business loans and assumes that they are homogeneous. Of course, the
absolute loss to the bank if the borrower defaults on a large loan is higher than the absolute
loss that the bank would incur on a smaller loan but this loss would not be reflected in a cut¬
off that relied on loans being homogeneous in size. If it happened that smaller firms who
were more likely to request smaller loans, exhibited a higher default rate than large firms,
the overall loss on the bank's portfolio would depend on the relative size of loans to SMEs
as well as the disparity in their default rates. Weiss (1996) urges future research to be
cognisant of the potential variation in loan sizes when calculating cut-offs. He argues that in
the US, the bankruptcy rate never exceeded 0.75 percent since 1934 although this statistic
relates to larger firms which are listed on the Stock Exchange. According to Barclay's Bank
Information Service (2000), just fewer than 20 percent of start-ups fail in their first year of
trading and over 60 percent in the first 5 years. We can conclude that there is considerable
variation in default rates that would confound efforts to estimate sensible cut-offs for a
heterogeneous sample of small, unlisted and large, listed businesses. The appropriateness of
a cut-off really depends on the heterogeneous nature of the estimation sample being used.
So we have looked at classifying applicants into two subsets of the application dataset A,
where applicants predicted to be good belong to the subset AG and bad applicants to the AB
subset. The corresponding Type I and Type II errors that I have discussed above can be
written as D and L respectively. D describes the loss arising from borrower default and L the
lost profit from rejecting a good applicant. PG and PB are the proportions of good and bad
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borrowers in the population of applicants. In practice PG and PB are often established from
those applicants who were granted a loan.
Let P (x | G) be the probability that an applicant has characteristics x given that he is good.
This is a conditional probability and it is written as follows;
P (x |G) = P (applicant is G and has characteristics x) / [P (applicant is G)]
So by cross-multiplying we get the expression;
P (applicant is good and has characteristics x) = P(x | G ) * Pg 3.1
The probability that an applicant with characteristics x is good q(G | x) , is also a conditional
probability and so equals;
q(G \x) =
P (applicant has characteristics x and is G) / P (applicant has characteristics x) 3.2
So from 3.1 and 3.2 we get;
q(G\x) = [P(x\G)PcJ/P(x) 3.3
An important concept to grasp in the above piece of mathematical notation dealing with the
choice of the decision rule the bank will take, is the idea that the bank can only observe the
past and not the future. In other words, the bank can observe the conditional probability that
borrowers who turned out to be creditworthy, G, were associated with a score x. This can be
expressed as the probability P (x \ G). Although this may seem a truism, it means that the
bank can observe that a borrower who was creditworthy had particular application details. It
is more useful for a bank to be able to infer whether applicants, given that they exhibit a
particular score, x, will subsequently turn out to be creditworthy, G. In mathematical
notation this reads as P (G | x). This is the essence of prediction. In scientific notation this
means that the bank can observe the good outcome of the borrower which is p ( x \ G) where
x is the application data exhibited by the borrower, G the good ex post outcome and p the
probability of the outcome occurring. The same rationale applies to the bad outcome. The
bank can look back in history, retrieve the defaulted borrower's files and establish that he
had application data x while turning out to be a defaulter at a later stage. In mathematical
notation this conditional probability translates into p( x | B).
A slightly more difficult concept to explain is the predicted outcome. Of course this is the
outcome we are really interested in because nobody cares to predict what has already
happened. Of far greater importance is to extrapolate future creditworthiness from past
outcomes. This concept lies at the heart of credit scoring. The ex ante outcome that is the
probability of a person exhibiting application data x going on to become a creditworthy
borrower is q( G \ x). This can be expressed as the following question; given that the
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borrower has application details x, what is the likelihood that he will turn out to be
creditworthy? The corollary to this is the conditional probability for the bad borrower. This
is written as
q( B | x) where the probability of an applicant having application details x and subsequently
turning out to be bad is described.
The assumption that we can predict the probability that an applicant with a certain score
turns out to be creditworthy, q (G \x), using the historic proportion of good applicants in the
population PG and the probabilities that such good applicants achieved a similar score x,
P (x | G), is an heroic one to make. This is because it depends on the application data
having the same relationship with the outcome variable in the time period in which the
application data was collected (scorecard estimation period) as the relationship existing
between the application data and the outcome variable in the unseen set of borrowers whose
creditworthiness is being predicted. It also depends on the proportion of good applicants, PG,
remaining constant across the two periods. Because the relationships between the
explanatory variables and the outcome variable can change over time, scorecards frequently
need to be recalibrated to account for this attrition. Also, scorecards rarely try to infer the
future behaviour of applicants at too distant a point into the future5.
Because we have shown how conditional probabilities can be used to generate a probability
that applicants exhibiting a certain score are good, let us now show how the credit scorer
comes up with a decision rule. This decision rule incorporates information on the relative
misclassification costs described earlier with the conditional probabilities described above.
Essentially this decision rule shows the trade-off between the cost arising to the bank
through default D and the lost profit arising from declining customers who turn out to be
creditworthy L. The full expected loss arising is;
L x p (x\G) Pg + D % p(x\B) Pb
xeAb xeAg
The product of the posterior probabilities by the proportions of good or bad in the sample
can also be written as;
L S q(G\x)P(x)+D S q(B\x)P(x)
xeAh xeAg
In order to minimise the total loss to the bank, the loan sanctioner will want to accept a
proportion of applicants such that they belong to the good subset AG in such a way that the
ratio of the posterior probabilities of the borrower being a good given that they have a score
5 The exception to this is the commercial scorecards predicting bankruptcy which is an outcome that
can occur years rather than months from the time the scorecard is estimated.
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x to the probabilities of the borrower being a bad given that they have the same score x is
less than the ratio of loss to the bank through default D to the loss arising through lost profit
L. I will explain why this is the case by providing an example. Imagine that the probability,
given that the applicant's score is x, that the applicant is good, P (G \ x ) = 97 percent.
Imagine, the corollary to this that the applicant has a 3 percent chance of being bad, given
that score x. now the ratio between the two (97/3) is 32. If the cost of a bankruptcy is 32
times the cost of a good misclassified loan, the sanctioner will want to ensure that all loans
have at least a 97 percent probability of being good before extending the loan. Otherwise the
probability that a loan is misclassified rises and exceeds the tolerance level of 32 set by the
bank. This is written in mathematical notation as;
Ag= q (G\x)/q(B\x) < D/L
This is the decision rule separating good from bads. The ratio of D/L, as we have already
indicated, depends on the cost structure of the bank and their tolerance towards default. If
the cost of default is very high e.g. with large commercial loans, this ratio will be closer to
Altman's estimate of 35/1 for the relative cost of bankruptcy, D, to the opportunity cost, L,
of denying funds to a good borrower. In this case the bank will have a lower acceptance rate
because it is wary of borrowers who could default. In this case even if the borrower is 4
percent likely to be bad given that he has a certain score but correspondingly 96 percent
likely to be a good, the borrower will be rejected.
Table 3.1 shows the decision rule in operation using Altman's D/L ratio as a reference point
and hence the cut-off point. For ex ante bad likelihoods q (B \x) of 1-percent and 2-percent,
but no higher, the loan sanctioner accepts the loan. However, once the likelihood that an
applicant is bad exceeds 2-percent, the loan is rejected. This is because the corresponding
ratio between the ex ante good and bad outcomes given the score x i.e. [q (G \x) / q(B \x)]
are only greater than the cut-off of 35 up to this point. If we were to apply the cut-off point
that Weiss (1996) advocated of 25 for the costs of misclassifying a bankrupt then the bank
would move the cut-off point for q (G\x) / q(B \x) to 25. With this new cut-off, businesses
with a certain score who would exhibit a 3 percent ex ante likelihood of becoming bankrupt
would also be accepted. It can be seen therefore, that the less highly the bank rates the cost
of the bad outcome against the good outcome D/L, the higher the acceptance rate.
I should note here that an individual scoring non-commercial loans might find these cut-off
points very conservative. For example, the loss on defaulted credit card repayments or car
loan may be considered relatively low against the loss arising when the bank forgoes new
business. In fact, a bank may be keen that non-commercial borrowers for financing facilities
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such as overdrafts actually default occasionally because of the higher interest rates that
accrue to the bank on default (Edelman, 1992). Therefore the scorecard should be cognisant
of the profit the bank aims to make and not just try to prevent losses arising from the bad
outcome, default in this case. It should be clear however, that bankruptcy does not carry any
benefit for the bank. Banks will go to great efforts to ward against bankruptcy, sometimes
nursing insolvent firms back to health if they perceive that the insolvency is attributable to
an event such as an economic downturn rather than managerial or production weaknesses
(Wruck, 1990; Lawrence and Arshadi, 1995; Piatt et al. 1998). Because of the irreversible
and adverse nature of bankruptcy, commercial scoring studies using bankruptcy as an
outcome variable tend to have high D/L ratios.
Now that I have covered the basic principle of the decision rule, in the next section I
describe the process of separation itself.
3.23 Logistic regression as an estimation function
In this section, I outline the logistic regression procedure. I explain the differences between
logistic regression and normal regression by referring to Gujarati (1999). Furthermore, I
describe the differences in prediction that are obtained when using logistic regression as
compared prediction when using the other commonly used algorithm, multiple discriminant
analysis, as described by Thomas (1998).
The two most commonly used algorithms for estimating scorecards are multiple
discriminant analysis and logistic regression (Hand, 1997; Thomas et al., 2002). According
to Hand (1997) there is very little difference in the predictive performance of both. However
there are statistical differences between the two that will be explained.
Before the introduction of computers with high computation power, credit scoring favoured
the algorithms linear discriminant analysis and linear regression as tools to separate the
goods from the bads as opposed to logistic regression. The latter requires relatively more
computing power permitting maximum likelihood estimation procedures.
For linear regression, the basis of a good regression is one that minimises sum of errors
squared. If the dependent variable is coded F=1 for a default and Y=0 for a non-default, then
an applicant, i, has his observation coded y, = 1 if he defaulted, or y, = 0 if he was
creditworthy. We assume that the bank has collected values for a set of variables or
characteristics from his application form and perhaps looked up his credit references for
some behavioural information. These explanatory variables that will be used in the
subsequent regression for applicant i are x(7, xi2, xi3....xip if there is p number of variables.
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The overall likelihood that the applicant is bad corresponds to the proportion of
creditworthy applicants in the population divided by the total number of applicants. In other
words, the chance that an applicant is bad is equal to nB/(nB + nG) where nB is the number of
bad applicants and (nB + nB) the number of all applicants both good and bad.
The concept of linear regression entails finding weights or coefficients for each of the
variables Xy, such that the product of these weights and coefficient values comes close to y,.
In so doing the sum of errors squared is minimised. The objective is therefore to;
Minimise Z, =j(y, - Xj w;- xyf
The coefficients or weights Wj are obtained using the usual ordinary least squares estimators.
The Fischer (1936) Linear Disciminant function used in linear discriminant analysis looks
very similar. Here the optimal cut-off score x is given as
x ~ As
where A is a scalar and S is the linear surface separating the mean of the goods jug and of the
bads
Now that I have shown that similarities exist between linear regression and discriminant
analysis, I turn to the similarities and differences existing between discriminant analysis and
logistic regression. The fundamental similarity between both techniques is their
appropriateness for a response variable that is in the binary format (e.g. y-l for a bankrupt
firm or y=l otherwise) rather than in a continuous format such as profit levels (Tacq, 1997).
Hence, the most striking resemblance between the two techniques is that both techniques are
valid for dichotomous outcome variables.
Lo (1986) provides a good mathematical summary of the overlap relationship between
logistic regression and discriminant analysis. Let y denote a discrete dichotomous variable
that takes the value of 1 for some event such as bankruptcy and 0 for a non-event. Let X be a
vector of continuous variables. The joint distribution for y and X is denoted as F( y, X).
According to Lo, an important consideration in choosing between logistic regression and
discriminant analysis is the assumption of conditional normality. He argues that it is more
convenient to focus on conditional distributions rather than joint distributions when dealing
with the classification of cases into groups. This is because the classification of an
observation into a group, Y„ depends on which population that X belongs to. The standard
discriminant analysis procedure assumes that the conditional distribution of X with respect
to y is multivariate normal with a mean, jUy, and the common covariance Z. If FD ( X \ y) is
the conditional distribution, then fD (X | y) is the corresponding density function. However,
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the logistic function requires no such assumption that the conditional probabilities are
multivariate normally distributed. Lo writes the conditional distribution of y with respect to
X for the logistic regression as FL ( y \ X ) with/L ( y | X ) as the corresponding density
function.
Discriminant analysis can be related to logistic regression through an application of Baye's
Law. Lo begins by taking FD( X\ y) denoting the conditional distribution of X \ y and letting
fD (X | y ) denote the corresponding density function where, D, denotes discriminant analysis.
He states that the;
A priori probability ofan event = Jfx ( X ) P (y /X) dX 3.1
We have seen that Lo denotes FL (y \ X) as the conditional distribution function of y | X,
where L denotes logistic regression. By applying Baye's Law and taking on board the
different assumptions of logistic regression and discriminant analysis about the distribution
of the conditional probabilities, he derives the conditional distribution function of logistic
regression in terms of the conditional distribution function of discriminant analysis as;
FL( y \ X) = [ fD( X\y )* A priori probability ofan event ] / fx ( X ) 3.2
The problem with linear discriminant analysis, as we have seen, that is addressed by logistic
regression is that linear discriminant analysis assumes that the conditional distribution of X
with respect to y is multivariate normal. In other words, discriminant analysis assumes that
the covariance matrix Xy is the same for the population of goods and bads (Eisenbeis, 1978).
According to Thomas (1998), this is an unreasonable assumption to make. If one were to
assume unequal covariance matrices between the goods and the bads, one would need to use
a quadratic formulation of the linear discriminant function and this would greatly increase
the number of explanatory variables to be computed.
Although logistic regression got around the problem of assuming equal covariances
matrices, due to the different way it is formulated, it was never really regarded as a real
substitute for linear disciminant analysis until the advent of powerful computers made
scorecards using linear regression relatively easy to compute.
The way logistic regression avoids the problems of covariance equality between the
defaulters and non-defaulters is not just confined to its different specification that I will
describe. It is also because an assumption of equal covariances is unnecessary for the
estimation of the parameters. Regarding its specification, instead of assuming that the
probability of being a bad p, is equal to the sum of the product of the variables for each
applicant xy by their respective variable coefficient Wjas follows;
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Pi = Wo + W,XU + W2Xi2 + WjXtf + W4X/4 + WpXip
Logistic regression assumes that the log of the odds of being a defaulter (unlike linear
regression that assumes the probability of being a defaulter) is equal to the sum of the
product of the variables for each applicant xy by their respective variable coefficient vv,. The
odds of being a defaulter are equal to the probability of being a defaulter divided by the
probability the person is not a defaulter. In other words, if the probability that an applicant is
a defaulter is p, the odds of him being a defaulter are p /(I - p). The formula for logistic
regression is therefore;
log( p/1 - Pi )= Wo + W,Xi, + W2Xi2 + WjJCy + WpCi4 + WjXy
The advantage of logistic regression is that it does not require the assumption that the
covariance matrices of the defaulters and non-defaulters are equal. Also, if any of the
explanatory variables are dummy variables (categorical variables in this particular instance
constructed from continuous variables), the expression is still robust to any changes in the
distributions these different formats of the explanatory variables bring about.
A further advantage of logistic regression, this time compared with normal linear regression,
is that it constrains the probability of being a default within the range 0 to 1 (Gujarati,
1999). With normal linear regression, there is no guarantee that the estimated probability of
the borrower being a bad will fall between 0 and 1. If an estimated probability is negative or
greater than 0, it is meaningless. The use of logistic regression avoids the possibility that the
probability will lie outside the acceptable range of probabilities. The logistic regression
schedule is described by an S-shaped curve (Figure 3.1 ).
You can see from Figure 3.1 that logistic regression performs much the same way as
ordinary linear regression for most of its range where the function describing the logistic
regression tracks the linear function and only is non-linear at its extremes. You can see that
it is bounded between 0 and 1 on the y-axis. This means that the levels of the response
variable lie on either horizontal line where y=0 (representing non-default) or y=l
(representing default).
Following the introduction of high-powered computers the maximum likelihood technique
used to estimate logistic regression is now feasible and easy to apply. According to Thomas
(1998), logistic regression is the technique most preferred by credit scoring practitioners.
Logistic regression is also used in several of the commercial credit scoring studies that I will
describe later (Leonard, 1992; Wiginton, 1980; Ohlson, 1980; Piatt and Piatt, 1987; Piatt
and Piatt, 1991b). There is therefore a well established precedent for my analysis in
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Chapter 6 using logistic regression since it has been used by both practitioners and
academic researchers before.
We have defined what the logistic regression algorithm is and have compared it with the
main other statistical technique used in scorecards linear discriminant analysis. I now
demonstrate how logistic regression is applied and interpreted using an example and outline
the corresponding goodness of fit statistics used in logistic models.
Let us assume that we have two explanatory variables Xj and x2 where x2 represents business
gross profit from the previous year's operations and x2 the sales turnover from the current
year.
The odds ratio of borrowers defaulting on their loans is (PB /(I- Pb)) where PB denotes the
probability of default occurring within 6-months and 1 - PB the probability that it does not
occur. Taking the natural log of the odds ratio and equating this with two hypothetical
scorecard variables, by way of example, gives the following model with the error term e,;
ln(Pj/(l - Pj )) = P0 + fi(Gross Profit level from Year,_i)i + ff (sales turnover from Year,),
+ et
The log of the odds ratio ln(P/(l - P,)) is a linear function of the explanatory variables last
year's gross profit level and this year's sales turnover. The predicted value of the dependent
variable if the borrower has gross profit of £40,000 and sales turnover of £120,000 is -
3.6007. That is;
ln(PB/(l-PB)) = -3.6007
This is then antilogged to give e raised to the power of -3.6007.
(P,/(l - Pi)) = e'3 6007
reorganising gives
D / -3.60071 // / , -3.6007 >P, = (e )/(l + e )
This gives a value of 0.0266. In other words, a hypothetical business with a gross profit
level of £40,000 and sales turnover of £120,000 can be expected to be approximately 3
percent likely to show default on its borrowing 6 months later. In general, the higher the
value of the logit, the higher the corresponding odds of the event occurring are and therefore
the higher the likelihood of the event occurring.
The discussion now turns to the goodness of fit statistics used in logistic regression,
comparing them with their corresponding test statistics in OLS regression.
In ordinary linear regression, the aim of the model is to minimise the SSE (Sum of Errors
Squared) or unexplained variance as a proportion of overall variance SSR (Sum of the Errors
Squared explained by the Regression). The F test in linear regression tests the null
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hypothesis that all the co-efficients are equal to zero (Ho•' Pi = = /?>••= Pk = 0) where F
is defined as
[SSR/k]/ [SSE/(N-k-l)], N is the number of observations in the sample and k the number of
explanatory variables.
The parallel to the F test in logistic regression is the log-likelihood. The initial log likelihood
function is analogous to SST (Total Sum of Squares) in OLS regression. This is referred to
in notation by Menard (1995) as D0t or the chi-squared value for the intercept only. The
deviation for the full model (analogous to SSE) is DM. When this deviation value for the
model (Dm) is subtracted from D(p GM is obtained which indicates the variance explained by
the model, analogous to SSR in OLS regression. The significance level of the variance
explained by the model, GM , is equivalent to the F test in OLS.
The pseudo R p for logistic regression and which is the most natural parallel to SSR/SST and
indicates the goodness of fit for the regression is
R2L = (D0-DJ/D0
In this section the justifications for using the logit model were presented. The way the logit
model operates was illustrated and explained using a hypothetical credit scoring scenario
with two explanatory variables. Finally, statistics used to evaluate the power of logit
regression models were presented alongside their parallel statistics in OLS.
The following section describes a technique less well known than the logistic regression
algorithm I will take care to explain the weights of evidence method used in the preparation
of the explanatory variables for the logistic regression model because of its lack of broad
application outside the area of credit scoring.
3.24 Selection and preparation of the right hand side variables
This section deals specifically with the preparation and selection of the explanatory
variables. Dealing firstly with the preparation of the explanatory variables. A common
problem in the construction of a scorecard is the limited number of observations in the
estimation sample compared with the abundance of explanatory variables. This reduces the
statistical power of the resulting model. This problem is compounded when the continuous
variables such as entrepreneur's age are transformed into categorical dummy variables.
Hence age can be reduced to the categorical classes age 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 45-65 and 65+
depending on the number of observations in each category. Also a researcher could apply
some a priori reasoning for the definition of ranges of values to categorical variables. An
example of this would be where he could inform his decision based on government statistics
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on the age at which self-employment becomes more a more lucrative alternative to waged
employment. Alternatively, the age at which waged, blue-collar employees, in the event of
redundancy from their job, are unable to re-enter the labour market because they are too old
to be retrained (the economic theory describing employment push factors be applied in this
case)6.
A difficulty arises where the number of variables is increased considerably with the addition
of extra categories. This problem is discussed by Crook, Hamilton and Thomas (1992b). A
way they suggest getting around the problem caused by a reduction in degrees of freedom is
to construct 'weights of evidence' for continuous and dummy variables alike. Thomas
(1998) also refers to this often used technique as a way of overcoming the problems where
there are a large number of right hand side variables.
Thomas (1998) suggests that there are three ways of organising categorical right hand side
variables. The most intuitive would be use n-1 dummy binary variables to represent n
number of categories as described above. He argues that the advantage of this technique is
that it does not impose any relationship on the coefficients of the variables. A disadvantage
is that it leads to a large number of variables with losses of degrees of freedom.
The second method is the location model where a different discriminant function with the
continuous variables is estimated for every combination of categories of the categorical
variables. This has the disadvantage of being difficult to apply because of the large number
of discriminant functions.
The third method is the one referred to by practitioners, according to Thomas (1998).
According to Thomas, a valuable feature of the weights of evidence method is that it can
allow quick updates of the existing data to incorporate new data. It is also used by some
other researchers (Banasik et al., 2001; Banasik et al., 1996; Crook et al., 1992b; Wiginton,
1980).
The weights of evidence method deals with non-linearities in the data by grouping both
categorical as well as numerical variables into homogenous groups or intervals and finding
the log of the proportion of the total number of goods to the proportion of the total number
of bads for that category within a characteristic, such as Marital Status. In the case of
continuous variables, an example being an entrepreneur's age, several groups can be chosen.
This gives a step function rather than smooth continuous function for age (Figure 3.2).The
weights of evidence values are calculated as:
6
Purely predictive scorecards do not have to take economic theory into consideration when informing
their choice of categorical variable categories. The issue is whether a variable proved to be predictive
rather than why the variable was predictive
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Xz = In gi + In Bt
bi Gf
where Xz = value of predictor X for category z
gi = number of good payers in nominal category z, the category of which the i is a member
bi = number of poor payers in nominal category z, the category of which i is a member
Gr = number of good payers in the sample responding to this question
Bt = number of poor payers in the sample responding to this question
Essentially, the replies to different questions on the loan application forms can be processed
in this way where each question represents a category and each reply or response represents
an attribute. BT and Gr represent the frequencies of goods and bads answering this question.
The more interesting piece of information is the frequency of goods g, and bads bt for each
of the attributes because it can happen, for example, that Divorcees exhibit relatively higher
default rates than the Widowed. In this case the proportions of each will capture the higher
propensity of Divorcees to default.
Now that we have looked at the preparation of the explanatory variables, how does the
application scorecard builder select the variables for inclusion in his scorecard estimations?
In practice, any variable that proves to be significant is retained in a credit-scoring model.
Consistent with the aim of scorecard construction to choose the most discriminative (able to
discriminate between good and bad outcomes) as opposed to the most theoretically valid, the
most popular methods of choosing the explanatory variables comprise the stepwise or
forward inclusion method or the backward deletion method.
Gujarati (1992) explains how these techniques allow for the exclusion of variables that are
'probably superfluous', leading to clearer models. He uses the word 'probably' because if
there is collinearity among the explanatory variables, the standard errors tend to be higher
and the estimated t-values are reduced(t= beta/standard, error beta). Because of the
reduction in the t-values with collinearity, it is more difficult to reject the null hypothesis
that the variable explains the response variable i.e. is meaningful and hence exclude the
variable from the model on the grounds that it is probably superfluous. Gujarati being a
writer steeped in the economic tradition, condemns data mining approaches where the
variables are all selected in this way and the researcher does not set out with a model in
mind.
Some of the academic literature dealing with commercial scoring has criticised this heuristic
approach to variable selection. Pinches, Mingo and Carruthers (1973) employed factor
analysis in their selection of variables in an attempt to isolate factors representing variables
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with high commonalties. Factors such as cash flow or liquidity measures correspond with
financial theory and provide the necessary reference points for an interpretation of the
outcomes.
Following on the lead established by Pinches, Mingo and Carruthers (1973), commercial
scoring studies by Barnes (1987) and Zavgren (1985) also employed factor analyses in their
variable selection procedures.
Finally, it may seem that the selection of explanatory variables based on their F statistic as
employed in stepwise, forward or backward selection methods may be expected to affect
comparability among different scorecards adversely and possibly different predictive
performance.
Flowever, Lovie and Lovie (1986) first discovered that the eventual predictive power of a
scorecard is relatively insensitive to the precise values of the coefficients of the explanatory
variables. This is known as the flat maximum effect. The flat maximum effect is of no use to
a researcher wanting to interpret the coefficients of a scorecard and discuss their individual
power. However, it is a bonus for researchers who are interested in the pure predictive
power of the models. The flat maximum effect has made it possible to create 'generic
scorecards' that can be applied on different datasets. Overstreet and Bradley (1992), in an
analysis of consumer credit created a generic scorecard using data from US credit unions.
They concluded that customised models perform better than generic models at classifying
the bad outcomes (reduce Type I error) However they would not be as robust where credit
unions widen their customer base as they are modelled on a very narrow set of clients. The
flat maximum effect exhibited by generic models reduces the marginal level of
misclassifying good loans compared with customised models.
3.25 Distinguishing a good from a bad scorecard
The next issue deals with scorecard discrimination. Since the science or art of credit scoring
emphasises the separation of creditworthy from non-creditworthy firms, it follows that a
good scorecard should be able to discriminate between both types of applicant.
The separation between goods and bads in the following way. Figure 3.3 taken from Hanley
(2000) shows the separation of bads and goods in a consumer credit scorecard. The posterior
probabilities that the consumer is a bad are described by the x-axis. The frequency of
creditworthy and non-creditworthy customers is indicated by the y-axis. The type of non-
creditworthy behaviour measured by the response variable in this example is whether the
applicant missed at least 2 consecutive repayments on their repayment schedule. The
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distribution of applicants missing at least 2 consecutive repayments (dark-shaded
distribution) lies slightly more to the right than the distribution of applicants who never
exhibited this type of adverse repayment behaviour. This is because at higher predicted
probabilities that an applicant is bad, we would expect a comparatively high frequency of
bads relative to goods. The corollary to this is that at low predicted probabilities that
applicants turn out to be non-creditworthy, we would expect a comparatively low frequency
of non-creditworthy compared to creditworthy applicants. Therefore, although there are
higher numbers of creditworthy applicants overall, we can observe a slight bias towards the
right (higher expected probabilities of an applicant being bad) for the applicants missing at
least 2 consecutive repayments.
If the distribution of the applicants missing at least 2 consecutive repayments on their
borrowings lies far to the right and there is no overlap, we can conclude that the scorecard
offered complete separation of the goods from the bads in the estimation sample. Such a
highly discriminative scorecard would be useful to the bank because they would be
extremely confident that applicants exhibiting certain characteristics would turn out to be
bad based on the previous association between these characteristics and the bad outcome.
Many scorecards do not permit full separation of the creditworthy from non-creditworthy
borrowers and some overlap exists between the two distributions. In practice, a bank may
review these marginal applicants who fall in the overlap area in more detail. A sanctioner
may request more comprehensive credit bureau data for these cases. Where there is no
overlap, the bank is more confident of correctly predicting the repayment behaviour of the
applicant and will reject applicants at the extreme values of posterior probabilities.
Therefore a scorecard with overlap can still save the bank time and money by dispensing
with the need to scrutinise applicants at the extremes of the distributions and instead focus
on the marginal cases where the repayment outcome is more uncertain.
A bank, when assessing the ability of a scorecard to discriminate between the goods and
bads, can employ two main techniques in order to evaluate the scorecard; classification
matrices and gini coefficients. I will now describe these techniques and relate them back to
Figure 3.3 before turning to a more detailed description.
The first and most basic way to evaluate the power of a scorecard is to derive a
classification matrix referred to as a 'confusion matrix' (Hand, 1997).
Looking back at Figure 3.3, a classification matrix is a 2 by 2 matrix that presents a
snapshot of how well the scorecard has performed at a particular expected probability level.
We see how the classification operates in the small classification matrix below ( See Table
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3.2). The error rates correspond to the proportion of events incorrectly predicted for each of
the outcomes as a proportion of all applicants showing that outcome. The proportion or rate
correctly predicted bad is a /(a + c) or the number correctly predicted to be bad divided by
the total number of bads. The proportion or rate correctly predicted to be good corresponds
to d/(b + d). If we are trying to predict the bad outcome (response variable y=l for a bad
outcome) then a/(a + c) is also referred to as the true positive rate and d/(b + d) as the true
negative rate.
Table 3.2 'Confusion' matrix
Predicted class (# of cases)
Trueclass (#ofcases)
Ever bad Never bad Total
Ever bad a c a+c
Never bad b d b+d
The classification matrix provides a useful method of evaluating the trade-off between the
correct prediction of an event (applicant is non-creditworthy) and the correct prediction of a
non-event (applicant is creditworthy). The percentages of goods and bads correctly
classified are dependent on the cut-off used. Imagine that the behaviour we are attempting to
predict is whether or not the customer defaults on his repayments i.e. PB. If we start off by
assuming the default cut-off of 0.50, we may find that only a few of the bads are correctly
classified. If there is a low number of bads in the estimation sample, it may be more difficult
for the scorecard to detect them. This is because all things equal, an observation randomly
selected from the sample is most likely to be a good due to the higher relative frequency of
goods in the sample. If we however raise the cut-off from 0.5 to 0.6 in order that we have a
higher likelihood of detecting good applicants (where the response variable is coded as 1 to
denote a good), then we should find that the classification accuracy for goods should
improve but at the expense of misclassifying a higher proportion of the bads. In other words,
the true positive rate d / (b + d) will increase and the true negative rate a / (a + c) will
decrease. Conversely, if we lower the cut-off rate, the classification accuracy of the bads
improves at the expense of the goods. It follows that the true negative rate a / (a + c) will
increase and the true positive rate d/(b + d) will decrease.
It is important to note when using true positive and negative rates that they are aligned to
whatever is deemed to be 'an event' by the statistician. In other words, an event can be
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either taken to mean the detection of a bad observation or alternatively of a good
observation. As long as the statistician indicates what he means as an event, we can interpret
the true error rates accordingly. For example, if the statistician deemed the detection of a
bankruptcy or default as an event, then the true positive rate would now imply the detection
(prediction) of bad observations as a percentage of all bad observations in the estimation
sample i.e. a/(a + cf. Similarly, the true negative rate would now be switched to imply the
correct prediction of all good observations as a percentage of all good observations
i.e. d/(b + d).
Apart from being aware of what represents 'an event' and the implications of how the
response variable is coded for the interpretation of the true error rates, there are other issues
that are worth noting in the context of cut-off rates. One way of determining the cut-off
point is to set it at such a level that the actual number of bads (assuming that bad
observations are events) is equal to the predicted number of bads. In other words, there is
full classification accuracy of the bads. Now the researcher ascertains the proportion of
goods correctly classified (true negative rate) at this pre-determined cut-off where all bads
have been correctly classified. This approach of fixing the cut-off at a level where the
predicted number of bads equals the actual number of bads was employed by Banasik et al.
(1996) when they experimented with various different types of cut-off.
One of the problems with the classification matrix is that it can only report the breakdown in
predictions for one expected probability level. For example, it might report the breakdown
of goods and bads at an expected probability level of 0.50 that the applicant is non-
creditworthy. In order to address the performance of the scorecard over the whole range of
the probability levels, the gini coefficient can be used. This is also referred to in Hand
(1997) as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
The most powerful measure of separation between the two distributions is the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test (Hand, 1997; SAS Institute, 1999). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is
also equivalent to the area under the ROC curve or the gini coefficient (Hand, 1997). ROC
curves are useful because it is necessary to calculate global discriminatory power over all
the cut-offs instead of the discriminatory power at one single cut-off. In other words, ROC
curves give a more comprehensive view of the performance of the scorecard over all the
7
Bankruptcy or default are typically coded as 1 in credit scoring scenarios because the lender is more
interested in reducing the costs of lending to firms who subsequently default rather than minimising
the cost of withholding finance from a borrower who turns out to be good. However, the codification
of the response variable depends on the relative costs the bank places on both types of
misclassification error.
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expected probability levels unlike the classification matrix reporting the performance at a
particular expected probability level.
Figure 3.4 illustrates what a ROC curve looks like. Sensitivity or the true positive rate
a/(a + c) is described by the y-axis. 1 minus specificity, or one minus the true negative rate,
d/(b + d) is depicted on the x-axis.
In Figure 3.3 you can see that the curve is crescent shaped and is described by the co¬
ordinates (0,0) and (1,1) at either extreme. A 45 degree line intersects it at its extremes.
A good scorecard should describe an arc capturing as large an area as possible between
itself and the 45 degree line. If the scorecard were perfectly predictive, as we described
earlier in the case of perfect separation of creditworthy from non-creditworthy borrowers,
the schedule would be coincident with the y-axis and form a triangle with the 45 degree line.
This would happen because the scorecard would perfectly distinguish all bads without
misclassifying any goods in the process. In other words, the true negative rate, a / a + c),
would be equal to 1 and the true positive rate, d/(b + d), would also be equal to 1, yielding
a specificity (1 - true positive rate) of zero. Hence the co-ordinates (0,1) would be on a
perfectly discriminatory scorecard.
A scorecard with no discrimination would be described by a ROC curve coincident with the
45° line. This is because in order to correctly classify some observations as events, a
corresponding number of non-events would have to be misclassified. The true positive and
true negative rates would be perfectly correlated with no discrimination because
classification would depend on the frequency of events and non-events in the estimation
sample and hence there would be a direct correspondence between classification and
misclassification. For example, imagine that there were 50 events and 50 non-events. With a
perfectly non-discriminatory scorecard, I could correctly predict 40 events only at the
expense of misclassifying 40 non-events. This would give true positive and true negative
rates of 0.8. I could correctly 30 events at the cost of misclassifying 30 non-events yielding
true positive and true negative rates of 0.6. Since the positive and negative error rates are
equal in each instance, a straight line can be plotted from the origin to the co-ordinate (1,1)
describing a 45° line.
The gini coefficient summarises the ROC curve by reporting the area under the ROC curve8.
Their procedure is based on the ranks of the data. The predicted posterior probabilities are
8 SAS software applies a procedure called ' Wilcoxon' to produce the output from which the gini
coefficient can be calculated.
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ranked from smallest to largest. The area under the ROC curve c, can be determined from
the rank-sum in the class where y=l (an event occurs such as default).
ni
c= £ / R-U 2n;(«;+ l)]/(nj* n0)
(<b=D
where R, is the sum of scores for the bads, c is the area under the ROC curve or gini, n„ is
the number of goods and finally n/ is the number of bads.
Classification matrices and ROC curves deal with the accuracy of the scorecard. However,
this accuracy is upwardly biased if the classifier function is applied to the sample that the
scorecard was estimated on. The error rate is referred to as the 'apparent error' rate because
of this bias.
There are several ways of dealing with this bias all of which, to some extent, involve
estimating the scorecard on a subset of the data and testing the classifier function on the
remaining observations to see if they are accurately classified.
The first method of ex ante validation of the scorecard classifier that is used in commercial
credit scoring is the leave-out-one method ( Betts and Belhoul, 1987; Piatt and Piatt, 1992).
This method developed by Lachenbruch (1975) estimates the classifier function on all but
one of the points and allows the scorecard to classifying the remaining observation. This is
repeated for all the observations in the sample. There is little bias using this method.
Thomas (1998) notes that its disadvantage is the large variance.
The second method is the bootstrap method which is used in commercial scoring analyses
by Taffler (1982) and Srinivasan and Kim (1987).The bootstrap can be used effectively for
small samples like Taffler's who had only 68 observations or Srinivasan and Kim's which
had 215 observations of which 39 were high risk.
The bootstrap is a bit more complicated than the leave-out-one method. It assumes that, if eT
is the true error rate, eA the apparent rate and b is the expected optimism or bias of the
apparent error rate, then the true error rate eT can be expressed as eT = eA + b. The expected
optimism, b, is estimated by drawing random samples with replacement S* from the
original sample S to build a classifying function. The classification error on S* is compared
with the error obtained on S and the difference is taken as an estimate of b. This procedure is
repeated for different samples S* and estimates b are obtained, which in turn, provide an
estimate of the true error rate eT-
The holdout sample method is another common method used in credit scoring studies of
checking the ex ante validity of the scorecard. This is a version of the leave-out-one method.
However, instead of classifying on the one remaining observation, it divides the sample into
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two large subsets (estimation and holdout sample) and tests the classifier on the subset that
was not used to estimate the classifier. This technique was used by Schellenger and Cross
(1994). They took 2,345 businesses and divided it such that the estimation sample contained
1,545 non-bankrupt businesses and 45 bankrupts (roughly 68 percent of the entire dataset).
They then tested the classifier on the remaining 735 non-bankrupts and 20 bankrupts.
An ex ante classification method that is not mentioned by Thomas (1998) but is used in
commercial credit scoring is to try the classifier on entirely new data. This is the purest test
of a classifier because it is not contaminated by any bias whatsoever. Zavgren (1985) applies
her classifier to an unseen sample of firms on the New York Stock Exchange, some of whom
had gone bankrupt. Piatt and Piatt (1992) also test their classifier on unseen business data.
A feature of some bankruptcy prediction models is that they tend to be a bit more lax about
ex ante classification than credit scoring models in the consumer credit literature. This
tendency is criticised by Zavgren (1985). Hence bankruptcy prediction analyses by Weiss
(1996) and Piesse and Wood (1992) do not apply ex ante classification techniques. Weiss is
more concerned with being able to 'predict' bankruptcy 1 or 5 years from the event and the
impact of the bank's trade-off ratio D/L described in section 3.22 earlier. Piesse and Wood
(1992) are more concerned with the supposed accuracy in commercial scoring where
accuracy is illusory because it is inflated when the estimation samples are biased towards
picking winning or losing firms at both extremes of the financial health scale. Business
scorecards predict comparatively well when the event denoted by the response variable is
complete failure rather than financial distress. There is more polarisation between bankrupt
and good firms than between financially distressed surviving firms and good firms. If
surviving but financially distressed firms are included, their failure (bankruptcy) is predicted
despite the fact that they remain in existence. Therefore, more representative estimation
samples would commit a lot of Type II error where surviving businesses would be flagged
as bankrupts.
Neither of these two analyses performs ex ante validation and yet they are often cited. It
therefore appears that while proper ex ante validation is deemed a good thing by writers
such as Zavgren (1985), ex ante validation is not as highly emphasised by researchers in the
area of bankruptcy prediction than researchers in the area of commercial scoring. One
possible reason for this lack of emphasis on determining how' robust a bankruptcy prediction
model is when tested on a hold out sample, is that the number of observations is so low that
performing a split such as 40/60 is not a realistic option. This would mean reducing the
estimation sample by 60 percent. However, notwithstanding the fact that bankruptcy studies
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typically have less data available to them then commercial scoring studies, it is suprising
that leave-out-one or bootstrapping methods, which can be used in the case of small
samples, are not more prevalent. The prediction of bankruptcy is a useful piece of
information in a bankruptcy analysis but I dispute that bankruptcy studies are aimed at
practitioners with the aim of commercialising their work but rather on shedding insights on
what induces business failure9.
3.3 Conclusion
I have introduced and described the standard credit scoring procedures and the methods for
evaluating the effectiveness of scorecards. These sections should help to clarify the
approach I will use to estimate my own small business scorecard in Chapter 6. I have
indicated that logistic regression rather than linear discriminant analysis is regarded as the
industry standard (Thomas, 1998). It also avoids possible problems that could arise if the
covariance matrices of the good and bad firms are not similar. In reality, previous analyses
have shown that there is little difference between the two estimation procedures in terms of
results (Leonard; 1992; Srinivasan and Kim, 1987; Hamer, 1983).
A researcher wishing to organise the explanatory variables in a small business scorecard can'
apply the weights of evidence procedures used by Crook, Hamilton and Thomas (1992b) and
described by Thomas (1998). This procedure provides an alternative to constructing
categorical dummy variables which would raise the number of right hand side variables
considerably causing losses in the degrees of freedom of the scorecard estimation
regression.
I have described the methods of evaluating scorecards and emphasised the importance of ex
ante or out-of-sample validation. Classification matrices can be used to evaluate the
discriminatory power of my scorecard for one cut-off. A researcher wishing to evaluate a
scorecard over all possible cut-offs, can refer to the gini coefficient and graphical ROC
curve.
9 The exception to the lack of applicability of bankruptcy studies to real life business scoring are
studies by Altman who has developed and commercialised the z score. However, in general
bankruptcy studies tend to be academic rather than applied
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Figure 3.3 Scorecard separation of creditworthy from non-creditworthy
customers
Posterior probabilities
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Table 3.1 Decision rule using Altman's 1977 D/L ratio
Acceptanceregion
q(B x) q(G\x) q(G\x)/q(B \x) Cut-off
99 99.00 35
2 98 49.00
3 97 32.33
4 96 24.00
5 95 19.00
6 94 15.67
7 93 13.29
8 92 11.50
9 91 10.11
10 90 9.00
11 89 8.09
12 88 7.33
13 87 6.69
14 86 6.14
15 85 5.67
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4.1 Review of gaps in the commercial scoring literature
The aim of this chapter is to present the gap in the literature that my analysis in Chapter 6
attempts to fill. In establishing that gaps exist in the literature, I refer to what existing
studies have already achieved and how no published study to date has provided an adequate
example of a small business application scorecard.
Part of the reason for this literature gap is that while small business application scorecards
exist, their performance and composition remains secret. The most prominent US small
business scorecard is the Fair Isaac model pioneered recently, as described by Asch (1995)
and Mester (1997). I have already highlighted in the previous chapter, that banks or scoring
institutions do not divulge their scoring practices. Hand (1997) argues that;
'..credit scoring is a commercially sensitive application. Banks are not in the business of
publishing scientific papers which would reveal the basis of any commercial edge they may
have gained'1.
Crook et al. (1992), on the other hand argue, that the flow of information about credit
scoring derives from practitioners rather than academic researchers and they can point to
more work from practitioners in this area;
'Research into credit scoring is almost exclusively the province of the practitioners who
develop and use credit scoring systems, but such research must be short term and geared to
2
new product development. Academic researchers into the topics are few andfar between' .
These two views by Crook et al. (1992) and Hand (1997) point to a paucity in the academic
literature. Where practitioners contribute to the literature, their papers are wary of disclosing
any information that would confer an advantage to competing banks or credit scoring
agencies. In an industry where every percentage point in improvement can increase bank
profits considerably, this reticence on the part of practitioners is understandable.
Nonetheless, it opens up the way for more academic literature to make good any shortfalls in
our understanding of small business scoring.
However, some analysts may argue that businesses have been scored and therefore it is
likely that they would deny a literature gap exists. I will go on to demonstrate that business
delinquency has been estimated before and that there is a plethora of studies estimating
business delinquency in different forms. However, these existing studies attempt to predict
that a large, listed business turns bankrupt. This type of analysis, which is referred to as a Z-
score analysis and which is described later, is inappropriate for the scoring of small
1 P. 174 Hand, 1997
2 From Preface, P.i Crook et al. (1992). 'Credit Scoring and Credit Control'
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businesses. It should become clear in the course of this chapter that bankruptcy studies, of
which the Z-score analysis is the first formalised bankruptcy study since its inception in the
1980's, relies on timely and accurate accountancy data in order to predict bankruptcy. Small
firms do not have to provide audited accounts (Gower, 1992). If non-audited accounts are
used, there is a suspicion that an entrepreneur can manipulate them (Zavgren, 1985). Finally,
there is the argument that human capital variables such as age and work experience should
be used in a small business scorecard. Cressy (1996a) has demonstrated that these variables
are highly correlated with the survival of a small firm. However, no Zeta score analysis
includes human capital variables in its default estimation, possibly because as firms become
larger and the ownership structure more dispersed, the relationship between the human
capital variables of the firm's founder and eventual default may become more tenuous.
It should be clear therefore, that while the Zeta analysis is potentially useful for the
prediction of default in large businesses, where bankruptcy proxies delinquency, that it is
inappropriate for the scoring of small businesses. This is precisely the gap in the literature
that needs to be addressed by an analysis estimating a small business scorecard.
A further gap in the literature arises from the predominance of bankruptcy as a measure of
default. A bank may be more interested in predicting distress rather than bankruptcy since
the former is a more frequent event (distress is a precursor to bankruptcy) and yet by the
time bankruptcy arises, it is already too late for a bank to consider taking any action. By the
time a business has been declared a bankrupt, it is likely that the bank has already had to
incur considerable expense in attempting to recoup its investment. Some banks may
reschedule debts and reorganise the business, as indicated by Wruck (1990). Therefore, a
measure of default that occurs prior to bankruptcy and that is indicative of financial distress,
is of more use to a bank because it is more timely. The time for bank action is the event
horizon prior to bankruptcy and therefore a bank requires an early warning system.
However, financial distress is an outcome that is more difficult to predict than bankruptcy
because the symptoms are not as pronounced (Gilbert et al., 1990; Altman et. ah, 1994).
To date, one direct analysis has been carried out to deriving a scorecard for commercial
loans using credit grade, indicative of financial distress, rather than bankruptcy as the
response variable (Dietrich and Kaplan, 1982). The fact that serious commercial default
represents a potentially useful outcome variable but that studies of commercial
default/distress are dominated by studies estimating bankruptcy, provides a further
motivation for my research.
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This next section outlines the differences between commercial and non-commercial credit
scoring. The section following this compares and contrasts the dominant type of commercial
scorecard, called the Zeta scorecard, pioneered by Altman and discusses whether it is
applicable to small business scoring. The section following this deals with the type of
outcome variables used in previous commercial scoring analyses and highlights some
controversies in this area. I conclude with a summary of the gaps in the commercial scoring
literature.
4.2 Distinction between commercial and mainstream credit scoring
The literature on the scoring of consumers for credit products is data driven and very much
influenced by what method works best and the rigour of cross-validation. However, the
commercial scoring literature which represents the subject of this chapter, while not
theoretical in that no financial economic models are presented, is to a large extent
interpretative. This is because the derivation of the explanatory variables, for models such as
the Zeta model, is based on the use of established financial indicators that have informed
decision-makers prior to the advent of scorecards. The fusion of accountancy and prediction
means that researchers commonly attempt to interpret their results by referring to the
established rules on the interpretation of accounting ratios and variables. Past critics of the
system include Barnes (1987) who criticises the lack of a theoretical underpinning in
bankruptcy studies as follows;
'..as company failure studies blatantly demonstrate, accounting ratios are rarely used in the
financial literature to test theories and hypotheses of economic and financial behaviour'7,.
Altman et al. (1994) have also commented on the lack of a theoretical underpinning for
bankruptcy models. They do not condemn the lack of a theoretical background but argue
that data driven techniques are quite appropriate;
'We know many things about how companies can fall into economic distress, about crisis
procedures and company decline, but we do not have a complete theory'4.
This lack of theoretical literature underpinning the derivation of commercial scorecards
contrasts with the theory-rich Chapter 2, where the issues investigated deal with the nature
of small business loans.
3 Barnes, 1987. P.457
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4.3 Bankruptcy prediction (Zeta analysis) and the prediction of SME default
In this section, I introduce the main type of business scorecard, the Zeta scorecard used for
predicting bankruptcy, and discuss whether it is relevant for the scoring of small businesses.
I look into several issues surrounding zeta type analyses before concluding whether they are
applicable to small business scoring. Moreover, I discuss matched sample design, the
reliability of accounting ratios and the availability and validity of such information for small
businesses. I also discuss whether the models capture all the relevant variables in the context
of small business borrowing and finally, whether bankruptcy is a relevant outcome variable
to predict.
The scoring of commercial applicants was initiated by the pathbreaking Altman et al. (1977)
paper that built on work by Deakin (1976). Deakin had previously investigated the
association between financial ratios and failure. Following on Deakin's analysis, Altman
pioneered the business Z score that he derived by regressing 7 accounting ratios against the
likelihood that the business subsequently went bankrupt. He used a matched sample design
of 53 bankrupt and 58 non-bankrupt firms and found that bankruptcy classification was quite
accurate for up to 5 years prior to failure. His scorecard exhibited a minimum successful
classification of the bankrupt firms of 62.8 percent when the holdout validation technique
was used. However, it must be remembered that Altman et al. employed a matched sample
design and so each bankruptcy had a 47.8 percent chance of being correctly classified in the
absence of a model, based on the frequency of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in his
estimation sample.
Turning to the 7 ratios used in the first zeta model, some ratios were chosen because they
had demonstrated a high correlation with bankruptcy in previous empirical studies. The 7
variables were 'return on assets', 'stability of earnings', 'logged debt service', 'cumulative
profitability', 'liquidity', 'capitalisation' and 'logged firm's assets' (a size measure).
'Capitalisation' stands for the ratio between total capital employed and assets5. Their
rationale for including this variable was that in previous studies the denominator, which is
the value of the firm as perceived by investors, conveys information about the firm's future
earnings potential (Beaver, 1968; Altman, 1968).
'Liquidity' is denoted by the ratio between current assets and current liabilities. It represents
the ability of a firm to meet its liabilities as they become due.'Altman et al. demonstrate that
'liquidity' is negatively related to bankruptcy. However, they do not employ any a priori
4
P.515. Altman et al. 1994
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reason for including 'liquidity' as an estimator of bankruptcy other than to comment, once
the regressions have been run, that it is predictive and therefore is worthy of inclusion.
The 'log of total assets' is included in order to control for firm size where larger firms are
less likely to go bankrupt. No a priori reason is cited by the authors to justify its inclusion.
The 'return on assets' ratio is denoted by net income divided by assets. It proxies the
profitability of the firm and is predicted to be negatively related to bankruptcy. Altman et al.
point to previous multivariate studies by themselves and by Beaver showing 'return on
assets' to be 'extremely helpful in assessing firm performance' (Altman, 1968; 1973;
Beaver, 1967)6.
You may notice that the assets variable is used as the denominator in two of the three
financial ratios namely 'capitalisation' and 'return on assets'. It is a feature of bankruptcy
studies using accounting ratios, that the same variable can be used as the input into several
accounting ratios. This overlap between accounting ratios typical of bankruptcy studies had
implications for collinearity.
The variable 'logged debt service' i.e. pre-tax earnings divided by total interest payments,
carries no justification for inclusion. Possibly the reader is expected to assume that a firm
that is comparatively less well able to cover its debt obligations, receiving little income
relative to its outgoings on loan repayments and denoted by a low ratio value, is more prone
to bankruptcy than a firm with a high ratio value.
The inclusion of the 'stability ofearnings' variables is justified on the grounds that business
risk is often expressed in terms of earnings fluctuations. However, this variable did not enter
the final model.
Although the pioneering analysis on bankruptcy prediction by Altman et al. dates from the
1970's, its acceptance by contemporary writers is confirmed by more recent analyses using
accounting ratios (Bahnson and Bartley, 1992; Gilbert et al., 1990; Piatt and Piatt, 1991a
and 1991b; Piatt et al., 1995, Schellenger and Cross, 1994; Taffler, 1999). Hence Weiss
(1996), in a more recent study uses variables similar to the original accounting ratios
employed by Altman et al. (1977). These are as follows; 'capitalisation', 'liquidity', 'log of
total assets' and 'return on assets'.
Table 4.1 outlines some of the other variables used in corporate bankruptcy studies. I will
now summarise these studies because no credit scoring analysis into small business default
is complete without reference to the literature on bankruptcy studies. Any analysis
5 This is analogous to a debt to capital ratio in the case of a small firm start-up employing little or no
initial capital of its own.
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attempting to fill a literature gap by estimating a small business scorecard should
acknowledge the contribution made by bankruptcy studies, owing to their pivotal role in the
literature of commercial default.
In Table 4.1, the variable 'leverage' comprising debt as a proportion of market
capitalisation or total equity is represented in all studies. 'Liquidity' is defined in various
different ways but here is interpreted as readily available or easily liquidable ('quick') assets
divided by current liabilities (Zavgren, 1985). In other words, this ratio is intended to show
how the firm can honour its short term commitments such as payment of debtors. The size of
the firm is either measured in terms of assets or market capitalisation. This is not a ratio but
rather a control variable. The return on assets or profitability measure is denoted by some
income measure as a proportion of capital employed, investment or assets. 'Quick' assets are
similar in some ways to the liquidity measure but this time are defined as readily available
assets such as cash divided by total assets. This variable is referred to by Zavgren (1985) as
the 'cash position' variable. Finally, more recent studies have emphasised the cash flow
position of the firm and have included cash flow ratios (Bahnson and Bartley, 1992; Gilbert
et al., 1990; Piatt and Piatt, 1991a and 1991b; Piatt et al., 1995, Schellenger and Cross,
1994; Taffler, 1999).
The rationale for using the Z score was that accountants had been using accounting ratios
prior to the introduction of automated scoring in order to establish how a business was
performing. Rising levels of liabilities and costs of servicing borrowed capital (flow
measures) were divided by company stock measures such as capitalisation in order to
produce a picture of how the company was faring. Given that rising levels of debt to equity,
the stockpiling of inventories and exacerbated cash flow problems were historically
associated with bankruptcy, Altman et al. (1977), as we have seen, incorporated these
traditional warning ratios into a regression model. They thereby found how each variable
contributed towards an explanation of bankruptcy when controlling for the other variables.
More recent commercial scoring studies employing the basic principles pioneered by
Altman (1977) are relatively common (Altman et al, 1994; Gilbert et al., 1990; Goss and
Ramchandani, 1995; Mossman, 1998, Piesse and Wood, 1992). The question to ask is
whether the scorecard techniques employed in these studies are applicable to the SME
sector.
In order to evaluate the bankruptcy studies, I start with the idea of the matched sample
design. This involves taking a sample of bankrupt and non-bankrupt businesses in order to
6 P.34 Altman et al., 1977
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perform the estimations. The number of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms is kept roughly
similar. For example, Goss and Ramchandan (1995) used a paired sample of 20 solvent and
insolvent firms, Lo (1985) derives a logit model using a set of 38 matched bankrupt/non-
bankrupt firms and Goss and Ramchandani (1995) apply a matched sample of 20 bankrupt
and non-bankrupt life insurers. This technique of matching the number of firms in each
sample implies that the proportion of bankrupt firms in the estimation sample is vastly
inflated. In reality, bankruptcy does not affect 50 percent of large corporations and therefore
this first constraint of quota sampling firms means that the samples used in zeta-analyses
bear little resemblance to the natural proportions of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in the
population of businesses (Zmijewski, 1984). This has led bankruptcy studies to criticise the
practice of matched sample designs (Piesse and Wood, 1992; Gilbert et al., 1990; Betts and
Belhoul, 1987; Schellenger and Cross, 1994). The issue with matched sample designs is that
researchers must apply the natural proportions of default in the population when applying
the cut-off. They must modify the cut-off accordingly if the estimation sample contains a
disproportionate number of bad companies (Thomas et ah, 2002). However, Altman et ah
(1994), when employing a large matched design containing 404 unsound and 404 healthy
companies, do not mention how their choice of companies affects the cut-off. Because they
do not mention the level of cut-off used, the reader is left considering whether the default
equal probability level was applied. A further example of the problems raised when
researchers fail to inform readers of why they choose a particular cut-off, occurs in Gilbert
et al (1990). They compare the relative rates of Type I error (a business goes bankrupt while
the model predicts it should not) with Type II errors (a business is predicted to be good
while it is in fact a bankrupt). They estimate their first regression using a random sample of
firms in addition to a sample of bankrupt firms. They additionally estimate a regression
using a sample of financially distressed firms compared with a sample of bankrupt firms.
They find that Type I error decreased when they used the random/bankrupt samples.
However, Type II error decreased when they used their distressed/bankrupt sample. They
used the same 50 percent cut-offs (expected probability levels for their classification
matrices) in both cases, despite the fact that the natural proportions of failure in the
population of borrowers was maintained at an artificial level of 50 percent.
Applying the reasoning outlined in Thomas et al. (2002), modified cut-offs should be used
that would amend the cut-offs to reflect the real incidence of failure in the population.
These modified cut-offs are calculated in the following way.
Assign a company to the group of goods, group 0, if
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pT x < log C ( 1 | 0)/( C(0\l)]-log [ (n0 7T,)/(n, ito) ]
= log[C( 1\ 0) n, 7to / C (0 \ 1) n0 n,] 4.1
where
TZo = population proportion in group 0
n0 = number of cases in sample in group 0
C (1 | 0) = cost of classifying a group 0 member into group 1 i.e. Type II error
The population proportions in the sample are;
7tb = n0 / (n, + n0)
and
7Tj — ni / (nj + no)
then multiplying the proportion tc<o by n, gives
TCo - ni no/ (nj + no) 4.2
and multiplying the proportion rto by n0 gives
n0 7ti - n0 Hj/ (ni + n0) 4.3
Cross-multiplying 4.2 by 4.3 we get ni7p> / no7tj. This gives 1.
Replacing ni JZo / no 7l\ with 1 in 4.1, gives the following; we classify into group 0 if
Returning to the example cited from Gilbert et al. (1990), it is highly unlikely that the
separate incidences of bankrupt and financially distressed firms in the population of
commercial borrowers amount to 50 percent. Given that bankrupt firms are also financially
distressed but that not all financially distressed firms are bankrupt, there should be a higher
proportion of financially distressed firms in the population than bankrupt firms. If the
researchers had considered the real proportions of the two types of failure in the population
of borrowers and adjusted the cut-offs accordingly, comparability between the models
would not be hampered by this limitation.
This lack of emphasis of why particular cut-offs are used in some of the bankruptcy studies,
makes comparability among studies problematic. This is because classification rates are
directly affected by the researcher's choice of cut-off.
A further problem raised by using a matched sample design is that distressed firms are
included in the estimation sample because they are known a priori to be distressed.
Anecdotal evidence from bankers suggests that the inclusion of already failed firms in
prx<log[C(l\0)/ C( 0 | 1)) 4.4
The issues in scoring businesses Chapter Four Page 98
estimation samples is incorrect7. Some evidence in the literature corroborates this anecdotal
evidence. Dietrich and Kaplan (1982), quoting from Benishay (1973), indicated that
bankruptcy studies using matched designs resemble more an 'autopsy of deceased firms
rather than a prediction of business failures'*'.They conclude that zeta-models would have
more value if they did not preselect financially healthy and bankrupt firms. Rather zeta-
models should include in their estimation samples dichotomies such as distressed and
surviving firms or distressed and bankrupt firms. A problem with the estimated zeta models
is that they preselect winners and losers, either category exhibiting very different financial
ratios to begin with. Since distressed firms that survive and distressed firms that fail will
have more similar financial ratios, it is more of a challenge and more valuable to a bank to
be able to differentiate between these two outcomes. Hence, Altman et al. (1994) have
revised Altman's earlier system, employed in Altman et al. (1977), of comparing bankrupt
companies with non-bankrupt companies by estimating a scorecard based on a surviving or
'vulnerable' I bad or 'unsound' dichotomy. Hence, Altman seems to have taken on board
criticisms that bankruptcy models represent more an 'autopsy of deceased companies', in
his more recent research.
To discriminate between firms at risk that survive and those that fail is precisely what the
Altman et al. (1994) considered in their analysis, which up to then had not been adequately
dealt with in the literature. According to Gilbert et al., in the analysis mentioned above
dealing with financially distressed firms as well as bankrupt ones, they conclude that;
'A stronger case could be made for information value if such (credit scoring) models
discriminate between 'at risk' firms that survive and 'at risk' firms that fail'9.
The second problem with the zeta-analyses is the timeliness of the accounting data. Since
they are based on historical accounting data rather than application or performance data, the
timing of financial statements is essential (Altman and Saunders, 1998). If data accounting
data is not current, a problem arises. If a researcher collects accounting data pertaining to
businesses at risk that fail, some businesses at time t.3 (3 years before the event outcome)
may provide up to date information while others may supply accounting information that
predates their current status. Therefore, the financial ratios derived from delayed accounts
will not reflect the state of the businesses in the time window t.3. Non-current data
7 For example, the bank from whom I obtained my data took care when constructing their in-house
scorecards to ensure that they eliminated firms who had been known to have defaulted from the
estimation sample. They took this precaution in order that the scorecard assessed the probability that a
firm fails, given that it is a good firm to begin with.
8 P. 31. Dietrich and Kaplan, 1982
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confounds analyses that attempt to match financial ratios with a particular time window
because it misrepresents the firm's financial situation at the time of estimation (time t_3 in
this example).
A related issue is the availability and validity of accounting data. Only VAT registered
businesses above the £50,000 turnover threshold (in the year 2001) are compelled to present
full, comprehensive accounts. Gower (1992) indicates that small and medium sized
companies can produce summarised profit and loss and balance sheet statements. Small and
medium sized businesses do not have to produce accounting information complying with the
Accounting Standards. However, Gower notes that the argument for this exemption is not a
cogent one. He asserts that certain small and medium sized companies wanting 'small to be
beautiful', are likely to produce audited statements10. Perhaps small businesses hoping to
impress their banks are among the SMEs who want 'small to be beautiful'. However, this
must remain a conjecture. The Accounting Standards exemption means that micro-
businesses that the bank would like to score, are not required to have accounting statements
that could be used to score their applications.
Apart from the restrictions on the availability of small business accounting information, the.
validity of accounting data is another issue that can impact on both large and small'
businesses alike. Accounting data can be manipulated to make the business look better than
it is. Zavgren (1985) found that the explanatory variables with the most significant t-values
in her model, were quick asset ratios e.g. acid test ratio because they are difficult to fake by
entrepreneurs. She found that profitability figures are not significant, perhaps because they
are easy to misrepresent. Therefore creative accounting practices can undermine the
effectiveness of scorecards that are built on historical accounting information. It should be
noted that some research has shown profitability to be a useful determinant of bankruptcy
(El Hennawy and Morris, 1987; Altman, 1977).
Perhaps the most important consideration in this discussion of the limitations of Zeta models
and the applicability of the Zeta model to small business scoring, is the explanatory
variables used. Incorporated businesses have a very different ownership structure to small
businesses with limited liability. Due to the higher dispersion of ownership in the larger
incorporated businesses, there has thitherto been no need for including human capital
variables such as principal partner's work experience in commercial scorecards. This is
because when the management and ownership of the business are only tenuously related to
9 P. 161. Gilbert et al„ 1990
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the principal partner, the expected explanatory power of human capital variables related to
the business principal is reduced".
Asch (1995), who is a practitioner in the area of credit scoring, indicates that human capital
variables are important in the scoring of small businesses. He describes the RMA/Fair Isaac
initiative using pooled data to develop scorecards for small business loans of up to $35,000
and those greater than $35,000. He draws an important distinction between techniques for
assessing larger corporations and smaller businesses. Small business lending is more
comparable to consumer credit since qualitative information, such as the credit standing of
the principal, is a requisite.
Leonard (1992), in his research into the scoring of 'small business' loans, did not employ
accounting ratios as explanatory variables12. Instead he modelled whether a business was
accepted or declined for a loan based on application details such as the name of the
company, the amount of loan requested, the gearing (credit position) of the company and
whether it was a new or existing company. A full listing of the variables used in the Leonard
analysis is contained in Table 4.2.
The reason why I focus on Leonard's analysis is because it is the first published analysis of
commercial businesses using explanatory variables that are stand-alone rather than
accounting ratios. Additionally, some explanatory variables used describe the human capital
of the owner. Therefore, Leonard's estimations are the first to demonstrate that variables,
such as whether a company is an existing company or a start-up, when used in the scoring of
consumers for credit, are significantly related to the outcome variable i.e. whether a business
had his loan application accepted or not. Leonard calls attention to the failure of commercial
scoring studies to emulate the methods used in non-commercial scoring.
'While the consumer credit industry has widely accepted and adopted the principles of
credit scoring, the same cannot be said for their counterparts in commercial credit...we
show that the same benefits that have been explored by consumer credit are available to
those in the commercial area'u.
10 P.470. Gower, 1992. 'Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law'. 5Ul Edition. London. Sweet
and Maxwell
11 Of course, it could be argued that the integrity of a high-profile CEO is immensely important in
large companies where goodwill and fair play play a prominent role e.g. Richard Branson of Virgin
Corp. However, my argument concerns more the financial composition of small businesses whose
stocks are non-traded and therefore whose ownership resides in the hands of a few principal owners.
12 What Leonard implies by 'small business' in fact large by UK standards. His sample contains loans
to businesses with assets of less than $10 million and for loans of less than or equal to $1 million.
13 P.89. Leonard, 1992. IMA Journal of Mathematical Applied in Business and Industry.
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Leonard's study is not the first to undertake modelling the decision of a loan officer to lend
or decline credit to an applicant. Overstreet and Kemp (1986) estimated the probability that
loan officers in three US Credit Unions declined applications by potential borrowers. He
indicates that the 'analysis of repayment performance' must be left as an exercise for future
research since his decision-making model does not consider actual repayment outcomes.
The importance of Leonard's study, is that it is the first to depart from the use of accounting
ratios. Also, Leonard's analysis is the first, prior to Altman et al. (1994), to estimate a small
business scorecard explicitly for small business loan applications. On the basis of Leonard's
study, it is easy to visualise how similar, stand-alone, human capital variables could be
adopted for use in commercial scoring studies. For example, stand-alone variables such as
age, number of years at current address or residential status have been successfully used in
consumer credit studies (Banasik et al., 1996; Crook et al., 1992c; Desai et al 1996; Desai et
al., 1997). The unique feature of Leonard's analysis, therefore, is his usage of stand-alone as
opposed to ratio type variables. For example, instead of dividing income surplus by the total
net worth of the company to derive a ratio equivalent to the return on assets ratio described
in Table 4.2, he leaves them as single variables.
Apart from Leonard's usage of straight variables rather than accounting ratios, there are
several other differences, which distinguish his work into small business scoring from the
bankruptcy studies outlined earlier. Leonard takes on board the possibility that small
businesses below a threshold size are not obliged by law to have full profit and loss, nor
cashflow statements. Some may submit their accounts in a summarised format (pro-forma)
and others not submit any at all. He therefore includes a dummy variable 'ST, indicating the
format of the financial statements (pro-forma or fully recorded) with a field indicating that
no statements were presented at all.
Leonard also considers the ownership structure of the small business in his choice of
variables, a consideration that is lacking in the bankruptcy studies. His dummy variable,
TF,' denoting whether the firm is a private company or not and his variable, 'NO',
indicating the number of owners of the firm, are potentially useful. This is because these
variables capture higher ownership dispersion (lower risk) and the legal liability structure of
the company, with implications for the ease with which the bank can requisition collateral
following company failure. Limited companies have their assets protected by law with
implications for moral hazard because if an entrepreneur enjoys protection, he may less
averse to risk-taking behaviour. This is analogous to theories of wealthy individuals being
less averse to taking risks as described by Cressy (1999). Also, businesses with a wider
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ownership structure enjoy a wider skills base and decisions are taken on a consensual basis,
thus pooling the experience and wisdom of several partners (Burns and Clements, 1992;
Bopaiah, 1997; Cressy, 1996a). This assumes that all partners are active and not merely
sleeping partners. Businesses with wider ownership structures are also more likely to
continue existing should one partner fall sick, die or simply wish to terminate the business.
Clements and Burns (1992) discussed how a bank is very concerned that a business owner's
succession is guaranteed, since this assures some degree of continuity into the future.
Unfortunately, Leonard's outcome variable 'outcome of application' is not one that models
default but rather the decision to accept or reject a loan. Therefore, as an application
scorecard, it has limited use unless the bank wishes to formalise its acceptance procedures
and replicate how it has given loans in the past. I also have an additional concern with
Leonard's research where he lists the variable 'OUT', the outcome of an application for
finance, as an explanatory variable. However, if he is 'predicting' the outcome of an
application, the inclusion of 'OUT' as a predictive variable leads to endogeneity.
Unfortunately, there is no clarification in his paper of the latter issue and I assume that this
variable was included in error on the list of explanatory variables.
This issue of Leonard's outcome variable leads us to the general issue of outcome variables
in the literature. I look next at the relevance of bankruptcy as an outcome variable which is
the standard used by the Zeta type model. This has been criticised by researchers who have
opted for an outcome variable that is closer to the risk grade system used by banks. Because
this final issue is very relevant to my analysis of small business default in Chapter 6, it will
be described separately in the next section.
4.4 The debate about a relevant outcome variable
When modelling commercial default in an applicant scorecard, should a credit scorer use
bankruptcy or some other measure of default as the dependent variable? This is a very
important question in commercial scoring because it hinges on the complex nature of
businesses. Even small businesses can potentially have many accounts and several business
principals. If one of an entrepreneur's accounts goes into arrears or one of the business
principals exhibits default on one of his personal accounts, does this translate into default by
the enterprise? Consumer scoring is not as affected by how default is defined since, in many
cases, a particular money transmission account (MTA) such as a current or credit card
account is targeted for scoring, rather than the sum of all the individual's accounts and those
individuals with whom he/she has a financial relationship. Hence, some consumer scoring
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studies have focussed on the severity of the default rather than the definition of default itself
(Crook et al., 1992b). One of the reasons for the lack of discussion in the consumer scoring
literature on the nature of, rather than severity of default, is that arrears on an individual's
MTAs are comparatively easy to model. It is only when the combined impact of default over
numerous accounts has to be taken into account, that the analysis becomes more complex.
Due to the complexity of business default, Zeta-type analyses have used bankruptcy as an
outcome variable. The alternative to using bankruptcy as an outcome variable is to use in-
house bank data such as credit grades. There are advantages and limitations to both types of
outcome variables that I will explain below.
Altman and Saunders (1998) support the usage of credit scoring models using objective
outcome variables such as bankrupt/non-bankrupt or default/non-default. They are critical of
methods attempting to replicate the loan grade or bond rating decision because they argue
that these analyses depend on a subjective dependent variable.
'A criterion such as bankruptcy/non-bankruptcy is preferable because the classifications
are less subjective than ratings. Bankruptcy is a fact! A bond rating or loan grade is a
subjective opinion; leading rating agencies often do not agree with each other on a
suprisingly large number of cases. And we know that bankers often disagree as to the
'appropriate' risk grade. Models that are designed to duplicate 'expert opinion' accept
highly subjective decision criteria'14.
However, Altman and Saunders do not take into account the subjective nature of
bankruptcy. Indeed banks themselves may initiate bankruptcy proceedings against a
business, as was modelled by Wruck (1990) and Lawrence and Arshadi (1995). Two
identical firms could exhibit the same signs of financial distress. However, owing to highly
subjective factors such as better personal rapport and trust between the loan officer and the
entrepreneur, one firm may be forced into receivership and the other have its debts
rescheduled. Although Altman and Saunders claim that 'bankruptcy is a fact', they fail to
acknowledge that ultimately the state of bankruptcy can depend on highly subjective factors
such as trust, rapport or belief in an entrepreneur's ability. Therefore, one must bear in mind
that bankruptcy itself is not an entirely objective outcome variable either. Evidence by Scott
and Smith (1986) even suggests that bankruptcy (Chapter 13 filing) may be a preferred
option by a small business wishing to keep its creditors at bay. Mester (1997) suggests that
this is indeed the case. It is possible to argue that the decision to instigate bankruptcy
proceedings is not entirely motivated by objective factors but may ultimately depend on the
ownership structure of the firm. This is because as Wruck (1990) suggests, firms whose
14
P.8 Altman and Saunders (1998)
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ownership rests in the hands of many stockholders present difficulty to receivers because the
stock has to be divided among a myriad of creditors. In this case, it makes sense to keep the
firm as a going concern and hence a bank is keener to reschedule the firm's debt and ensure
that it reorganises its operations.
Therefore, I would argue that bankruptcy is as subjective or objective an outcome variable
as the loan grade grade of a business, given that bankruptcy is inextricably linked to the
decision processes of the firm's creditors.
Further evidence of the subjective nature of bankruptcy is seen in the inability of a
bankruptcy scorecard to distinguish between insolvency and bankruptcy (Piesse and Wood,
1992). Bankruptcy and financial distress are flagged in the same way by a commercial
scorecard but what differentiates the two outcomes, is the decision taken by the creditors. If
the creditors can effectively reorganise a financially distressed company and exert some
influence over the organisation process, bankruptcy is a less attractive option. Therefore
bankruptcy is not necessarily influenced by the accounting ratios used in the Zeta-model, to
the extent that insolvency is. What forces the bankruptcy outcome, is the decision that that
the bank or main creditors take in order to mitigate the damage. Not only are different
explanatory variables called for in order to explain the decisioning process for bankruptcy to
occur, (e.g. the concentration of creditors), but the end result may be influenced more by
subjective factors not captured in the Zeta model.
Scott and Smith (1986) provide indirect evidence that bankruptcy is not a useful outcome
variable. Taking a sample of 1,653 US small business loans they find that following the
introduction of The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the price of lending to small
businesses was increased. This was because more borrower assets were now declared
immune from forfeiture by a bank, causing the bank to raise the price of credit as the cover
offered by businesses decreased. The borrower also could prevent the secured creditors
(including the banks) from immediately seizing any other assets. Keasey and Watson (1994)
on the other hand, have looked into the effect of insolvency law on SMEs in the UK.
The point being made is that bankruptcy is influenced by both legal factors as much as by
subjective factors and therefore it is incorrect to claim that it entirely free of subjective bias.
Small businesses (sole proprietors) in the US can now receive a 3 year (possibly 5 year with
the court's permission) stay on the seizure of their assets by creditors. A small business
experiencing financial difficulties has an incentive to file for bankruptcy knowing that this
provides ample breathing space for a reorganisation of the business activities. If bankruptcy
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is a choice variable, it is not merrely endogenous to the accounting variables but also
influenced by the bank and entrepreneur's actions.
Despite the relative abundance of Zeta-type analyses using bankruptcy as the default
variable, there are relatively few analyses modelling actions taken by the bank using default
or in-house risk grades as outcome variables. The only known examples of such analyses are
by Orgler (1970), Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) and Srinivasan and Kim (1987). Perhaps one
of the reasons for this paucity in the number of studies using the credit grade as a response
variable, is that they require information from the bank itself whereas analyses modelling
bankruptcy and using financial ratios, can obtain data for their estimations directly from
Compustat or some other commercial database.
One example of a study using a subjective response variable is by Dietrich and Kaplan
(1982). They replicate the probit technique (McKelvey-Zavoina) used in the bond rating
industry to derive five narrow intervals, which correspond to different probability cut-offs.
Their model uses a response variable, similar to that used by Orgler (1970), and aims to
reproduce the lending officer's classification decisions. In so doing, the Dietrich and Kaplan
analysis shares some similarities with other models aiming to replicate decisions made by
lending officers (Leonard, 1992; Overstreet and Kemp, 1986).
The McKelvey-Zavoina procedure assumes that there is a variable, P, measuring the
riskiness or probability of default of a loan. P is a continuous variable, measured on an
interval scale. It represents a linear function of a set of independent predictors describing the
financial condition of the company. An ordinal version of P is estimated, which is denoted
by the researchers as Z. They determine Z by assuming the four intervals (-«, 0), (0, ju2),
(jult jU2), (ju2, °°) where ju2, u2 are constants estimated from the data.
The intervals correspond to the loan classification categories as follows;
Pt=0, then Z, = category I
0< Pj then Z, = category IA
jUj< Pi <fi2 then Zj = category II
ji2 < Pi then Z, = category III
Where;
/: current (acceptable banking risk)
IA: Especially mentioned (weakness in financial position)
//: Substandard (adverse trends)
III: Doubtful (repayment questionable)
IV: Loss (uncollectible)
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Dietrich and Kaplan select their predictor variables based on interviews with 10 loan
officers from the participating bank, the financial statement analysis literature and bond
rating literature. The dataset consists of 140 loans from a commercial bank, which are
matched to firms on the Compustat database. Of these 140 loans, 109 are classified as I, 16
as IA, 10 as II and 5 as III.
The linear model derived by Dietrich and Kaplan and used in the subsequent classifications
is;
Y = -.390 + 6.41 D/E - 1.12FFC + 0.664SD
Where Y is the predicted score for a loan, D/E represents the debt/equity ratio, FFC the
Funds from operations ratio and SD the number of years of sales decline.
They perform out-of-sample validations of their two functions as summarised in Table 4.1.
They classify the observations of 140 loans granted in 1976, whose performance was
observed one year from the time of application in 1977, using their model estimated on 1975
data (referred to as model 4). Using model 4, they correctly predict 1 of the 5 grade III
loans, indicating a hit rate of 20 percent. While this hit rate appears low, of the 4
misclassified grade III loans, 3 were predicted to be grade II. Hence, it could be argued that
model 4 correctly predicts 1 of the 5 grade III loans as grade 111 ('uncollectable'), while a
remaining 3 bad loans are predicted to be grade II or 'doubtful'.
They then take 187 Compustat loans from 1975 and classify these using the 1976 function
(referred to as model 3 and estimated on data from 1976) in order to predict their status one
year from the time of granting the loans in 1976. Model 3 accurately classifies 1 of the 2
grade III loans. Although this may seem poor, the grade 111 loan that it misclassified, was
classified as a grade II loan. Therefore, it correctly classified the grade III loan as a bad
loan, albeit designating its status as 'doubtfid' rather than 'uncollectible'. This suggests that
while classifying the bad loans correctly as bad, model 3 did not classify grade III loans as
bad enough, thereby underestimating the severity of the default.
In order to summarise the discussion on a relevant outcome variable, there is no optimal
response variable that can be used in a commercial scorecard. This is because of the
complexity of default which relates, not merely to default on one account, but rather to
default over many accounts of interconnected borrowers. Because of the holistic approach to
default measurement in commercial scoring, finding a valid outcome variable has not been
easy.
Despite limitations in using either bankruptcy or credit grade response variables, due to the
subjectivity in both, they are the only available outcome variables so far to be used in
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commercial scoring. I would argue that they are both equally valid. However an advantage
of using credit grades to summarise the commercial borrower's position, is that certain
grades denote insolvency. On balance, it is preferable to use insolvency rather than
bankruptcy as a response variable given that the transition from insolvency to bankruptcy is
a matter for the creditors to decide i.e. is a choice variable and hence there is a danger that
using bankruptcy as an outcome variable leads to model misspecification.
4.5 Conclusion
Despite the predominance of firm failure or bankruptcy studies, these are not applicable to
an analysis of small business scoring. This is because they omit possible important human
capital variables such as ownership structure, the age of the entrepreneur or behavioural
attributes such as past insolvency.
The issue of an appropriate outcome variable is one that is central to commercial scoring.
Altman and Saunders (1998) are particularly critical of analyses that do not include
bankruptcy as an outcome variable. However, Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) have successfully
used credit grade as an outcome variable. Notwithstanding, the successful usage of credit
grade in the past, Altman and Saunders (1998) have a point in condemning subjective
measures of default. There is no commercial failure study, including bankruptcy studies, that
is entirely free from subjectivity. This is because bankruptcy itself is subject to the same
criticism of subjectivity. In the US, from where the majority of bankruptcy studies originate,
a small business owner has even an incentive to initiate bankruptcy procedures because he
enjoys legal protection over his collateralised business assets under US law. On the other
hand, sometimes a bank has an incentive to withhold bankruptcy procedures (Wruck, 1990).
Therefore, it is a fallacy to understand bankruptcy as an entirely objective outcome. It is
equally simplistic to regard credit grade as an entirely subjective outcome variable. The
credit grade of 'unrecoverable' in the definition used by Dietrich and Kaplan, may be
designated as such for entirely objective reasons e.g. because the level of firm assets are
insufficient to cover the firm's liabilities. Invoking this type of objective criteria in assigning
credit grades to borrowers, indicates that the credit grade system is not necessarily free from
subjective bias. It is quite plausible that any loan officer would designate an insolvent firm
as grade III, although the intermediary category of grade II or 'doubtful' may be prone to
more subjectivity, depending on the loan officer's confidence in the entrepreneur's ability to
repay the loan.
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Consumer scoring studies do not exhibit the same problems with outcome variables as
commercial scoring studies. This is because if the product is for a credit card or store card,
there is invariably more consensus on what is meant by default. For example Crook,
Hamilton and Thomas (1992b) experiment with consecutive and single missed repayments.
However, in the case of commercial scoring, the outcome variable has to relate to the
creditworthiness of the business principal (sole-trader), the entity as a whole or some
amalgamation of the risk over the principal business partners (partnership).
Therefore, the definition of an outcome variable is complex and fraught with the problems
described here. I would have to conclude on this basis that there is no ideal outcome variable
for a business scorecard but that all definitions have some element of subjectivity. As long
as these weaknesses are noted, commercial scoring becomes a more honest and open
procedure.
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Table 4.2 Variables used by Leonard (1992)
Company name
Company number
Outcome of application (approved or declined)
Amount of the loan application
Total credit postion (gearing) of the company
New versus existing company
Branch of bank
Type of loan (operating/term/small business loan)
Financial statements (past records/pro-forms/none)
Sales
Gross profit
Operating profit
Bad debts
Depreciation
Income surplus (loss) transferred to equity
Total net worth
Net working capital
Private/other company
Number of owners of firm
Owners guaranteed security in the company
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Chapter Five
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5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the data was collated from various sources
within the bank and how it was refined in order to ensure that there would be a one-to-one
correspondence between each applicant's characteristics and his performance data.
The data used in this study was extracted from a UK bank, the extraction of which took place
between January and July 2000. The cleaning of this data continued until December 2000.
I do not think that I have discovered the definitive way of collating small business data.
However, it must be understood that I worked under time and information constraints while
undertaking the extraction process at the head office of the UK bank supplying this data.
This data had never been used before in an application scorecard nor in any other analysis.
As such it presented great scope for research. The corollary and downside to the uniqueness
of the dataset, is that because a large part the data had never been extracted before, it also
presented a myriad of extraction problems. In many cases the employees at the bank, who
were extremely busy because they were experiencing major changes in their corporate
structure, could offer few insights on how best to aggregate business borrowers over the
1,068 variables that I was initially faced with. I had to work out many relationships on my
own. Because of these constraints, it is quite likely that some information has been extracted
in a less than optimal way. In a minority of cases, I have had to gauge the function of some
of the identifier variables and aggregate the data in accordance with my understanding of the
underlying linking relationships. In view of the challenging nature of this part of my
research, I will attempt to explain using examples where possible of how the data fits
together.
It is worthwhile noting that while the data did not produce very powerful scorecards
(Chapter 6), my findings in subsequent analyses into the financing of small firms, produced
results similar to those produced by past research. If the outcome of my research is therefore
anything to go by, the data performed satisfactorily and so any errors occurring at this stage
did not impact too adversely on my subsequent analyses.
Because the material in this chapter is highly specific, I will consign the detail of the
extraction process to Appendix A5. Such detail includes lists of the individual variables. The
interested reader can therefore refer to Appendix A5, for a more comprehensive overview of
the data extraction process and detailed discussion of variables that gave particular difficulty,
including some of the loan contract variables such as collateral amount and the amount
borrowed. This chapter contains a summary of the process.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I first describe the relational database format of
the database from which I extracted the data. I then list the stages in the extraction process.
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In the section that follows, I describe how flat files were created from the variables in the
relational database. The section following this deals with the sources of my application data.
I then describe the extraction of the performance data that took the form of risk bands and
credit grades. Finally, I present a summary of this chapter.
5.2 The relational database
Business data is characterised by high fragmentation because of its links to multiple
associated accounts and the interconnections among individuals related to the business.
Therefore, in order to save storage space, it is sensible to use a relational database format.
The dataset, at source, was not stored in a flat file but in a relational database format because
of storage considerations. A relational database is where the data is hierarchical and each
part of the dataset can be related to another part via one or several link variables. Some core
portions of the data are common to most other portions. However, some portions of the data
contain only a small number of observations. An example of such a data field is 'Number of
bad events'. Few businesses have experienced either the personal bankruptcy of their
directors and even fewer, of the business entity as a whole. Both of these events would be
described as bad events by the bank. However, despite the low frequency of bad events and
the low cell population this entails, this variable is essential to the analysis. Chandler and
Johnson (1992) and Wiginton (1980) both highlight how the inclusion of performance data
i.e. credit bureau data, can enhance the discriminatory power of a scorecard. Bahnson and
Bartley (1992) have shown how cash flow variables inferring the performance of the
business can enhance a scorecard including financial data alone. Therefore, it is imperative
that as many performance variables as possible are included in the eventual dataset even if
they contain a low incidence of cases.
In my example above dealing with past insolvency, instead of the database reproducing the
matrix for each and every variable, it only reproduces the bad events and these can be linked
uniquely to a customer, a customer's account or a customer's loan application via an
identifier variable. I will now explain what is meant by an identifier variable.
Identifier variables link all these relational datasets together. Four different identifier
variables were used in the dataset from which I extracted my small business loan dataset.
These were 'apcu_id', 'appljtd', 'appl_ver_no' and 'customer_id'.
As I understand the origin of the link variables from discussions with members of the small
business systems team at the bank, they were derived by a team of database consultants. The
link variable 'customerJd' is the easiest to understand and this was the variable that I
retained in the eventual flat files that I took from the bank. This variable simply assigns a
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unique customer number to each customer, irrespective of whether he is a business or
personal customer. In other words, Joe Bloggs may have several roles. He may be a business
owner or alternatively he may have taken out a mortgage and have a car loan. However, he
can be referred to in each case by his 'customer_id'.
The explanation gets more complex with the remaining identifier variables. 'Appl_id' and
'appl_ver_no' are always used together, where 'appl_id' denotes the number assigned to
each request for finance submitted by the individual and 'appl_ver_no' refers to the version
of the request. In other words, the request may be modified where the bank regards the initial
request as excessive or is prepared to change the terms of the lending contract in response to
revisions made by the borrower to collateral presented or guarantees made. These two link
variables are always used in conjunction with one another. These were the link variables that
I referred to when I was looking at portions of the relational database outlining the customer
accounts.
However, it is impossible to link the customer 'customer_id' to his end account 'appljd',
without considering any other players who may be involved in the same account. For
example, a partnership may have applied for a loan. I will illustrate this scenario using
fictitious names and data.1 The bank denotes two hypothetical entrepreneurs, the Smith
brothers Albert and Ronnie, by two unique customer identification numbers 23 and 32
respectively. The bank always, for data collation purposes, denotes one of the partners as the
principal partner and therefore his form of customer identification number is described as the
lead customer identification number of 23. Therefore, the lead customer identification
number of 23 denoting Albert, ensures that he is designated as the principal.
The customer identification number 'customerJd' therefore carries a suffix 'lea so that it
becomes 'customerJdJea', allowing me to identify it as the lead customer identification
number.
Figure 5.1 shows the three main link variables. From left to right we move from application
level 'appl_id' to application-lead applicant level 'apcujd' and, finally, to the unique
customer level 'customer_id'. 'Apcu_id' represents a transitional identification variable
providing the vital link between the loan or overdraft facility applied for and the eventual
customer. A staff member at the bank indicated to me that while 'appl_id' and 'customer_id'
represent real entities, the former denoting a borrower's application and the latter an
individual borrower, 'apcujd' does not stand for any physical entity. It is merely an
additional identifier variable. 'CustomerJd' was an important linking variable because it
1
In accordance with the Data Protection Act, I had no access to names of bank customers
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linked all customers with their respective repayment information in the form of credit grades
and risk bands.
Tables in the database were linked on either 'apcu_id' or the dual links 'appl_id' and
'appl_ver_no'. All tables with application characteristics could only be united to their
corresponding performance data at a later stage via the link variable 'customer_id' once they
had been related back to their respective transition tables. These transition tables were
TD5APCU APP_CUST (known as TD5APCU) linking on the variable 'apcu_id' and
TD5APPL_APPLICATN (known as TD5APPL) linking on the variable 'appl_id'.
Before I commenced my work with the bank, I mapped out in a diagram format how the
different tables should fit together. The original maps I used are illustrated in Figure 5.2 and
Figure 5.3. In these maps, the link table is located in the centre of the map and the tables that
are being included by means of the link variables, are located on the periphery of the map. In
Figure 5.2, the link variable in question is 'app_cust_id', otherwise known as 'apcu_id'. In
Figure 5.3, the paired link variables are 'appl_id' and 'appl_ver_no'.
There is not always a unique one to one relationship between the variables which link the
dataset together (link variables) and the characteristics of the borrower. When there is a 'one
to many' relationship between a link variable such as 'apcu_id' and variables within a table,"
multiple observations were seen for any given link variable. Hence, all the tables seen in
Figure 5.3 exhibited one-to-many relationships with the link variables, 'appl_id' and
'appl_ver_no'. In section 5.4 dealing with the creation of a flat file, this difficulty of
multiple entries for any given link variable is described and addressed.
Given that there were 1,068 variables in all, the strategy used was to extract all possible
variables that were known to relate to business borrowers even if all variables were not used
in any subsequent analysis. I had to ensure that I had covered as many variables as possible
during that first extraction period. This was because the bank wanted to minimise any
disturbance to their staffs time and therefore was not keen on redressing any problems that
would arise once the data had been extracted and their obligation to me fulfilled. The bank
encouraged me to 'flatten' tables, where there were multiple entries, by applying my own
criteria such as averaging, maximising or minimising values.
The 1,068 variables in the dataset related to about 90 tables and 60 partition numbers2. The
data in these tables came from several sources, as described in section 5.5 below. Originally,
the application forms to be completed by prospective business borrowers were examined and
2
A partition number is not a variable but a field that demarcates tables from one. another similar
tables. In other words, a partition number is inserted between blocks of variables that come from the
same section of an application form and that deal, for instance, with the collateral position of the firm.
They do not play a role in my future analysis because they are meaningless in themselves.
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the variables noted. Information about the business applicant would have been entered into
the Personal Financial Profile, the Business Lending Checklist or the Business Financial
Profile form. Since a business is made up of the personal finances of the individuals
involved as well as the overall business, estimating the viability of a business is more
complex then estimating the viability of an individual. This is why the sources of
information are diverse. The aim of any data retrieval exercise is to aggregate data relating to
the personal finances of the principals as well as the official data about the performance of
the business. The following description of the dataset outlines the documentation used by the
bank to capture the application characteristics of the borrower.
5.3 Stages in the extraction process
The extraction process involved moving the data from the IBM mainframe where it was
stored, using a software application. The data needed to be examined for flaws that arose
during the transferral process. Finally the data needed to be anonymised in the sense that
identifier variables such as 'customer_id' needed to be changed in order to preserve the
anonymity of the bank customer.
The first and second steps, the extraction of the data and the preliminary reduction of the
dataset so that it relates only to business customers, can be performed together using the
'proc sql1 procedure in SAS. This procedure permits data to be extracted from a mainframe
environment on which matching and selection criteria have been performed. This process
also permits the elimination of observations that add no value to the end analysis. For
example, personal customers with no business connection would represent a subset of the
personal customer observations that could be omitted at this stage. This would help to reduce
the dataset to a manageable size.
The second step involves examining the explanatory (right hand side) variables that do not
have a one to one relationship with the link variable. It is essential that there is a one to one
relationship between all variables and the link variable in order that there is a unique link that
corresponds to a customer or a customer's application to the bank. Multiple entries for the
link variable would rule out completely the possibility of performing a regression analysis of
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. This process of invoking 'banking rules'
to reformat tables with multiple entries is elaborated upon in section 5.4.
This second step was deemed the most time consuming because the one to one relationship
had to make banking sense. In a highly categorical table with many variables apart from the
link variable, an intuitive pattern between the link variable and other variables breaks down.
A system for identifying the variables responsible was used and the bank needed to be
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consulted on ways to derive a flat file that invoked banking rules for the aggregation and
averaging of amounts.
The third stage involved fitting each separate component table together by two separate sets
of link variables. About half of the tables containing the explanatory variables were linked
with one set of link variables and the other half independently linked via a separate link
variable. The resultant flat file would contain most of the explanatory variables needed for
the analysis.
In the stage that followed, the linked tables were united to an intermediary table that
contained a link variable common to both tables as well as a new but pivotal variable
'customer_id'. This linking process was carried out in order to take on board the variable
'customer_id'. 'Customer_id', in turn, would be used to link the application data of
customers and their related business connections with the performance data.
The necessary response variables for my small business scorecard (credit grades) were
included in the next stage of the extraction process. Both credit grades and connected risk
bands were related at this stage to their corresponding application data3. Several estimation
samples were chosen for different six-month time windows. These customers were matched
with their respective credit grade and risk band information. Since performance data is
collected at a discrete point in time, it was decided to select the customer risk band and credit
grade for a point in time six months after the date of the estimation window. The estimation
window itself spanned a longer period4. For management information purposes, credit grades
and risk bands were released to, and captured on the system on 15th of each month. An
explanation of the banks credit grades and risk bands is provided in section 5.6.
The next step involved anonymising potentially sensitive variables such as 'customer_id'.
This was to prevent against the data being misused by anybody with access to it. It was
decided to subtract a constant from these sensitive variables, thereby creating a new variable
and easing data extraction as the resulting variable is shorter in length. These new variables
could still be used to permit links among the various tables on condition that the changes
applied to all the tables and not just a subset of the tables.
The final stage in the data extraction process was to convert all extracted flat files to a
portable format to enable them be read by PC versions of SAS and SPSS. This was
3 Credit grades were subsequently used in the scorecard estimations because they posed fewer
statistical problems than risk bands. The bank estimated risk-bands in a complex procedure using
many of the same right hand side variables as used in the scorecard. Risk bands also used credit
grades as a right hand side variable and therefore do not represent an independent response variable.
Credit grades on the other hand described the actual physical state of the customer's account. Grade F
or worse, involved the physical reallocation of the credit to the Bad Debt Collections department.
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performed using a macro developed by the in-house bank scoring team. This macro
permitted the migration of the SAS data from the SAS mainframe to a PC at the bank. The
resulting format that was compatible with my PC version of SAS was stored on a CD.
5.4 The creation of a flat file
The data in its raw format is highly categorical. In order to create a flat file format, the
individual categories of each variable must be aggregated. Alternatively, the row value
becomes a column value by naming a new variable for the category. An example of this is
where there are several partners in a small business. This would be seen in several rows for
the variable 'apcu_id' where each row corresponds to one of the partners (Table 5.1). It
should be noted that Table 5.1 contains hypothetical data based on variables contained in the
table TD50WNR and is only used to illustrate the relationships underpinning the data.
'Apcujd' represents the link variable. This should only have one unique value. 'Apcu_id'
exhibits multiple values because there are several partners in some businesses. For example
'apcujd' of 24 is repeated twice where each of the partners born 16th May 1943 and 2nd July
1935 has a 50 percent shareholding respectively. The creation of a flat file involves
compressing these multiple entries into one by taking one of several options.
The first option would be to note only the first row for each value of 'apcujd'. Although
this would not be ideal, the advantage of taking this measure would be that since the
percentage shareholding 'percent' is sorted in descending order, taking the first partner
would ensure that the partner with the largest stake is considered in the analysis.
The other option would be to consider all partners with shares of at least 50 percent. This
would allow partners with equal stakes in the business to be represented by variables
'partnerl' and 'partner2'. The drawback of this approach is that if the majority partner
owned 30 percent of the business, he would not be included in this analysis.
The solution would be to construct a clause that allowed for the first partner to be
represented and the second partner to be also represented, if the second partner had a stake
hold of at least 50 percent. This would combine both approaches. The final point to note is
that information that relates to each of the partners must now be appended to the new
variables 'dob_pl' and 'dob_p2 \ for the dates of birth of partners with major shareholdings.
This increases the number of variables by a factor of two. The number of observations, on
the other hand, is reduced from 7 to 4. The percent equity each partner holds in the firm is
now represented by the two variables '%_pl' and '%_p2' respectively (Table 5.2). Like the
example presented in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 contains hypothetical data rather than real data in
4 A more comprehensive discussion of the length of time windows for the estimation sample and the
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order to illustrate how I dealt with relationships in the data. The point of this exercise is to
limit the rows for any one observation to one and hence create a flat file format.
The difficulty in this part of the data extraction, is that some of the categories are not as
intuitive as the above example. The value of the linking variable is therefore repeated
without an apparent reason for multiple entries. In these cases where there did not appear to
be any basis for multiple entries, the bank was consulted because the bank analysts had a
fuller understanding than the researcher, of which variable was accountable for any increase
in the number of observations in the data. The difficulty of identifying variables that caused
duplications in the link variables increased, where tables had large numbers of variables. The
example cited above dealing with business partners would have been further complicated, if
there had been additional variables with multiple entries. The process of identifying which
variables are at fault for duplications in the link variables, is analogous to unravelling a ball
of string; each knot has to be separately undone before further knots are located.
Table A 5.2 in Appendix A5 gives a list of all the variables extracted, their source tables
and new variables created by me in order to reduce the number of observations for an
individual borrower so that there was a one-to-one correspondence between each borrower
and his application data. In some instances, variables were summed across a borrower e.g.
the variable 'discount' in table TD5SECI or the variable 'retained' in table TD5BURK. In
other cases, the average value was taken of the different values of a variable e.g. 'prop_inl'
from the table TD5FACR. Finally, sometimes a minimum or maximum function was used in
order to render the data in a flat file format e.g. the highest interest rate margin if there were
two separate interest margins for the same type of loan5.
The next section briefly describes the origin of the application data. The section dealing with
the origin of the application data concludes my description of the explanatory variables used
in my dataset. The section following it deals with the performance data that was linked to my
application data in order to indicate the performance of applicants at a time subsequent to
their time of application.
5.5 Sources of the application data
The application data was derived primarily from several application forms of which the most
comprehensive and specific to business borrowers was the Business Lending Checklist.
subsequent performance of applicants is contained in Chapter 6.
5 For instance, sometimes banks offer stepped-interest rate loans. For instance, the bank may charge 5
percent on the first £5,000 but drop the interest margin to £4.5 percent on the next £10,000, and so on.
Appendix A5 outlines in more detail how the individual interest rates were separated out first before
applying the averaging function.
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Due to an oversight at the time of introducing an electronic database of business borrower
details, the system could not assign the link variable 'customer_id' to new customers until
July 2000. Some loan sanctioners in the bank branches managed to manually assign
'customer_ids' to new customers thus permitting the researcher to follow up the repayment
performance of these first time clients.
The database is almost primarily comprised of existing borrowers for which repayment
information is available.
Personal Financial Profile
The researcher first examined the Personal Financial Profile and identified 75 variables.
Only 17 of these variables were captured in the bank's dataset. Of these 17 variables, some
such as occupation description were unusable because they had not been coded as categorical
variables. Postcode was not included because it would breach data protection requirements
(Appendix 5.1).
Given that there are more business principals than businesses, it follows that for every
business applicant appearing in the Business Lending Checklist, there is at least one Personal
Financial Profile application form. There is also data from the Personal Financial Profile'
pertaining to individuals that are not business owners. Relating this to the data capture
process, it was a primary concern to have matched the finances of individuals to the
performance of their businesses at an early stage in the data extraction process in order to
limit the size of the resulting dataset.
Business Financial Profile
This form which was denoted by a 'D' in the researcher's notation, supplied information
relating to 90 questions of which only 5 were identified as having being captured by the bank
in their data base (See Appendix 5.2). This form outlines information about other credit
relationships the borrower has and looks at the issue of assets, guarantees and business
ownership structure.
Altogether there were 1,068 variables, of which approximately 240 were contained in the
forms described above. Some of the remaining variables comprise a mixture of behavioural
variables such as account excesses exhibited to date, the details of enclosures such as
statements the customer may have included with his application and finally actions taken by
the employee monitoring the account. Finally, there are variables such as 'Partition Number'
and 'appl_id' which are designed to identify tables or link tables with others.
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Business Lending Checklist
The letter 'B' denoted variables from this form in order to identify them in the final bank
dataset (See Appendix 5.3).
This data related to applications from existing business customers for between £15,000 and
£1,000,000. The bank expected 12,000 of these applications each year. Since this data has
been automatically captured since October 1997, this implies that there were theoretically
two years of business data available for analysis. The data from the Business Lending
Checklist forms could be related to the personal and business performance of the borrower
on other accounts with the bank. There were also links describing customer details such as
sector and length of connection. All of these applications were manually underwritten. Some
of the fields contained the comments of the relevant lending officer that could not easily be
transformed into code.
The Business Lending Checklist noted the adverse events in the borrower's borrowing history
or the history of related businesses, gave a summary of debtors, creditors, balance sheet
financials and sales. It also assessed the maximum borrowing requirement and business risks
as well as requesting additional information of the borrower. Borrowers for whom there is a
Business Lending Checklist available, offer more scope for credit analysis as the information
is rich and quantifiable in many instances. Many variables from the Business Lending
Checklist were captured by the bank and contained in their data warehouse system. Of 249
variables identified, 163 featured in the database although some had to subsequently be
eliminated because they could not be easily coded (Appendix 5.3).
Some of these variables were categorical and the researcher had to refer back to the question
in the Business Lending Checklist to visualise how best to recode the categories into one
variable. An example of the need for such cross-referencing is presented in Table 5.3 below
where Question 42 in the Business Lending Checklist has four categories. These categories
correspond to field B251 in the nomenclature that I used. The categories elicit responses to
the question;
'In the customer's opinion, can the business continue to operate in the absence of the
principalis)?'
The response categories to the above are as follows; 'closeJamily_memb', 'key_employee',
'otherprincipals' and 'noprincipalspthe'. These responses can be taken to mean that the
business can continue to run with the aid of a close family member, key employee, another
principal or finally, that there is no principal partner to assume the managerial role in the
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absence of the principal6. The example in Table 5.3 is provided to show how a perusal of the
bank's application forms was a prerequisite to understanding what the variables meant. It
was often the case that not even bank personnel could clarify what certain variables meant in
their abbreviated format and it was only by examining the documentation and matching
variables with questions that their meaning became apparent and groups of categorical
variables emerged such as those above.
5.6 The location of repayment information in the form of risk bands and credit
grades
The one and a half years of application data from January 1998 until June 1999 was divided
into three periods of approximately six months duration. Application data was available for
each of these three periods. The first period was from January 1998 until June 1998. The
second extended from June 1998 until December 1998. The third period comprised January
1999 until June 19997.
Risk bands were extracted in the initial stage because I could not, on my own accord,
undertake the extraction of credit grades at the bank. The latter required extraction by
authorised banking personnel and it was suggested originally that credit grades would not be
available to me. In the event, grades were available and consequently risk bands were not
used in the analysis because, unlike credit grades, risk bands predicted measures of likely
performance rather than observed performance outcomes.
Credit grades represent objective measures of business repayment performance. They
represent the physical transferral of the customer within the bank based on his ability to meet
repayments. If a customer enters a credit grade status equal to or worse than E, this implies a
transferral of monitoring authority from the branch level to management at bank operations
level. The business is placed on a watch-list. If his performance deteriorates even further, it
is assigned an F credit grade and transferred to recoveries where attempts are made to recoup
money owed to the bank. Accounts with a credit grade status of E or worse are deemed bad
by the bank's own in-house scoring team. I inferred this meaning of credit grade status by
the usage of E grades as the response variable in the derivation of the bank's in-house risk
bands.
6 Where variables are used in subsequent analyses, I supply their meaning that was crosschecked with
the bank. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the extraction process rather than describe the
individual variables
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Dependent variable: Taking a global view of customer risk in the data extraction
The reason why an appraisal of business customer risk is more complex than an appraisal of
normal borrower risk is because of the banker's exposure to several business and personal
connections relating to the business. The decision to move a non-performing account from
branch office to management control is taken, whenever any one of the borrower's Money
Transmission Accounts (MTA's) is flagged. Hence, the motivation for assigning an E grade
is initiated when any MTA is flagged as being in serious arrears.
This factor of multiple business accounts has implications for the data extraction process and
the shaping of the subsequent analysis. Unless all possible business accounts are included for
the business customer, there is a danger of model misspecification arising.
It was not possible for the researcher to view the excesses on all three non-performing
accounts for a case such as that illustrated in Figure 5.4.
In the illustration, the borrower exhibits arrears on his working capital facility (a bad
outcome) but at the same time does not exhibit bad behaviour on his two remaining MTAs
(overdraft and personal account). The one bad event outweighs the two good ones in such a
way that his credit grade is bad overall. In other words, the sum of the parts amounts to
something different than the whole picture. This is because of the global view the bank takes
of the finances of a small business. Because his fortunes are inextricably linked with his
personal finances, it only takes one seriously bad event to prompt overall insolvency.
In this case, a fall in credit grade is a proxy for how the borrower is performing overall since
it comprises a view taken by the banker on the business borrower's overall risk. This was the
approach adopted by Dietrich and Kaplan in their assessment of risk (1982) when they used
the Kelvey Zaviona bond rating technique to represent the credit grade as the dependent
variable.
The bank had urged a global view to be taken of the business customer using their definition
of risk (credit grade) as a dependent variable. This global view was also reflected in the
bank's own risk band approach which integrates the entrepreneur's performance over all his
accounts.
5.7 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to give an overview of the data extraction process. It is essential
for an understanding of how many of the variables were derived and the relationship between
the outcome and explanatory variables.
7 The remaining one year period from July 1999 until June 2000 captured the repayment information.
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I described how I extracted the small business data from the bank's mainframe. Much of the
process involved rendering the relational database into flat files that could be used in
subsequent regressions. This involved looking into each separate table of the relational
database matrix and relating the individual tables back to two core tables TD5APPL and
TD5APCU in order to include all the four necessary identifier variables. When this process
had been completed, the performance data in the form of credit grades and risk bands were
integrated into the main dataset.
This chapter mapped out the concepts that I applied in order to link the variables. It also
explains the steps taken to summarise the values over an applicant, either by averaging or
taking the maximum/minimum value, when there were multiple values for one individual
business applicant. This inevitably led to some data loss, but was necessary in order to create
a flat file. However, all information leakages have to be viewed in a pragmatic way. It is not
possible to examine the finances and human capital characteristics of small businesses
without being cognisant that a small business represents a myriad of accounts each carrying
different interest rates and collateral types. There is, additionally, not always a one-to-one
relationship between the business owner and the various explanatory variables because, for
example, there may be several business owners. For this reason, the bank itself employs
aggregation techniques in summarising the business borrower attributes. However, the bank
was not in a position to allocate personnel to extracting this data on my behalf and so I had to
perform my own aggregation techniques. This chapter gives me the opportunity to reveal
how the various aggregations were performed and by doing so, new variables created.
See Figure 6.3 in the next chapter for an overall plan of the time periods.
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Table 5.1 Example of categorical data with mu tiple entries
OBS APCU_ID Percent Date_of_birth
1 24 50 16MAY43.
2 24 50 02JUL35I
3 48 50 02JUN62:
4 48 50 21SEP64
5 50 100 17JUL51
6 59 50 20JUL53
7 59 50 23MAR42
Table 5.2 Example of categorical data with unique entries
OBS APCU_ID DOB_Pl %_P1 DOB_P2 %_P2
1 24 16MAY43 50 02JUL35 50
2 48 02JUN62 50 21SEP64 50
3 50 17 JUL 51 100
j
4 59 20JUL53 50 23MAR42 50 j
i
Table 5.3 Categorical nature of data
Host table Variable name Type Length Location on Personal
Financial Profile
TD5BUST CLOSE_FAMILY_MEMB CHAR 1 B251
TD5BUST KEY_EMPLOYEE CHAR ~T B251
TD5BUST OTHER_PRINCIPALS CHAR 1 B251
TD5BUST NO_PRINCIPALS_OTHE CHAR 1 B251
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Figure 5.1 The three link variables
Facility applied for
(appljd)
Application-lead applicant
(apcujd)
Customer
(customerjd)
Figure 5.4 Fall in credit grade due to arrears on one money transmission
account (MTA)
Arrears on working
capital facility
No excesses on
overdraft
No personal A/C
violations
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6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present estimates of several business application scorecards
based on different estimation samples of new small business applicants for both serious
default and mild to serious default.
Application scorecards use the application characteristics from the application forms for a
loan as explanatory variables. It is useful to derive these scorecards for several reasons.
Firstly, there is a paucity of small business scorecards in the literature. Where small business
scorecards have been reported in the literature they have tended to focus on issues other than
application scoring (Srinivasan and Kim, 1987). Alternatively, they are based on SMEs
whose turnovers are comparable to the turnovers of large, established businesses as in
Altman et al. (1994). In other words, the usage of the term SME to loosely denote small
businesses can imply businesses with up to 500 employees and is therefore misleading
(Bank of England, 2001). Commercial credit scoring as used by practitioners only considers
loans of a magnitude associated with small or micro enterprises (Strahan and Weston, 1998;
Asch, 1995). Therefore, studies such as that of Altman et al. (1994) do not adequately
reflect the size of enterprises that are being commercially scored.
'..anecdotal evidence suggests that banks are beginning to lend to small business based on
easily-obtained financial information. Moreover, Levonian (1997) finds that these credit
scoring technologies have been applied mainly to very small business loans, those under
$100,000, and have facilitated rapid expansion of these loans by very large banking
companies..7 1
The second main reason for this analysis is to discover whether the application data
available to this bank, is sufficient to allow it make an informed decision on the applicant's
creditworthiness.
Analyses of bank lending such as Cressy (1996a) have focused on the statistical significance
of individual coefficients to show how the explanatory variables explain the response
variable. However, the most robust test of how good a bank is at 'picking winners', to
paraphrase Cressy (1996a), is to see how it would classify these applicants once a classifier
has been estimated, using data from their loan/overdraft applications. In fact one of the most
robust tests of the information regime a bank operates in, when lending to new business
customers, is to test the classifier on an unseen or holdout sample of applicants. In so doing,
I use a scorecard methodology.
In line with the credit scoring literature, I focus on the classification of business loan
applicants. A main motivation for undertaking this analysis is in order to ascertain whether a
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loan sanctioner can perform better than chance when inputting the application details of a
first-period business borrower into a scorecard. Therefore, the decision arrived at is non-
judgmental (objective) and relies on observable information. Various financial economists
have argued that is impossible to construct a small business scorecard because the main
factors informing a lending decision are non-quantifiable and hence cannot be captured in a
scorecard (Cressy and Toivanen, 1998; Doreen and Farhoomand, 1983; Syau et ah, 2001).
Such factors include trust, the ability of the entrepreneur to convince a sanctioner of his
creditworthiness, his body language during the loan interview etc.
This chapter commences by giving some background information on business scorecards. It
then gives a description of the data subsets used in the estimation of scorecards for the new
business applicant borrowers. The data aggregation procedures and scorecard algorithm
used such in the estimation of the scorecards, i.e. logistic regression, have already been
described in Chapter Five and Chapter Three respectively.
The next section outlines how the weights of evidence method introduced in Chapter
Three was implemented in order to organise the scorecard explanatory variables.
This is followed by a section delivering the within-sample results for the scorecards,
followed by a section giving the out-of-sample results. Finally, the discriminatory power of
my chosen scorecard that used a sample of 930 borrowers,'Bigdata930', is compared with
that of the other scorecards, where they were estimated from different subsets of the
transfer/start-up borrower group at the bank. Reasons for the disparity in discriminatory
power among the different scorecards for new business customers are outlined in this
section. I then move on to discuss the most predictive variables in the 'Bigdata930F'
scorecard using a credit grade F as the response variable before summarising my findings in
the concluding section.
I have described the methods of evaluating scorecards and emphasised the importance of ex
ante or out-of-sample validation. I will also use classification matrices to evaluate the
discriminatory power of my scorecard for one cut-off. In order to evaluate my scorecard
over all the possible cut-offs, I will use the gini coefficient.
5.2 Some background on the scorecards
I have already described the more technical aspects of credit scoring in Chapter 3 when I
explained the use of logistic regression and weights of evidence.
1 Strahan and Weston (1998). P.824
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In this section I provide details of the type of response variable used in the regressions that
follow as well as describing the type of explanatory variables used. All the scorecards that I
estimated use application data as predictor variables because an application scorecard, by
definition, implies that the bank does not have access to any prior performance data.
My definition of default takes the form of credit grades. I use two definitions of default
ranging from moderately bad to unrecoverable debt (stringent measure) and unrecoverable
debt (less stringent). The stringent definition of bad implies a wide measure of bad that
encompasses mild to serious delinquency i.e. E to F grades. An F grade is described as 'less
stringent' because the customer's credit grade is allowed to deteriorate this far before it is
designated as bad. Accordingly there should be fewer customers that are designated as bad
under the less stringent measure, than customers categorised as bad under the stringent
measure.
If an applicant exhibits credit grade F on his borrowing, responsibility for the loan is
automatically transferred from the branch level to the bank's Bad Debt Collections
Department at Head Office. A credit grade of E could be regarded as a stage most F's would
pass through in the transition from good to bad status. A credit grade of E is defined as the
stage prior to the transfer of the debt to bad Debt Collections where the credit manager still
has the authority to pursue the borrower for the overdue amount that is outstanding.
The 'ever F grade' borrowers are furthermore a subset of the 'ever at least E grade'
borrowers because F is worse than E and is therefore included in the definition of 'ever at
least E grade' because it is the worst credit grade employed by the bank.
My methodology aims to develop several small business scorecards using ways of
aggregating the applicant's accounts. Then the best performing two scorecards for each
credit grade are further investigated.
I will use logistic regression rather than linear discriminant analysis because this is the
industry standard (Thomas, 1998). It also avoids possible problems that could arise if the
covariance matrices of the good and bad firms are not similar. In reality, previous analyses
have shown that there is little difference between the two estimation procedures in terms of
results2. (Leonard; 1992; Srinivasan and Kim, 1987; Hamer, 1983).
The organisation of the explanatory variables in my scorecard will follow the weights of
evidence procedures used by Crook, Hamilton and Thomas (1991a) and described by
Thomas (1998). This procedure provides an alternative to constructing categorical dummy
2 For a more comprehensive discussion on the comparison of logistic regression to linear discriminant
analysis, See Chapter 3.
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variables. The usage of dummy variables would raise the number of right hand side
variables considerably, causing losses in the degrees of freedom of the scorecard estimation
regression.
I have described the methods of evaluating scorecards and emphasised the importance of ex
ante or out-of-sample validation. I will also use classification matrices to evaluate the
discriminatory power of my scorecard for one cut-off. In order to evaluate my scorecard
over all the possible cut-offs, I will use the Gini coefficient. I calculate the Gini measure for
scorecard discrimination both within and out-of sample for these two best performing
scorecards and the results obtained compared against the corresponding Ginis obtained for
the other six scorecards.
6.3.1 Introduction to the new business customer scorecards
I have divided this section on the small business scorecards into two parts. The first part
deals with the selection of the different samples that comprised the training and holdout
samples for the scorecards. The second section deals with the different way I dealt with
multiple business connection according to the scorecard in question.
6.3.1 Sample selection
What follows is a description of eight scorecards that I derived from the same data and an
evaluation of the limitations and advantages of each. The names of these scorecards are as
follows; 'Drastic618E', 'Drastic618F', 'Bigdatal572E', 'Bigdatal572E\ 'Bigdata930E\
'Bigdata930F,, iSAScard930E1 and 'SAScard 930F'.
Figure 6.1 illustrates how the initial sample of 1,572 start-up and transfer businesses was
organised into the 3 main scorecards 'Bigdatal572', 'Bigdata930' and 'Drastic618\ A
business start-up as the name suggests is an newly founded enterprise. This could either take
the legal form of a sole trader or a partnership. All business start-ups were first time
business borrowers. A transferred business is also a first-time borrower but of a different
type. A business that has transferred its custom from another bank is described as a
'business transfer'3.
3
Although I do not have actual figures showing the relative breakdown between start-ups and business
transfers, sources at the bank indicated that by far the majority of observations in the data relate to
business start-ups (estimated at 1 in 10 by the bank). The transferred businesses were included in the
application scorecard because the bank had no prior knowledge of their creditworthiness. However,
these are likely to be larger and more established than the business start-ups. Despite the potential bias
of including transferred businesses because of their larger size, we know from the theoretical literature
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Starting from the 1,572 observations in the original dataset which was made up of small
businesses with and without previous private borrowing and which was referred to as the
'Bigdatal572' dataset, those with existing private borrowing were excluded to form the
'Bigdata930' dataset. The latter dataset contains business loan applicants both with and
without multiple business owners/principals. In other words, it is likely that this dataset
contains a heterogeneous group of business owners some of whom have business partners
and some of whom do not.
The 'Drastic618' dataset contains a more homogeneous group of business principals than
the dataset from which it was derived i.e. the 'Bigdata930' dataset because only businesses
with a one-to-one correspondence between business data and an individual account at the
bank were considered. It is most likely that the 'Drastic618' dataset represents businesses
where the business principle is the sole provider of equity, collateral and uniquely
responsible for the business project. With the 'Drastic618' dataset there are no other family
or business interest other than the proprietor's own interest.
The 'Drastic' dataset contains observations that had no multiple connections i.e. there was a
one-to-one correspondence between the business owner and his borrowing. The 'Drastic'
dataset therefore excludes entrepreneurs with several accounts or businesses that were run
by more than one partner. The total number of observations was reduced from 2,768 (full,
uncleaned dataset) to 618 when applicants with multiple connections or who had previous
borrowing other than the new borrowing were removed. Figure 6.2 how the SAS
programme for structuring the dataset was set up. The performance information in the form
of credit grades was fed in on the right hand side loop in the PER9906 dataset while the
application data was fed in the left hand side in the dataset ONEl999. You can see from
Figure 6.2 that the first step taken was to ensure that the borrowers has actually borrowed
during the application time window. This was done by including borrowers who had an
application number and hence whom I was certain had borrowed from the bank during this
period. I next ensured that there were no multiple observations of the customer number
'd_Jk_lea' (a variable uniquely associated with each business principal or private customer
as described in Chapter 5), by taking care that only the first observation of each customer
number was included.
Then I had to carry out a number of exclusions in order to ensure that the entrepreneurs had
time to exhibit default status. These exclusions are best explained by looking at the diagram
that a bank is not likely to lend to a business that transfers from another bank due to adverse selection
problems (See Chapter 2 regarding adverse selection and Chapter 7 regarding 'informationally
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that maps out the scorecard time windows (Figure 6.3). The application data and
performance data were organised according to this timeline. This timeline allowed for a
period of initial application followed by a period within which the applications could either
default or otherwise4. The time windows are divided into the application period (white
areas) and performance period (grey shaded periods). There are altogether three 6-monthly
cohorts of borrowers applying during the application period.
Referring back to Figure 6.2, my first restriction was to exclude those 910 borrowers who
had applied during the first period 1998 (first cohort) leaving 2,177 observations. The
second exclusion refers to the 874 borrowers applying during the second period 1998
(second cohort) leaving 1,303 observations. I must also add that in addition to ensuring that
borrowing was confined to the period within the 4-month time window (January to April
1999,) I adopted a further constraint used by the bank in their in-house scoring systems. In
doing so, I excluded all observations relating to borrowers who were classified as
uncreditworthy at the cut-off date of May 1999, when the performance data commenced. In
other words, I filtered out any observations that has gone immediately bad in the four
months before the performance window commenced. It might seem unusual that
approximately 30 percent of borrowers ( 321/939) exhibited financial distress immediately
after receiving their first loan but it must be remembered that as many as 20 percent of start¬
ups become financially insolvent in the first year of their trading (Barclay's Bank
Information Service, 2000). Since financial distress is a precursor to bankruptcy, it is not
implausible that this proportion is so high. Following the final exclusion, I was left with 618
observations relating to the 4-month period, January 1999 until April 1999.
The reason that I was so restrictive with my data and cut down the number of observations
from 3,692 to 618 is as follows. Ideally, I would like to have included applicants from the
first and second cohort because resulting sample would be larger and relationships between
my response variable and the predictor variables easier to attribute to real rather than
random effects. In other words, I would have had the benefit of working with a larger
sample size with implications for sample variance. However, assume that I had included
borrowers from the first and second cohort. An issue arises here of whether some businesses
applying towards the beginning of the data time window e.g. a customer applying in July
1998 (from the first cohort) would have 22 months to turn bad before he had even entered
the performance time window. Comparing this customer's likelihood of turning bad with the
captured' borrowers).
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likelihood of a customer applying in April 1999, just before the performance window, would
bias the likelihood of a borrower exhibiting a bad grade towards earlier applicants.
The difficulty with the 'Drastic' dataset is that I have forfeited many observations in the
interests of a one-to-one relationship between the applicant and the loan. There is a trade-off
between the integrity of the data and the size of the resulting sample.
6.3.2 Multiple business connections
In order to increase the number of observations in my estimation sample, I had to think of
ways to reorganise the data upstream (at the stage of deriving the MERGED dataset in
Figure 6.2) before the exclusions took place. This would allow me to include more
observations from applicants in the third cohort. In so doing, I would increase my estimation
sample as much as was possible without compromising the estimation sample by including
borrowers who would have had a longer time to exhibit financial distress before the
commencement of the performance window.
My solution to the problem of a small estimation sample was to review those borrowers who
had been excluded at the MERGED dataset in Figure 6.2 because they had multiple
connections and therefore could not be identified uniquely by a customer number and
ultimately a credit grade.
With this in mind, I derived the 'Bigdata' dataset by aggregating all borrowing over a
multiple business connection. I was able to aggregate the data in this way by taking the
maximum values for the variables describing the interest rates, collateral rates and borrower
age. This policy is in line with that employed by the bank. In the case of several business
partners, they take the most mature partner.
The aggregation procedure used, provides an approximation of total borrowing over the
connection and takes the maximum amounts in each instance. A weakness of this
aggregation method is that the data diverges most from the reality of the borrowing situation
when several almost equal yet different amounts are borrowed. An example of this would be
where an entrepreneur had taken out a loan of £50,000 and an overdraft of £40,000. The
aggregation approach means that the loan is the only amount considered because it is the
maximum value. In reality, first time business applicants are only likely to take out one
borrowing facility and so therefore this limitation does not arise in the majority of cases.
The instances of multiple security valuations, loan amounts or other values that were almost
41 used the same procedure used here to structure the application and performance data for the other
scorecards.
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equal in amount and magnitude were rare. It is fair to use this approximation in the
knowledge that most of the dataset comprised borrowers who had a high core loan
accompanied in some rare cases by a much smaller facility. The potential distortion caused
by omitting any much tinier facility was therefore reduced.
When I compiled the 'SAScard' dataset on the other hand, I identified variables such as
borrowed amount and collateral amount where the distortions mentioned above could arise.
The SAS Institute then wrote me a bespoke SAS programme that allowed me to aggregate
potentially troublesome values in a meaningful way. Applying the example above with the
£50,000 loan and £40,000 overdraft, the amount of the loan would be added to the amount
of the overdraft.
Table 6.1 shows, by way of example, how the 'Bigdata930' dataset differs from the
'SAScard' dataset using the example of collateral as the variable being aggregated. Business
1 and Business 2 are identified by two separate identifier codes. These identifier codes most
likely denote that there are other business interests apart from the main business principal
who own collateral which was used in the business. For example, the business owner may
have a piece of land with a collateral value of £6,300 while his wife/business partner has
another piece of land worth £450 which is also taken as security on the loan. The technique
used to aggregate the collateral and other such values where such multiple values exist for
the 'Bigdata930' dataset is to take the largest value in all cases. In the organisation of the
'SAScard930' dataset, the values of variables such as collateral were summed if the values
were different. However, only one of the values was taken if they were the same. Business 2
in Table 6.1 is an example of the latter.
The reason for taking only one value for a variable such as collateral if it was repeated
across the identifier variable, was that it was likely the collateral related to the same piece of
land and by summing the values there was duplication.
Although this approach involves distortion if the multiple observations for collateral are
very close in amount e.g. both parcels of land were £6,300 and £6,200 respectively with the
exclusion of the £6,200 value, I argue that it is a useful approximation of reality. This is
because in most cases, the values of collateral were very unequal, similar to the level of
inequality seen in my example for Business 1.
There are two possible reasons why the values for collateral were so unequal. The first
reason for collateral inequalities is that because collateral is difficult to monitor, the bank
prefers to take an amount sufficient to or almost sufficient to cover the risk of the
investment before taking a smaller amount if necessary to supplement the main core amount.
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Such a policy would allow the bank to easily review the core amount and place emphasis on
this while the ancillary amount were of secondary importance. The second reason for
collateral inequalities is that all businesses in the 'Bigdata930' and 'SAScard930' datasets
are first time borrowers with the bank. They do not have two facilities, one from an earlier
period, being secured by a comparable amount of collateral. It is likely that the core
collateral component is secured on the business premises or some other main piece of real
estate. Small businesses are unlikely to have highly valued pieces of real estate to offer as
collateral in the first place and so it follows that the large piece of collateral relates to their
family home i.e. only piece of real estate.
'Bigdata930' is my own SAS programme written using its 'iffirst.value' function and the
sort facility. 'SAScard930' is a bespoke code written for me by the SAS Institute5.
However, whilst it makes sense to sum collateral amounts, it does not make sense to sum
two different interest rates or percentages in general. So, in the case of percentages and
interest rates, the average value was taken if the percentages were different and otherwise
the maximum value was taken. In all, over 40 variables had their values averaged or summed
in this way.
I can summarise my organisation of the different datasets as follows. The method I took in
deriving the 'Bigdata930' dataset involved taking the 'Bigdata 1572' dataset and excluding
borrowers who had previous borrowing. This was done to see how accurately I could predict
default for those applicants with no previous borrowing connections and thus who were new
applicants to the bank6. This reduced the number of observations from 1,572 to 930. I
further reduced this number of observations by omitting any borrowers with multiple values
for any variables such as borrowed amount and collateral amount to produce the 'Drastic'
dataset with 618 cases.
For all datasets, the categories of the 37 explanatory variables were coarse classified, finely
classified and then weights of evidence assigned as described in Chapter Two. The next
section explains how I applied the weights of evidence methodology explained in Chapter
Two to my particular dataset.
5 It is important to underline here that I gave the specification for the SAScard930 code to my contact
at the company because SAS write technical solutions but the underlying solution which they translate
into code, the aggregation technique in my case, remains with their client.
6
At a later stage I looked at borrowers who already had borrowing connections because they are of
interest when looking at business/bank relationships. (See Chapters 7 and 8)
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6.4 Organisation of the explanatory variables
The weights of evidence methodology used in scorecards is described in Chapter Two
dealing with the methodology and literature of credit scoring. This procedure was used by
Crook, Hamilton and Thomas (1991a) and described by Thomas (1998). It provides an
alternative to constructing categorical dummy variables that would raise the number of right
hand side variables considerably causing losses in the degrees of freedom of the scorecard
estimation regression.
The tables in Appendix 6.1 show the calculation of weights of evidence for both my
continuous variables and dummy variables in the 'Bigdata930E dataset. The values of the
weights of evidence are calculated for variables grouped under 5 separate categories i.e.
Assets and Collateral, Accounting Data, Entrepreneur Data, Distance and Miscellaneous
Data and Exposure. The corresponding tables for the 'Bigdata930F are also included in
Appendix 6.2
Table 6.2 shows an example of the grouping procedure used for the weights of evidence
method where the variable being grouped is amount borrowed ' newsum'. The corresponding
groups are up to £4,000, greater than £4,000 but less than £40,000, greater than £40,000 but
less than £100,000 and greater than £100,000. I will now explain the general rules I used to
group my variables in this way.
When deciding upon where to locate the categories of the continuous variables several rules
of thumb were applied as in Banasik et al. (2001). It should be noted there that there are
guidelines that a researcher can apply when constructing weights of evidence. Despite
taking care to ensure that the weight of evidence categories give good separation, there is
evidence that scorecards using marginally different categories of the continuous variables
can still achieve similar results. The predictions obtained are less sensitive to the usage of
different categories than one would expect. This allows some but not much discretion over
where to locate the categories. However, the main rule determining the location of the
categories is to insert divisions such that there is greatest disparity in the bad rate among the
different categories of the variable. As with most estimation techniques, a researcher wants
to locate categories such that the difference between the groups is the highest whilst the
difference among observations within a group is low (high within-group homogeneity).
The rules of thumb I used were as follows. I needed to compare the results obtained by the
'Bigdata930F' with the 'Bigdcita930E' and so used the same categories for both. If possible,
the values were multiples of 10, 100 or 1,000. I avoided using awkward values such 67.5
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because a bank when using the scorecard will need to reuse it and therefore would be
opposed to overfitting the scorecard.
Overfitting a scorecard, while possibly achieving excellent, predictive results within sample,
may be less discriminating in future periods, with different data or on a holdout sample.
Therefore, a person who estimates a scorecard is doing his client no service in overtuning
the scorecard instrument. The rounding of awkward values is therefore permissible. I
amalgamated categories where there were low frequencies of observations since the
sampling error for such a category when calculating the percentages of goods and bads,
would be higher.
A very large drawback of the data that was considered when constructing the weights of
evidence categories, was the large number of missing values, which was over 50 percent for
some variables. I had to balance the large number of missing values in the discrete 'missing
value category' with the small number of values which remained to be assigned to separate
non-missing categories. It is unwise to create a profusion of other non-missing categories
when most of the observations are missing and the number of non-missing values in each
category is quite low. This explains the reason for the small number of non-missing
categories in many cases. Close examination of the percentages of goods and bads shows
that there are differences among the non-missing categories even when the categories are
relatively broad rather than too finely divided and dispersed. The use of broad categories
increases the number of observations in each and so reduces the sampling error in each
category.
An aid used when doubtful about where to locate the weight of evidence categories were the
visual guides, examples of which are seen in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5.
These diagrams show examples from 'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdata930E' respectively. The
variable in question is projected sales iproj_sal'. The first thick black curve in each of the
figures shows the frequency of the bad rate across the categories when they have been
coarsely classified into 35 groups with intervals of £20,000 worth of projected sales. The
second thin black curve represents a 5-point moving average smoothing the first curve of the
raw data. The formula for the 5-point moving average is;
X = I (xt + xt+l + xl+2 + xl+3 + xf+4)Vf
where x refers to the frequency of the bads in each coarsely classified category, t denotes the
category and x bar refers to the 5-point moving average.
Finally, the third white graph shows the ranges of the final categories when they have been
finely classified. The white 'weights of evidence' line does not track the 5-point moving
average smoothed line for the highest ranges. Since most applicants' projected sales fall into
the lower ranges, more 'weight of evidence categories' arise for sales under £11,000. After
this, the relative frequency of observations is much lower for higher values (which is
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partially reflected in the variance of the bads frequency curve). Therefore in order to
minimise sampling error, the observations for higher levels of projected sales are assigned to
broader categories to retain similar numbers of observations in each group.
6.5 Within-sample regression results for grades E and F
The following two sections outline the predictive performance of the 'Bigdata930E' and
'Bigdata930F'' business scorecards. This section deals with results for the 'Bigdata930'
dataset. The next section validates these results by testing them out of sample.
I will begin this section by comparing the distribution of good and bad borrowers over the
predicted probabilities (cut-offs) in order to provide visual evidence of how discriminating
the scorecards have performed. After looking at the visual evidence of how well the
scorecards have performed, this section moves on to appraise scorecard performance using
the standard procedures for appraising scorecards. The first of these procedures reports Gini
coefficients (performance over all cut-offs) and the second of these procedures reports
classification matrices (performance for a particular cut-off) for each scorecard. Finally, this
section attempts to show how the bank could pursue a high growth strategy by maintaining a
higher acceptance rate for small business applicants. This final illustration of how cut-offs
are used in practice, aims to demonstrate how the bank could implement the 'Bigdata930E'
and 'Bigdata930F' scorecards by operating different cut-offs depending on the scorecard
used, growth strategy and cost structure of the bank.
Before moving on to measures of discrimination for my 'Bigdata930' scorecards, it is useful
to look first at the distribution of goods and bads over the range of predicted probabilities.
The range of predicted probabilities show where the scorecards model the probability of an
observation being bad {'dummy^ 1) where dummy is my binary response variable for
businesses which exhibit delinquency of 'ever at least E grade' or 'ever F grade'
respectively. These are shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7.
It can be seen in Figure 6.6 where the response variable is 'ever at least grade E', that the
distribution of bads is widely dispersed and less bunched towards the right than one would
like. A discriminating scorecard should show 2 leptokurtic distributions, the distribution of
bads located over the range of higher probability values (positively skewed) if the
probability modelled is that of a observation being a bad. The corollary to this is that the
distribution of goods should be located in the lower regions of the predicted probability
levels (negatively skewed) and giving a right hand tail. With equal probability cut-offs i.e. a
cut-off value of 0.5, observations with a predicted probability above 0.5 would be classified
as bad and those cases with a probability of less than 0.5 would be classified as good.
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One measure of discrimination, the classification matrix, shows the ratio between the two
errors at a particular cut-off value. These errors represent the bads accepted and goods
rejected or Type I error and Type II error respectively when the behaviour modelled is the
likelihood of being a bad (See Chapter 3).
I choose 0.50 as the cut-off point for the classification matrix for two reasons. Firstly, I have
little idea how the bank perceives the relative cost of lending to a firm that goes bankrupt
compared to a firm that is creditworthy. If the bank is pursuing a growth strategy and the
size of loans is small (e.g. under a pilot new business borrower loan scheme), it may tolerate
relatively more Type I error that Type II error in order to capture a large portion of the
market for first-period commercial borrowing. You will recall that the businesses in my
iBigdata930' estimation samples are all first time borrowers with the bank. If the bank were
to extend relatively small loans to these first time borrowers with the intention of scoring
these businesses by using their behavioural data that would be generated over subsequent
periods, a policy of high cut-offs may be even desirable. The low per unit loss on these trial
loans would be compensated for by the bank's success in having garnered a share of the
commercial loan market, in the hope of profiting from it in subsequent lending periods.
Given the high attrition rate of start-ups, it is likely that the bank will pursue such an
incremental strategy, where lending small amounts on a trial basis is a precursor to lending
at levels that reflect the small businesses' real demand for finance7.
On the other hand, if the bank is sensitive to business failure, it will rate Type I error as
more costly than Type II error and the cut-off will change accordingly. If the bank wishes to
grow its commercial loan portfolio, a likely scenario if margins in the consumer sector are
thin, it may be prepared to tolerate even higher cut-offs than 0.5 with the aim of retaining as
much business as possible by accepting relatively more loan applicants.
In the absence of such information on how this bank evaluates the relative cost of Type I and
Type II error, the default cut-off of 0.50 is the safest option. Furthermore, this is the level
chosen in several empirical papers (bankruptcy studies) where researchers do not presume to
know anything about the bank or insurer's cost-structure (Mossman et al. 1998, Wilson et
al. 1995, Goss and Ramchandani, 1995; Hamer, 1983). Using the default level of 0.50 is a
conservative cut-off because existing studies suggest that the cost of lending to a bankrupt
firm can be up to 30 times more expensive than withholding credit from a good firm.
Therefore, any classification matrix at the 0.50 cut-off level understates the real number of
bads that can be correctly classified if a lower cut-off were applied8.
7 In a 1997 study, I discovered that Irish bankers were prepared to accept zero profits on a selection of
their business start-up portfolio in the hope that they would recoup this investment in later periods
8 See Chapter 4 for discussion on cut-offs used in the literature
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Figure 6.7 where the response variable is the less stringent measure 'ever F grade', appears
to discriminate better, in my opinion, than the 'ever at least E grade' distribution9. This is
because the distribution of bads is inclined slightly to the right of the peak for the goods,
meaning that any cut-off in this region should eliminate comparatively more bads at the
expense of comparatively fewer goods. However, it is unlikely that any banker would set a
cut-off in this region (approximately 0.1) because he would be rating the relative costs of
misclassifying a bad 'very highly'. This expression 'very highly' is a relative one. It depends
on the cost structure of the bank although the cost of misclassifying a bad is normally
expected to be more expensive than the cost of misclassifying a good and therefore equal
probability cut-offs are unrealistic (Weiss, 1996; Altman, 1977; Hand, 1997)10.
It is to be expected that the scorecard with the response variable 'ever at least grade E'
seems on the basis of the distribution of goods and bads, to underperform its 'ever grade F'
counterpart. This is analogous to the analysis by Hanley (2000), where I found the same
pattern applies to scorecards estimated on consumer data, the second of which had a less
stringent response variable 'at least 3-cycles delinquent'. Generally, the more severe
behaviour (less stringent measure of delinquency) being more pronounced, should be easier
predict (relative to chance) in a scorecard and related to customer attributes than the milder
behaviour (more stringent measure of delinquency). In the former case, 'ever grade F\ the
type of default modelled by the response variable is more extreme. Judging by credit scoring
analyses using extreme or less extreme definitions of default, the 'ever grade F' scorecard
should be more discriminating because it is more extreme (Gilbert et ah, 1990).
We also compare the predictive performance of the two models using Gini coefficients.
Figure 6.8 shows the ROC curve for 'Bigdata930E' with a Gini coefficient of 0.67.
'Bigdata930E', when validated within-sample, exceeds the minimum 0.50 threshold as is
seen in the fact that the graph lies at all points above the 45° angle line and 0.67 > 0.50.
However, the out-of-sample test of its predictive power in section 6.6 provides a more
accurate indication of how discriminating this scorecard is11.
In order to obtain the 2-by-2 classification matrices for the 'Bigdata930F' and the
'Bigdata930E' scorecards, I first have to examine the output produced for the regressions
91 make this observation based on visual evidence alone. A more definitive proof of the superiority of
the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard would be on the basis of its classification ability in a two-way matrix or
its Gini coefficient.
10
Chapter 4 gives formula for the modified cut-off that was outlined in Thomas et al. (2002)
'1 All Ginis in this section were calculated using the 'full substitution' model i.e. the scorecard is
trained and validated on the design sample. This is not to be confused with the 'full resubstitution'
model Ginis calculated using the SAS Wilcoxon procedure outlined in the next section where
training/holdout and Lachenbruch leave-out-one validation is used. The Ginis used here correspond to
the ROC curves shown in Figures 5.43 and 5.44. The SAS procedure did not permit the creation of
ROC curves for the 'full resubstitution' training sample Ginis and so these are not cited here for the
sake of consistency
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where the performance of the scorecards is described over the whole range of cut-offs. The
output relating to the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard is contained in Table 6.3. Table 6.4
describes the output obtained for the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard. Once I have investigated the
raw output contained in these tables, I can derive the classification matrices at the 0.5 cut-off
for the two iBigdata930y scorecards. The simple, two-by-two matrices for the
'Bigdata930F' scorecard is depicted in Table 6.5, The corresponding two-by-two matrix
relating to the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard is depicted in Table 6.6.
Table 6.5 shows that at a probability level of 0.5 for the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard, of those
observations which were correct, 5 were borrowers who turned out to be bad and the
majority of the 790 good borrowers i.e. 785, were found to be good. These two values of 5
and 785 correspond to the cells a and d in the classification matrix outlined as described by
Hand (1998)12. Of those borrowers incorrectly adjudged to be good or bads, 135 real bads
were predicted to be goods whilst 5 real goods were incorrectly classified as bads. 135 and 5
correspond to cells c and b of the model classification matrix above. The corresponding
sensitivities and specificities for the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard can be calculated as follows
below;
Sensitivity = at(a + c) = 5/(5 + 135) = 5/140 = 0.036 =» sensitivity = 3.6
Specificity = dl(d + b) = 785/(785 + 5) = 785/790 = 0.9936 => specificity = 99.4
Although only correctly detecting 5 of the applicants who exhibited an F grade during the
12 month period following the borrower's take-up of a loan when using a cut-off point of
0.5, this cut-off could be changed to reflect the in-house cost of classification errors at the
bank. In this example, the bank would have achieved a reduction in ex post failure of 3.6
percent for the bad group at the cost of turning down 5 applicants who subsequently turned
out to be good borrowers. If the bank had reduced the bad rate on ex post bad borrowers by
declining a significant number of ex post good borrowers for finance, there might be more
cause for concern. However, regarding the trade-off between goods and bads, the policy the
bank adopts should be predicated on its cost structure. Imagine that the hypothetical cost of
extending a loan to an ex post bad business is 10 times the opportunity cost of declining one
ex post good borrower. In this case, the bank might be prepared to go as far as accepting the
opportunity cost of turning down the applications of as many as 50 good borrowers. It would
do this in order to have correctly ascertained the ex post risk status of the same 5 ex post bad
borrowers.
For the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard, the ROC curve is shown in Figure 6.9 with a
corresponding Gini coefficient of 0.70. This value for the Gini coefficient is placed well
12 See Chapter 3, Table 3.2 for derivation of sensitivity and specificity
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above the minimum value of 0.5. The curved graph lies above the diagonal representing the
random model where the prior probabilities are arbitrarily assigned.
Turning to the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard, the corresponding sensitivity and specificity at the
0.5 cut-off is calculated as;
Sensitivity = a/(a + c) = 34/(34 + 244) = 34/278= 0.122 =s> sensitivity - 12.2
Specificity = d/{d + b) = 616/(616 + 36) = 616/652 = 0.9447 => specificity = 94.5
Although only detecting 34 of the applicants who turned 'ever at least E grade' grade on
their accounts, this model does so at a cost of turning down only 36 good applicants. In
banking, where the costs are not likely to be equal and 0.5 cut-offs not used, more of the
bads could be captured at a lower cut-off point, albeit at the cost of turning down more good
customers. A printout of all the classification accuracies over the range of predicted
probabilities shows the overall performance of the scorecard over all the cut-offs (See Table
6.4). The corresponding ROC curve for the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard illustrates how well the
scorecard performed over all the cut-offs. This has a Gini coefficient of 0.67, which likewise
is better than the random model where the prior probabilities are arbitrarily assigned
(Figure 6.8).
Given that the relative importance of correctly turning down an ex post Ever E applicant
compared to the importance of correctly declining an Ever E applicant, it is to be expected
that the bank would operate different cut-offs for both scorecards. At a cut-off of 0.32 in the
case of the lBigdata930F' scorecard, for example, the bank correctly refuses loans to 16 bad
borrowers at the expense of turning down 49 ex post good borrowers. The bank may choose
to apply this cut-off point if the cost of correctly predicting the risk category of the bad
borrowers is 49/16 or 3.06 times the cost of losing future business to an ex post good
borrower. However, the trade-off is likely to be different for the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard,
because the meaning of bad does not necessarily imply terminal default and therefore the
costs of being a bad are likely overall to be less than in the case of the 'Bigdata930F'
scorecard. In the case of the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard, the bank may opt to retain a cut-off of
0.5 to reflect the relatively lower severity of incorrectly classifying ex post bads.
6.6 Out-of-sample regression results
Because scorecard estimates in the previous sample were not validated out-of-sample, the
results obtained in the previous section need to be validated out-of-sample. It is easier to
train and validate a model on the same set of data than on a holdout sample or other such set
of 'unseen' observations. Hand (1998) describes the estimate of misclassification error (bads
classified as goods and vice versa) by validating within sample as the apparent or
resubstitution error rate. Overfitting of the model to the data can occur and this reusing of
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the estimation sample for validation can lead to underestimated error rates in samples that
are small relative to the population. With larger data sets there is, however, less scope for
overfitting. This implies that if my dataset is sufficiently large relative to the population, the
results obtained in this section should be close to the results obtained in the previous section
where the scorecard was tested within sample.
A fundamental question to ask is why should emphasis be placed on validating the two
scorecards? Firstly, it should be remembered that I use credit grade as my response variable.
Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) argue that out-of-sample (ex ante) validation is particularly
important for commercial loans because of the subjectively derived response variable. In
view of my subjectively defined response variable, it is all the more important to use a large
enough estimation sample (close to the population size) and report results within sample or
alternatively to test the model out-of-sample. Notwithstanding the small size of my sample
compared with samples used in the consumer credit literature, it is large compared to the
samples used in matched design bankruptcy studies, where samples of less than 100 are
commonplace (See Chapter 4). Another factor underlining the need for rigorous model
validation is the fact that I have 36 explanatory variables in my model that greatly increases
the chances of model overfitting compared with Leonard's (1992) model that used only 19
variables.
The out-of-sample testing procedure is a little more complex than testing within sample.
Two procedures were used to test 'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdata930F' out-of-sample. The
first procedure is the well known training/holdout technique. This entails taking a random
sample (70 percent in this case) of observations and estimating the scorecard based on these
training sample observations. The remaining 30 percent of the observations retained in a
holdout sample are then used to validate the model.
The second procedure entails using the Lachenbruch (1965) method13. Hand (1998) argues
that the advantage of this method is that the design set is almost as large as the entire data
set. The estimate of the error rate is unbiased or any potential bias arises from the 'extra
variation in the position of the decision surface due to using a design set of n-1 instead of
n'14. In other words, the expected performance will be slightly worse when estimating on a
training sample of n-1 observations than a training sample of n observations. Lachenbruch
(1965) was the first to pioneer this method of reducing bias of the apparent error rate.
The Gini coefficients obtained on the 30 percent holdout samples are 0.55 and 0.60 for the
'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdata930F' datasets respectively. The corresponding Ginis obtained
on the 70 percent training samples are 0.71 and 0.73 although the latter is with full
13 This entails using a SAS macro called %CVpred to estimate output which in turn can be used to
produce unbiased Gini coefficients
14 P123 Hand (1998)
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substitution i.e. within-sample and so can be expected to be higher. Both out-of-sample Gini
coefficients still exceed the 0.50 threshold. Therefore there is evidence that the probabilities
are not assigned in an arbitrary way and that the models are better than random.
Using the Lachenbruch method, the Gini coefficients, c, are both 0.59 for the 'Bigdata930E'
and 'Bigdata930F' models. This represents an improvement on the 30 percent holdout for
the 'Bigdata930E' models and a slight deterioration for the 'Bigdata930F' model. Overall,
the models outperform the random model when validated on a 30 percent holdout and using
the Lachenbruch method.
It is interesting that the 'Bigdata930F' model does not fit better than the 'Bigdata930E"
model on the basis that the 'Bigdata930F' response variable is more extreme and hence
should permit better separation of the goods from the bads. Contrary to what one would
expect, both models are seen to be equally predictive when tested out-of-sample i.e. when
resubstitution bias has been eliminated15.
6.7 Comparison of the 'Bigdata930' scorecards with other scorecards
The final issue is to compare the results from the 'Bigdata930' datasets with those obtained
when the application information was aggregated in different ways (Table 6.7).
The 'Drastic' datasets which omit borrowers with other connections and focus on the
simplest scenario of one borrower-one loan, perform nearly as well as the 'Bigdata930'
dataset which aggregated borrowers by maximising loan and collateral amounts. The
'Drastic models appear to be slightly overfitted because although they obtain higher Ginis
over the 'full resubstitution' i.e. within-sample models than the 'Bigdcita930' models they
perform slightly worse over the holdout samples and using the Lachenbruch leave-out-one
validations.
The results in column (1) indicate the value of the Gini coefficient for the estimation
sample. 'DrasticE' shows a Gini of 0.75 on the 70 percent training sample. The Gini
coefficient for the 'DrasticF' model is 0.8116. The corresponding Ginis for the
'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdatci930F' models on the training samples are 0.71 and 0.73.
Looking at the Lachenbruch validations in column (3) , the 'DrasticE' model exhibits a Gini
of 0.58 compared with a Gini of .59 for the 'Bigdata930E'. The latter is marginally better.
For the models using the F grade as the response variable, both 'DrasticF' and
1:1 A possible reason for the similarity in performance of the 'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdata930F' models
when tested out-of-sample is that with a smaller number of bads in the case of the latter (140 vs. 278)
there may be greater sampling error
16 Results on the training samples (Column (2)) can differ depending on the random sample taken but
should approximate the results obtained using the Lachenbruch method
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'Bigdata930F' have Ginis of 0.59 demonstrating that there is no difference in the samples
used.
On balance the 'Bigdata' scorecards perform as well using the Lachenbruch validation
method, as the 'Drastic' models. However, the 'SAScard' models perform poorly out-of-
sample, as evidenced by low Ginis of 0.44 and 0.43 in column (3) for the two models using
the Ever E and Ever F specifications respectively (Table 6.1). Furthermore, the
'Bigdatal572' models perform better than the 'SAScard' models but nevertheless are
inferior when tested out-of-sample compared with the 'Drastic' and 'Bigdata930' models.
This is demonstrated by Ginis of 0.57 and 0.55 for the 'Bigdatal572' models when using
the Lachenbruch.
This comparable performance of the 'Bigdata' over the 'Drastic' scorecards when using the
Lachenbruch validation method, demonstrates that observations from borrowers with
multiple borrowing connections should not be excluded from the estimation sample. These
borrowers can be aggregated satisfactorily for two reasons. Firstly, being small businesses,
these aggregations are legitimate since the borrowers are their businesses and so it does not
cause a distortion by amalgamating their personal and business borrowing. Secondly, these
businesses are small and are expected to have a short track record. Other business
connections are expected to have negligible importance since we are not dealing with large
corporations with the accompanying complexity of holding operations and affiliated groups.
Comparing the 'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdata930F' scorecards with the corresponding two
scorecards from the 'Bigdatal572' dataset, which includes borrowers who have had
previous aggregate borrowing, a different picture emerges. The 'Bigdata930' scorecards
perform better both within-sample and out-of-sample compared with the 'Bigdatal572'
models when looking at the magnitude of their Gini coefficients. The corresponding ROC
curves comparing the 'Bigdatal572' scorecards with their 'Bigdata930' counterparts
graphically illustrates the comparatively higher Gini obtained by the 'Bigdata930' scorecard
within-sample. The black line pertaining to the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard lies above the
white line relating to the 'Bigdatal572E' scorecard over all the ranges of the cut-off score
(Figure 6.10).
Figure 6.11 shows how the two 'Bigdata930' scorecards perform within-sample when
evaluated together over their range of cut-offs. Their performance is comparable, although
the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard performs marginally better as demonstrated by the higher
position of the black line over the white one17.
17
Unfortunately, it was not possible to construct ROC curves for my Lachenbruch validation
techniques because a different bespoke, estimation procedure was used in SAS to estimate this
validation test and this did not generate the output needed for the derivation of an out-of-sample ROC
curve. This is why the definitive test of scorecard discrimination is the Gini coefficient obtained for the
Lachenbruch test because it is out-of-sample.
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On the basis of the Gini coefficients for the Lachenbruch tests, the 'Bigdata930' scorecard
performs marginally better than the 'Bigdatal572' scorecard. However, it only performs
better than the 'Bigdata930' scorecard when the response variable is Ever grade F. On a
priori grounds, I decided against proceeding with the 'Bigdatal572' scorecard despite its
comparable discrimination and therefore it is not elaborated upon any further in this chapter.
642 of the 1,572 observations in the 'Bigdatal572' estimation sample are likely to have a
previous borrowing history. Hence the estimation data contains a confounding factor, in the
case of the 'Bigdatal572' data because this data also contains borrowers who have
borrowed from the bank in a private as opposed to a business capacity before. In other
words, some borrowers within this larger sample are likely to have developed entrepreneur-
bank relationships prior to application for a business loan18. If this important explanatory
variable is omitted because of data constraints, the model is misspecified because
explanatory variables are excluded which could potentially be included. In a separate
analysis using similar data it was found that such borrowers exhibit similar default rates than
'through-the-door' borrowers (Burke and Hanley, 2002).
It is incorrect to include such borrowers when estimating an application scorecard because
they are not 'through-the-door' borrowers and so have to be excluded from the estimation
sample. Although I would have liked to have estimated a performance scorecard for these
borrowers, I was prevented from doing so by data constraints. My data does not capture the
past performance of these borrowers over their mortgages, credit card repayments, education
loans or personal overdrafts. Therefore, some potentially useful information is not available
that would allow me to score the 642 observations from the 'Bigdatal572' dataset who have
pre-existing entrepreneur-bank relationships. Furthermore, my sources at the bank had asked
me to estimate an application scorecard for first time borrowers because they had already
successfully implemented several performance scorecards.
It can be seen in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 that borrower reputation does play a vital role in
determining the loan/overdraft interest rate for borrowers with some limited previous
borrowing and the level of collateral submitted by the borrower respectively. Therefore,
these 642 applicants within the 'Bigdatal572' scorecard would more appropriately be
scored using the previous repayment performance as an additional explanatory variable i.e.
by constructing a performance as opposed to application scorecard.
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the comparison of the 'Bigdata930F' and
'Bigdatal572F' scorecards, is that bank personnel who estimate bespoke scorecards for first
time applicants should eliminate any borrowers who have also got personal accounts with
the banks. A failure to do so could undermine the discriminatory ability of the application
18
Chapter 7 gives a fuller description of entrepreneur-bank relationships and explores the issue of
reputation.
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scorecard. In other words, in order for an application scorecard to work, care should be
taken that the estimation sample contains totally unknown businesses from the bank's point
of view.
Perhaps a further implication of my results is the effect of data capture processes on
scorecard results. Given the multi-faceted nature of small business account and application
details, a person designing a data capture instrument should consider how the data is to be
used. It would be useful if a system of rules could be devised a priori by a database designer
that allowed easy aggregation of the data in a way that avoided duplication or omission. A
user would then be sure of the integrity of the data and be able to apply filters in order to
eliminate, for instance, borrowers who had borrowed before from the training samples.
6.8 Most predictive variables for 'Bigdata930F'
This final section deals with the explanatory power of the individual coefficients for the
'Bigdata930F' scorecard. I choose the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard for this final analysis
because the response variable 'ever F' denotes the worst type of default possible and also to
limit the scope of the analysis.
I will first outline the variables used in the scorecard before providing the rank order of the
variables that were significant at the 10 percent level. Because I use the weights of evidence
method of organising my explanatory variables, I rank the variables in terms of their
explanatory power by referring to the significance level obtained on their t-statistic. For
those variables that are significant, I present their weight of evidence chart in order to see
the variation in the weight of evidence value across the ranges or categories of the variable.
In so doing, we can visualise how highly non-linear the explanatory variables are. Appendix
6.2, referred to earlier, supplies the weight of evidence values for all variables used in the
'Bigdata930F' scorecard.
The variables used in the 'Bigdata930F' scorecard are listed in Table 6.8. We can see that
there are 25 variables in all that were used in the final model when the backward elimination
procedure excluded variables whose chi-squared statistic was less than 0.50. The excluded
variables have not been entered into the regression there was likely to be collinearity
between them and an existing variable. An example of a variable with a high level of
collinearity is present gross profits 'Pgpgroup' and present net profits 'Pnpgroup'.
Therefore, I only use present gross profits in my scorecard regression. The suffix -group
means that the variable has been grouped according to the weights of evidence method.
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Most variables are self-explanatory in Table 6.8. However, some may require some
explanation. Account credit limit, 'aclgroup', indicates the limit that an entrepreneur can
draw down. In other words, his overdraft limit. 'Bpvgroup' denotes the present value of the
business asset. In the case of real estate purchases this would represent the mortgaged value
of the asset. 'Cprgroup' is a variable taken from the Business Lending Checklist indicating
the breakdown between the proportion of sales by the entrepreneur that are in the form of
cash compared with credit sales. It should convey the entrepreneur's working capital
position. This is because entrepreneurs with high levels of cash sales are less liquidity
constrained than entrepreneurs with high levels of sales conducted on credit. 'Psdgroup'
represents the drawings the entrepreneur has made from the business. On the other hand,
'rtngroup' represents the amount of excess earnings he has been able to reinvest in the
business.
Table 6.9 shows the most significant variables ranked by the significance level of their chi-
square statistic. It can be seen that 'cprgroup' the variable indicating the liquidity position
of the business is first in the ranking.
I then looked at the bivariate correlations between all the variables in order to derive a
reduced form model that only contained the most orthogonal (non-collinear) variables.
Appendix 6.3 shows the bivariate correlations on a variable by variable basis.
Eliminating the variables 'ryegroup', 'rtaggroup', 'pnpgroup', 'rplgroup', 'pgpgroup' and
'psdgroup' might seem extreme on first impressions but each exclusion has a reason. The
first variable to be excluded was 'ryegroup' because it was collinear with most others. In
then concentrated on the concept of profits. The variable that consistently comes out higher
in the chi-square rankings is recent gross profits 'rgpgroup' and so this was retained. All
other profit variables are by definition collinear with this and so are excluded.
There is an argument for retaining net profit variables. If I had a larger, cleaner dataset I
would have given this more consideration but in my dataset the overlap with gross profit is
too great and it is safer to exclude it.
I next turn to the concept of assets. The asset measure is encapsulated in the variable recent
profit and loss balance statement 'rplgroup' and 'rtagroup' denoting recent total assets.
Both variables are highly collinear with a bivariate correlation coefficient, which is
significant at 1 percent. With 591 missing values 'rplgroup' achieves an above average
variable non-missing rate out of the list of accounting variables compared with 619 for
'rtagroup'. 'Rplgroup' is therefore chosen in preference to 'rtagroup' as an asset measure.
My measure of how much firms are able to put aside from their operations in the form of
savings is retained profit 'rtngroup'. Although 'rtngroup' is expectedly collinear with recent
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gross profit 'rgpgroup' it is nonetheless included because it features highly on the ranking
of significant variables for the 'Bigdata930F' model and may be a proxy for how non-
constrained small businesses are. All retained profit can be ploughed back into the business.
Retained profit is therefore a more easily interpretable measure of the health of the business
than even a net profit figure.
Finally, tidying up the list of variables to be included, I retain 'Idogroup' the dummy for
whether the business premises is owned or leased operating as an asset proxy. 'Psdgroup' is
excluded because it has a high number of missing values. It is not very significant in the
equations so far and is perhaps difficult to estimate accurately by an entrepreneur.
Regarding the other variables for the model 'Bigdata930F', the same juggling exercise is
performed between omitting variables on the basis of collinearity, their low significance
ranking or a higher than average number of missing values. The easiest variable to omit is
'agrgroup', a measure of aggregate borrowing because this is collinear with lnsmgroup\ the
alternative and more comprehensive definition of aggregate borrowing. Next to be addressed
are 'olngroup' and 'odvgroup denoting other loan and other asset values respectively.
These two variables do not feature highly in the significance rankings and there are a
relatively high number of missing values. The next two choices regard tradeoffs between
variables, which are collinear with one another. 'Bpvgroup' is collinear with 'cprgroup' and
ddogroup' is highly collinear with 'dyrgroup\
There is no a priori reason why 'bpvgroup', indicating the value of business owned assets,
should be collinear with 'cprgroup' indicating the proportion of the business funded by
credit rather than equity i.e. gearing. Once again the decision rests on the number of missing
values and the rankings achieved so far by the two variables. Since 'bpvgroup' has 436
missing values vis a viz 428 for the variable 'cprgroup', the latter is preferred on the basis
of having fewer missing values19. 'Cprgroup' also features higher in the significance
rankings and so is taken while 'bpvgroup is eliminated.
The next tradeoff is between the variables lldogroup' and 'dyrgroup' that are collinear with
one another. 'Ldogroup indicates whether entrepreneurs have a lease or freehold on their
19 In order to establish whether a value of an accounting variable was structurally or randomly missing,
I benchmarked all the accounting variables on the recent net profit variable 'Rnpgroup' which was one
of the best populated accounting variables (perhaps because the bank issues instructions to personnel
inputting the data or loan sanctioners to ensure that this field is filled). Therefore, if there were no
recent profits reported and hence the 'Rnpgroup' field was empty, other less reported were likely to be
structurally missing because the firm had not filed statements. If the 'Rnpgroup' was filled and the
benchmarked accounting variable was reported missing, it was likely to be system missing because the
firm had reported accounts statements. This issue of missing values only affected accounting
information and therefore does not arise in the analyses in subsequent chapters because they rely on a
more limited range on non-accounting information. However, since accounting information provides
the basis of bankruptcy prediction models (See Chapter 4), it was deemed appropriate to use these
variables notwithstanding the high level of missing values.
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business premises and 'dyrgroup' the number of years work experience the entrepreneur
has. The variable 'dyrgroup' has a very high number of missing values compared with
'Ldogroup', 674 vis a viz 214 and so the former is chosen on the missing value criteria.
Also, 'Idogroup' does better on the significance rankings than 'dyrgroup'.
Although the variables 'pjsgroup' projected sales and lbsmgroup' the number of miles the
business is from the bank are collinear, I decide to retain these for two reasons. Firstly, there
is no a priori reason why projected sales should be linked to the number of miles a business
is from its bank but most importantly, neither of these two variables have above average
frequencies of missing values with 166 and 289 for 'bsmgroup' and 'pjsgroup' respectively.
Finally, 'dprgroup' is discarded because it has 511 missing values and might not be very
robust.
The regressions for the 'Bigdata930F' model are rerun for the noncollinear variables only
and the rank order of the most significant variables is seen in Table 6.10. The standardised
estimates are interpreted with reference to the weights of evidence diagrams for each
variable. The most highly significant variables are as follows: 'cprgroup', 'rrpgroup',
'rtngroup', and 'Idogroup'. The corresponding tables showing the weights of evidence
charts for these significant variables are seen in Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13.
Once again 'cprgroup' indicating the liquidity position of the enterprise is first in the
rankings followed by the variable recent retained profit 'rrpgroup'. In Figure 6.12 we can
see that entrepreneurs that have between 50 and 95 percent of their revenues in the form of
cash and entrepreneurs that have none of their revenues in the form of cash (zero) are
associated with lower default rates than any other entrepreneur group. Most worrying is the
group who have over 95 percent of their sales receipts in the form of cash. This may
represent difficulties faced by the catering or retail sectors.
Figure 6.13 illustrates the weight of evidence diagram for the variable 'rrpgroup'. Those
borrowers who report negative retained profits are associated with higher default rates as
seen in the negative value for the weight of evidence. For borrowers with positive retained
profits of less than and equal to £9,000, the proportion of bads is the lowest of all the
categories as evidenced by the high plateau of the weight of evidence value at 0.8.
Thereafter, higher levels of retained profits (greater than £9,000) are associated with higher
default rates than those seen in the previous category.
The next significant variable is recent gross profit 'rgpgroup' (Figure 6.14). This variable is
not easy to interpret because it is highly non-linear. The weight of evidence for the first
category, 'missing' is 0.07 indicating a proportion bad of 14 percent. Businesses with no
recent gross profit are more likely to exhibit higher proportional default rates of 18 percent,
corresponding to a weight of evidence value of -0.226. The default rate then drops to
approximately 13 percent on gross profits of less than or equal to £27,000 corresponding to
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a weight of evidence value of 0.13. The proportion bad rises for borrowers announcing gross
profits of between £27,000 and £50,000 (weight of evidence value of -0.632) before finally
falling to 13.19 percent for the final category where recent gross profit is greater than
£50,000. Part of the reason for this variability could be induced by high levels of non-
systematic variance within the subset of borrowers who reported recent gross profits. Only
330 borrowers reported gross profits out of the sample of 930 borrowers. However, there is
an alternative explanation for this non-linearity. Firstly, I have to examine whether the non-
linearity is induced by high non-systematic variance among the small subset of borrowers
who reported gross profits from their financial statements.
I can address this issue by examining whether the same pattern is evidenced in the
'Bigdata930E' scorecard. The weight of evidence values for 'rgpgroup' for the
'Bigdata930E' scorecard point to the same phenomenon. The highest proportion of bads
from any of the groups is seen in the intermediary group where borrowers report gross profit
levels of between £27,000 and £50,000 (Appendix 6.1). The proportion of bads in this
category is 42.7 percent. Perhaps the reason for the high attrition rate for borrowers in this
category is that these borrowers are likely to be experience a stage in their development
when they need to expand or fail. Once firms achieve a critical size in terms of their gross
profits, their failure rates diminish. Alternatively, there may be the case that firms in the
£27,000 and £50,000 category start to over invest compared to other firms and hence starve
their firms of the liquidity needed to repay their loans.
The next variable I examine is the variable 'rtngroup' (Figure 6.15). This variable is similar
to the variable 'rrpgroup' but there is an important difference. While 'rrpgroup' refers to
the retained profits reported in the financial statements of the firm, 'rtngroup' is a variable
that is filled in by all applicants irrespective of whether they supply financial statements or
not. This variable 'rtngroup' is likely to be more reliable than 'rrpgroup' because all
respondents have replied to this question and hence there is no dichotomy between
respondents who replied and respondents who did not reply. In the case of the variable
'rrpgroup', I had to interpret the influence of retained profit on default rates only for those
respondents who had been asked to supply (or were in a position to supply) financial
statements. There is more of a likelihood that an influence is systematic (a real trend) rather
than non-systematic with higher numbers in the individual categories because the variation
within each category relative to the variation between categories is reduced with higher cell
frequencies.
I find that the category where the highest levels of retained profits are reported (greater than
£40,000) is the one associated with the highest default level. This default level of 20 percent
corresponds to a weight of evidence value of -0.344 (Figure 6.15). In order to ensure that
this bad rate is not an artefact of the data, I cross-check this result against the result
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obtained for the 'Bigdata930E' scorecard in Appendix 6.1 and find that this category also
reports the highest default rate in the other scorecard. It appears therefore, that borrowers
reporting the highest levels of retained profits are more susceptible to failure. This seems
counter-intuitive because we would understand retained profit to be a good sign of a firm's
prosperity and ability to be self-financing.
Referring back to Figure 6.13 that looked at retained profits but confining our analysis to
businesses reporting their profits from financial statements, the same phenomenon is
observed. You will recall that the weight of evidence value attains its maximum level for
positive values of retained profit of £9,000 but that it decreases for values above this. This
range of categories for retained profits is terminated at this fourth category because the
number of observations in the final cell, if split any further, would yield very low cell
frequencies (at least less than 30 observations). However, the same pattern is witnessed with
respect to the variable 'rrpgroup' as with the variable 'rtngroup' where higher levels of
retained profits are associated with higher default levels.
We can conclude from the possible positive association between retained profits and default
that firms with higher levels of reinvestment, where they reinvest surplus profits into the
business, are associated with higher levels of default than businesses with lower levels of
reinvestment. This positive association between reinvestment level and default must be
separated from the influence of surplus profit (before reallocation as investment in the firm
or absorption by the business owner) which is negatively related to default, which you will
recall from Figure 6.14. If we interpret the associations between reinvestment and default
and profits and default, a consistent picture emerges of what is happening in the firm. Those
business owners who do not see the need to grow and hence reinvest the surplus business
profits back into their businesses, are likely not to be cash constrained as a result. Therefore,
they have sufficient liquidity available to repay balances owing to the bank when they fall
due. On the other hand, high levels of reinvestment may be coupled with high levels of
growth in capital assets. However the payoff time for making this investment may be at a
future stage. Meanwhile the firm is placed in a precarious position because it may not have
much liquidity and hence default on its loan repayments. Hence if the retention of profits
signals liquidity constraints, it is likely that high levels of profit retention is associated with
above average business default.
The final significant variable, 'Idogroup', denoting asset availability is a variable that is
used by the bank on its own in-house application scorecard (Figure 6.16). Contrary to the
bank's recommendation that business owners who lease their business premises should be
scored less highly than business owners who own their business premises, I find that
freeholders exhibit higher default rates than leaseholders. In fact nearly 12 percent of
leaseholders subsequently default on their repayments compared to 14 percent of
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freeholders. The weight of evidence value for leaseholders and freeholders is 0.264 and -
0.116 respectively. However, the highest default proportion is reported for the missing
category where nearly 17 percent subsequently default on their repayments. This
corresponds to a weight of evidence value of -0.116.
This result is contrary to what we would expect given that freeholders theoretically have an
additional asset with which to secure additional funding. However, the result is most likely
to be driven by the fact that supposed freeholders do not have two assets to offer the bank as
collateral. Many of the observations in this category are likely to relate to entrepreneurs who
operate from their own homes. For example services such as plumbing, electricians,
beauticians or hairdressers do not need a separate business premises but can operate quite
successfully from their own homes20.
The overall result of my analysis of the significant explanatory variables points to liquidity
as being the foremost variable influencing business default rates. This conclusion is borne
out in the negative correlation between gross profit and default. Furthermore, there is
tentative evidence that the levels of retained profits, if indicative of business growth,
reinvestment or liquidity, are positively correlated with default. This result corroborates the
study by Weiss (1996) that indicates that the liquidity variable is one of the consistently
important variables in influencing business failure.
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that it is possible for a loan sanctioner to use the information
obtained on the application forms of a small business borrower in order to predict the risk of
default during the period following application. My results show that the discrimination of
these scorecards is better than chance, although not much better.
Of the eight small business scorecards that I estimated, six scorecards performed better than
chance when validated using the Lachenbruch out-of-sample test. These were both
'Drastic', 'Bigdata930' and 'Bigdatal572' scorecards. I varied the response variable in each
case to create Ever E and Ever E scorecards for each of the three samples.
My analysis is the first to prove that it is possible to estimate the risk of default better than
chance using small business application data. The only other existing small business
scorecards do not give a comprehensive account of how the scorecard is estimated by failing
to describe either the aggregation procedures used, the classification accuracy obtained by
the scorecards or the interpretation of the variables.
20 This argument that supposed freeholders are in fact entrepreneurs operating from their own homes is
reasonable given that the question in the bank application forms asks whether the business owner owns
the business premises but does not clarify whether the business premises comprise the owner's home.
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Hence Leonard (1992) estimates the decision to reject or accept a business loan but does not
predict business failure once the loan has been accepted. Altman et al. (1994) do not
disclose how the variables used in their estimation should be interpreted because on their
own admission the usage of the neural network algorithm rules out an explanation of how
the individual explanatory variables operate. Asch (1995) do not enumerate the variables
used in the Fair Isaac small business scorecard and therefore there is also no interpretation
of the variables. This omission is probably due to the proprietary nature of the Fair Isaac
scorecard. My scorecard is therefore the first analysis to discuss the aggregation procedures
and variables used. It also highlights problems that emerge in aggregation of the data when
the business is not owner-managed and therefore multiple connections exist owing to the
dispersion of ownership among several partners.
The most important finding is that the use of application data alone allows a researcher to
derive an application scorecard that is better than chance. However, it is likely that the use
of credit bureau data would enhance these scorecards (Chandler and Johnson, 1992).
Unfortunately, I was not given access to credit bureau data by the bank. Yet even in the
absence of credit bureau data, the scorecards discriminate better than chance between
borrowers who default and borrowers who do not.
An additional result of my analysis points to the significance of liquidity in influencing
business default. Profit retention variables and gross profit variables are the foremost
variables influencing business default rates. The importance of profitability is borne out in
the negative correlation between gross profit and default. Furthermore, there is tentative
evidence that the levels of retained profits, if indicative of business growth, reinvestment or
liquidity, are positively correlated with default.
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Table 6.1 Organisation of 'Bigdata930' and 'SAScard930'
Business 1
Business 1
Identifier 1
Identifier 2
Collateral x
6,300
450
Collateral value
using
'Bigdata930'
6,300
Collateral value
using 'SAScard'
6,750
Business 2 Identifier 1
Business 2
6,300
Identifier 2
6,300
6,300
6,300
Table 6.2 'Bigdata930F' Sum of total borrowing 'Newsum'
NSM_BAND(NEWSUM) LE LE LE LE GT Total
4000 10000 40000 100000 100000
Goods 174 123 229 152 112 790
Bads 25 16 47 35 17 140
Total 199 139 276 187 129 930
gij/bij 6.96 7.69 4.87 4.34 6.59
ln(gij/bij) 1.94 2.04 1.58 1.47 1.89
Bj/Gj 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
ln(Bj/Gj) -1.73 -1.73 -1.73 -1.73 -1.73
ln(gij/bij) + ln(Bj/Gj) 0.21 0.31 -0.15 -0.26 0.15
Scorecard results Chapter Six Page 160
Table 6.3 Sensitivities and specificities for Bigdata930F'
Correct Incorrect
Prob.
level
At least
once
grade F
Never
grade F
At least
once
grade F
Never
grade F
Correct Sensitivity Specificity
0.00 140 0 790 0 15.1 100.0 0.0
0.02 140 6 784 0 15.7 100.0 0.8
0.04 138 46 744 2 19.8 98.6 5.8
0.06 132 123 667 8 27.4 94.3 15.6
0.08 120 231 559 20 37.7 85.7 29.2
0.10 107 321 469 33 46.0 76.4 40.6
0.12 95 396 394 45 52.8 67.9 50.1
0.14 82 472 318 58 59.6 58.6 59.7
0.16 69 524 266 71 63.8 49.3 66.3
0.18 57 573 217 83 67.7 40.7 72.5
0.20 51 617 173 89 71.8 36.4 78.1
0.22 44 653 137 96 74.9 31.4 82.7
0.24 37 677 113 103 76.8 26.4 85.7
0.26 31 702 88 109 78.8 22.1 88.9
0.28 25 715 75 115 79.6 17.9 90.5
0.30 20 732 58 120 80.9 14.3 '92.7
0.32 16 741 49 124 81.4 11.4 93.8
0.34 14 751 39 126 82.3 10.0 95.1
0.36 12 763 27 128 83.3 8.6 96.6
0.38 10 768 22 130 83.7 7.1 97.2
0.40 9 770 20 131 83.8 6.4 97.5
0.42 7 773 17 133 83.9 5.0 97.8
0.44 7 776 14 133 84.2 5.0 98.2
0.46 7 781 9 133 84.7 5.0 98.9
0.48 6 784 6 134 84.9 4.3 99.2
0.50 5 785 5 135 84.9 3.6 99.4
0.52 4 788 2 136 85.2 29 99.7
0.54 4 789 1 136 85.3 2.9 99.9
0.56 4 789 1 136 85.3 2.9 99.9
0.58 4 790 0 136 85.4 2.9 100.0
0.60 4 790 0 136 85.4 2.91 100.0
0.62 4 790 0 136 85.4 2.9 100.0
0.64 3 790 0 137 85.3 2.1 100.0
0.66 2 790 0 138 85.2 1.4 100.0
0.68 2 790 0 138 85.2 1.4 100.0
070 1 790 0 139 85.1 0.7 100.0
0.72 0 790 0 140 84.9 0.0 100.0
-2 Log likelihood Intercept and covariates 718.87
Chi square for covariates 69.102 with 37 DF (p=0.0010)
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Table 6.4 Sensitivities and specificities for 'Bigdata930E'
Correct Incorrect
Prob.
level
At least
grade E
Never
grade E
At least
grade E
Never
grade E
Correct Sensitivity Specificity
0.04 278 0 652 0 29.9 100.0 0.0
0.06 276 2 650 2 29.9 99.3 0.3
0.08 276 6 646 2 30.3 99.3 0.9
0.10 275 18 634 3 31.5 98.9 2.8
0.12 270 35 617 8 32.8 97.1 5.4
0.14 265 68 584 13 35.8 95.3 10.4
0.16 250 95 557 28 37.1 89.9 14.6
0.18 245- 132 520 33 40.5 88.1 20.2
0.20 229 175 477 49 43.4 82.4 26.8
0.22 212 225 427 66 47.0 76.3 34.5
0.24 202 279 373 76 51.7 72.7 42.8
0.26 183 316 336 95 53.7 65.8 48.5
0.28 169 354 298 109 56.2 60.8 54.3
0.30 156 390 262 122 58.7 56.1 59.8
0.32 143 429 223 135 61.5 51.4 65.8
0.34 127 472 180 151 64.4 45.7 72.4
0.36 115 497 155 163 65.8 41.4 76.2
0.38 99 525 127 179 67.1 35.6 80.5
0.40 87 548 104 191 68.3 31.3 84.0
0.42 74 568 84 204 69.0 26.6 87.1
0.44 65 579 73 213 69.2 23.4 OO 0° oo
0.46 56 590 62 222 69.5 20.1 90.5
0.48 44 608 44 234 70.1 15.8 93.3
0.50 34 616 36 244 69.9 12.2 94.5
0.52 28 622 30 250 69.9 10.1 95.4
0.54 22 623 29 256 69.4 7.9 95.6
0.56 18 630 22 260 69.7 6.5 96.6
0.58 18 637 15 260 70.4 6.5 97.7
0.60 14 640 12 264 70.3 5.0 98.2
0.62 10 645 7 268 70.4 3.6 98.9
0.64 8 647 5 270 70.4 2.9 99.2
0.66 7 647 5 271 70.3 2.5 99.2
0.68 5 649 3 273 70.3 1.8 99.5
0.70 4 650 2 274 70.3 1.4 99.7
0.72 2 650 2 276 70.1 0.7 99.7
0.74 2 650 2 276 70.1 0.7 99.7
0.76 1 652 0 277 70.2 0.4 100.0
0.78 0 652 0 278 70.1 0 100.0
-2 Log likelihood Intercept and covariates 1057.499
Chi square for covariates 77.009 with 37 DF (p=0.0002)
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Table 6.5
'Bigdata930F'; classification at 0.50
cut-off
Predicted Predicted Total
bads goods
At least F 5 135 140
grade
Never F 5 785 790
grade
930
Table 6.6
'Bigdata930E; classification at 0.50
cut-off
Pred. Pred. Total
bads goods
At least 34 244 278
E grade
Never E 36 616 652
grade
930
Table 6.7 Gini coefficients for all scorecards Gini coefficients (c)
(1) (2) (3)
Ex post validation Out-of-sample Lachenbruch
validation
70 percent training 30 percent holdout
sample sample
'
DrasticE' 0.75 0.51 0.58
' DrasticF' 0.81 0.57 0.59
'Bigdatal572E' 0.65 0.57 0.57
'Bigdatal572F' 0.68 0.56 0.55
'Bigdata930E' 0.71 0.55 0.59
'Bigdata930F' 0.73 0.60 0 59
'SAScard930E' 0.66 0.62 0.44
'SAScard930F' 0.71 0.57 0.43
Scorecard results Chapter Six Page 163
Table 6.8 Variable names used in 'Bigdata930F scorecard
Aclgroup Account credit limit
Agegroup Entrepreneur's age
Agrgroup Aggregate borrowings
Blngroup Has a business loan
Bpvgroup Present value of bank owned asset
(mortgaged asset)
Bsmgroup Number of miles business is from bank
Cprgroup Breakdown between cash sales and credit
sales
Dyigroup Number of years work experience
Ldogroup Business premises leased or owned
Nbgroup Owner has contributed own equity
Nsmgroup New amount borrowed
Olngroup Has multiple loan facilities
Pgpgroup Present gross profit
Pjsgroup Projected sales
Pnpgroup Present net profit
Psdgroup Present business drawings
Pstgroup Past sales turnover
Rgpgroup Recent gross profit
Rplgroup Recent profit and loss
balance
Rrpgroup Recent retained profit
Rtagroup Recent total assets
Rtngroup Retained profit
Ryegroup Had financial accounts
Singroup Sales increase
Taggroup Total aggregate
borrowings
Table 6.9 Significant variables in the 'Bigdata930F' model before testing for
collinearity
Weight of evidence variable name Pr > chi-square
Intercept 0.00
Cprgroup** 0.02
Taggroup** 0.02
Ryegroup** 0.03
Dprgroup** 0.03
Bpvgroup** 0.04
Rtngroup* 0.07
Pstgroup* 0.08
Rtagroup* 0.09
Ldogroup* 0.09
Rgpgroup* 0.10
*** significant at the 1-percent level; ** significant at the 5-percent level; * significant at the 10-percent level
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Table 6.10 Significant variables in the 'Bigdata930F' model after testing for
collinearity
Weight of evidence variable name Pr > chi-square
Intercept 0.00
Cprgroup*** 0.01
Rrpgroup** 0.06
Rgpgroup* 0.08
Rtngroup* 0.08
Ldogroup* 0.09
*** significant at the 1-percent level; ** significant at the 5-percent level; * significant at the 10-percent level
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Figure 6.1 Derivation of different scorecard estimation samples
with
multiple ties
Bigdata 1572 E/F
Bigdata 930 E/F &
SAScard 930 E/F
Drastic 618
E/F
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Figure 6.2 Plan for creation of drastic' dataset
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Figure6.3
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Figure 6.4 WOE Categories for 'proj_sal' Bigdata930E
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Figure 6.6 Predicted probabilities for 'Bigdata 930E'
Figure 6.7 Predicted probabilities for 'Bigdata930F'
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Figure 6.8 ROC curve for Bigdata930E
1 - specificity
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Table 6.10 ROC for Bigdata930F and Bigdata1572F
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Figure 6.12 WOE for 'cprgroup'
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Figure 6.14 WOE for 'rgpgroup'
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Figure 6.16 WOE for 'Idogroup'
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Chapter 7
Impact of entrepreneur-bank
relationships on the price of credit
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7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role played by entrepreneur-bank relationships
in influencing the cost of credit. An entrepreneur-bank relationship is a pre-existing
relationship that exists prior to the time in which the entrepreneur applies for this first
business loan with the bank.
No existing analysis has yet explored the impact of pre-existing entrepreneur-bank
relationships on the cost of first-period business borrowing. However, there is a closely
related literature on the effects of borrower reputation on the price and other terms of credit
such as collateral (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). The model by
Petersen and Rajan (1995) that borrows from Diamond (1989) and that illustrates the effect
of close business-bank ties, has already been outlined in section 2.4 of Chapter 2. I will
refer to this parallel literature on borrower reputation and interpret the findings of my
analysis of entrepreneur-bank relationships in the context of this wider literature. A full
description and critique of these borrower reputation models is provided in section 2.5 of
Chapter 2.
7.2 The structure of this chapter and its contribution to the credit pricing
literature
In this chapter I seek to establish whether the presence of pre-existing, entrepreneur-bank
relationships influence the cost of first-time business finance using a unique, UK dataset of
loans to first-period business borrowers. In so doing, I appeal to theories of private
information and the effect of reputation on the cost of borrowing. I expect that any
differences in my results compared with previous studies that proxy reputation using
business-bank relationships, will be due to differences in the magnitude of the effect of
reputation, rather than in the direction of the effect. This is because I have chosen to
examine small businesses when the business-bank relationship commences and private-
information effects are likely to be most pronounced, hence reputation is predicted to play a
pivotal role due to the early-stage nature of borrowing in my data.
I also compare the contribution of reputation and credit history variables (non-observable,
private information variables) with observable, human capital variables in explaining the
price of credit after controlling for variables describing the amount borrowed, loan type,
purpose and security.
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My first research question aims to establish whether the previous borrowings of an
entrepreneur prior to his take-up of a commercial loan, in other words, his entrepreneur-
bank relationship, influence the price of his credit.
The second research question that I address concerns the incremental value of firm/borrower
quality variables (observable factors) compared with loan contract variables in explaining
the price of credit. If the bank is motivated by transaction variables, the explanatory power
of loan contract variables as a group should be higher than that of the firm quality variables.
I include additional variables in the group of firm quality variables that have not been used
before in past studies of this kind. For example, the number of years employment experience
the entrepreneur has, whether the entrepreneur is confident of his future and whether the
business can continue to operate without the business owner.
My analysis additionally contains a more exhaustive range of loan contract variables
compared to the range employed in previous research. The choice of loan contract variables
used in my estimations includes the amount borrowed and the value of collateral. This is the
first study relating to the price of credit which is able to show the trade-off between the
price of credit (interest margin) and collateral level, if such a trade-off exists. My study is
also the first of its kind to use the amount borrowed as an explanatory variable. This latter
addition is necessary on the grounds that the per unit cost of credit is hypothesised to be
decreasing in the amount borrowed. In other words, if transaction and monitoring costs are
reduced on larger credit volumes, then the amount borrowed is an essential explanatory
variable for the interest margins. By exploring the sensitivity of interest margins to the
volume of credit, my analysis is the first to indirectly examine the phenomenon of interest
rate 'embeddedness' described by Petersen and Rajan (1994) by including the amount
borrowed as an additional explanatory variable1.
I structure this chapter as follows. In the next section, I explain why it is necessary to
explore entrepreneur-bank relationships. In the section following this, I describe the major
theoretical and empirical contributions to this area. The section following this describes my
data, which will be used in the estimations that follow. I then introduce the variables used to
estimate the price of credit. Next I present some descriptive statistics and the results of my
regressions. In the final section, I conclude whether entrepreneur-bank relationships affect
the price of credit after controlling for other variables that are likely to influence credit
terms.
1
Interest rate 'embeddedness' is described more fully in section 7.4
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7.3 Why investigate the influence of entrepreneur-bank relationships?
Numerous theoretical and financial economists have investigated the price of commercial
credit. Central to the price of credit is the role of business-bank relationships because these
are argued to influence the costs of lending to unquoted small businesses where the problem
of information asymmetry is most acute. Several empirical studies have sought to establish
the impact of borrower reputation on numerous aspects of business credit. Issues where
relationships are shown to play a role include credit availability, the pricing of IPOs (initial
public offerings) and the magnitude of interest on various types of borrowing (Cole, 1998;
James and Weir, 1990; Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The aim of my
chapter is to investigate whether the presence of pre-existing entrepreneur-bank
relationships influence the cost of first time business finance.
The founder of a business start-up has often established a credit history (entrepreneur-bank
relationship) prior to setting up his business. An entrepreneur-bank relationship therefore
predates a business-bank relationship because it is the only known relationship in existence
when an entrepreneur sets up a new business and when costless public information about the
business is non-existent.
A lender can amass information about borrowers over a series of consumer products such as
home mortgages, credit cards, car and education loans or personal overdrafts. Pre-existing
entrepreneur-bank relationships are hypothesised, to influence the cost of any subsequent
loans to borrowers, including any first-period business loans. Practitioners who estimate
small business application scorecards are cognisant of the interconnectedness between
entrepreneurs' personal finances and their business risk and include credit bureau data
relating to business principals in scorecard estimations (Asch, 1995). If an entrepreneur has
shown himself to be a reliable bank customer in the past, there is little reason to believe that
he will alter his future behaviour. However, an element of uncertainty is inherent in all new
ventures (project risk), irrespective of the entrepreneur's reliability (customer risk). Holding
project risk constant, if a bank is responsive to customer risk, it should adjust interest
margins to reflect changes in the customer's risk profile.
However, the intuitive expectation that a bank having an entrepreneur-bank relationship
will be lenient to its business client by charging a lower interest margin on the client's first-
period business loan, is not necessarily realistic. There is an argument to support the reverse
case that a bank raises rather than lowers the interest margin. If a borrower is tied to his
original lender due to the effect of private information where other potential lenders cannot
observe the borrower's reputation, little choice remains to an entrepreneur but to seek
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finance from his original lender who is aware of his reputation. An entrepreneur may be
required to pay higher-than-competitive interest margins on his borrowings in subsequent
lending periods because he is 'informationally captured' by his lender (Sharpe, 1990). Even
if other banks wanted to attract 'informationally captured' borrowers, they would run the
risk of adverse selection. Competing banks may suspect that the borrower's departure is
prompted by the original lender's refusal to expand or to re-extend the borrower's original
loan facility, due to poor repayment behaviour. If the bank is able to wield this type of
market power, the credit market is understood to be 'concentrated' (Petersen and Rajan,
1995).
Therefore, if private information best describes the information environment surrounding a
first-period business loan, a bank with an entrepreneur-bank relationship extending over a
number of years is in a better position, than a competitor bank with no such relationship, to
assess the integrity or creditworthiness of this new business borrower. This is because
borrower risk is conditioned on past lending experience with the borrower (Diamond, 1991).
If the market for first-time loans is conditioned on private information, we should see
considerable emphasis placed on variables that are non-observable to outside banks i.e.
reputation and credit history as determinants of the interest rate charged2. On the other hand,
if emphasis is placed on observable characteristics of the borrower, such as his age or work
experience, support for private information arguments is weakened. It is important when
drawing this distinction between observable and non-observable variables influencing the
cost of credit, that a researcher controls for the variables collateral, borrowed amount, loan
purpose and type i.e. the transaction-cost variables3.
In this chapter I assume that only the original lender is aware of a borrower's reputation at
the business start-up stage. Newly founded UK businesses are unlikely to have audited,
public or comprehensive accounts (Gower, 1992). Additionally, they are highly unlikely to
exhibit share valuations unless they emanate from a larger, established parent company. The
age of a business is known to convey information about a borrower's creditworthiness to
outsiders and denotes the true quality of a business borrower (Diamond, 1989). However, at
2
Assuming that accessing a borrower's credit history implies a cost. Diamond (1989) refers to a
borrower's credit history as an observable commodity. We argue that borrower credit histories can be
accessed via credit bureau but that it is a source of information that must be purchased and therefore is
not equivalent to the 'costless' information arising from an entrepreneur-bank relationship.
3 Particular caution must be taken in interpreting the results of any analysis if assets and borrower type
are correlated (James and Weir, 1990; Cressy, 1996b). However, if one assumes that first-period
business borrowers post all their assets as collateral (a plausible assumption given initial wealth
constraints) and collateral is included as an explanatory variable, there is less danger of model
misspecification.
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the start-up stage, business age is zero and therefore no costless source of information about
the borrower exists4.
I argue that in empirical investigations of the determinants of interest margins there is an
advantage in using entrepreneur-bank relationships rather than business-bank relationships
to proxy reputation effects. This arises because by the time a business successfully applies
for a rollover loan, the borrower is already likely to have established a public credit history.
It follows that the entrepreneur is freer to move his custom to another bank once his survival
can be observed. Once the first critical five years of a new firm's trading life have elapsed,
external investors are likely to regard a business more favourably5. Therefore, the impact of
reputation should be most pronounced when an entrepreneur takes out his first-period
business loan0.
In a parallel literature on the effects of reputation for publicly traded companies, studies
have found that the renewal of a loan facility rather than new issue of a loan facility often
generates comparatively higher market returns (Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Best and
Zhang, 1993). This difference in returns arises from the positive signal conveyed to
investors when a bank extends its loan commitment to subsequent periods. James and Weir
(1990) find that the existence of a borrowing relationship alone is sufficient to reduce
uncertainty regarding the value of an initial public offering (IPO) while James (1987) finds
that that investors react positively to the announcement of new bank credit facilities.
In view of the diminishing importance of private-information over time, (or following the
first rollover loan) by using entrepreneur-bank relationships to proxy reputation effects on
the price of credit, I expect to capture the effect of borrower reputation on interest margins
at the earliest possible stage in a firm's development. At this stage, the reputation of the
borrower is expected to matter most because at this time there is the least amount of public
information about the borrower.
7.4 The literature on borrower reputation and the price of credit
The literature that predicts the effect that business-bank relationships have on the price of
credit is divided into two opposing viewpoints. Some models predict that in the first
borrowing period interest rates will be lower than in the second borrowing period
4 We assume that credit bureau data is not costless.
5 The high attrition rates exhibited by new businesses is evidenced by a 20 percent failure rate for UK
start-up businesses in their first trading year, with 60 percent of businesses failing by their fifth trading
year (Barclay's Bank Information Service, 2000. http.Vwww.businesspark.barclays.com)
6 Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that the role of reputation is strongest when firms are young and
that the marginal returns to reputation decrease as a firm ages.
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(Greenbaum et al, 1989; Sharpe, 1990). On the other hand, Boot and Thakor (1994) and
Diamond (1989) have developed models predicting completely the opposite effect on
interest rates, whereby a bank commences lending at a comparatively higher rate than in
subsequent periods. Furthermore, Petersen and Rajan (1995) have developed a model that
delivers different predictions, describing the disparity between first-period and second-
period interest margins, that are contingent on the degree of competition/concentration in the
credit market.
Perhaps these differences in model predictions arise from the different emphasis of each
model with implications for what happens to the price of credit when the first borrowing
period elapses. For example, Sharpe focuses on implicit contracts as a way of cementing the
borrower-bank relationship. Petersen and Rajan deal primarily with bank concentration as a
driver of the inefficiencies arising from private information. Greenbaum et al. deal with,
among other issues, the exit costs that would be incurred by a second-period borrower. Boot
and Thakor assume that lending takes the form of a sequential game with the prospect of
cheaper second-period finance operating as a deterrent to borrowers hoping to leave their
original lender. Diamond assumes a multiperiod framework entailing a game where it only
pays a borrower to develop a reputation once a borrower has survived the first period of
boiTowing with high interest rates.
These models, with the exception of Diamond, all assume that private information collected
by the bank about the borrower's creditworthiness cannot be passed on to other lenders7.
The different predictions of models for interest rate margins are summarised in Table 7.2.
Relatively little empirical work dealing with the effect of reputation on the price of credit to
small firms has been carried out. This is due to difficulties in obtaining in-house data from
retail banks on non-quoted small businesses. All existing empirical work on small
businesses uses data from the US National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF).
Thus Cole (1998), using data from the 1993 NSSBF, finds that pre-existing business-bank
relationships enhance the borrower's prospects of obtaining credit. Petersen and Rajan
(1994) find that the duration of a pre-existing business-bank relationship increases credit
availability but that the duration of a relationship exerts no significant effect on the price of
credit. Berger and Udell (1995) find that borrowers with longer business-bank relationships
are associated with comparatively lower margins on their Letters of Credit (L/C's) facilities.
The disparity between the results obtained by Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and
7 Diamond (1989) cites the availability of a borrower's credit rating as confirmation that a borrower
develops a public reputation
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Rajan (1994) is most likely due to the relationship-driven, rather than transaction-driven
nature of L/C's.
In a separate analysis, Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that older firms (age being a proxy for
external reputation effects) are associated with lower interest rates, irrespective of the
structure of the credit market. They find that lenders tend to smooth the cost of credit over
the life cycle of the firm in a concentrated market, and so the decline in interest margin with
firm age is less dramatic in concentrated, compared to competitive, markets. Lenders appear
to charge lower-than-competitive interest rates when a firm is young but recoup this shortfall
when the firm is older by charging higher-than-competitive interest rates.
Overall, this literature suggests that business-bank relationships (private information) are
likely to matter most when the financial product is relationship-driven e.g. L/Cs. In addition,
if markets are concentrated, a lender will amortise the costs of low initial interest rates to
first-term borrowers by recouping the initial outlay over subsequent loans8. Therefore, while
the costs of borrowing are expected to decrease over the firm's life cycle, the decrease in the
cost of borrowing may be less than the decrease warranted by the overall reduction in risk.
Therefore, the overall effect of close firm-creditor ties on the cost of borrowing is
ambiguous (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
Moreover, Petersen and Rajan (1994) concluded that the 'embeddedness' of interest rates
makes the role of business/bank relationships redundant. 'Embeddedness' means that the
sanctioner has little discretion over the magnitude of the interest margin because the volume,
rather than the risk, of credit determines interest margins. Hence, a sanctioner has discretion
over how much he lends to a business borrower but little discretion over the interest margin,
since this is determined by the magnitude of the loan. If interest rates are embedded in the
size of loans, they should respond more to changes in the volume of borrowing than to
changes in other explanatory variables, such as relationship or borrower quality variables.
With embeddedness, there is little latitude for the person sanctioning the loan to consider
such 'soft information' as borrower quality.
7.5 The dataset and description of the variables
The data used contains 5,967 small businesses that had no previous commercial loan with
the bank. The vast majority of these first-period borrowers were in the form of business
start-ups although sources at the bank indicated that several first-period borrowers had
8 A feature of private information is that it tends to concentrate the market for credit because
borrowers are dependent on their original lender and hence private information promotes the existence
of exclusive business-bank relationships.
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transferred their custom from another bank9. All data related to loans or overdrafts from my
UK bank data source and related to the borrowing period December 1997 to July 1999.
Regarding the composition of small businesses in my data, none of these small businesses
was incorporated because publicly traded businesses were dealt with by a separate, less
automated branch of the bank. The majority of the small businesses, approximately 80
percent, are sole traders (owner managed) with unlimited liability. About 19 percent are
partnerships, with a further 1 percent of the sample enjoying limited liability status. I
derived this approximation for the breakdown of the companies in my sample by inferring
that personal guarantees are supplied by limited companies and that the presence of partners
suggests a non-owner managed business. Unfortunately, no better approximation of the
breakdown of my data is available.
A list and description of the variables used in this analysis is contained in Table 7.1.
I estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the effect of the five explanatory
variable groups on the magnitude of the interest margin charged by the bank. It takes the
form;
1 6 7 15 18
Yi = cx + ^ fij Xij + ^ Pj Xy + ^ Pj Xjj + ^ Pj Xjj + ^ Pj Xy
7=1 7=2 7=7 7=8 7=16
Where
Y, is the magnitude of the interest margin for borrower i
j — j is my relationship proxy
j = 2-6 represent my loan contract variables
j ~ 7 is my size proxy
j = s -15 are borrower/business characteristics
j = 16- is are risk variables
The subscript i refers to the number of borrower observations and the subscript j refers to
the explanatory variables. I explore whether the cost of credit, in terms of interest margins,
is positively or negatively related to the magnitude of first period borrowing for
entrepreneurs with or without an entrepreneur-bank relationship.
I use the dummy variable 'prevbor=l' to denote whether a borrower has previously
borrowed or not10. This is consistent with multiperiod lending dummies used in other
research (Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Best and Zhang, 1993).
9
Unfortunately, there was no way of differentiating between the two types of first-period borrower
although I was assured by sources at the bank that the number of businesses that had transferred from
another bank were comparatively few. The literature on adverse selection (see Chapter 2 section 2.2)
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The loan contract variables that 1 use are as follows: the variable 'borr' indicates the amount
borrowed, 'coll' indicates the amount of collateral used, 'overdrft' denotes whether the loan
is an overdraft or not, 'working' signifies whether the loan is for working capital purposes
and 'nonborrl' indicates that the borrower injected his own cash savings into the project. I
also include the squared terms of the continuous variables in this set of loan contract
variables. These are squared borrowing, 'borr2', and 'colli' denoting squared collateral.
The reason that I use these loan contract variables is that the amount borrowed and the level
of security or collateral define the level of exposure of the bank to the business. These two
variables have not been used before in the two existing studies by Petersen and Rajan (1994)
and Berger and Udell (1995). The reason for this omission of these two loan contract
variables in previous research is that they are possibly difficult to estimate when borrowing
is cumulative or when it has been partially amortised. Because all the loans in my data refer
to first-period business borrowing, these variables are available. I would expect an inverse
relationship between collateral and interest margins. This trade-off between interest margins
and the level of collateral should be evidenced by a negative sign for the collateral variable
'coll'. I would expect that higher amounts of borrowing indicated by higher values for the
borrowing variable 'borr' should be associated with lower margins due to the reduced per
unit transaction-cost of lending comparatively larger amounts of finance.
The variables relating to the term structure of the loan are the overdraft 'overclrft' and
working capital 'working' dummies. An overdraft dummy has been used before in previous
work where Petersen and Rajan (1994) differentiated between loans and overdrafts. Berger
and Udell (1995) directly controlled for the structure of the loan by concentrating only on
the subset of all borrowers who had taken out an overdraft". I would expect both overdraft
and working finance to be associated with higher interest margins (a positive sign). My
rationale for a positive sign for the variables 'overdrft' and 'working' is due to the higher
risk associated with an option to buy money forward at a fixed rate of interest in order to
fund the working capital requirements of the business (Berger and Udell, 1995).
confirms that a bank is less likely to accept a business who has previously borrowed from another bank
on the grounds that the original lender is unhappy with the borrower's repayment record or risk profile
10 An example of an entrepreneur-bank relationship is where an entrepreneur had a mortgage with the
bank before taking out a business loan. The bank therefore infers the borrower's creditworthiness from
his repayment performance on the mortgage. However, the bank still remains unsure how the
entrepreneur will manage his business and has no pre-existing business-bank relationship. Therefore,
no business in my sample had a business-bank (as opposed to entrepreneur-bank) relationship before
applying for its first loan.
"
Berger and Udell (1995) actually deal with Letters of Credit which are analogous to overdrafts. L/C
appears to be the preferred US terminology for overdraft finance.
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A size proxy is possibly not as relevant to my analysis as to analyses containing firms that
greatly vary in size. However, in order to keep my analysis consistent with similar US
analyses, I control for size. Hence US analyses using data from the NSSBF survey control
for size (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). Although, as I have noted in
footnote 9 that very few businesses in my sample have transferred from another bank due to
the likelihood of adverse selection, in order to control for any size differences that the
presence of transferred businesses might give rise to, I decided to control for variation in
industry size. This variable therefore captures any variation in interest margin that is due to
a business being comparatively larger, or more established, than other businesses.
I furthermore control for human capital variables in view of the importance placed on these
variables by Cressy (1996c) The human capital variables included in this analysis are as
follows: borrower age, 'age', the number of years work experience that the entrepreneur has,
'exp', whether the entrepreneur thinks his business is risky, 'norisk', whether the
entrepreneur has a business partner, 'partner', whether the borrower retained a profit from
his previous business sales, 'retainl', and whether the business can continue in the absence
of the business principal, 'busoper'. I would expect more mature borrowers with longer
work experience records to receive lower interest margins than young borrowers who have
not gained much work experience. Such borrowers are expected to have accumulated more
experience on how to derive and implement a viable business project. Hence a negative sign
is predicted for the variables 'age' and 'exp' with interest margin. I included both the
variables 'age' and work experience 'exp' although there is likely to be a very high
correlation between them. Indeed, the Pearson correlation between them of 0.417, is
significant to the 1 percent level. The reason I include both variables is to allow for the fact
that professionals who enter self-employment, such as doctors and lawyers, are likely to
have spent more time in full time education and have less work experience than their age
would suggest, than an early school leaver. I would also expect the variables 'partner' and
'busoper' to be associated with lower interest rates and hence a negative sign because
entrepreneurs with business partners benefit from shared knowledge and decision making as
well as additional equity sources. Furthermore, a business that can continue to operate when
the principal owner is sick or otherwise absent, is assured of a more steady and continuous
income stream. Hence, businesses with fewer succession issues ('busoper'-1) are expected
to receive lower interest margins.
I also control for the business risk variables 'debtres' and 'anyinso'. The variable 'debtres'
indicates whether the business owner had had his borrowing consolidated or rescheduled in
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the past. The variable 'anyinso' indicates whether the borrower was insolvent at any stage in
the past prior to obtaining the loan. These variables being symptomatic of financial distress
are predicted to be positively related to interest rates where borrowers exhibiting past
financial distress are predicted to receive higher interest margins. This reasoning is
consistent with the results obtained by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell
(1995) where past insolvency was positively related to the price of credit.
7.6 Descriptive statistics for the data
I first of all explore some simple descriptive statistics describing the breakdown of our
variables according to whether an entrepreneur-bank relationship exists or not. 1,152 of the
5,968 borrowers in our data have entrepreneur-bank relationships compared with 4,816
through-the-door applicants. It would appear that there are more through-the-door applicants
than borrowers who are known beforehand to the bank.
Table 7.3 shows the composition of interest margin, 'interest', amount borrowed, 'borr', the
number of years employment experience the entrepreneur has, 'exp', the magnitude of
collateral, 'coll', the size of the small business in terms of recent sales turnover, 'sales 1' and
finally, the entrepreneur's age, 'age'.
I use a difference of means test to establish differences between the two groups. We can see
that interest margins are slightly higher for borrowers with previous borrowing histories and
that this difference is significant at the 1 percent level. Rather suprisingly, borrowers with
pre-existing relationships tend to borrow less on average than borrowers without these
relationships and the significance level for the t-statistic is less than 1 percent. Borrowers
without entrepreneur-bank relationships tend to have about 9 months more employment
experience than borrowers without these relationships and the difference is also significant
at the 1 percent level. Regarding collateral, borrowers without entrepreneur-bank
relationships provide on average less collateral than their counterparts. This difference in the
means is significant at the 5 percent level. The remaining two variables, 'salesl' and 'age',
show no significant differences in their means.
Table 7.4 reports the corresponding differences between the relative proportions for the
dummy variables. These variables are as follows: 'overdrft', denotes that a borrower takes
out an overdraft (L/C) rather than a fixed term loan, and 'debtres' indicates that the
borrower has needed to have his borrowings rescheduled in the past. The financial distress
variable, 'anyinso', indicates that the borrower has been insolvent in the past. The variable
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'liql' indicates that the borrower invests his own savings in the business venture or carries
over profits from a previous time period. The dummy 'busoper' indicates that the
entrepreneur has got a partner or key employee who can take over the business in the
absence of the business principal. This variable is closely related to the dummy variable
'partner' indicating that the business was a partnership. It is intuitive that a partnership will
experience fewer problems with succession issues than an owner-managed business. Indeed,
the correlation between the two variables of 0.135 is significant at the 1 percent level and
indicates that partnerships are also businesses with fewer problems regarding succession1".
The variable 'norisk' indicates that the entrepreneur stated on his application form, that he
did not think that his business project was likely to encounter any risks ahead. The final
variable 'working' denotes whether the loan purpose is designated for working capital
purposes.
We can see that there is a structural difference in the breakdown of finance, where firms
with entrepreneur-bank relationships are more likely to take out an overdraft, 'overclrft',
than a term loan. The relative proportion for borrowers with a pre-existing relationship
stands at 60 percent, compared to 49 percent for through-the-door applicants and this
difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
Of businesses with entrepreneur-bank relationships, only 1.5 percent have exhibited past
insolvency compared with 1.7 percent of their through-the-door counterparts but this
disparity is insignificant.
Of borrowers with entrepreneur-bank relationships, 9.6 percent have needed their
borrowings rescheduled compared with 20.6 percent of through-the-door applicants. This
result seems suprising because we would expect the lender to be more lenient to its existing
customers than its through-the-door business applicants. However, it may well be the case
that a certain amount of debt consolidation is required for ab initio customers and that this is
reflected in this high proportion of rescheduled borrowing. However, borrowers who have
had their borrowings rescheduled are less likely to obtain an overdraft than other borrowers.
This is evidenced by a Spearman's rho of -0.080 for the variable 'clebtres' when it is
correlated with overdraft finance 'overdrft'. This correlation is significant at the 1 percent
level. We can conclude from this that the bank might not be as selective about which
customers it lends to rather than selective about the financial products that it makes
12 Of course it is possible that some partners are sleeping partners who merely inject equity into the
business. However, if several partners are actively involved in running the business, there is a higher
likelihood that the withdrawal of the principal partner will adversely affect the continuity of the
business.
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available to them. Therefore, while keen to win new customers, the bank also appears to
tailor its financial products to the borrowers' risk profiles.
Of businesses with entrepreneur-bank relationships, 70 percent invest their own cash in
their business project or have shown a retained profit compared with 76 percent of through-
the-door borrowers. This suggests that those entrepreneurs with reputations are less likely to
face onerous requirements regarding their financial commitment to their business projects or
the past viability (profits) of their projects. Despite the higher demands imposed on through-
the-door customers regarding project viability, and their own commitment to the project, we
must remember that on average, borrowers with entrepreneur-bank relationships post more
collateral than their counterparts (From Table 7.3). This latter result could be influenced by
the cumulative effect of collateral that was previously posted on past personal borrowing.
An inexact relationship therefore may exist between the magnitude of the present business
loan, 'borr', and the level of collateral 'coll' due to this artefact of the data. Furthermore,
due to collateral indivisibilities, collateral is not necessarily priced to risk11.
Similarly, less onerous requirements are imposed on businesses with entrepreneur-bank
relationships, regarding the continuity of their business (succession issues). They are
significantly less likely to have a key employee or business partner to take over the business
operations in the absence of the business principal. The onus is most likely on through-the-
door applicants to allocate some individual to fulfil this role in order to make themselves
more appealing to a lender. In the same way, through-the-door applicants are significantly
more upbeat about the viability of their projects. Of through-the-door applicants, 58 percent
stated that their project would not encounter any risks compared with 55 percent of
entrepreneurs that had banked with the lender before. The remaining two variables,
'partner' and 'working', did not exhibit any significance in their relative proportions
between the two groups.
7.7 Regression results for the factors influencing the price of credit
Now that I have presented the descriptive statistics showing the relative breakdown of the
variables according to whether borrowers had established a reputation or were through-the-
door applicants, I move on to estimations where I can control for all explanatory variables
simultaneously. I regress the interest rate margin 'interest' against the other explanatory
variables and, in so doing, adhere to the same broad variable groups as used by Petersen and
11 See Chapter 9 for a comprehensive discussion of collateral
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Rajan (1994). These groups comprise the relationship, loan contract, size, borrower/business
attributes and finally risk/performance variables (Table 7.5).
First, it should be noted that the adjusted r-square value of 0.29 is higher than those reported
by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995). The former reported a maximum
adjusted r-squared value of 0.158 while the latter cited a maximum unadjusted value of
0.095. Therefore, my model represents a comparatively good fit to the data with higher
levels of explained variance.
Consistent with what we have already seen in the cross-tabs and their corresponding
statistics, borrowers exhibiting entrepreneur-bank relationships {'prevbor = 1) are associated
with higher interest margins. The raw coefficient for the entrepreneur-bank relationship
proxy Cprevbor= 1) is 0.161 and this is significant at the 1 percent level. This means that
borrowers with previous bank borrowings show an increase in their interest rate margin of
16.1 basis points compared with borrowers who have no previous borrowing experience. I
therefore have initial evidence that the sign of the relationship variable coefficient
corresponds with theories predicting that borrowers are 'informationally captured' by the
bank (Sharpe, 1990). If banks enjoy the monopoly power conferred by private information
as is argued by Sharpe (1990) and Greenbaum et al. (1989), the result should be reflected in
higher interest rates in the second round of finance and hence a positive sign for the
coefficient on the relationship variable.
I now look at the loan contract variables beginning with the loan type dummy 'overdrft'.
The raw coefficient of 0.418 indicates that borrowers with overdrafts are expected to pay
41.8 basis points more for their borrowings. This relationship is significant at the 1 percent
level. It is no suprise that overdraft finance is more expensive than other types of finance.
This is because it is flexible (an option to draw down finance at a predetermined, fixed
interest rate at some future time-period) and likely to be non-asset backed if used to finance
working capital (Berger and Udell, 1995).
Analogous to the higher expected cost of overdraft finance, is the higher expected cost of
working capital finance where borrowers taking out a working capital loan are expected to
pay 19 basis points more for their finance. The corresponding raw coefficient for the
variable 'working-1' is 0.190. This relationship is again significant at the 1 percent level.
The next variable in the group of loan contract variables is the variable 'borr . The interest
margin is negatively related to the amount borrowed with a coefficient of -5.5 * 10~6. This
result is intuitive because the per unit transaction and information monitoring costs of larger
loans are lower. An increase in the amount borrowed of £10,000 causes an expected
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reduction in the interest margin of 0.055 percent which is equivalent to 5.5 basis points.
However, the expected reductions with successive increases in borrowing show a tailing-off
effect, as seen in the positive value of the coefficient of borrowing squared 'borr2\
Therefore larger reductions in the interest rate margin are expected at comparatively low
levels of borrowing. Successive reductions in interest rate margins with higher levels of
borrowing should decrease at a decreasing rate. Eventually, for borrowings above £552,360
the interest margin will increase (at an increasing rate)14.
I next look at the impact of collateral level 'coll' on interest margins. Interest rates are
decreasing in collateral amount, as one would expect with a trade-off between the two risk
instruments. Its non-standardised coefficient of - 1.371 *10 "6 indicates that if a borrower
increases the amount of collateral borrowed by £100,000, the expected reduction in interest
margin is 0.1371 percent, or approximately 14 basis points. However, as with the amount
borrowed, the collateral variable, 'coll', shows a tailing-off effect as evidenced by the
positive and significant sign of its squared coefficient.
Leaving the loan contract variables and turning to the size variable, turnover 'sales 1', I note
that it is non-significant.
The next category of explanatory variables is that containing the business/borrower
attributes. These variables are important because they can be gleaned from the application
details of the borrower and can help reduce information asymmetry problems. The variables
in this group which have coefficients significant at the 1 percent level are 'doblyr , the
number of years industrial experience, and 'doblyr2' representing experience squared. Also
the dummy variable, 'busoper , indicating whether the continuity of the business is assured
in the absence of the owner and 'partner', indicating that the entrepreneur has at least one
business partner. Finally, the entrepreneur's age, 'age' is significant and the fact that he
retained a profit, 'retainl
An entrepreneur can expect a reduction in his interest margin of 2.1 basis points for each
additional year of prior work experience he has. This corresponds to a non-standardised
coefficient of -.021 or a reduction of 0.021 percent in the interest margin. As we would
expect, this effect tails off because additional work experience is most valuable at a low
initial levels of work experience. Therefore the coefficient of experience squared,
'doblyr2', has the expected positive sign. Combining the work experience and experience-
14 This value of £552,360 is calculated by differentiating interest rate with respect to borrowing
Id'mXJS borr) and setting the result of the first derivative equal to zero. When (<5"int/<5 borr ) > 0 the
interest margin by borrowed amount schedule is at the minimum point £503,000 before interest rate
rises again
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squared variables, an entrepreneur who has 20 years work experience is expected to receive
a reduction in his interest rate margin of 40.7 basis points compared with a person with no
work experience15.
The dummy variable 'busoper' representing the continuity of the business, is the variable
from the business attribute group that induces the greatest expected reduction in the interest
rate margin. A business whose continuity is assured, is expected to receive a cut of 24.2
basis points (0.242 percent) in its interest rate margin compared to a business where the
continuity of the business is not guaranteed.
The only other two variables in the borrower attribute category whose coefficients are
significant to at least the 1 percent level is entrepreneur age, 'age', and the dummy variable
'partner', denoting that there is more than one business owner. An increase of one year in
the entrepreneur's age is associated with an expected decrease in the interest margin of
0.017 percent or 1.7 basis points. I checked for a non-linear relationship in the age term but
this was non-significant, indicating that the percentage is steadily decreasing with age. Since
the relationship between interest rate and age is linear, an increase in age of 40 years, from
18 to 58, should prompt an expected reduction in the interest rate of 68 basis points (40 *
0.017) or 0.68 percent. More mature entrepreneurs are associated with cheaper credit, all
things equal.
Finally, the variable 'partner , which is complementary to the business continuity variable
'busoper' described earlier, has a coefficient of -0.04. This indicates that businesses with
more than one equity holder or owner (broader ownership structures) are expected to receive
cheaper credit than businesses without such structures. The expected difference is 4 basis
points. This result of the positive return to the variable 'partner' is broadly in line with the
prediction of Cressy (1996c) who hypothesises that the number of business proprietors is
positively associated with what he refers to as 'group' human capital, and ultimately with
survival16. I can interpret this 'group' human capital effect as the benefit to a business of
possessing a broader skills and decision-making base than an owner-managed business. The
additional benefit enjoyed by a business with several partners has to do with its lower
likelihood that it will experience succession issues. However, this effect is already captured
by the variable 'busoper'.
The combined marginal effect of a business with a diffused ownership structure and which
is assured continuity on the death of the owner is 4 plus 24.2 basis points (marginal effect of
'busoper' plus 'partner') or 28.2 basis points. This indicates a cut in the interest margin of
15 Calculated as -0.02066 * 20 + 4.21 * 10"4 * 20 = -0.4132 + .00842 = -0.4047
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almost a third of a percent. It therefore follows that the lender conditions its interest rates, to
some extent, on the long-term prospects of the business. In other words, the bank reacts
more positively to businesses which, if they survive, can evolve into enterprises whose
prospects are not dependent on the health, ability or financial affairs of the main owner.
Edwards and Fisher (1994) have noted continuity issues as being important to decisions
made by German banks when lending to small businesses. The benefit the guarantee of
business continuity confers to the business is seen in the negative sign on the coefficient of
'busoper .
A firm that has retained a profit, 'retainl'-l, is associated with a higher interest margin, all
things equal. This effect is approximately 5 basis points or 0.049 percent. My explanation
for this is that perhaps such firms are in a better position to pay a marginally higher interest
margin than others. However, a possible counter-argument would be that such firms should
have better negotiating power with a lender over their interest margin.
The remaining variable in the borrower/business attribute category, 'norisk', is non¬
significant.
Finally, I come to the performance/risk category. Both variables, namely whether the owner
was insolvent in the past, 'anyinsoand whether the loan was rescheduled, dlebtres', are
significant. Interest margins are unexpectedly negatively related to the risk dummy
'debtres'. This is contrary to what I would expect but it may reflect the lender converting a
troublesome overdraft to a term loan on a lower interest schedule. However, consistent with
what I would expect and with the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994), past insolvency,
'anyinso', is associated with higher interest rate margins. If an entrepreneur has been
insolvent in the past, the interest margin he is expected to pay is 30.2 basis points (0.302
percent) higher than an entrepreneur who has never gone bankrupt. Lending to past
bankrupts must be regarded as high risk and carry a higher default premium. This is
consistent with the lender adopting a risk based pricing policy.
I now examine the incremental value of the variable groups in order to establish how much
of the explanatory power of the model is due to each group in turn (Table 7.6).
Starting with the relationship dummy 'prevbor', we see that the adjusted r-square is only
0.013 when it is entered as the single explanatory variable. It is only when I add the contract
variables that the adjusted r-square rises to 0.27, which is close to its value in the full model
of 0.29. The marginal contribution of the loan contract group in terms of the increase in the
sum of squares explained by the model (explained variance) is 1,924 (i.e. 2,019 minus 95). I
16
Cressy (1996). P.1,258
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derive this value by subtracting the model sum of squares when loan contract variables are
excluded from the model sum of squares when loan contract variables are included. This
value of 1,924 is the highest achieved on the addition of any individual group to the model.
Therefore, the loan contract group is the most important in explaining the interest margin.
It is interesting that neither Petersen and Rajan (1994) nor Berger and Udell (1995) included
amount borrowed 'borr nor collateral value 'colV in their loan contract variable groups1'. I
argue that including borrowed amount is advisable due to the high explanatory power of its
coefficient. Apart from its explanatory power, there are sound a priori arguments for
including borrowed amount in the estimations. The reduction in the transaction costs of
borrowing per pound borrowed when the amount borrowed increases, should prompt future
research to consider amount borrowed as a useful explanatory variable for the cost of credit.
The next group of variables whose contribution to the model is considered is the
business/borrower attribute category. This group has a marginal contribution to the sum of
squares for the model of 168 i.e. 2,187 - 2,019. The r-square value increases from 0.27 to
0.29. The final group to be added to the model is the group containing the performance/risk
variables. The adjusted value for the r-squared remains the same at 0.29. The increase in the
model sum of squares is a mere 13 (2,285 - 2,274).
It can be concluded that the loan contract variable group is the most important in explaining
interest margins.
There was a final issue that I had to investigate before concluding this empirical section. It is
possible that the collateral variable, 'coll', is partially determined by the amount borrowed,
'borr',s. This is not an endogeneity problem (rather a collinearity issue) because the
response variable, 'interest', should not determine the level of collateral nor the amount
borrowed and hence the causality is in the direction described by my model in section 7.5.
The reason my model predicts the interest margin based inter alia on the level of collateral
and loan amount is intuitive. A small business owner comes to the bank and fills in his
application details. He requests a certain level of funding ('borr') and is asked to post a
certain portion of his assets as collateral. Only when the bank has considered all these
application details and the term and structure of the funding is an interest margin set.
Therefore, the setting of the interest margin occurs ex post the decision to grant a specific
amount of finance for a specific level of collateral. Although it is possible that the interest
17 Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) use collateral dummies indicating whether
collateral was taken or not on loans. Their omission of collateral amount may be due to an artefact of
the data rather than an oversight on their part
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margin could influence the level of collateral if the borrower negotiated the transfer of more
collateral as a quid pro quo for receiving a lower interest rate, the likelihood of this
happening is low. I argue that negotiation based on collateral is unlikely because first-time
business borrowers are likely to post all their assets as collateral. Entrepreneurs post all
their appropriate assets as collateral because initial wealth is low, the bank does not accept
any collateral other than land, buildings (likely to be the entrepreneur's house) and life
assurance policies. Hence there is little latitude for negotiating more favourable interest
margins based on the posting of additional collateral. Moreover, in a separate analysis using
similar data, Burke and Hanley (2002) found that collateral to loan amount ratios were
relatively invariant for first-time business borrowers suggesting that additional collateral is
not posted in order to secure lower interest margins. A final reason for including collateral
as an explanatory variable is based on the existing studies into the price of borrowing by
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) where collateral is used as an
explanatory variable.
Table 7.7 demonstrates what happens the regression explaining the price of credit when
either collateral, loan amount or both collateral and loan amount are excluded from the
estimations. Column (1) shows the full model with both variables included. In Column (2)
the borrowing variables, 'borr' and 'borr2' are excluded. The significance levels of none of
the other variables change although the values of the coefficients of the collateral variables,
'coll' and 'coll2' change. This change in the values of the coefficients reflects the
collinearity of the collateral level variables with the borrowing level variables. The
coefficient of the variable 'coll' falls from -0.154 to -0.356. The r-square value drops from
0.293 to 0.242 indicating a worse fit for the model in the absence of the borrowing level
variables. When in column (3), the collateral level variables are excluded from the
estimation but the borrowing level variables are retained, the significance levels of the other
explanatory variables remain the same but the coefficients of the borrowing level variables
increase, again denoting collinearity. Finally, if both the collateral and borrowing level
variables are dropped from the estimation as seen in column (4), the r-squared value for the
model drops from 0.293 to 0.195. Variables most affected by the exclusion of the collateral
and borrowing level variables on the basis of changes to their coefficients are 'working',
'overdrft', 'salesl', 'partner' and 'age'. It is worth highlighting that the most significantly
affected variable is the size proxy, 'salesl' which becomes significant for the first time. This
18
Indeed, in my analysis in Chapter 9,1 investigate the issues determining the level of collateral and
find that collateral is conditioned on the amount borrowed and the structure of the loan.
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suggests that the levels of borrowing and collateral already indicate the relative size of a
small business and render the size proxy redundant until they are excluded.
7.8 Conclusion
There are several implications of my analysis for the cost of credit for small, young firms.
Firstly, firms with existing entrepreneur-bank relationships prior to their application for a
loan, pay on average 16 basis points more for their borrowing than through-the-door
business applicants. This result may appear counter-intuitive but it agrees with models by
Sharpe (1990) and by Greenbaum et al. (1989) that banks offer first-term borrowers lower
interest rates than second-period borrowers19.
However, previous theoretical and empirical studies have not adequately considered the role
of the changing structure of finance over the business growth cycle in the context of interest
margins. As a business evolves from a start-up to an established business, its demand for
finance may change according to its need for increased/decreased working capital finance,
vis. a viz. asset backed finance. My analyses show that the financial structure differs
between first and second-period borrowers, where second-period borrowers are more likely
the receive overdraft finance. However, even when I consider the different structure of
finance by loan type and purpose, second-period borrowers are still charged comparatively
more for their finance than first-period borrowers20.
The reason that second-period borrowers incur higher costs for their finance than through-
the-door applicants could well be due to prohibitively high exit costs as modelled by
Greenbaum et al. (1989). Alternatively, my results may be explained by Sharpe's (1990)
theory that businesses are 'informationally captured'. He argues that even though banks
earn zero profits over the life cycle of the average customer relationship, that they are not
disciplined by the market to offer better-performing customers 'competitive' rates.
'Due to competition....rents are competed away via lower interest rates offered to all firms
in their initial period, precisely when banks know least about firms'"1.
19 Since the degree of market concentration plays a central role in the theoretical model by Petersen
and Rajan (1995), it is unfortunate that I could not easily test for this because my data was obtained
from one bank. I suspect however, that the UK credit market for business loans is concentrated judging
by concerns raised recently by the Bank of England concerning the competitiveness of UK banks in
the small business sector. Bank of England (2001): Financing of Technology-Based Small Firms
20
Unfortunately, my data did not contain arrangement fees for overdrafts. If it had, it is likely that the
relative cost differential between first- and second period borrowers would have increased even further
since second-period borrowers are more likely to receive overdraft finance.
21 P. 1,070. Sharpe (1990)
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What is certain, is that second-period borrowers pay more for their finance, even when
finance type and purpose are controlled for, and are more likely to take out higher risk, more
expensive overdraft finance. Entrepreneurs who take out an overdraft in-lieu of a loan are
expected to pay 42 basis points more for their borrowing.
There is scope for future research to tease out a possible relationship between the evolution
of a firm's demand for finance over time as well as the transition from loan to overdraft
finance. Given the difficulties that start-up firms experience with overtrading and financing
their working capital, it seems anomalous that they would prefer loans to overdrafts. An
overdraft is better tailored towards working capital requirements. For this reason, the fact
that 'through-the-door' applicants are less likely than firms with entrepreneur-bank
relationships to receive overdraft finance may have more to do with supply than demand
issues.
An additional outcome of my analysis is that collateral and interest rates are substitutable.
An increase of £100,000 in the value of collateral, reduces the interest margin by 0.137
percent or approximately 14 basis points. This suggests that firms that have comparatively
higher asset levels may be able to trade off higher collateral levels against a reduction in
interest margins.
Similarly the entrepreneur can expect a reduction of 5.5 basis points on his interest margin
for a £10,000 increase in the amount borrowed. My finding that interest margins are
decreasing in the amount borrowed, underpins the conjecture of Petersen and Rajan (1994)
that there may be some price embeddedness in the volume of borrowing meaning that loans
are transaction-driven.
However, the bank is not motivated entirely by transaction based lending, as seen in
importance of the business attribute variables especially those dealing with ownership
dispersion and employment experience. If interest margins showed 'embeddedness' as
Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest, the bank would respond only to the magnitude of the
loan or overdraft when setting the interest margin. Hence with 'embeddedness', the margin
charged for borrowing would reflect the transaction cost of making that loan. However, we
have seen that the bank does respond the human capital characteristics of the borrower when
pricing loans and overdrafts. We see this responsiveness of the bank to borrower attributes
where it charges mature, more experienced entrepreneurs less on their borrowings than
younger and less experienced entrepreneurs. The bank also rewards businesses which can
continue to operate in the absence of the business owner and which have a shared ownership
structure by charging such businesses less on their borrowings.
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In answer to my research question of whether the bank is more transaction driven or human
capital oriented, I conclude that the bank bases the price of credit more on transaction
variables rather than on human capital variables. This is evidenced by the higher explanatory
power of the loan contract variables as a group. The marginal contribution of the loan
contract group in terms of the increase in the sum of squares explained by the model
(explained variance) is 1,924. This is the highest marginal contribution of any of the groups
added to the model. Although my list of human capital variables is not exhaustive, I have
initial evidence that transaction-cost variables such as borrowing purpose, the amount
borrowed and the type of loan facility used, are key factors considered by the lender when
setting the price of a loan.
The cheaper cost of first-term finance is good news, at least for start-ups and businesses
without a track record, but not for borrowers in subsequent periods. This supports the
argument for implicit contracts of the type described by Sharpe (1990) in order that
businesses developing reputations and surviving into the second period will be rewarded
rather than penalised for their efforts. Moreover, it suggests that first-term loans are
subsidised by the bank. However, this subsidisation does not continue into second-period
finance. Subsidisation exists even when potential distortions, which impact on the cost of
finance, are taken into account. Controlling for these other factors (whether the finance is an
overdraft or not, the amount borrowed and the amount of collateral given), does not overturn
my conclusion that first-term finance is cheaper than finance in subsequent periods. I
conclude that entrepreneur-bank relationships influence interest margins, whereby they
increase rather than decrease the price of credit.
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Table 7.1 List of variable names
Variable names
age
age2
anyinso
borr
borr2
busoper
coll
debtres
doblyr
doblyr2
interest
nonborrl
norisk
Description
Continuous variable denoting the age of the entrepreneur
Entrepreneur's age squared
Borrower has been insolvent or bankrupt in the past(anyinso=l if
bankruptcy occurred)
My measure for new borrowing requested Sum of loan, overdraft and
other amount requested (overlap with agg_borr)
Borrowing squared
The business can continue to exist without the founder. Measure of
dispersion of ownership (busoper=l if 'Yes')
Sum of owner's equity injected into the project in addition to the
liquidation value of land, buildings and life policies offered as
collateral
Borrower has had to have his loan rescheduled on a different
timeframe. Denotes financial distress and difficulty meeting
repayments. (debtres=l if 'Yes')
Experience of borrower in current industrial sector
Experience in industrial sector squared
Interest rate margin (margin above the base rate)
Entrepreneur has injected own cash savings into the business project
Borrower believes that he will have no business or financial risks in
the year ahead. Denotes borrower confidence (norisk=l if 'Yes')
overdrft
partner
prevbor=l
retainl
salesl
working
Loan purpose is overdraft (overdrft=l) rather than loan (overdrft=0)
Main owner has a business partner
Previous cumulative aggregate borrowing (dummy variable=l if
applicant has previous borrowing)
Business has retained a profit
Current or projected sales (size proxy)
Borrowing used to finance working capital as opposed to any other
type of asset backed loan
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Table 7.2 Private information models
model information bank
concentration
Petersen and Rajan (1995) Non-observable either high or
low
Boot and Thakor (1994) Non-observable low
Greenbaum et al. (1989) Non-observable low
Sharpe(1990) Non-observable low
Diamond (1989) Observable to other Not-specified
lenders
prediction for first-period finance
rate in concentrated market period 2 > rate
in competitive market period 1
rate in concentrated market period 1 < rate
in competitive market period 1
interest rates period 1 > interest rates
period 2
interest rates period 1 < interest rates
period 2
interest rates period 1 < interest rates
period 2
interest rates period 1 > interest rates
period 2
impactoientrepreneur-bankr lationships....Cha terSev n
Page
200
Table7.3Breakdownincontinuousvar ablecc rdingtwheth rpplicanth strep eneur-ba krelat nshipot Meanforbusinesses"through-the-door'S g. withentrepreneur-bankbusiness s(Equalvariancesnoass m d) relationships interest3 .493 .171
00
h-1
CD
0.00
borr
52,225
73,938
6.75
0.00
exp
11.9
12.7
2.63
0 .1
coll
65,773
54,970
-2.10
0.04
salesl
531,999
240,710
-0.84
0.40
age
43.5
43.4
-0.24
0.81
Totalnumber
1,152
4,816
Table7.4Breakdowninproportionsfobi aryvariablcc rdingtwhethapplicanth sentrepreneur-ba kl t nship ornot Ofbusinesseswithentrepreneur-f*through-the-door'busin s es,Cram r'VSign fica c bankrelationships,%w twithatt ibuteCramer'sV attribute overdrft60
49
0.0904
0.0000
anyinso
1.5
1.7
-0.006
0.621
debtres
9.6
20.6
-0.112
0.0000
liql
70
76
0.0556
0.0000
busoper
72
78
0.0584
0.0000
norisk
55
58
0.0270
0.0369
partner
53
52
0.0117
0.3667
working
53
53
0.0049
0.7049
Totalnumber
1,52
4,816
&
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Table 7.5 Influence of entrepreneur-bank relationships on interest margins
Dependent variable = interest margin
(1 interest')
Unstd. est. t stat P> t Std. est.
Explanatory Variables
Intercept 4.162 23 .146 0.000
Relationship
Previous borrowing (1prevbor'=1) 0.161*** 5.113 0 . 000 0.057***
Loan contract
Working capital ("working'=1) 0.190*** 6.242 0.000 0.085***
Borrowed amount ("borr') -5.. 5214-6*** -19.889 0.000 -0.497***
Borrowed amount squared ("borr2') 4.998E-12*** 13.263 0 . 000 0 .303***
Collateral level ('coll') -1.371E-6*** -6.910 0.000 -0.154***
Collateral level squared ('coll2') 9.309E-13*** 4 .764 0.098***
Overdraft finance (1overdrft'=1) 0.418*** 13.564 0.000 0.187***
Entrepreneur has injected own equity
into project ("nonborrl'=1)
-6.671E-2*** -2.423 oTois1 -0.029**
Size
Recent or projected sales income
('salesl')
-1.699E-9 -0.727 0.468 -0.008
Borrower/business attributes
Principal has business partner
(1 partner'=1)
-4.188E-2* -1.685 0.092 -0.019*
Age of entrepreneur ('age') -1.745E-2** -2.149 0.032 -0.158**
Age of entrepreneur squared ('age2') 1.073E-4 1.207 0 . 227 0.089
Yrs. employment experience in similar
business ('doblyr1)
-2.066E-2*** -5.909 0 .000 -0.174***
Yrs. employment experience squared
('doblyr2')
4.214E-4*** 4.558 0.000 0.135***
Continuity of businesses death of owner
('busoper1=1)
-0.242*** -7.931 0.000 -0.091***
Business owner optimistic ('norisk'=l) -3.360E-2 -1.333 0.183 -0.015
Entrepreneur has retained a profit
(1retainl'=1)
4.940E-2* 1.886 0.059 0.021*
Performance/risk
Finance has been rescheduled
('debtres1=1)
-7.005E-2** -2.078 0.038 -0.024**
Past insolvency ('anyinso'=1) 0.302*** 3 .152 0.002 0.034***
Number of observations 5, 968
R-square 0.293
Adj. R-square 0.290
* sig. at 10 percent level
** sig. at 5 percent level
*** sig. at 1 percent level
t^e lot
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Table 7.6 Contribution of explanatory variable groups predicting interest margins
Dependent variable = interest margin
('interest')
Standardised estimates
Relationshi
P
Loan
contract
Borrower
attributes
Performance
/risk
Previous borrowing ('prevbor1=1) 0.113*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working capital ('working'=1) 0.067*** 0.085*** 0 .085***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrowed amount ('borr' ) -0.531*** -.501*** -0.497***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrowed amount squared ('borr2') 0.325*** 0.305*** 0 . 303***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Collateral level ('coll') -.189*** -0 .160*** -0.154***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Collateral level squared ('coll2') 0 .123*** 0 .103*** 0 . 098***
(0.000) (0.000) (0. 000)
Overdraft finance ('overdrft'=1) 0 . 200*** 0.189*** 0.187***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Entrepreneur injects own equity
('nonborrl'=1)
-0.025** -0 . 023** -0.029**
(0.034) (0.043) (0. 015)
Business size proxied by current or
projected sales ('salesl')
-0.008 -0.008
(0.479) (0.468)
Business has retained a profit or
savings ('retainl'=1)
0.019* 0.021*
(0.086) (0.059)
Has business partner (1 partner'=1) -0.019* -0.019*
(0.081) (0. 092)
Age of entrepreneur ('age') -0.160** -0.158**
(0.030) (0.032)
Age of entrepreneur squared ('age2') 0.089 0.089
(0.229) (0.227)
Yrs. employment experience
in similar business ('doblyr')
-0.176*** -0.174***
(0.000) (0.000)
Yrs. employment experience squared
('doblyr2')
0.138*** 0.135***
(0.000) (0.000)
Continuity of business on death of
owner
('busoper'=1)
-0.092*** -0.091***
(0.000) (0. 000)
Business owner optimistic ('norisk'=l) -0.017 -0.015
(0.133) (0.183)
Finance has been rescheduled
('debtres'=1)
-0 . 024**
(0.038)
Past insolvency ('anyinso'=1) 0. 034***
(0.002)
Adj. R-square 0.013 0.270 0.292 0.293
F value 77.353 276.872 145.472 131.196
Sum of squares (model) 95.377 2,019.202 2,187.786 2,200.582
Number of observations 5, 967 5, 967 5, 967 5, 967
Pane loi
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Table 7.7 Check for independent contribution of collateral and amount borrowed
Dependent variable = interest margin
('interest')
Standardised estimates
(1) |(2) (3) (4)
Previous borrowing (1prevbor'=1) 0.057*** 0.080*** 0 . 052*** 0.073***
(0.000)1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working capital ('working'=1) 0.085*** 0.109*** 0.087*** 0.130***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrowed amount ('borr') -0.497*** -0.57***
(0.000) (0.000)
Borrowed amount squared ('borr2') 0 . 303*** 0 . 334***
(0.000) (0. 000)
Collateral level ('coll') -0.154*** -0.356***
(0.000) (0.000)
Collateral level squared ( 'coll2') 0.098*** 0.193***
(0.000'i (0. 000)
Overdraft finance ('overdrft'=1) 0.187*** 0.247*** 0.179*** 0.255***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Entrepreneur injects own equity
(1nonborrl'=1)
-0.029** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002)
Business size proxied by current or
projected sales ('salesl')
-0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.019*
(0.468) (0.329) (0.329) (0.10)
Business has retained a profit or savings
(1retainl'=1)
0.021* 0.015* 0.022* 0.016
(0.059) (0.054) (0.054) (0.189)
Has business partner ('partner'=1) -0.019* -0 . 028* -0.020* -0.035***
(0.092) (0.069) (0. 069) (0.003)
Age of entrepreneur ('age') -0.158** 0.227** -0.165** -0.291***
(0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.000)
Age of entrepreneur squared ('age2') 0.089 0.155 0.090 0.197***
(0.227) (0.226) (0.226) (0.012)
Yrs. employment experience
in similar business ('doblyr')
-0 .174*** -0.175*** -0.18*** -0.191***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Yrs. employment experience squared
('doblyr2')
0.135*** 0.26*** 0.141*** 0.137***
(0.000) (0.000) (0. 000) (0. 000)
Continuity of business on death of owner
('busoper'=1)
-0.091*** -0 .107*** -0.093*** -0.123***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0. 000)
Business owner optimistic ('norisk'=l) -0.015 -0.001 -0.016 0.002
(0.183) (0.908) (0.159) (0.883)
Finance has been rescheduled ('debtres'=1) -0.024** -0.045*** -0.032*** -0 . 076***
(0.038) (0.000) (0.007) (0. 000)
Past insolvency ('anyinso'=1) 0 .034*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Adj. R-square 0.293 0.242 0 .287 0 .195
F value 131.196 113 .282 142.603 97.579
Sum of squares (model) 2,200.582 1822.041 2157.129 1470.755
Number of observations j 5,967 5, 967 5, 967 5, 967
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8.1 Introduction and contribution of this chapter to the literature
This chapter deals with the decision to lend or otherwise to a new small business borrower.
Since small businesses are primarily reliant on banks for their access to finance, the
availability of credit has always been to the forefront of research into small business finance
(Hancock and Wilcox, 1998; Cressy, 1996; De Meza and Southey, 1996; Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989).
Notwithstanding the importance attached to this research area internationally, the lack of
data relating to the bank rejection decision has hampered empirical work in this area. There
is only one empirical analysis investigating the bank sanctioning decision for commercial
borrowers and this relates to the US only (Cole, 1998) '. Cole applies the NSSBF (National
Survey of Small Business Finances) survey data to his analysis of what factors prompt a
bank to reject a commercial loan. He emphasises the role of business-bank relationships and
concludes that a potential lender is more likely to grant finance to a commercial borrower
with whom it has a pre-existing relationship.
However, the analysis by Cole omits potentially important variables relating to the
characteristics of the entrepreneur and of his business.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. I set out to use unique and thitherto unused data relating
to 5,968 UK commercial borrowers to address the question of which factors motivate a bank
to reject a funding application to a new commercial borrower. The data refers to
applications within the period 1998 to 1999 and which are relatively homogeneous, where
all applicants are first-time commercial borrowers and therefore without a business track
record at the bank. 1,152 of the 5,968 borrowers have pre-existing non-commercial
borrowing relationships with the bank compared with 4,816 through-the-door applicants.
Because all applicants in our data are applying for their first commercial loan with the
lender, our data permits us to estimate the importance of non-commercial borrower
relationships in a way that has not been possible before. This constraint allows me infer the
value of entrepreneur-bank relationships when a commercial borrower does not have a
business track-record with the bank but does not rule out the possibility that the bank has
access to in-house information on any non-commercial accounts relating to the applicants.
1 Leonard (1992) also uses a sample of accepted and rejected commercial for 283 loan applications
but this is not an analysis that looks at the sanctioning decision. It is primarily concerned with scoring
issues and achieving a separation between accepted and rejected applicants based on regression
techniques.
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If information about a commercial applicant is costless, as Diamond (1989) assumes, then
the value of pre-existing non-commercial accounts should be zero. However, this is a heroic
assumption to make given the cost (and possibly lack in depth) of credit bureau data. Hence,
if the market for information is not fully efficient and costless, there will be a value placed
on the information conveyed by non-commercial accounts.
I also investigate the degree to which a bank is cautious or risk adverse by measuring the
marginal effect of business exposure (collateral and loan amounts) on the sanctioner's
decision. If a bank responds positively to increases in collateral provision or increases in the
amount of finance requested, then it is concerned about the level of its exposure to a small
business. Indeed, previous studies on the effects of collateral have hypothesised the positive
effects of collateral usage where collateral can increase an entrepreneur's commitment to a
business project, reduce moral hazard and reduce the bank's exposure to the risk of default
(Wette, 1983; Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987)2. Indeed, Basu and Parker (2001)
note that all UK start-ups in their sample who were refused bank funding claimed that this
refusal was prompted by their lack of sufficient collateral.
A further feature of this study is that, for the first time, variables are included that describe
the quality of an entrepreneur in terms of his age, work experience and his assessment of the
risk of this business project3. This is deemed particularly important as Mester (1997) points
out that of the five separate commercial scorecards introduced in the US by the Fair Isaac
pic. Credit rating agency the 'most important indicators of small-business loan performance
were characteristics of the business owner rather than the business itself'4. This is likely due
to the fact that the owners' finances and those of the business are commingled.
1 also include variables that relate to the quality of the business itself in terms of its
continuity in the absence of the applicant for the business loan, its growth and its liquidity.
By including variables relating to the quality of an entrepreneur, I acknowledge the work of
Cressy (1996) who emphasised the importance of borrower characteristics in influencing
survival. My hypothesis is that if the survival of businesses is conditioned on characteristics
2
Furthermore, some two-period models of bank lending that assume non-costless borrower
information, indicate that a bank may reduce its exposure to a risky business in a systematic way by
staggering finance over two borrowing periods. In practice, this would lead to introductory lending
where a bank would agree to lending a small loan (low overdraft limit) with the possibility of a larger
loan (higher limit) in successive applications for finance if the borrower is creditworthy (Jaffee and
Russell, 1976; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Multi-period models assuming costless information such as
Diamond (1989) do not conclude that finance is staggered in this way.
3 The age of an entrepreneur at the time of business start-up was found by Basu and Parker (2001) to
be positively correlated with the ability of an entrepreneur to obtain funding from his family. However,
other factors may obtain in the ability of an entrepreneur to secure funding from his bank.
4
P.3, Mester (1997)
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of the borrower, then it follows that these characteristics should also influence the bank's
decision to accept or reject a business loan5.
The main finding of this analysis is that the pre-existence of a non-commercial borrowing
relationship is by far the most important factor leading to a favourable credit application
outcome. I also find that, consistent with what we would expect, borrowers with sullied
credit histories are more likely to have their credit applications turned down. Loan
sanctioners place importance on the self-financing capability of the firm but borrower
attributes such as age and number of years work experience have little or no effect on the
sanctioner's decision. This result on the negligible role played by age and work experience
when an entrepreneur applies for bank funding contrasts strongly with the important
contribution of age and work experience variables that was documented by Basu and Parker
(2001) when the entrepreneur secures family funding for his start-up. It follows that a loan
sanctioner's decision is informed more by the past performance of an enterprise or of the
business owner than by characteristics of the business principal or of his business.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first Section presents the relevant literature on
variables affecting the bank's lending decision. In the section following this, I describe my
data. I then present some descriptive statistics before supplying the results of the
estimations. I conclude in the final section and discuss the implications of my results for
first time business borrowers. Finally, my 'E-T' model that attempts to rationalise some of
the results obtained in my estimations in a theoretical framework is contained in the
Appendix to this chapter.
8.2 Background
Since first-period business borrowers are primarily reliant on banks for their access to
finance, the availability of credit has always been to the forefront of research into small
business finance (Hancock and Wilcox, 1998; Cressy, 1996a; Cressy, 1996b; Cressy, 1996c;
De Meza and Southey, 1996; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Binks and Ennew, 1996). Despite
the importance attached to this research area internationally, the lack of data relating to the
bank rejection decision has hampered empirical work in this area. There are only two
empirical analyses that relate to the bank rejection decision for small businesses (Cole,
1 Unlike Kon and Storey (2000), we do not explore the implications of bank rejection on the
borrower's willingness to apply for funding. It is quite plausible that so-called 'discouraged
borrowers' have not applied to the bank because they anticipate that they will be rejected, hence
underestimating the true proportion of borrowers in the population of applicants who are rejected.
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1998; Leonard, 1992). However, the analysis by Cole focuses on relationship variables and
includes neither human capital variables nor loan contract variables. The analysis by
Leonard focuses on prediction rather than explanation and therefore does not explain how
the human capital variables included in this analysis relate to the accept/reject decision other
than reporting that they are significant.
In this analysis, I follow the lead set by Cole (1998), which is the only existing analysis of
this type investigating the factors that influence a sanctioner to reject a small business loan.
However, I also include human capital variables and control for the magnitude of the loan
and collateral. My analysis therefore represents the first UK analysis of this kind. It is also
the first analysis to be able to investigate the dual role of the factors borrowing level and
collateral in influencing the accept/reject decision.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I set out to replicate the empirical analysis
performed by Cole (1998) but including human capital variables such as the entrepreneur's
age and work experience. In so doing, I acknowledge the work of Cressy (1996c) who
emphasised the importance of borrower characteristics in influencing survival. My
hypothesis is that if the survival of business start-ups is conditioned on human capital
variables, human capital variables should also influence the bank's decision to accept or
reject a business loan. I argue that it is not enough to include borrower credit history or
relationship as the only factors explaining why a bank grants finance to a first-period
borrower but that human capital variables should also be included as potential factors
influencing the accept/reject decision.
In addition to controlling for human capital variables in my analysis I also, for the first time
in an analysis of this kind, control for the value of collateral provided by the small business
and the magnitude of the finance requested. The level of collateral is hypothesised to reduce
the risk posed by a business applicant and also hypothesised to increase the applicant's
commitment to the business project (Wette, 1983; Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor,
1987a; Besanko and Thakor, 1987b). If first-period borrowing is put in a multi-period
context, the bank will also want to reduce its exposure to the applicant until his credit status
becomes known and the business-bank relationship matures (Jaffee and Russell, 1976;
Petersen and Rajan, 1995). A bank can opt to stagger finance over two periods where the
borrower receives the larger tranche of finance in the second period once the bank is assured
of his creditworthiness6. During the trial lending period, the bank gathers behavioural
6 This view that the amount loaned is a choice variable is challenged by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who
argue that under investment by banks increases portfolio risk because under capitalised firms are more
financially frail
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information about the borrower. This situation is in some ways analogous to the strategy
employed by some US filling stations where customers are permitted to purchase a dollar's
worth of fuel on credit while the customer's credit ratings are checked.
If the bank shows a tendency towards staggered finance, the effect should be an inverse
relationship between the likelihood of receiving credit and the amount of credit requested.
Therefore, it is necessary to control for the magnitude of the loan and collateral provided as
these affect the risk profile of the loan and are hypothesised to affect the accept/reject
decision accordingly.
8.3 The literature on credit constraints
I describe what is meant by credit rationing in Chapter 2, section 2.3. In this section, I will
provide a critique of the models presented in Chapter 2, section 2.4 (dealing with the
availability of credit) because they relate to the bank's decision to accept or decline a small
business loan application.
All the theoretical literature points to the existence of asymmetric information where the
entrepreneur knows more about his creditworthiness or the viability of his project than the
bank (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Besanko and Thakor, 1987b;
Bester, 1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The exception to the assumption that the
entrepreneur knows more about his credit status than the bank, is in the newer papers where
entrepreneurs are deemed naive, overconfident or simply lacking the overview and
experience of a banker (Manove and Padilla, 1999; de Meza and Southey, 1996). The
theoretical literature on credit constraints focuses, therefore, on information.
Any empirical analysis on credit constraints has to consider the fundamental question of
banker/entrepreneur knowledge or information. In other words, it should ask two questions.
The first question is, 'How little does the bank know? and the second question is 'How much
emphasis is placed on the contract variables (collateral, amount loaned, likelihood of being
denied credit and interest margins) as a result of how little the bank knows?.
The transitional credit rationing (TCR) model by Jaffee and Russell (1976) describes how
the bank minimises its exposure to a first-term borrower in the first lending period while
waiting from his creditworthiness to be revealed in the second period. They describe all
borrowers as being either honest or dishonest. The decision'to be dishonest is influenced by
the incentive to default on a loan based on the size of the loan remaining to be repaid
compared with the cost of defaulting on that loan. The decision to be honest, on the other
hand, is not motivated by the size of the loan.
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Default increases the borrower's utility if the cost of default is less than the cost of repaying
the loan. The tendency to default for dishonest borrowers is increasing in the size of the loan
because the dishonest borrower benefits more (utility increases more) by defaulting on a
comparatively large loan when he pockets the outstanding borrowings.
In a pooling equilibrium, where the borrower types cannot be separated out, honest
borrowers prefer a loan that is less than the one they requested in return for a lower interest
margin (cost of servicing the loan) and some future payoff. Under a future payoff the bank
makes good the financial shortfall experienced by the honest borrower in the loan run.
Accordingly, the bank will make smaller loans than requested to all borrowers and by doing
so will reduce the incentive for dishonest borrowers to default. Under perfect competition,
the bank passes on the gains arising from decreased default over its total portfolio to the
honest borrowers when their status is revealed over time.
The equilibrium credit rationing (ECR) model by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) disagrees with
the predictions of the Jaffee and Russell model outlined above by observing that reducing
the amount loaned to each borrower will not decrease but rather increase level of bank
portfolio risk. If a bank lends a lower amount than a business requires for its project, the
likelihood of this undercapitalised project succeeding is lower. Therefore the bank's
portfolio is riskier because the probability that individual businesses default is higher.
Rather than cutting down the amount loaned to each borrower, the Stiglitz and Weiss model
proposes that a better way of dealing with risk than limiting the amount granted to each
borrower, is to retain a threshold interest margin below the equilibrium interest margin. At
this threshold interest margin, the bank's profits are maximised where the bank allocates
loans to a portion of the applicants such that the total amount loaned corresponds to the
amount the bank is prepared to supply at the threshold interest margin. Since the demand for
loans outstrips the supply of loans at interest margins below the equilibrium interest margin,
credit is rationed. The credit rationing implemented by the bank at this threshold interest
margin is justified by a demonstration of what would happen if the interest margin were
raised above the threshold rate. At interest margins above the threshold interest margin, the
marginal gains from the increased interest margin that would accrue to the bank would be
negated by the higher default losses arising when higher risk borrowers entered the borrower
pool. Higher interest margins would attract more volatile borrower types who would have
the same average returns as safer, more stable borrowers but who would have a wider
dispersion of project returns around the average return.
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Unlike any of the other models, Bester's (1985) model does not predict credit rationing
because he argues that the bank can perfectly distinguish high from low risk borrowers
through their self-selection of credit contracts comprising a trade-off between collateral and
interest margin. The bank will have been so successful in tailoring the terms of the loans that
even if a high risk borrower is rejected for a high risk loan, he is unwilling to accept the loan
terms offered to his low risk counterpart.
The main cornerstone of the Bester paper is that a set of contracts can be devised such that
high and low risk borrowers will prefer one of the risk instruments (interest margins or
collateral) to the other. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution or slope of the line
showing the trade-off between collateral and interest margins will be unique to each of the
borrower groups. Accordingly, Bester's model does not predict credit rationing because he
assumes that perfect separation of the risk types can be achieved.
Unlike Bester, Besanko and Thakor (1987b) do not deduce from their credit-rationing
model that banks can perfectly separate high from low risk applicants by deriving incentive
compatible contracts. Screening is not 100 percent efficient. Their model indicates that with
wealth constraints low risk borrowers will have their loans allocated on a lottery basis. In
other words, there is non-discriminative credit rationing on loans to low risk borrowers.
Credit rationing is used as a deterrent to borrowers wishing to apply for finance.
In the Besanko and Thakor model, what makes a borrower high risk, is his lower probability
of yielding a certain project return. Unlike other models, the average return of high-risk
borrowers is lower than the average return of low risk borrowers.
What differentiates the outcome of Besanko and Thakor's model from that of Bester is the
assumption of binding wealth constraints. With binding wealth constraints there are limits to
which a low risk borrower can signal his creditworthiness using collateral (binding wealth
constraints apply). Accordingly lower risk borrowers have their loans rationed. In other
words, their loans are rationed because of the inadequacy of collateral under binding wealth
constraints to testify to the borrower's lower risk. Put another way, collateral is unable to
perfectly signal ex ante borrower creditworthiness and low risk.
It is important to note that the bank would prefer if low risk borrowers were not rationed.
The only reason they are rationed is that the bank cannot ascertain their risk status ex ante.
As Besanko and Thakor note;
'If the bank can perfectly sort borrowers into distinct risk classes based on observable
differences alone, then there would not be any rationing'1.
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Any analysis of the theoretical literature would be incomplete without referring to the
'newer' theories of credit constraints that depart from some of the traditional assumptions of
the older models or employ alternative approaches to investigating credit constraints. There
is a tendency for the papers to advocate or warn against Government subsidisation of first-
time borrowers and so the 'newer' theories are less detached from the policy implications of
their model predictions than older models that do not caution against Government
intervention.
De Meza and Southey (1996) depict entrepreneurs as relatively naive participants in the
lending contract while banks are comparatively well informed and able to use their
information on the borrower efficiently. Drawing on the human psychology of risk they
explore the consequences of a systematic bias in the population of entrepreneurs and
conclude that the entrepreneurs most likely to receive loans under self-selection are the most
optimistic. The meaning attached to the word 'optimism' is where the entrepreneur
misconstrues or de-emphasises the inherent risks of his undertaking.
Because banks are aware of systematic optimistic bias, they do not attempt to separate
borrowers but offer a pooling equilibrium with high interest margins and collateral
requirements. The stringent terms demanded by the bank to start-up businesses that are
meant to neutralise the losses arising from high loss rates, discourage the good risk
pessimists from applying. The high-risk optimists will also regard the bank's terms as
inordinately stringent because their assessment of their risk is so much at variance with the
bank's assessment.
The model suggests that all types of first-period (start-up) entrepreneurs will therefore
minimise their reliance on banks and instead opt for self-finance.
According to de Meza and Southey, credit constraints are justifiable in view of a systematic
optimistic bias.
'Whereas the standard formulations suggest that credit markets lend too little.... the obvious
implication of the optimism story is that new entrepreneurs are drawn to business and
excessive bank loans much as lemmings are drawn to the sea. Banks should be applauded
for stemming the rush '8.
This paper therefore finds that credit constraints are a consequence of entrepreneurial
optimism and that they are entirely justifiable.
Another of the newer papers to make a contribution in the area of credit constraints is by
Evans and Jovanovic (1989). One of the unusual features of the Evans and Jovanovic paper
7 P.678 Besanko and Thakor (1987a)
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is its almost equal emphasis describing and testing the theory. Unlike any of the papers that
have gone before it follows up the exposition of the theoretical model with an exercise that
tests the model's predictions.
Evans and Jovanovic investigate whether individuals choosing to become first-time
entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Individuals are predicted to face an L-shaped liquidity
curve or credit constraint where individuals with high entrepreneurial ability but low assets
are more constrained than individuals with comparable ability but higher initial assets.
Individuals face two options; either they work in wage employment or they enter self-
employment. Depending on their entrepreneurial ability, individuals with higher levels of
'business acumen' will seek to move from wage earning employment to self-employment
where the total and marginal return on their entrepreneurial ability is higher. Then,
depending on their starting level of assets they will be either credit constrained or not.
They find that almost all the entrepreneurs in their sample devoted less capital in their
businesses than they would like to, given the marginal increase in earnings they would gain
from the investment of additional assets. A 10 percent increase in business capital leads to a
2.2 percent increase in earnings.
They conclude that because businesses can only leverage 1.5 times their asset value in the
form of outside capital, under-capitalisation of businesses arises and entrepreneurs have to
recourse to friends and relatives to help them out financially. However, assets are only
essential at the inception of the new business because their correlation with business income
even becomes negative when the initial financing period has elapsed.
Their assertion that credit constraints exist, agrees with that of de Meza and Southey.
However, unlike the latter, Evans and Jovanovic do not contend that entrepreneurs are
justifiably denied sufficient capital by the bank. A major distinction between the two papers
is that while de Meza and Southey assume that the bank's portfolio of first-time borrowers
exhibits a high default rate, Evans and Jovanovic assume that there is no default loss
because loans are either too small or are heavily collateralised. This feature of the two
papers brings about opposing viewpoints regarding the justice of credit constraints. While
de Meza and Southey observe no inefficiency in the credit market, merely entrepreneurial
underestimation of the risks involved, Evans and Jovanovic conclude that subsidisation of
business by Government is an imperative as a consequence of the shortfall in initial wealth
of prospective entrepreneurs. They infer from their data that the existence of credit
constraints deters 1.3 percent of the population of individuals from trying entrepreneurship.
s P.385 de Meza and Southey (1996)
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8.4 Summary of the credit constraints models and their weaknesses
To sum up the theoretical work of credit constraints, it can be seen that past theories of
credit constraints are far from unanimous on the nature and effectiveness of credit
constraints in reducing lending risk to first-term borrowers. While Jaffee and Russell
advocate a reduction of the amount loaned to each borrower until the risk category of the
borrower becomes known, Stiglitz and Weiss indicate that this would raise rather than lower
the risk profile of the loan portfolio because businesses would be undercapitalised. They
suggest their alternative theory where a threshold interest margin, below the equilibrium
rate, allows the bank to maximise its profits. The bank practises non-discriminative, lottery-
style rationing and does not supply loans to the rejected applicants. The remaining
applicants who are charged a low interest have no incentive to engage in excessive risk
taking behaviour because the interest margin is kept artificially low and overall portfolio
risk is reduced.
While Bester argues that banks can devise contracts that permit them to completely separate
high from low risk borrowers, Besanko and Thakor argue that this is not possible because of
wealth constraints. Credit rationing cannot be eliminated because of the inadequacy of
collateral under binding wealth constraints to signal the creditworthiness of low risk
borrowers. Instead the bank must resort to rationing good borrowers in order to dissuade bad
borrowers from preferring the low-risk contract.
Evans and Jovanovic's model agrees with the verdict of Besanko and Thakor (1987b) that
initial-wealth is binding. Unlike Besanko and Thakor they also empirically test their model
and support the model predictions with empirical evidence. De Meza and Southey find
theoretical evidence for credit constraints that arise from excessive borrower optimism that
systematically distorts the risks of undertaking a business project. Accordingly, they
conclude that credit constraints are a necessary evil. Unlike Evans and Jovanovic who argue
for more State support of enterprise due to inefficiencies in the credit market, de Meza and
Southey lay the blame for credit constraints squarely at the feet of the entrepreneurs
themselves.
There are some weaknesses with the theories that I would like to raise here. Firstly, with
assumptions of information asymmetry there is an emphasis on the loan contract variables
such as collateral, interest margins and loaned amount that help the bank discriminate
between high and low risk borrowers. The exception to this general pattern of omitting
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borrower-specific control variables is the encapsulation of control variables (work
experience and educational attainment) in the entrepreneurial ability variable by Evans and
Jovanovic (1989).
The undue emphasis on information asymmetry by the theorists, masks what is a more likely
situation in practice. The reality of the lending environment means that the bank has more
information at its disposal than the collateral, loan amount and interest margin variables. It
also has recourse to credit bureau data, however limited, and in commercial borrowing
situations the track record of the borrower on any non-commercial loans it has taken out in
the past. The models generally fail to take cognisance of other information that is available
to the bank and in so doing have concentrated somewhat excessively on the loan contract
variables.
Secondly, a related weakness of the theory, the exception again being the Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) paper, is the dichotomy between the theory and observed practice of credit
rationing. The theories generally suffer from a lack of reference to empirical regularities.
While the theories mean to simplify reality, the practice of not testing the theories on real
data means that the general theories of credit constraints tend to be divorced from the risk
assessment procedures performed by banks worldwide. Authors who derive new theories
referring to credit constraints generally do not test them on real data.
A final problem relates to the mutual exclusivity of the TCR and ECR theories. It is not
improbable that a bank practices both types of credit rationing simultaneously. The bank
may employ above average rejection rates for first-time borrowers (ECR). However, the
bank may also regard first-period lending as a period where the bank establishes the
creditworthiness of the borrower and therefore lends a smaller loan than requested as a
precautionary measure with amounts more in line with the borrower's expectations to be
loaned in subsequent periods ('transitionary credit rationing').
8.5 Empirical evidence of credit rationing
The main empirical analyses of commercial credit constraints by Cressy (1996c) and Cole
(1998) are now described9. In the evaluation of both studies, the primary issue of controlling
for other information available to the banker when a loan application is under review is
considered. The second criteria used here for evaluating an analysis is the interpretability of
9
Cressy (1996a) also contains a theoretical model containing an adaptation of the Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) model showing that survival should be positively influenced by human capital
variables. Because of the paucity of empirical work, I have described it here
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the findings. Since data relating to the rejection and acceptance of loans is difficult to
access, other ways of inferring the existence of credit constraints have to be used.
Cressy (1996c) tries to discover whether small businesses are credit constrained. He does
not examine credit constraints directly but instead measures the effects of financial factors,
assets and human capital on the survival of small businesses. He regresses his explanatory
variables against his response variable, indicating whether or not an account that was
opened in the second quarter of 1988 had remained open until the first quarter of 1992.
His indirect methodology of inferring the existence of credit constraints when using survival
as an outcome variable is the standard test of credit constraints when following the Evans-
Jovanovic (1989) model .
'A testable prediction of the E-J model is therefore that if the probability of survival
depends on assets, then capital constraints exist'10.
The link between credit constraints and business survival has already been established
empirically. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) discovered that entrepreneurs who received
inheritances i.e. had higher initial wealth, were more likely to survive in business than the
control group. His control group consisted of individuals who had received no wealth
endowment. A $150,000 inheritance increased the probability of survival by 1.3 percent.
Cressy infers from the weak relationship he finds between financial variables and firm
survival when human capital variables are controlled for, that credit rationing, if it exists at
all, does not affect the survival of business start-ups. Human capital factors such as
educational attainment are the only major variables, which are significantly correlated with
the survival of businesses.
Cressy concludes that the supply of credit by banks is perfectly elastic and that any rationing
is legitimate on the basis that the bank is only picking winners a priori because the best
start-ups in terms of human capital are the ones that survive.
'Rationing exists but is human capital based and reflects the bank's desire to bet wisely'".
Cressy's HC (Human Capital) theory that was described under the 'switching models' in
section 2.3 of Chapter 2, does not lend support to the debt-gaps findings of Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) where the survival of firms is predicated by the amount of assets or wealth
they have to offer the bank as collateral on borrowing. According to the Evans-Jovanovic
model, assets should be positively correlated with survival if start-ups are credit rationed.
The rationale for this test is based on the predicted correlation between assets and the
10 P. 1256 Cressy, 1996a
" P. 1254 Cressy, 1996c
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likelihood of obtaining the optimal level of finance requested, if credit rationing operates.
The corollary to this is that under-funded, higher quality firms are less likely to survive if a
bank fails to supply them with the amount of finance they needed to realise their business
project. Cressy (1996c) finds that higher quality firms, in terms of human capital, are more
likely to survive and that these high quality firms are also more likely to receive finance.
The bank can therefore 'pick winners'. Therefore, Cressy concludes that E-J rationing does
not exist because a bank is able to differentiate between high and low quality firms. Where
human capital variables enter his regressions, they cancel out any relationship between asset
levels and survival. High quality firms are more likely to survive and they are also more
likely to have higher levels of initial wealth.
The implication of Cressy's conclusion is that banks have enough information at their
disposal to make wise bets as to the quality of firms. Rather than allowing an incentive
compatible loan contracts to sort bad from good borrowers as we have seen described by
Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987b), the bank resorts to using the information it
has to screen borrowers. In other words, banks know more about the borrower's quality than
the literature gives them credit for. The information regime characterising bank lending is
symmetric rather than asymmetric.
But a criticism of Cressy's paper is that his survival outcome variable, indicating whether or
not an account was closed or not four years after the date of opening, is not an optimal
measurement of survival. He notes this weakness in Cressy (1996c) when he acknowledges
that a business may close its account for reasons other than business failure. It may be
offered better rates elsewhere. A key assumption is therefore the correlation between
account closure and business failure.
A further weakness of Cressy's research design is that his sample of businesses is not
representative of the population of entrepreneurs who apply for loans. The estimation
sample he used consists only of business start-ups that have been accepted by the bank.
Therefore, businesses applying for finance, but which have had their applications turned
down, are not represented in Cressy's estimation sample. The distribution of start-ups
includes only businesses that have already passed the bank's criteria. It follows that the only
ranges of the demand curve for finance being captured, are where demand is met by supply.
Since constraints are a symptom of precisely this phenomenon where supply fails to satisfy
demand, it follows that the estimation sample is not adequately representative of constrained
firms and it is likely that he underestimates the magnitude of credit constraints. This is also
an example where sample selection bias may occur (Heckman, 1979).
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Despite the problems of sample bias, one of the major strengths of his analysis, which is
unequalled anywhere else in the literature, is his inclusion of many variables representing
the level and depth of information available to a loan sanctioner. The human capital
variables include the entrepreneur's age, experience, academic education, vocational
education, previous employment status and present employment status. The significance of
these additional variables should indicate the extent of the bank's information at the time of
application. A further strength of his analysis is his use of a four-stage estimation procedure
allowing a system of simultaneous equations to sort out interdependencies among the
variables. An example of these interdependencies arises where individuals with high human
capital (ability) are more likely to be endowed with high levels of assets. However high
human capital also influences survival as does the ability to leverage finance using assets.
Unfortunately, Cressy does not include any behavioural information (creditworthiness of
entrepreneur on previous loans in a business or personal capacity). The lack of behavioural
information, plays down the importance of pre-existing bank-borrower relationships and
overestimates the importance of the application characteristics of the borrower such as the
human capital characteristics12. The assumption that start-ups do not have a track-record,
excludes potentially useful explanatory variables for credit rationing which would otherwise
complete the list already comprising variables such as human capital, asset and loan
factors13. Chakravarty and Scott (1999) investigated the likelihood that US households were
credit rationed. They attempted to address the issue of asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders by hypothesising that asymmetric information is decreasing in the
length of the borrower/lender relationship. It follows that the longer the relationship
between the borrower and lender the less credit constrained a household would be expected
to be.
In their empirical work they found that the relationship variables denoting the length of the
borrowing relationship and another denoting the breadth of the relationship' were
significantly negatively related to credit constraints.
12 Cole (1998) uses bankruptcy as an explanatory variable for credit constraints and Chakravarty and
Scott's (1999) analysis contains a dummy variable indicating whether a member of the family had
difficulty in making payments over the past year. In my model, I include the behavioral variable
'fin_dif as my proxy for financial distress
13 It can be argued that human capital characteristics such as age and vocational experience are
exogenous to previous repayment performance. In this case human capital variables are likely to be
collinear with past performance variables if both are used to explain the sanctioner's decision to grant
a loan or not. This reasoning may well be correct, in which case Cressy's (1996a) model is not
misspecified. However, the rationale underpinning the inclusion of such variables is to include as
many of the variables informing the loan extension decision as possible in order to explain why certain
loans are turned down.
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However, the analysis by Chakravarty and Scott investigates US households and not small
businesses. The same results do not necessarily obtain for small businesses. Nevertheless,
there are similarities between this research and the small business literature. Chakravarty
and Scott focus on asymmetric information and credit constraints, and refer to the theory on
financial constraints between businesses and their banks and use a logit model to estimate
the significance of their relationship variables on the existence of credit constraints.
A further study by Cole (1998) addresses the question of what motivates a bank to decline a
small business loan. Cole uses a logit model to find that the likelihood that a small business
has its loan application turned down is lower for a business which has a pre-existing
relationship with the bank. The format of Cole's analysis is therefore very similar to that
used by Chakravarty and Scott described earlier but the data relate to US businesses rather
than US households.
Unlike Cressy, Cole's (1998) analysis does include firms that had their applications for
finance rejected. It is, therefore, more likely to be representative of constrained firms. He
argues that previous research has not addressed the disproportionate number of
unconstrained firms in estimation samples. Cole notes that;
'This is a more comprehensive and intuitive test than previous studies...moreover it enables
us to make inferences about firms denied credit as well as those extended credit'14.
The most important outcome of Cole's analysis, is that a potential lender is more likely to
extend credit to a firm which has a pre-existing relationship as a source of financial services
(track record) but that the duration of this relationship is unimportant. A second finding of
Cole's analysis, is that businesses which have several connections with other banks are more
likely to be turned down on their credit applications. This latter finding supports banking
intermediation theories postulating that the private information a bank accumulates on a
business is less valuable when the business cultivates multiple ties with other banks.
To my knowledge, Cole's analysis is the only empirical analysis to date that has investigated
the loan rejection decision. A drawback of Cole's analysis is that he does not control for
human capital variables in his analysis. This means that he cannot define the quality of an
entrepreneur's application in terms of variables measuring the continuity of the business, the
shared decision making structure, the confidence of the entrepreneur, his age or work
experience. Therefore, it is not as easy to infer from Cole's analysis that a small business is
credit constrained because it could happen that the real reason that the bank rejected the
small business loan was due to the poor quality of the entrepreneur's skills, his inexperience
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or lack of confidence. A business can only be said to be credit constrained if it merits more
capital on the basis of the viability of its business project. Therefore, the viability of the
entrepreneur's business project or human capital must be controlled for before a researcher
can conclude that a small business is credit constrained.
An additional drawback with Cole's analysis as an empirical response to the theoretical
literature on credit constraints, is that it is not aimed at analysing credit constraints in the
context of asymmetric information. Unlike Cressy (1996c), who deliberately chooses a
sample of start-up firms because of their lack of a track record and hence most adversely
affected by problems of information asymmetry, Cole investigates a general set of firms. He
does not set out to examine first time business borrowers or those without a track record
with the bank. It is therefore possible that his conclusion that credit constraints do not exist
is predicated by the under-representation of risky, first time borrowers in his estimation
sample.
An argument in support of the general nature of Cole's sample is the average size of firms it
contains. On average, firms which had their application for loans accepted had total sales of
$7,040,000 and the average sales of businesses which had been denied finance was
$1,530,000. Similarly, firms which had their applications accepted were on average 16
years old and their rejected counterparts 11 years old. Cole's analysis deals therefore with
established firms. However, large and existing firms are the least likely to exhibit credit
rationing as a result of asymmetric information problems and therefore the sample of
businesses used by Cole is not ideal for testing theories of asymmetric information and their
implications for credit rationing.
In the following sections I outline my research which aims to address some of the
shortcomings in the existing research into credit constraints. The methodology uses the same
approach as that used by Cole. However, the data used is similar to the data on business
start-ups used by Cressy, where problems with asymmetric information should be most
pronounced (for first-time business borrowers without a track record).
In the next section, I describe the data used in the subsequent regressions investigating the
effect of my explanatory variables on credit constraints.
14 P.976
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8.6 The dataset and description of the variables
As in my previous chapter on the role of entrepreneur-bank relationships (Chapter 7), I
describe the main variables affecting the decision to grant a loan to a first-period borrower
as relationship, credit history, loan contract or human capital variables. The emphasis in
empirical work so far has been on the role played by the former two groups, relationship and
credit history. To date, there is no direct empirical analysis of the influence of human capital
and loan contract variables on the decision to grant a small business loan. Therefore, I
concentrate on exploring the hypothesised relationships between human capital and loan
contract variables with a bank's decision to reject a first-period business loan.
A summary of all the predicted signs of the variables employed in my analysis is contained
in Table 8.1.
Human capital variables
I first turn to the potential importance of human capital variables to the bank's appraisal of
the firm. The reason I emphasise the importance of these variables is twofold. The first and
most important reason is that only by controlling for these variables can a researcher
ascertain whether a small business is credit constrained or not. You will recall from the
previous section, that a drawback of Cole's study was that it did not control for human
capital variables. Therefore, the reason why the bank rejected a small business loan could be
due to low project or entrepreneur quality rather than the necessity to limit funds to the
business because of asymmetric information.
Intuitively we know that the appraisal of business start-ups is similar to the appraisal of
individuals. This is because the creditworthiness of a business start-up is dependent on the
creditworthiness of one or two key individuals (Mester, 1997).
Cressy (1996c) finds that human capital variables such as group capital, where the business
ownership structure is dispersed and hence the firm benefits from a wider skills base, and
the entrepreneur's age are highly related to the survival of business start-ups. If banks are
cognisant of the importance of 'picking winners', it is reasonable to assume that a priori
good entrepreneurs who are rich in human capital have a higher chance of obtaining credit
than entrepreneurs who are lacking in these attributes. Therefore, 1 include an ownership
dispersion proxy 'partner' and business continuity proxy 'busoper' because businesses with
broader ownership structures and whose succession is assured are less likely to fail and
hence are more likely to obtain credit (Burns and Clements, 1992; Bopaiah. 1997; Cressy,
The reason why a bank rejects a small business loan Chapter Eight Page 222
1996c)15. I also include a variable indicating whether the entrepreneur's description of his
business activities was corroborated by bank personnel visiting his business premises,
'businl', as a check of the veracity of the entrepreneur's replies. Consistent with Cressy's
discovery that an entrepreneur's age and survival are positively correlated, I include the
variable 'age' but also a squared term to capture potential non-linear effects. Borrower
experience is captured in the variable 'exp' and I again include a squared term. I hypothesise
that business cash flow captured in the variable 'liql' also informs the bank's decision on
the basis of its high correlation with business survival (Bahnson and Bartley, 1992; Gilbert
et al., 1990; Piatt and Piatt, 1990; Piatt et al., 1994, Schellenger and Cross, 1994; Taffler,
1999). I expect that the sign of the coefficient of the growth proxy 'growth!' shows that
higher growth is associated with a higher rejection likelihood because excessive early
growth drains the enterprise of cash flow thereby inducing failure. The final human capital
variable 'norisk' indicates borrower confidence by signifying that the firm faces no risks. If
entrepreneurs are telling the truth, this variable should be negatively related to the likelihood
of rejection.
Moving on to the topic of loan contract terms, my hypothesised sign for the relationship
between collateral level and the bank accept/reject decision is indeterminate. Cressy and
Toivanen (2001) found that collateral is independent of risk type while Berger and Udell
(1993) found that riskier firms were more frequently asked to provide collateral. The
relationship between the amount of finance requested and the rejection decision is also
indeterminate because although a bank seeks to reduce its exposure to first-period borrowers
according to Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that this under
investment in the entrepreneur makes him riskier as a result. Finally, interest margins were
not included as loan contract variables because they are set after the bank has reached its
decision to lend to the firm or otherwise16.
As already indicated, Table 8.1 shows a summary of the hypothesised relationships for all
the variables in my data with the bank's decision to grant first-period finance.
The response variable {'con'= 1)
It should be pointed out that the response variable that I use {'con') denotes whether the
bank rejected a commercial loan. However, 'con' can also has a value of one when the
15 These group capital variables, 'busoper' and 'partner' were also included in Chapter 7
investigating the price of credit
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entrepreneur rather than the bank turned down the loan. Therefore, it has a dual meaning
which leads to ambiguities when the supply schedule (bank rejects the loan) cannot be
differentiated from the demand schedule (entrepreneur rejects the loan). Despite this
ambiguity, sources at the bank have indicated that the majority of loans that are turned
down, are turned down by the bank and not by the business17.
My credit constraint measure replicates the credit constraint proxy used by Cole (1998). The
measure used in the following analysis distinguishes between borrowers who have had their
applications rejected or accepted by their bank, given that some but not all have previously
borrowed in the past in a personal rather than business capacity. In Cole's study, businesses
have had a business track record with the bank.
Unlike Cole (1998), the businesses used in my sample have not been borrowing from the
bank in a business capacity before. Some of these businesses have been borrowing in a
personal capacity and therefore have a personal rather than business track record. Therefore
the entrepreneurs in my sample may have established entrepreneur-bank relationships prior
to applying for their first business loan18. This distinction is necessary because the
borrowers in my sample are more likely to be representative of businesses who are adversely
affected by information problems. This is because the bank has little idea how these start¬
ups will perform. The businesses in Cole's data are less likely to be affected by asymmetric
information problems because they have an established business track-record, are relatively
large on average and hence are likely to have higher quality financial information.
Therefore, Cole's conclusion that credit constraints are unaffected by the length of a
borrowing relationship for a sample of established firms, may not be applicable to the firms
in my sample.
The question now turns to the extent of bank information on the past repayment
performance of businesses in my sample. There is little public information available to the
bank on the start-ups in my sample since they have not been in existence for very long and
are non-listed companies. There is possibly more public information available on the
transferred businesses, although they represented a small minority of businesses. Given that
the lack of a track record applies to all members of the small businesses in my data, it is
16 See Chapter 7 section 7.7
17
Cressy (1996a) experienced the same problem distinguishing between loans turned down by the
business (non-rationing) and those by the bank (rationing). He found that businesses requesting finance
and not taking up their loans comprised only 4 percent of his sample implying that the majority of loan
rejections are initiated by the bank (credit-rationing)
18 See Chapter 7 section 7.2 for a description of entrepreneur-bank relationships and how they are
different from business-bank relationships
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relatively homogeneous. Applications were either placed for loans, overdrafts or other non-
specified loans. The bank set the terms of the loans including the amount of collateral
required and the amount of the loan were set before the decision was taken to decline or
accept the loan.
The relationship variable ('prevbor'=l)
Consistent with other empirical work which proxy bank-borrower relationships, I have
aimed to give a measure of how long the borrower has been with the bank. Unfortunately,
the data does not indicate when the borrower commenced the bank relationship. Even if the
data did show the day on which the relationship began, it could be argued that this
information is of limited value. An entrepreneur can wear many hats; spouse, brother,
private borrower or business borrower. Given that businesses may begin a non-business
borrowing relationship before they open a business account, there is often pre-existing
information on the borrower before the official date on which the connection is opened.
With small businesses, it is not sensible to separate the performance of the business from the
performance of the business owner because the owner is the business and his private and
business finances are interrelated19.
The dummy variable, previous borrowing ('prevbor'= 1) which was already described in
Chapter 7, indicates whether the entrepreneur had borrowed from the bank at some stage
prior to applying for his first business loan. Unlike Cole's analysis, this previous borrowing
denotes existing consumer or personal rather than business borrowing because the high-risk
classified businesses in my sample are businesses without a business track record. Inability
to demonstrate a business track record does not preclude businesses from having a track
record that relates to their personal borrowing e.g. for a mortgage or personal current
account. Therefore while Cole's relationship variable indicates the existence of a business-
bank relationship, my relationship variable signifies a pre-existing entrepreneur-bank
relationship.
Relationship variables in general are expected to play a significant role in explaining
whether a loan was rejected or not. The likelihood that the bank turns down a business loan
is expected to be negatively related to the relationship variable 'prevbor' because the bank
already knows the credit status of a small business that, has previous borrowings. The
outcome of Cole's analysis, demonstrated that the length of a relationship is not significant
in explaining rejected loans. However, the probability the bank rejects an application for
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finance from an existing customer is lower than the rejection probability for a 'through-the-
door' customer.
8.7 Model specifications and methodology
The fundamental question of my analysis aims to answer is: what variables are the most
significant in predicting whether a loan was turned down or not?
Like Cole (1998), I use a logistic regression specification to model the relationship between
the ex post likelihood that the bank rejects a first-period business loan. The model for credit
constraints, 'con' is Cont=1 for a rejected borrower (has had application rejected) and
Corii=0 otherwise. For the logistic regression let
Pr (Corij=l) = G(Z,), Vi = {1,2},
Where pr (T,=7) denotes the probability of Y, = 7,
and G(Zi) is the corresponding cumulative logistic function defined as
G(Z,) = l/(l+ez'y V i = - °°< Z, < °°
and
1 6 7 n 18
Zj — cc + /3j Xy + {5j Xy + f3j Xy + ^ (3j Xjj + pj Xij + £,
7=1 7=2 7=7 j=8 7=18
Where
i = i is my relationship proxy
; = 2.6are my loan contract variables (including squared terms to check for non-linearities)
i = 6 is my size proxy
7 = 8-77 are human capital variables (including squared terms to check for non-linearities)
i~ is is my risk variable
Si is the stochastic error
8.8 Descriptive statistics
Table 8.2 outlines the univariate statistics for the relationship, loan contract, size,
firm/entrepreneur specific and credit history variables used in my analysis.
19 This assumption is corroborated by Petersen and Rajan (1994) when they conclude that the
reputation of the owner is more important than the firm's reputation
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Column 2 describes the mean value for the group that was denied credit by the bank in each
case. Alternatively, in the case of dummy variables, Column 2 indicates the proportion of
firms within the category of the variable that was denied credit. These individual
proportions for separate dummy variables can then be compared to the overall rejection rate
of 28.4 percent. Column 3 likewise describes the mean amounts or proportions for each of
the separate explanatory variables that will later be used in my estimations. In this instance,
the proportions are compared to the overall accept rate of 71.6 percent. Column 4 contains
the significance levels and test statistics for each of the variables in the table.
We can see from Table 8.2 that the most significant variables are the relationship and the
loan contract variables. However some of the firm/entrepreneur characteristics are also
significantly associated with the sanctioning of finance.
Of the significant variables, if a borrower has borrowed finance previously from the bank
for his own personal use {'prevbor-1), it enhances his probability that he will receive
funding for his business. The proportion of accepted applicants within the category of
borrowers with existing borrowings is 81 percent compared with an overall acceptance rate
of 71.6 percent.
Firms that are extended credit are more likely to request smaller amounts. The difference in
the means of £9,682 is significant at the 0.01 level. Firms who are successful on their loan
applications are also more likely to provide higher collateral. The difference of £6,293 in the
value of collateral is also significant at the 0.01 level. We can conclude therefore that a
sanctioner is more likely to accept credit applicants where the bank's exposure to the
possibility of default is minimised i.e. the credit amount is comparatively low and the
collateral level is comparatively high.
Consistent with the cautious approach employed by the bank that we have seen in its
preference for low risk loans, is the slight but significant preference for non-working capital
loans which is significant at the 0.10 level.
Turning to the firm/entrepreneur characteristics that significantly affect the decision to deny
credit; the self-assessment by the entrepreneur of his own risk is highly significant. More
sanguine entrepreneurs who see no risks that would jeopardise their business projects, are
more likely to receive credit than entrepreneurs who demonstrate self-financing capability.
Finally, the bank shows a marked preference for businesses who can operate in the absence
of the principal owner as evidenced by the higher proportion (73 percent) of applicants in
this group who receive finance.
The reason why a hank rejects a small business loan Chapter Eight Page 227
There is only one variable, namely credit history, in the last group and this is significantly
related to the credit granting decision. Firms who have demonstrated financial difficulty in
the past, tfin_dif'= 1, are significantly less likely to receive credit than firms who have an
unsullied credit history.
Overall, the univariate statistics point to the fact that the bank is cautious about the extent of
its exposure to the risk of the business. However, it responds positively to a business who is
in a position to finance a portion of the project, who is confident of the outcome of his
project and who can assure the bank that the business can continue to manage its daily
operations in the owner's absence.
8.9 Regression results
We now move on to the first regression that estimates the relationship between the four
main categories of explanatory variables and the probability that an entrepreneur has his
credit application turned down. In other words, I model the likelihood that 'con—1'. The
results are shown in Table 8.3.
Column 1 describes the model when I include the business-bank relationship variable,
'prevbor', on its own. Consistent with what we have already seen in the univariate statistics,
'prevbor is highly statistically significant and has a negative sign. This indicates that
entrepreneurs with existing borrowing are less likely to have their applications for finance
rejected by the bank. The pseudo r-squared value of 0.009 is low. Nevertheless, as the X
statistic indicates, the overall model is statistically significant.
Column 2 indicates the regression model of the accept/reject decision after the loan contract
variables are added. Once again, consistent with what we have already seen in the univariate
statistics, the higher the value of collateral provided, the lower the probability that an
applicant will have his application for finance rejected, as indicated by a negatively signed
coefficient. This confirms evidence from Basu and Parker (2001) that entrepreneurs in their
sample attributed the lack of sufficient security as the main reason their credit application
was turned down by a bank. However, there appears to be diminishing returns to collateral
provision, as suggested by the positive sign on the coefficient of the variable 'colli'.
The larger the amount requested by the borrower, the higher the probability that a
borrower's application will be declined by the bank, as evidenced in the positive sign and
significance of the coefficient of the variable 'borr'. Corroborating what we have seen
earlier in the univariate statistics, loans for working capital purposes are more likely to be
turned down.
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In Column 4, I include the size control variable 'proj_sal' but this is neither significant nor
does it affect the model fit.
The results in Column 4 describe the effect on the regression outcome when the
entrepreneur/firm specific variables are added to the model. The pseudo r increases to
0.024.
Consistent with Burns and Clements (1992) and Bopaiah (1997) comments on the
importance of succession issues in small businesses, the coefficient of the variable 'busoper'
indicates that businesses whose succession is assured, are less likely to have their loans
turned down. Business borrowers who have reinvested capital in their business or partially
financed their projects using their own funds, are also less likely to have their loan requests
turned down. Also entrepreneurs who are confident that their businesses face no risks, are
more likely to be successful.
Finally in Column 5 I include the credit history variable fin_dif indicating whether the
business owner exhibited insolvency in the past or had his borrowings rescheduled. The
pseudo r2 increases to 0.026. As we would expect, applicants who have experienced
financial difficulty in the past are significantly less likely to be granted a loan.
The most important outcome conclusion I draw from the analysis, is that there is evidence
that the bank is keen to minimise its exposure to a small business. However, it is likely to
reward new business borrowers who have existing accounts with the bank as evidenced by
their higher likelihood of obtaining credit. The reason for this could be high information
retrieval costs. Obtaining credit bureau data in order to judge an applicant's creditworthiness
is costly. However, the information that a bank has already gathered about its existing
customers is useful if they apply for a business loan. Because the creditworthiness of any
individual who applies for a new business loan has an important role in informing the
sanctioner's decision, it follows that a bank must deem the borrower's personal credit
history as of high importance for a business loan.
A separate issue concerns the strength of the small business in terms of its liquidity, its
ownership structure and the mindset of the entrepreneur. New businesses who are in a
position to make a contribution towards the costs of their project i.e. are to some extent self-
financing, are more likely to receive finance. Similarly, businesses with ownership
structures guaranteeing continuity in the absence of the business loan applicant and
entrepreneurs who are confident about the riskless nature of their venture, are preferred by
loan sanctioners.
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8.10 Individual variables explaining the bank accept/reject decision
When interpreting the value of the coefficients in a logistic regression I refer to the odds
ratios because these reflect the most accurate measure of the individual contribution of the
variables although the standardised coefficients can be used for ranking the variables in
order of their relative importance (Allison, 1999). Table 8.4 describes the marginal effects
of the individual explanatory variables on the sanctioner's decision.
Column 1 in Table 8.4 lists the beta values for the regression. In Column 2, the odds ratio
for each of the explanatory variables is calculated. The odds ratio i.e. the ratio between the
probability of being rejected and the probability of being accepted, (Preject (1 ~ Preject)), is
calculated by obtaining the exponent of the beta values. In order to derive the values in
Column 3,1 first of all calculate the base odds ratio from the regression coefficients in order
to provide a baseline against which I can measure any marginal effects. This baseline value
(base odds ratio) is calculated by substituting back the averages of the continuous variables
and setting the dummy variables equal to zero. The exponent of the resulting value is the
base odds ratio which is found to be equal to 0.4877. This in turn is multiplied by the odds
ratio in order to obtain the change in the base odds ratio for when the dummy variables are
equal to 1 or the continuous variables increase/decrease by £100,000.
In Column 4 I convert the modified base odds ratio when the marginal effect is included to
a rejection probability, Preject, for that variable. Finally, in Column 5, the change in
rejection probabilities from the baseline probability of approximately 33 percent is
calculated as Preject ~ Pbase in order to demonstrate how entrepreneurs possessing this
attribute exhibit rejection probabilities that differ from the baseline rejection probability.
We see in Table 8.4 that the relationship dummy, 'prevbor', is the single most important
variable in the regression where applicants for finance are 12 percent less likely to have
their applications turned down if they have banked with the lender before. This result
corroborates the importance of previous borrowing relationships testified by Cole (1998).
However, I expand on Cole's analysis by noting the marginal effect of previous borrowings
on the rejection probability. The marginal effects of different variables on the sanctioner's
decision are now described in order of the magnitude of their effect.
Applicants retaining a profit or ploughing their own equity into a business project
{'liqP=1), are almost 8 percent less likely to be rejected compared with the baseline
probability level. Hence the bank values the self-financing capability of new commercial
borrowers.
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Commercial borrowers who have had previous borrowings rescheduled due to an inability to
meet repayments or who have been insolvent in the past, Cfin_dif'= 1), are 5.8 percent less
likely to have their applications accepted.
The role of entrepreneurial self-confidence is evident in the fact that applicants who state on
their application forms that they do envisage that any risks lie ahead that would threaten
their project ('no_risk'= 1), are 4.3 percent more likely to obtain finance. De Meza and
Southey (1996) have documented some of the theoretical considerations relating to
entrepreneurial self-confidence and have concluded that the most risky entrepreneurs are not
only likely to be more confident but also likely to be more successful in applying for
finance. We cannot infer from this result whether these entrepreneurs are higher risk but we
can conclude that more confident entrepreneurs are more likely to have their applications
accepted.
A slightly worrying outcome is that applicants applying for working capital finance,
'working', are 3.6 percent more likely to be rejected than applicants whose borrowing
purpose is for asset backed finance even when collateral has been controlled for. The
problem is that liquidity constrained borrowers with good growth prospects may find that
this constraint bites. However, one could argue that this marginal effect is small enough to
be negligible and what really matters is relationship, clean track-record and an ability to be
self-financing.
It is evident that a bank is cognisant of business continuity issues when sanctioning a loan to
a new commercial borrower. Business owners who indicate that their business can continue
to operate in their absence, 'busoper'= 1, are associated with lower rejection probabilities"0.
The loan contract variables 'coll' and 'borr' do not individually lead to a dramatic change in
the likelihood that a loan is accepted/rejected. Borrowers providing £100,000 additional
collateral are approximately 4 percent less likely to be rejected compared with the baseline
acceptance probability. Applicants who request £100,000 more are associated with a
relatively higher rejection probability i.e. a 2.9 percent differential.
Factors like the entrepreneur's age and work experience, while significant in explaining the
price of credit as Hanley and Crook (2001b) demonstrate, do not appear to influence the
sanctioning decision.
20 It appears contradictory that the variable 'partner' indicating that the business ownership comprises
at least one owner is associated with a higher rejection likelihood. The business continuity variable
'busoper' has the expected negative sign and 'partner' was similarly expected to reduce the rejection
probability. Our explanation for this anomaly is that a sanctioner may be marginally inclined to favour
loans over which it has greater control and increasing the number of partners may decrease the
strength of the relationship between the applicant and his contact at the bank.
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8.11 Conclusions and implications of analysis for relationship lending
It is evident from these estimations that relationship, loan contract and some
entrepreneur/firm variables are important inputs in the sanctioner's decision to reject a loan
to a new commercial borrower. Increasing the amount of collateral provided and reducing
the amount of finance requested, increases the likelihood that a loan will be granted. This
indicates that the bank prefers lower risk exposures to higher exposure, all things equal. This
outcome is consistent with my expectation that a bank is a rational, risk adverse agent.
I conclude that a bank emphasises the value of pre-existing relationships, borrower credit
history and the ability of a borrower to be self-financing when granting a loan. However,
the fact that a borrower has banked with the lender before, is by far the most important
factor to elicit a positive sanctioning response from the lender.
The implication of this finding that entrepreneur-bank relationship and credit history
variables play an important role in the sanctioning of finance to new business customers is
profound. A prospective new business borrower seeking finance for his new business
venture has a greater chance of succeeding if he already has some type of existing MTA
(Money Transmission Mechanism) account such as a student or adult current account21. If
he does not exhibit adverse behaviour, such as overdrawing on this account and delaying the
repayment of these excesses, he runs the risk that this adverse repayment behaviour on
personal borrowings will jeopardise his application for business borrowing. Therefore, in
the absence of information that would describe the business' track record, a bank defaults to
the next best alternative which is its own store of in-house information albeit relating to a
personal rather than business track-record. New corporate borrowers, particularly those
seeking start-up finance where the credit history of the owner is of key importance, would
be advised not to underestimate the importance of their existing MTAs when applying for a
first time commercial loan.
21
An MTA is a dynamic account that is used for credit scoring purposes because it allows a banker to
identify how often, by how much and for how long a customer has exceeded his account limit. It is
therefore a useful indicator of customer quality
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Table 8.2 Univariate Statistics
(1)
Variable
(2)
Firms
denied
credit
(3)
Firms
extended
credit
(4)
t-
statistic/
%2
statistic
Number of firms 1, 695 4, 273
Proportion of firms 28.4% 71.6%
Business-bank relationship
Entrepreneur has previous borrowings
{prevbor=1)
19% 81% 65 .394a***
Loan contract terms
Amount borrowed 76,679 66, 997 -3 .166b***
Amount of collateral 52,549 58,842 1.744b***
Loan purpose is working capital
(working=1)
29 .4% 70 . 6% 3.192a*
Size
Sales 265,250 309,506 0.2 96b
Firm/entrepreneur characteristics
Entrepreneur's age 43 . 3 43 . 5 0.582b
Number of yrs. work experience 12 . 7 12 .5 -0.821b
Business owner has business partner 29% 71% 1.055a
Business sees no risks ahead
(norisk=1)
26% 74% 19.058a***
Firm growth (projected sales/present
sales)
5.31 5 . 85 0.251b
Ability to self-finance (has retained
a profit or invested own capital)
(liql=l)
26% 74% 40 . 809a***
Continuity of business is assured
(busoper=±)
27% 73% 9 . 241a***
Credit history
Financial difficulty {fin_dif=l) 33% 67% 15 . 572a***
a denotes %2 statistic (difference in proportions)
b denotes t-test (difference in means)
*** difference in means of groups or proportions significant at the 0.01
level
** difference in means of groups or proportions significant at the 0.05
level
* difference in means of groups or proportions significant at the 0.10 level
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Table 8.3 Logit to determine relative importance of variable groups in accept/reject decision
Response variable: P(con)=1: applic. Rejected (Prob. > %2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept - . 8137*** -.9064*** - . 9064*** -1.0098** —.9444***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0261) (.0378)
Business-bank
relationship
prevbor - . 6526*** -.6214*** - . 6214*** —.6665*** -.6430***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Loan contract terms
coll -1.8E-06*** -1.8E-06*** -1.7E-06*** -1.9E-06***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0001)
coll2 9.48E-13** 9.48E-13** 8.83E-13 * 9.87E-13**
(0.0412) (.0413) (.0581) (.0344)
borr 1.28E-06** 1.28E-06** 1.48E-06** 1. 30E-06**
(.0321) (.0321) (.0129) (.0307)
borr2 4.58E-13 4 . 58E-13 1.05E-13 3.14E-13
(.6075) (. 6076) ( .9042) (.7202)
working .1359** . 1359** . 1672*** .1594***
(.0239) (. 0239) (.0062) (.0092)
Size
projsal -1.2E-10 3.06E-10 2.47E-10
(.9866) (.9645) - (.9778)
Firm/entrepreneur
characteristics
partner . 0901 . 0818
(.1296) (.1699)
age . 0281 . 0254
(.1783) (.2251)
age2 -.0003 -.0003
(.1322) (.1505)
exp -.0016 -.0019
(.8424) (.8142)
exp2 . 0001 . 0001
(.5819) (.5282)
busoper - . 1428** -.1577**
(.0466) (.0282)
norisk - . 1964*** -.2019***
(.0011) (.0008)
liql -.3892*** - . 3845***
(.0000) (.0000)
growthl 5.05E-05 6.9IE-05
( .8992) (.8622)
Credit history
fin_dif .2523***
(.0006)
-2 log likelihood
Intercept 7052.50 7021.63 7021. 63 6953 .49 6941 . 81
X.2 for covariates 69 .766 100.64 100.642 168 .776 180.464
DF x2 for covariates 1 6 7 16 17
Sig. for covariates . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000 . 0000
Pseudo-r 0.00989 0.0143 0.0143 0 . 024 0 . 026
(Number of observations 5, 968 5, 968 5, 968 5, 968 5, 968
***sig. at 0.01 level ** sig at 0.05 level *sig. at 0.10 level
Table8.4Marginalnalysis;effectofindividu lvari b ethb kr jectiont BOddsratio (expB))
Oddsratio*b seod ratio1
Pereject
Differencein rej.ates3
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Intercept
-0.9444
prevbor
-0.643
0.5257
0.2564
0.2041
-12.4%
coll(00,000)
-0.1900
0 .8270
0.4033
0.2874
-3.98%
borr(00,000)
0.1300
1.1388
0.5553
0.3571
+2.9%
working
0.1594
1.1728
0 .5719
0.3638
+3.6%
projsal(00,000)
2.47E-10
1.0000
0 .4877
0.3278
0 .%
partner
0,0818
1.0852
0.5292
0 .34611
+1.8%
age
0.0254
1.0257
0.5002
0.3334
+0.6%
age2
-0.0003
0.9997
0.4875
0.3277
0 .%
exp
-0.0019
0.9981
0.4867
0.3274
0 .%
exp2
0 .001
1.0001
0.4877
0.3278
0 .%
busoper
-0.1577
0.8541
0.4165
0.2940
-3.4%
norisk
-0.2019
0.8172
0.3985
0.2849
-4.3%
liql
-0.3845
0.6808
0.3320
0 .2492
-7.9%
growthl
0.0001
1.0001
0 .4877
0 .3278
0 .%
fin_dif
0.2523
1.2870
0 .6276
0.3856
+5.8%
1Thebasoddsratio=exp(Bifi^)0.4877 2Preject=basoddsratio* ti i/[1+(b eoddsr tiotio )] 3pbase-baseoddratio/(1+ )=0.3272r2.7% Differenceinrej tat s=P ject~ba
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Chapter 9
Collateral levels for existing businesses
and first-period business borrowers1
1
A shortened version of this chapter is available as Hanley (2002). 'Do binary collateral outcome
variables proxy collateral levels? The case ofcollateral from start-ups and existing SMEs'. Small
Business Economics, vl8, pp. 317-331
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9.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have dealt with the availability and price of credit. This final empirical
chapter looks at collateral level issues. This chapter not only investigates the level of
collateral provided by entrepreneurs from business start-ups. It also compares collateral
levels for new business borrowers with the magnitude of collateral that is provided by
existing business borrowers.
This is the first empirical analysis contrasting the collateral levels required from new viz. a
vis existing borrowers. A previous analysis has investigated the likelihood that collateral is
required from businesses as a function, inter alia, of the business-bank relationship, duration
of the loan and size of the firm (Cressy and Toivanen, 2001). Other analyses have compared
the likelihood that various types of collateral are required on overdraft finance only (Berger
and Udell, 1995; Cressy, 1996a). However, no analysis has directly compared the collateral
levels required on bank lending for new vis a vis existing firms respectively.
This is also the first analysis to compare the results obtained using two different definitions
of the collateral variable; a binary variable indicating whether collateral was required or not
and a continuous variable indicating the level of collateral. Therefore, this analysis is the
first to investigate whether a binary 'yes_no' type variable leads to the same conclusions
about the role of the independent variables as the variable measuring collateral level that I
have used in analyses so far 'allcolV. If the analysis using the binary response variable
yields results similar to the analysis on collateral level, there is a rationale for proxying
collateral level using a simple binary variable. Such a proxy would be very useful for further
research where there is comparative difficulty quantifying the amount of collateral on loans.
An additional feature of this analysis is that it also controls for the level of borrowing and
thus measures the effect of borrower type on collateral level per unit of finance borrowed.
Therefore this analysis looks at the level of bank exposure to the firm rather than looking at
collateral in isolation without controlling for the amount of finance borrowed2.
I find that new business borrowers are charged less collateral than existing borrowers.
However, this result is qualified by an artefact of collateral data, where the indivisible and
cumulative nature of collateral make pricing to risk or business type difficult to implement
in reality.
2
Cressy (1996a) includes the level of allowable borrowing in the form of the overdraft limit as an
explanatory variable in his regression estimating whether collateral is demanded or not. Cressy and
Toivanen (2001) have a measure of loan size but do not derive collateral to loan value ratios or control
for borrowed amount in their estimation.
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. I first of all outline the central issues relating to
collateral and where I have sought to address some of these issues in the next section. The
sections following this deal with the theoretical and empirical literature respectively. In the
next section, I describe the data, introducing for the first time the new dummy variable
distinguishing between business first-period business borrowers and established business
borrowers. This is followed by the methodology before I present my results. My results
section comprises some descriptive statistics and the results of my estimations. I then
present my conclusions before giving the implications of my findings for future research.
9.2 Key collateral issues
The issue of collateral is central to the debate on the provision of finance to small
businesses. In a general sense, there is a limit to which interest margins can be used to
neutralise the risk of lending to a risky borrower due to the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
adverse selection effects that were described in Chapter 23. This means that a bank
becomes more reliant on collateral to produce motivation in the borrower who knows he will
lose his collateral if he defaults (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990). Collateral can also be expected
to diminish the likelihood that the borrower will take excessive risks (moral hazard).
In general, the importance of collateral is underpinned by a number of key issues. The first
issue concerns the central role of the collateral to loan value ratio in influencing the number
of individuals who choose to set up their own business. Collateral therefore has important
microeconomic implications. I have already highlighted in Chapter 2 the role that is played
by collateral in the 'switching theory' by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) that was further
developed by Cressy (1996b) to include human capital. According to this theory, if a more
favourable lending to assets ratio employed by the bank induced an entrepreneur to switch
from waged-employment to self-employment, then credit rationing exists. If a more
favourable bank lending to assets ratio induced entrepreneurs to enter self-employment, then
the level of collateral demanded by banks plays a significant role in determining the level of
entrepreneurship in the economy.
The second issue concerns the role of collateral when the bank is unsure of the borrower's
risk status due to asymmetric information. If a viable small business is confined to
leveraging bank debt in direct proportion to its existing assets, then, ceteris paribus, asset-
poor start-ups are penalised relative to asset-rich existing businesses that have accumulated
Collateral levels for existing businesses and Chapter Nine Page 239
wealth over the number of years that their business has been in operation. Moreover, if
collateral is used to defray against the risk of bankruptcy and new businesses have a higher
likelihood of going bankrupt, it follows that new businesses are likely to leverage even less
debt in proportion to the magnitude of their asset base than existing businesses who have a
lower a priori risk of failure. This conclusion would be actuarially fair (justified on the basis
of increased risk) if the bank's appraisal of small business risk were correct. In this case new
businesses, being higher risk, would be charged appropriately higher collateral levels. If the
bank's judgement is distorted due to asymmetric information, then an actuarially unfair
situation would emerge whereby newly founded businesses would be penalised by being
asked to provide relatively more collateral as a result of insufficient information regarding
their risk status4.
A final issue concerns the nature of collateral and how it is used by the bank. This issue
concerns the measurement problem that arises when collateral is cumulative and not
necessarily priced to risk. Collateral is a complex variable when used in empirical regression
studies. This complexity has as much to do with the form it takes (binary or continuous) as
with its purpose (signalling or priced to risk).
It could be argued that the age of the business and features of the loan contract (interest
margin and loan amount) determine whether collateral is taken or not on a loan (binary
variable format) to a greater extent than inform the level of collateral taken (continuous
variable format). The basis for this argument is that the bank is keen that the business
provides collateral in order to signal its commitment to the project. This precondition that is
laid down by the bank that the business should provide collateral should be determined by
the borrower's risk type. However, the bank cannot use collateral in a very effective way to
neutralise the risk of lending because collateral is indivisible and the bank is reluctant to
foreclose on the borrower because of the losses that this would entail (Wruck, 1990).
Therefore, it is more essential for the borrower to demonstrate his good faith by providing
collateral when his risk type necessitates collateral provision. However, the usefulness of
3
By 'adverse selection' is meant the phenomenon whereby the bank, by raising the interest rate in
order to neutralise risk, attracts riskier borrowers and in so doing raises rather than lowers its risk
profile
4
Furthermore, businesses in industrial sectors where there is a relatively low level of tangible assets to
the level of cash flow required are likely to be placed at a disadvantage compared to their counterparts
in industries with comparatively heavy concentrations of tangible assets if lending is capital based.
This is because if banks favour capital based lending, which a regime of asymmetric information
suggests they will because they are unable to adequately assess the viability of a small business's plan,
industries lacking in tangible assets will be placed at a disadvantage when applying for bank finance. I
could not investigate this question in the context of this chapter due to a lack of appropriate
information on firm sector and asset structure.
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this collateral as a way of compensating the bank for any subsequent losses is less clear cut.
For this reason, I would expect there to be a stronger relationship between the risk type of
the firm and the decision to take collateral from the business than for the relationship
between the risk type of the business and the level of collateral.
Although this may seem a simplistic argument, anecdotal evidence from interviews with
German and Irish bankers from different types of bank suggests that collateral, while an
important component of the lending contract, is less important than the viability of the
business plan and the credibility of the business principals (Hanley, 1997). The decision to
take collateral or not is a function inter alia of the loan purpose where bankers match asset
type to collateral type and relegate collateral to second place behind the viability of the
business and the business plan. It is natural that bankers would want to portray themselves in
the best possible light and therefore understate the significance they attach to collateral and
overstate their ability to correctly assess good projects.
I argue that deciding upon a level of collateral as opposed to deciding whether to take
collateral or not, cannot be clean cut or scientific. The very indivisible nature of collateral
suggests that banks cannot easily match the level of collateral to the level of borrowing.
Since a unit of collateral is typically understood to be indivisible, it follows that this unit of
collateral must be spread over a number of loans or overdrafts. Real-life data does not
typically exhibit neat, clean separations between collateral units. It involves spreading the
security over an aggregation of combined borrowing. This feature of collateral being
indivisible highlights the need to examine aggregate borrowing rather than loans or
overdrafts in isolation. Collateral may furthermore be under- or overvalued and realise less
value on disposal than its value as a going concern (sunk cost). Given the comparative
'messiness' of looking at collateral levels rather than the binary decision of whether
collateral is taken or not, it might be expected that the same factors driving the decision to
take collateral might not be significant in explaining the level of collateral taken.
It is necessary to compare the significance and effects of factors on the level of collateral
taken. Firstly, if these factors exert a similar influence on both the binary (decision to take
collateral or not) as well as the continuous (level of collateral) response variable, an
empiricist can use the decision to take collateral or not as a proxy for the level of collateral
taken. Given the difficulty in valuing collateral and assigning its value over individual loans
as well as the problem in obtaining estimates of collateral value, using the binary outcome
variable of whether collateral is taken or not represents a simplification of the
collateralisation process and eases data constraints in this area. This in turn could facilitate
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further research into the area of signalling and information asymmetry which to date has
been hampered by a lack of data.
Because of the influence of collateral to loan ratios in influencing the level of
entrepreneurship in the economy and the role of collateral in reducing the problems
associated with information asymmetries, collateral is central to any debate relating to the
supply of finance to small businesses.
9.3 How my analysis addresses key collateral issues
The aim of this chapter is to examine these collateral issues outlined above by comparing
the collateral terms that are granted to new vis a vis existing business borrowers'\
Particular attention will be paid to research describing how the age of the borrower's
account (analogous to the dichotomy between new and existing business borrowers or
asymmetric versus symmetric information respectively) influences the level of collateral.
Applying the same logic, differences in how collateral levels vary across the two groups
correspond to differences arising whereby first time business borrowers have not established
an external reputation relative to existing businesses.
I therefore examine the collateral posted by applicants for commercial loans over two
adjacent time periods in order to see whether there is a disparity in the way first-period
business borrower businesses are treated in terms of collateral requirements viz. a vis
existing businesses. The additional constraint of using two time periods acts as a control on
the validity of my results.
In comparing the collateral levels provided by new vis a vis existing borrowers, the
motivation for this chapter is similar to the motivation behind Chapter 7 where
entrepreneur-bank relationships were investigated. Analogous to the investigation of
entrepreneur-bank relationships in Chapter 7, is the dichotomy between how new vis a vis
established business customers are treated by a bank in terms of the levels of collateral that
they are asked to provide.
9.4 Summary of theoretical work on collateral
Issues concerning the internal reputation of the borrower (existence of entrepreneur-bank
relationship on credit terms) were investigated in Chapter 7. This chapter deals inter alia
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with the external reputation of the borrower where more established borrowers are assumed
to have higher external reputation effects than less established borrowers. However, there is
much overlap between the literature dealing with the internal and external reputations of the
borrower. Therefore, much of the theoretical work referred to in Chapter 2 also applies
here. On this basis, I will briefly recall the theoretical work on the predicted effects of
reputation on collateral that has already been presented in Chapter 7 before outlining in
more depth the empirical literature.
Arguably the most significant theoretical papers on collateral are by Bester (1985) and
Besanko and Thakor (1987b). Both these papers were fully described in Chapter 2. Both
papers assume an asymmetric information environment where the entrepreneur knows more
about his repayment likelihood than the bank. The external reputation of the borrower serves
to decrease the level of information asymmetry because the bank or other lender can observe
the borrower's survival and infer from this how likely it is that the borrower will repay in
the future.
I now relate the level of information asymmetry back to the level to collateral provision. The
papers by Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987b) assume low levels of external
reputation by assuming high level of information asymmetry. Under information asymmetry,
borrowers who know they will not default on their repayments to the bank, will provide
additional collateral in order to signal their ex ante creditworthiness to the lender.
The only substantial difference between the two papers is the assumption of non-binding
wealth constraints by Bester. This leads Bester to conclude that the bank can perfectly
distinguish between good and bad borrowers where the good borrowers choose higher
collateral levels on their loans, all things equal, than bad borrowers. Because Bester assumes
that collateral is subject to non-binding wealth constraints, the amount of collateral extended
by entrepreneurs is entirely at their discretion and is not bounded by some upper wealth
limit. In other words, entrepreneurs are free to give as much collateral as they like and more
cautious, less risky entrepreneurs will give comparatively more collateral than their risky
counterparts. On the other hand, because of their assumption of binding wealth constraints,
Besanko and Thakor (1987b) argue that the bank cannot perfectly separate good from bad
borrowers on the basis of the choice of collateral level because good borrowers do not have
an infinite supply of assets to offer as collateral in order to secure their loan.
5
Unfortunately, a lack of performance data for existing businesses, prevents me from interpreting my
results in the context of whether new businesses are inherently riskier than existing businesses and so
justify any possible differentials in collateral levels between the two groups.
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The implications of both theoretical papers for any analysis on the effect of external
reputation effects on collateral levels are ambiguous. Because both theories offer only
explanations of what happens under asymmetric information rather than the lower risk
symmetric information environment, there is no prediction as to the relative levels of
collateral according as to whether a borrower's information status is symmetric or
asymmetric. In other words, I cannot infer whether borrowers whose applications are subject
to asymmetric information post more collateral than borrowers whose applications are not
subject to this information constraint. What can be concluded however, is that when there is
more asymmetric information there may be a wider dispersion of collateral levels (where
non-defaulters offer comparatively higher collateral than defaulters) than the dispersion of
collateral in the group with less asymmetric information. However, there is no inference
from the theories that the average collateral levels in low and high-risk groups or symmetric
and asymmetric information regimes respectively should differ. The theories therefore offer
little insight on the comparative differences in collateral levels across different information
regimes.
9.5 Previous empirical work on collateral
We therefore turn to the empirical literature. There has been empirical work into the
decisioning process of whether a bank decides to take collateral or not (Berger and Udell,
1993; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001). Unfortunately there has been no empirical analysis to
date of the level of collateral taken. This gap in the literature has meant that while analyses
have modelled and demonstrated empirically the decision to take collateral or not, there has
been no corresponding empirical analysis that demonstrates whether the same factors
affecting the decision to take collateral or not also affect the level of collateral taken.
The analysis by Berger and Udell (1995) models the decision to require collateral from a
business as a function of the financial characteristics of the business, its corporate
governance, the industry within which it operates and relationship characteristics such as the
number of years it has been a bank customer. Their estimations produced the following
significant relationships between the explanatory variables and the decision to take
collateral6;
Decision to take collateral = a + /Jy lev + arturn + (3j Inta - age - relate + e
6 For the sake of brevity only the variables significant to at least 10 percent are included as
explanatory variables here
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Where 'lev' is defined as the ratio between the amount borrowed and total business assets,
'Inta' is the level of total assets logged, 'arturn' refers to the turnover of accounts receivable
in days, 'Inage' a relationship variable, refers to the logged number of years the current
entrepreneurs have owned the business. This variable 'Inage' proxies external reputation
effects because all lenders can observe it alike. Finally 'Inrelate', another relationship
factor, denotes the logged number of years that the borrower has had a borrowing
relationship with the current lender.
The signs on the coefficients of the variables that are significant in their estimations indicate
the following relationships. Loans in the form of bank overdrafts are more likely to require
collateral when the firm is highly geared and hence the positive sign on 'lev' (debt forms a
higher component of the market capitalisation of the firm). Also positively related to the
likelihood that collateral is required, is the level of day's credit granted by the firm to its
debtors denoted by a high value for 'arturn'. This relationship is intuitive because firms that
are relatively generous with their credit are in effect granting a loan to their debtors and
hence are more likely to stretch their working capital to its limit. Larger firms in terms of
total assets are more likely to be required to provide collateral as evidenced by the positive
sign for the coefficient of the variable 'Inta'. The final two variables measuring the
reputation of the business are negatively related to the probability that collateral is taken.
Therefore more mature entrepreneurs, as denoted by higher values for the variable 'Inage'
and those who have borrowed for a longer period with the bank, as indicated by higher
values of 'Inrelate', are associated with a lower probability that collateral is taken.
Although Berger and Udell find that the likelihood that collateral is taken is negatively
associated with the age 'Inage' variable that proxies external reputation effects, this result is
somewhat undermined by their failure to control for loan size in their estimation. Their
omission of loan size as a right hand side variable is problematic because we cannot infer
that more experienced entrepreneurs are associated with less onerous collateral
requirements. If for the sake of argument, more mature firms demand smaller loans (unlikely
to be the case as they are likely to be larger firms and hence to have a higher demand for
finance) the negative relationship between age 'Inage' and the likelihood that a loan is
collateralised could be influenced by the size of the loan rather than the maturity of the firm.
It is safe to assume that the size of a loan is an important variable and its omission runs the
risk of model misspecification. What matters more than the amount of collateral required, is
the amount of collateral per unit borrowed. If loan size is not controlled for, any results
describing the effect of the explanatory variables on collateral level are incomplete.
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Cressy and Toivanen (2001) model the hypothesised relationships between their variables
before embarking on their empirical analysis. They model the level of collateral 'C" as;
Level of Collateral C=f(Ind, purp, succ, dur)
Where 'succ' (an endogenous variable in the 2-stage least squares estimate) is the ex post
risk type of the entrepreneur and indicates whether she defaulted on her loan or not. This
should be negatively related with the collateral level if the bank correctly gauges the risk
type of the firm at the time that the loan is made. 'purp' is the loan purpose that represents
the purchase of stock, plant, a business, vehicles, improvements to property, working capital
and other. It is assumed, although Cressy and Toivanen do not explicitly say so, that if the
bank secures a loan on the asset purchased, that categories of the loan purpose variable
where an asset was purchased, will be associated with higher levels of collateral. 7nd'
represents the industrial sector of the business and asset rich sectors should be associated
with higher levels of collateral. Finally, 'dur , the duration of the loan should be associated
with higher levels of collateral if longer-term loans. Unfortunately the authors do not have
an estimate for the level of collateral, 'C', in their dataset and use instead a dummy similar
to that used by Berger and Udell as a proxy.
Finally, the results of Cressy's (1996a) empirical estimations modelling the decision to take
collateral on overdrafts that were offered to UK business start-ups show that the decision to
take collateral is a function of the following variables; 'perfin' indicating whether the
business owner invests his own equity in the business project, 'odlim' the maximum
allowable amount of the overdraft, 'marg' the interest premium and 'pres921' indicating
whether the firm was still in existence at a predefined later period.
9.6 Differences between my analysis and existing work
Unlike the study by Cressy and Toivanen (2001), my analysis does not set out to establish
the relationship between the decision to take collateral and the ultimate risk type of the
entrepreneur. At a far simpler level, my analysis aims to compare the levels of collateral
required from small businesses as a function of whether they are existing or first-period
business borrowers. Unlike Cressy and Toivanen who proxy reputation effects using
'Inrelate', the logged number of years that a business has banked with the lender, I will
proxy reputation using the variable 'type'. This variable denotes that a firm is a first-period
business borrower and hence new borrower where the firm is otherwise an existing and
established borrower. It is assumed that the first-period business borrower businesses in my
sample are more subject to the limitations of asymmetric information according to
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Diamond's theory of the learning bank where a bank learns more about the risk status of its
borrower over time (Diamond, 1989; Diamond, 1991) 7. It would seem intuitive that the
bank would impose a higher collateral to loan amount ratio on first-period business
borrower firms in order to offset the increased risk of lending to such firms. In other words,
for every pound that is loaned, the bank should exact more collateral. The opposite effect
would arise, where a bank exacts less collateral from first-period business borrower firms, if
start-ups are lacking in assets. In this case the bank is more lenient because it is anxious to
win increased market share. Therefore, it is prepared to enter increased risk by increasing its
level of unsecured exposure to the small firm in order to prevent a competing bank from
claiming this new business customer. It follows that the predicted sign for the type of
business customer with respect to the level of collateral is ambiguous.
The analysis by Cressy and Toivanen focuses on ascertaining whether asymmetric
information prevails in the market for credit. However, because I do not have a measure for
the subsequent performance of the established businesses, I confine the analysis that follows
to describing the relationship between the collateral level and the type of business applicant
(start-up or established). In so doing, my analysis exhibits two unique features that add to
the existing literature. Firstly, I have got two alternative measures of collateral i.e. collateral
level and a binary variable indicating whether collateral was taken or not. Neither Berger
and Udell (1995) nor Cressy and Toivanen (2001) have explored collateral level, a fact that
the latter acknowledge. Indeed, Cressy and Toivanen's exploration of information
asymmetries assumes that collateral is continuous (in the modelling part) and yet the
empirical part uses a binary collateral variable. They acknowledge this shortcoming in their
analysis and note that this replacement of the continuous by a binary variable is necessary
due to data constraints. Since no analysis to date has used a continuous measure of
collateral, it is useful to explore whether the two variables (binary and continuous) are
interchangeable in that the direction of the coefficients explaining collateral as a response
variable are invariant with the definition of collateral used. Ultimately, I seek to infer
whether the binary decision to take collateral or not represents a useful proxy for the
magnitude of collateral since only binary variables have been used in the literature to date.
An additional unique feature of my analysis that differs from previous analyses, is that I
control for the collective amount that is borrowed by the entrepreneur. This controlling
variable is integral to any analysis of collateral because what should be measured is
7 This concept of the learning bank was further developed by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and is
explained in Chapter 2 section 2.46.
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collateral as a proportion of the amount loaned or the amount of collateral extended when
the loan amount is kept constant. My analysis is the first therefore, to look at total exposure,
which is the amount of collateral securing a given amount of borrowing. It does not make
sense to omit the amount borrowed because the higher the amount borrowed, the higher the
exposure of the bank to the entrepreneur and hence the greater the need for collateral, all
things equal.
9.7 Data description
The data used in this chapter comprises the original dataset of applicants for finance from
first-period business borrower or transferred businesses in addition to a further dataset
containing applicants who are established customers of the bank i.e. existing customers8.
The dummy variable 'type' distinguishes between the two types of borrower.
The breakdown first-period business borrowers and borrowers from established businesses
is 1,553 and 2,782 businesses respectively for the first 6 month period in which the bank
accepted applications. The number of applicants in my database for the second 6 months is
over twice that for the first period with a total of 9,879 businesses. Of these 3,065 were from
the first-period business group and the remaining 6,814 from the established business group.
The constraint was that all applicants had applied for either a loan or overdraft within either
of the 6 month periods. It was possible that applicants who applied within the first 6 months
could also apply in the second period and so the two periods do not represent a mutually
exclusive set of applicants9.
The first-period business group, as described before, contains businesses that have
transferred their business from another lender or are ab initio start-ups. They have been
grouped together because neither transfers nor start-ups have a track record with the lender
and are hence unknown quantities as far as the lender is concerned. On the other hand, the
established business group comprises existing businesses that have a track record with the
bank. The variable 'type' is a dummy variable taking on values of 1 if the loan is to an
existing business and zero if not. It follows that the coefficient of the variable 'type' refers
8
Unfortunately, there was no way of differentiating between the two types of first-period borrower
(businesses that had transferred from another bank and business start-ups) although I was assured by
sources at the bank that the number of businesses that had transferred from another bank were very
few. The theory would corroborate this. The literature on adverse selection (see Chapter 2 section
2.2) confirms that a bank is less likely to accept a business who has previously borrowed from another
bank on the grounds that the original lender is unhappy with the borrower's repayment record or risk
profile.
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to the relationship between membership of the established business group and the response
variable, with the first-period business group representing the base category.
The definition of borrowing used in this analysis is aggregate borrowing and is calculated by
summing all term loans and overdraft limits applied for and secured during a 6 month time
window in 1999. It is necessary to use an aggregate borrowing measure to allow us to use an
aggregate collateral measure. This approach is used due to the indivisibilities of collateral.
There were anomalies in the collateral data that needed to be addressed prior to working
with the data. These anomalies could have arisen as a result of collateral indivisibilities.
They first became apparent when I looked through the collateral to loan amount ratios for
all borrowers and I initially attributed them to inputting error. Apart from errors made when
entering the data, a further reason for excessive collateral ratios is that if collateral has not
been decommissioned it remains on the system and does not reflect the current borrowing
situation having already served its purpose. Moreover, collateral can be assigned in
anticipation of future borrowing in which case it does not reflect the current borrowing
situation since it reflects future intentions. Since collateral in the form of real estate is often
non-divisible, it is plausible that such anomalies arise. I needed to control for errors arising
when collateral data would not be decommissioned but would remain on the system for
subsequent loans. The check I performed entailed a modification of my regressions in the
next section in order to look at the response variable within acceptable collateral to loan
ranges i.e. collateral as a proportion of borrowed amount does not exceed 200 percent. This
gives a collateral to loan ratio of 2. This modification is only performed for the response
variable when it is continuous. This is because we assume that analyses using dichotomous
outcome variables would not have this collateral to loan information on hand since collateral
to loan ratios contain collateral level in its continuous variable format in their numerators.
A unique feature of this analysis that is mentioned in section 9.6 is that it contains both a
value for collateral (continuous variable called 'allcoll') and a variable indicating whether
collateral was taken by the bank to secure borrowing (binary variable called lyes_no'). As
described in previous chapters the variable 'allcoll' is calculated by adding the values of
land and buildings, guarantees, life policies and cash the owner injects into the project. In all
instances, the value of collateral is estimated at its liquidation price by the bank. The
percentage mark-down for land and buildings is 30 percent, guarantees is 100 percent and
life policies a percentage mark-down that is based on the time to run.
9 Because of the proximity of the time periods, it is doubtful that the profile of the applicant type will
have changed very much as the population of applicants is likely to have remained stationary (Hanley,
2000).
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Keasey and Watson (1996) refer to this mark-down value of collateral as the 'carcass'
values arguing that;
'..a relatively illiquid market in second hand plant and equipment would suggest that the
value of a business asset for the purposes of collateral is often considered to be much lower
than its cost as a new asset'10 .
As such the dataset allows us to infer whether using dummy variables for collateral
influences coefficient signs and significance levels in a way which differs from the
conclusions arrived at when using continuous variables. The choice of variables would have
repercussions in theory testing exercises where the sign of the collateral coefficient has
implications for the information regime that prevails.
I will now outline the hypothesised signs of the main variables in this chapter. In so doing I
will refer to their signs in past empirical studies or their hypothesised signs in the theoretical
literature.
The next question to ask is which variables influence the bank's decision to take collateral.
We know from the review of the literature in section 9.5 that Berger and Udell (1995) have
modelled the collateral level as a function of company size in terms of assets and the
duration of the loan. They also included the entrepreneur's age and the business-bank
relationship i.e. the number of years that the entrepreneur has been borrowing from the
bank, in their regression. Cressy (1996a) models the decision to take collateral on overdrafts
as a function of whether the business owner invests his own equity in the business project,
the maximum allowable amount of the overdraft, the interest premium and whether the firm
was still in existence at a predefined later period. Cressy and Toivanen (2001) model the
level of collateral taken by the bank as a function of industrial sector, the purpose of the loan
and the duration of the loan as well as the survival status of the firm at a predefined period.
It is evident from the above that the format of the collateral model varies according to the
authors, their data limitations and whether the type of loan was something as specific as an
overdraft as in the case of Cressy (1996a).
I would summarise the commonalities of the existing models as follows; collateral is a
function of the terms of the loan (duration, purpose and amount), the business-bank
relationship and some measure of the risk type of the loan (actual ex post survival in both of
Cressy's analyses). In addition to the above specification, I would argue for the inclusion of
some measure of the assets of the firm that could be used as collateral. For instance, if a loan
is secured on a loan applicant's house, then it might be useful to know about the home
10
Keasey and Watson (1996). P.20
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ownership status of the entrepreneur because this indicates whether this asset is available. I
would also argue for the inclusion of some measure of past delinquency because this may
reflect on the bank's need for additional collateral if the borrower has exhibited risky
behaviour in the past. Unlike the Cressy (1996a) model, I do not include the interest margin
as an explanatory variable for two reasons. Firstly, I argue that the setting of collateral is
independent to the setting of the interest rate because it occurs at an earlier point in time.
Hence the application forms for a loan or overdraft do not contain a field for the interest
margin because this occurs once the decision to take collateral and grant the loan has taken
place. A second reason, is the 'embeddedness' or invariance of interest margins that was
discussed in Chapter 7. Hence, a loan sanctioner tailors the interest rate to the amount
borrowed, level of collateral provided and the type and term of borrowing but has little, if
any, discretion over the magnitude of the interest margin".
Looking at the variables that I have in my data of existing and first-period borrowers, I
match these to the requirements of the model above. Unfortunately, I do not have a measure
of the loan duration in my dataset. Loan duration may well be captured under the variable
loan purpose (that I do have), where working capital loans are of shorter duration. The
categories for the loan purpose variable are as follows; 'assetpu' indicating that the owner
purchased an asset, 'working', indicating that the loan was for working capital purposes,
'purchca' indicating that the owner purchased capital and an 'other' category which serves
as the base category. Whether collateral is taken on a loan or not is expected to be positively
related to the loan being used to finance an asset 'assetpu' and is expected to have a
negative sign if the purpose of the loan is to fund working capital, 'working'. This most
liquid type of borrowing does not involve the purchase of tangible assets that could be used
to secure the borrowing. It is also to be expected that loans for working capital are less
collateralised than loans for business capital according to the golden rule that banks
collateralise like assets with like collateral (Hanley, 1997). Optimally highly liquid
collateral such as a lien on a deposit account is used to collateralise working capital as it is a
highly liquid form of collateral. However, the bank in my sample does not resort to using
liens on deposit accounts.
The next loan term used as an explanatory variable is the variable 'total' indicating the total
amount borrowed. I hypothesise that it is positively related to the collateral level or decision
to take collateral because as the amount borrowed increases, so also does the exposure of the
"
It is interesting that Cressy and Toivanen (2001) do not include interest rate as an explanatory
variable in their general model of collateral level but it is included in the Cressy (1996a) paper which
investigates the specific case of overdraft finance to start-ups.
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bank to the business. There is a need to reduce the risk that accompanies higher exposure by
demanding additional collateral.
The next variable which explains the level of collateral taken, or decision to take collateral,
is the existence of a business-bank relationship. I represent the business-bank relationship
using the variable 'type' that is coded as 1 if the business is an existing one and 0 if the
business is a first-period borrower.
Regarding the expected sign for the coefficient of the business-bank relationship variable
'type', I cannot confidently predict the sign of the coefficient 'type' because arguments for
both a positive and for a negative sign can be made (see discussion section 9.7). We might
expect a negative sign for the following reasons. First, according to the capital gearing
approach described by Binks and Ennew (1997), banks use collateral as a way of attenuating
the risk on their loans where risk is difficult to gauge ex ante. This was indirectly
corroborated by Cressy and Toivanen (2001) who find that collateral increases in ex ante
risk. In my sample, the bank has more information about the established business firms than
about members of the first-period business group and accordingly we would expect the
established business group to offer less collateral. In addition, empirical work by Berger and.
Udell (1993) found that businesses having longer relationships with a bank and longer
business experience, had a lower likelihood of giving collateral. But Berger and Udell did
not control for the size of the loan and so when loan size is not controlled for, it appears that
businesses with a longer relationship with the bank (the established business group) might
exhibit reduced collateral requirements because of reduced information asymmetry.
A positive sign for the coefficient of the variable 'type' is also possible. If the bank were
willing to increase its market share (under perfect competition in the lending market for first
period loans because no information monopolies have been established), it might be
prepared to accept less than optimal levels of collateral from first-period borrowers. It might
be prepared to do so on the basis that first-period business borrowers do not have as many
assets to offer as collateral comparedto existing businesses. There is empirical evidence for
this conjecture. Results from a US study by Hancock and Wilcox (1998) suggests a positive
relationship between membership of the established business group and offering collateral.
They find that small firms have lower rather than higher collateral to loan ratios due to a
shortage of appropriate assets to offer as collateral. Therefore, the coefficient for 'type', if
coded 1 for established firms, should be positive if a bank is prepared to lower its collateral
requirements for asset-poor, first-period borrowers. Furthermore, Hughes (1992) in a UK
study finds that smaller companies have a lower ratio of fixed to total assets compared to
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larger companies (31.5 percent viz. 44.4 percent). They also have comparatively more of
their assets tied up in trade debts and other debtors than larger companies (37.9 percent viz.
23.6 percent). The implication of their different asset structure means that they have
comparatively fewer assets to offer as collateral to a creditor. So overall, in view of the lack
of consensus in the literature, the sign of the 'type' coefficient cannot be conjectured ex ante
because it depends on the leniency of the bank and asset structure of the small business
applicant.
The conjectured sign for the coefficient of the variable 'busprem' is assumed to be positive.
This is because 'busprem' indicates that the entrepreneur owns his own business premises
i.e. is a freeholder and hence may have an additional asset to offer the bank as collateral.
However, 'busprem' may be a poor proxy for asset availability, in which case it will be
insignificant.
The hypothesised coefficient of the financial difficulty indicator 'debtres' is positive
because I hypothesise that businesses that have exhibited financial difficulty may need to
extend additional collateral in order to reduce the bank's exposure to their high risk
borrowings (Wruck, 1990).
Several further constraints were placed on the data and these are outlined as follows. My
screened dataset contained only borrowers who had borrowed at least £1,000 in either
overdraft or term loan form. This was to exclude very small amounts of borrowing that
would not necessitate collateral. In a further screening of the data, the ratio of collateral to
aggregate borrowing was calculated. If these collateral ratios exceeded 20, as a minority of
the observations did. applicants whose collateral ratios exhibited these anomalies were
excluded from the dataset. There was a concern that duplication by bank personnel inputting
the data had occurred in the right tail of the collateral ratio distribution and a value of 20
represented a generous cut-off point allowing for 'excessive' ratios while excluding the
extreme ratios for cautionary reasons.
9.8 Methodology
1 specify two different approaches to investigate the relationship between the collateral
response variable and the independent variables12. The first approach employs a logit
specification and the second approach uses a tobit specification.
The first version of the response variable is the dummy 'yesjio' for collateral. The response
variable collateral value is dichotomised into the binary outcomes 'bank takes collateral'
12 See section 9.2 for discussion on the two types of response variable i.e. binary and continuous
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and 'bank does not take collateral'. This variable 'yes_no' takes the value of 1 when the
bank takes collateral and 0 otherwise. The binary logistic regression model uses the same
definition of collateral i.e. the dichotomous outcome variable, as used by Berger and Udell
(1995) and by Cressy and Toivanen (2001). It serves as a benchmark against which to
compare the outcomes of the subsequent Tobit analysis that uses a continuous variable for
collateral.
The format of the binary logit model is;
'yes_no' = Zj (3' + e
where Z is a vector of variables that are summarised in Table 9.1 along with the expected
signs on the coefficients. These variables are further discussed in more detail below.
The analysis moves in a second stage to an estimation of a linear regression using Tobit
techniques. While the response variable to be used in the first set of linear regressions is the
variable 'yes_no' as described above, the response variable used in the Tobit analysis is the
variable 'allcoll' which represents the aggregate value of collateral13.
In order to explore the relationship between collateral level and the explanatory variables
that have already been used in the logistic regression, a problem arises. The distribution of
the collateral is truncated at 0 because there is no such thing as negative collateral. In order
to circumvent this problem, a Tobit specification is used instead of normal OLS. This Tobit
uses the latent variable yi* which can theoretically take on negative values. But these
negative values are not observed, there are none. Thus yj*=0 due to nonobservability. The
format the Tobit takes is;
-yi* = XiP' + uj ui~IN(0,c~)
The observed values are related to the latent variable yi* as follows;
yi = yi* if yi*>0
yi = 0 otherwise
The format of the Tobit model is;
'allcoll' = Z^' + e
where Z represents the same vector of independent variables as used in the logit model
(See Table 9.1).
Ij It is possible to replace collateral level, 'allcoll', as the dependent variable by the ratio between
collateral and aggregate borrowing. However, this alternative approach makes it impossible to isolate
the pure relationship between collateral level and the other explanatory variables and is inconsistent
with our aim of comparing the effects of the explanatory variables on collateral as the response
variable
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In the following section, I present the results of the models that are outlined above.
9.9 Results
First of all I present some summary statistics describing the distributions of the data with
respect to borrower type before embarking on the regressions that relate the influence of
borrower type to collateral level while controlling for other variables.
9.91 Descriptive statistics
The purpose of this section is to shed some light on some distributions within the data in
order to generate an idea of the breakdown between the existing business group and the
first-period business group across several dimensions.
Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2 show the distribution of collateral across the existing business
and first-period business groups for borrowing of over £1,000. It can be seen that the first-
period business group fares better than the established business group in terms of being less
well represented in the fourth quartile representing the highest 25 percent of observations by
collateral amount. This counter intuitive result showing that the established business group
offer more rather than less collateral, will be examined more closely in the regressions that
follow. The pattern whereby the established business group has a comparatively higher
presence than its first-period business group counterpart in the fourth quartile holds for the
first period (July 1999 until December 1999) and also for the second period (January 2000
until June 2000). The differences seen in these distributions are significant to the 1 percent
level as seen in the corresponding cross-tabs (Table 9.2).
It can easily be argued that it does not matter if businesses in the established business group
appear to have given more collateral because they receive higher loans anyway. In other
words, collateral per unit would fall because the established business group are receiving
comparatively higher finance than their first-period business borrower counterparts. Table
9.3 shows that this is not the case. In the first period, only 43.1 percent of the first-period
business group were borrowing over the median level compared with 54.5 percent of the
established business group. However, by the second period this pattern was reversed with 54
percent of the first-period business group borrowing over the median level compared with
49.1 percent of the established business group.
The lack of an appreciable difference between the two perhaps points to the homogeneity of
my sample given that all my firms are small irrespective of their borrowing status. This may
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explain the blurring of distinction between the established business and first-period business
group regarding borrowing amount.
So far we have looked at cross-tabs which describe the difference between borrowers from
the established business and first-period business groups in terms of their relative borrowing
and collateral levels. However, the issue of borrowing and collateral amount is best
expressed as the ratio between collateral and borrowing i.e. collateral to loan value. The
question now is whether businesses from the first-period business group are in general more
highly geared than their counterparts in the established business group? Since collateral to
loan ratios are typically non-normally distributed, they are best logged to give a distribution
closer to normality. Altman and Saunders (1998) and Goss et al. (1995) also encountered the
same difficulty with non-normally distributed gearing ratios.
I examined the corresponding Q-Q plots to ensure that the logged distributions were indeed
more multivariate normally distributed than the untransformed collateral ratios before
dichotomising the logged collateral to borrowing ratios around their median for both
periods14.
It can be seen that for the variable 'tot_rat' comprising the ratio between collateral value
and the amount borrowed for the first period of 1999, that the distribution departs from
normality (Figure 9.3). The observed values describe a curve through the straight line
representing the normal distribution. On the other hand, the logged version of 'tot_rcit'
denoted by the variable 'InJot', shows an improvement on 'ratJot' (Figure 9.4).
Since 0 cannot be logged as the result is not computable, I choose to modify the variable
'totjrat' before logging it and hence changed zero values to a negligibly small value which
approximated 0 . This value could then be logged. The transformed version of 'tot_rat' i.e.
'ln_tot' describes a curve on its Q-Q plot that departs less from the straight line indicating
the normal distribution. The distribution of the transformed variable 'ln_tot' is therefore
more normal and symmetric than the distribution of the untransformed variable 'totjrat' on
the basis of the Q-Q plot.
When the relative frequencies of the transformed collateral to loan ratios are compared
across the SME borrower type groups, it is suprising that the pattern is inconsistent across
the periods (Table 9.4). Borrowers from the established business group have a higher
14 The Q-Q plot method is a procedure of visually checking the distributions being tested against the
normal distribution. I compare my distribution of the variable against the normal probability plot. This
is obtained by ranking the observed values of a variable from the smallest to the largest and then
pairing each value with an expected normal value for a sample of that size from a standard normal
distribution. If the distribution of the observations are from a normal distribution, points in the plot
should be approximately in a straight line (Norusis, 1990).
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likelihood of showing collateral to loan values above the median value in the first period.
However, this pattern is reversed in the second period where borrowers from the first-period
business group are more likely to exhibit collateral to loan values that are above the median
value. I conclude on the basis of this lack of consistency across periods, that differences
between my two a priori risk categories are perhaps blurred due to similarity between
borrowers in both groups. Rather than comparing small start-ups with large existing
businesses, all small business borrowers in my database are small, unquoted companies
according to the bank's definition of small. They may represent a more homogenous group
of small risky businesses than their different bank relationship status suggests.
It could also be argued that businesses from the established business group may have, by
definition, higher assets with which to leverage higher borrowing or signal their
creditworthiness. Unfortunately, my dataset does not permit a direct comparison between
asset values for both small business groups because the dataset relating to the established
business group is limited in the number and scope of its variables. However, I have asset
values for a subset of the first-period business group and these are compared against their
corresponding level of borrowing. I wish to investigate a link between assets and amount
borrowed, although this information pertains to the first-period borrower group alone (Table
9.5). It can be seen from Table 9.5 that higher borrowing is associated with higher levels of
assets and that this association is statistically significant. Borrowers from the first-period
business group borrowing more than £100,000 are most likely to have at least £175,000
worth of business assets where 69 percent of the highest level borrowers are located in the
highest asset category.
9.92 Regression results
I first present and interpret the results from the logit before moving on to the results from the
tobits. Looking at the logit for all collateral to loan ranges, businesses from the established
business group rather than the businesses from the first-period business group are more
likely to have provided collateral in both periods. This likelihood is indicated by odds ratios
of 1.18 and 1.21 for the first and second periods respectively for the coefficient of the
variable 'type' ('type' = 1 for an existing business) (Table 9.6).
This suggests that banks may be more lenient on businesses lacking appropriate assets to
offer as collateral. This result also seems to corroborate the results of Hancock and Wilcox
(1998) where smaller businesses exhibit lower gearing ratios. Those businesses which have
been in existence for a while (existing business group) are expected to have accumulated
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assets which in turn can be used to collateralise loans. This finding of higher collateral
requirements for established business group businesses agrees with the summary statistics
presented in the 'Descriptive Statistics' section.
However, the relationship between a higher likelihood of giving collateral and the
established business group could be spurious if collateral is not decommissioned after its
first use and remains on the data system. Such redundancy would be particularly pronounced
for the established business group, which is likely to be already borrowing in periods
subsequent to the period in which it commenced its relationship with the bank. There is a
higher risk of such redundancy with maturing bank-business relationships not captured in
the binary collateral outcome variable.
The variable 'total' denoting total amount borrowed is significant and positive in both
periods, demonstrating that the likelihood of collateral being given is directly related to the
amount borrowed.
As expected, the coefficient for the variable 'working' in both periods is negative. Such
loans are not likely to be collateralised because no hard asset is being purchased which
could in turn be used to collateralise the working capital loan. A similar reasoning applies to
the positive sign on the coefficient for the category of loan purpose implying the purchase of
an asset, 'assetpu', in both periods. The bank can collateralise the loan using the newly
purchased asset as collateral. The coefficient for the category implying the purchase of
capital, 'purchca', is also positive in both periods.
Although the fact that a business has rescheduled its debts ('clebtres' =1) appears to reduce
the likelihood of a business providing collateral, this variable is not significant at the 95
percent level for the second period. Finally, the fact that a business operates from its own
premises ('busprem' = 1) conjectured to be positively related to the likelihood of being
collateralised, is not significant for the second period and moves in a different direction in
both periods with only the first period the expected positive relationship.
We now move on to the Tobit analysis using the level of collateral as the response variable
(Tables 9.7 and 9.8). Table 9.7 shows the results when the dependent variable is the value
of collateral. Table 9.8 shows the results for the same dependent variable when the sample
is restricted to only those cases where the collateral to loan ratio was 2 or less15.
1 I initially imposed this restriction of capping collateral ratios at 2 in order to ascertain whether the
same relationships applied when collateral to loan value ratios were closer to the 'acceptable range'
used by practitioners. Intuitively we know that a banker will not seek a charge over an asset which is
worth more than a loan (a collateral to loan ratio in excess of unity). However, owing to the 'carcass'
value of collateral described by Keasey and Watson (1996), it is possible that the banker would
consider ratios in excess of unity. Notwithstanding this possibility, I would argue that even taking on
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The interesting feature of the tobits is the difference in the significance level of the variable
'type' when controlling for collateral distortions than when these distortions are not
controlled for. Table 9.7 shows that the variable 'type' is significant: businesses from the
established business group are more likely to provide collateral than their counterparts in the
first-period business group. However, column 4 of Table 9.8 shows that 'type' is no longer
significant when collateral to loan value ratios in excess of 2 are excluded and the Tobits
rerun. This pattern of non-significance for the variable 'type' is repeated for both periods
when controlling for collateral to loan levels greater than 2.
These disparities between the significance levels of the 'type' business dummy when
controlling for the collateral to loan regime or otherwise, underline the hazard of looking at
collateral which has not been decommissioned over subsequent lending periods. When all
collateral to loan ranges are investigated in Table 9.7, the variable 'type' is significant in
both periods appearing to corroborate the findings of the logits above and supporting the
view that the binary variable represents a good proxy for collateral level. However, this is
not the case when looking at the level of all collateral, 'allcoll', within the arbitrarily 'safe
zone' where the collateral to loan ratio reaches a maximum of 216. Here the variable 'type'
becomes redundant and does not obtain any statistical significance in either period 1 or
period 2.
This final result cautions against applying collateral data where distortions may exist and
demonstrates how these distortions can lead an analyst to make inferences based on spurious
relationships. This problem is most likely to arise in comparisons between new borrowers
and existing borrowers where the latter group has had time to accumulate collateral over
subsequent borrowing periods and hence mismatches between collateral level and borrowing
are more likely to occur.
A final test of the validity of collateral level 'allcoll' under different collateral to loan
regimes is performed in column 5 of Table 9.8. Column 5 of Table 9.8 demonstrates that if
loan to value ratios in excess of 2 are capped at the threshold value of 2 and the tobits again
rerun, that the significance levels of 'type' increases. On this occasion, it achieves
significance in the second period at the 1 percent level but nonetheless fails to be significant
for the first period. Therefore, even capping values of collateral suspected to be distorted at
board the loss in value of an asset on liquidation or resale, collateral to value ratios in excess of two
are anomalous (See section 9. for a further discussion of why this restriction was made).
161 did not use gearing as an explanatory variable because of endogeneity problems. Since its
numerator is the same value as the response variable 'allcoll' and its denominator another explanatory
variable 'total', we deemed it safer to control for its effects without increasing distortion by including
it as an additional explanatory variable
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the threshold level is not sufficient to restore the significance level of the business dummy
'type' in both periods.
However, apart from this disparity between the results when looking at the relationship
between business type and collateral level for all collateral to loan levels or a subset of
collateral to loan levels, there is less disparity among the other variables. Working capital is
consistently negatively related to collateral level as hypothesised while the purchasing of
assets is positively related to collateral levels. These results point to the practice of using
assets purchased to back lending. Less consistent are the signs and significance levels of the
business freeholder and asset proxy variable, 'busprem', and the debt rescheduled and proxy
for financial distress variable, 'debtres'. The former is only significant in the first period (all
collateral to loan levels) with the hypothesised sign and the latter is not significant in any of
the periods or under any of the collateral to loan regimes17. The amount of the loan 'total' is
positively related to the level of collateral and is significant in all periods and under all
collateral to loan regimes. The results of the tobit in this instance agree with the results
obtained in the logit.
The capital purchased dummy, 'purchca' is both positive and significant for both collateral
to loan regimes (second period only). A possible interpretation for its lack of significance in
the first period is that business capital is not always useful as an asset and the bank does not
use capital such as machinery as collateral. Hence, other more suitable collateral would have
to be used.
We now are faced with an ambiguity in interpreting the positive sign of the variable 'type'
with respect to collateral level. On the one hand, it is positive when the loan to value ratio
(gearing) is not capped at 2. However, it changes sign when the loan to value ratio is
assigned a maximum value of 2. The question is whether we are to conclude from this that
the main determinant of the sign of the 'type' coefficient is poor database management (a
spurious outcome arising when collateral is not decommissioned for the established business
group) or whether existing firms are really associated with higher collateral levels?
17 This inconsistency in the signs and significance levels of 'busprem' and 'debtres' is not likely to
have been induced by a lack of population stationarity due to the proximity of the two time periods but
a lack of robustness in the variables themselves. This lack of robustness could arise for a number of
reasons including inappropriate treatment of missing values by data inputters in the case of 'busprem'
or different treatment of borrowers by loan officers for 'debtres'. Since the relationship between
borrower and lender is not controlled for, this latter scenario is likely where leniency towards troubled
borrowers differs among loan officers depending on the strength of the individual borrower/business
relationship. Troubled borrowers who are 'participative' according to the definition by Binks and
Ennew (1997) and cooperate with their banks, may be treated less severely on reschedulement of their
loans.
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A further check on the validity of my results is to replicate the analysis using a dataset of
commercial loans where the spurious outcome (changes in the coefficient of 'type' with
changes in the level of collateral due to redundant collateral left on the system) cannot arise.
If we were to look at first-period borrowers only, no collateral would have cumulated on the
system that would distort the analysis in the case of the established business group.
In order to perform this cross-validation, I use a different dataset comprising first-period
business borrower loans only. I decided to drop the 2-period approach to this analysis in
order to simplify the analysis, because this analysis was for cross-validation purposes only
and in order to increase the number of observations in the final dataset.
A slight problem arises because I no longer have any 'type' variable because, by definition,
there is no longer any distinction between established business and first-period businesses
since we are looking within the first-period business dataset. The first concern is to get a
variable to replace the external reputation proxy represented by the variable 'type' in this
cross-validation.
One way of very crudely proxying external reputation effects i.e. the 'type' variable is to use
the internal reputation dummy 'prevbor=l' that I have used in previous chapters. Although
the two variables are not interchangeable, the direction of the two variables with respect to
the collateral level variable 'allcoll' should be the same.
Table 9.9 repeats the tobit analysis using 'prevbor=l' in lieu of the variable 'type'. I also
replace the asset variable 'busprem' by the variable 'owned' because there are fewer missing
values for 'owned' in the first-period business borrower dataset and it is roughly equivalent
18
in meaning .
The sign of 'prevbor=l' in the tobit is positive meaning that commercial borrowers who
have borrowed in the past are associated with higher collateral levels.
This result is counter intuitive but it corroborates my analysis so far showing that existing
borrowers are associated with higher collateral levels. If this is indeed the case, the evidence
suggests that banks are lenient with first-time borrowers or first-period business borrowers
without a track record by demanding less rather than more collateral. It suggests that
collateral is incremental and may be increasing over time. As the borrower becomes more
established and enters into successive loan negotiations, the bank increases its level of
collateral used to secure its exposure to the business.
18 While 'busprem' means that the owner works out of his own business premises and therefore
suggests that he owns a separate business premises, 'owned' implies that the entrepreneur owns his
own premises. It is therefore a better asset proxy than 'busprem' but unfortunately was not reported for
businesses in the established business dataset and so could not be used previously.
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The fact that the asset variable indicating that the entrepreneur owns his business premises,
'owned.', is positively associated with collateral levels also testifies to lenient bank lending
practices. Entrepreneurs owing their own business premises are in a position to mortgage
them to the bank in return for borrowing. Businesses owing their own premises are also
more likely to have higher collateral levels. If their real estate asset is being used to secure
borrowing, the conclusion is that available assets are used by the bank as collateral. The
corollary to this is that businesses with less real estate ('owned=0') to offer as collateral are
associated with lower collateral levels.
It appears therefore from the positive association between 'owned' and 'allcoll', that the
bank takes what assets it can as collateral. It may do so on a retrospective basis by claiming
comparatively more collateral from non first-period borrowers and the established business
group that it claims from first-period borrowers and first-period business borrower
businesses.
9.10 Conclusion
The first conclusion of my analysis is that two different specifications i.e. a binary logit and
tobit analysis yield similar results when exploring the factors which affect the incidence and
level of collateralisation on business loans respectively, but only at a superficial level. The
dummy variable 'yesjio' indicating whether collateral was taken or not and which has been
used by all empirical studies so far, performed in much the same way as the response
variable denoting value of collateral, 'allcoll'. However, binary collateral variables lack the
incisiveness of collateral level variables because they do not allow the researcher to go
beyond the anomalies arising in collateral databases. Given the complexity of collateral data
and its possible usage as a goodwill token rather than a scientifically derived price to risk
mechanism, sensible analyses of collateral must avoid coming to premature conclusions on
the properties of collateral unless prior cognisance is taken of its anomalies. These
anomalies would comprise indivisibilities in addition to mismatches between borrowing
values and collateral for subsequent periods if collateral were not decommissioned.
There are other problems with using binary collateral variables. Firstly, they confine the
econometrics to techniques that deal with binary variables i.e. logits or studies of relative
?
frequencies such as cross-tabs based on the % distribution. A more important consideration
deals with the limited set of conclusions that can be drawn with dichotomous outcome
variables. They do not allow the researcher to deal with concepts of more or less but confine
the analysis to studies of relative frequencies. The simple 'yes_no' dichotomy does not
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permit a differentiation between businesses whose collateral terms are light from those who
have had to pay comparatively heavier terms. There is a long continuum of businesses that
are charged collateral in varying degrees of magnitude.
However, the main conclusion of my analysis is that there appears to be less disparity in the
collateral terms that are extended to first-period business borrowers and existing businesses
than thitherto believed. If anything, the evidence points to banks being more lenient to first-
period borrowers by taking less collateral, all things equal, than they take from their
established business counterparts.
However, this conclusion must remain tentative given that other mechanisms may be at
work. For example, the bank may compensate for its level-handedness in the area of
collateral by discriminating between businesses in other areas such as interest rates or by
rationing credit. The latter hypothesis could not be adequately tested give the lack of assets
data for existing businesses which would allow a fuller exploration of the supply dynamics
of the lending relationship.
However, we have seen in Chapter 7 that non first-period borrowers are more likely to be
charged higher interest premia on their loans. In Chapter 8 we saw however, that non first-
period business borrowers faced lower rejection rates.
When the evidence in this chapter is evaluated in the context of higher interest margins
charged to non-first period borrowers in Chapter 7, the overall evidence points to the bank
operating as a monopoly lender in periods subsequent to the first lending period. Rather than
there being a trade-off between interest rates and collateral, it appears that more established
borrowers are being penalised regarding both interest margins and collateral.
The bank is either discriminating against existing businesses because it can get away with it
due to high exit costs (Greenbaum et al., 1989). Alternatively, it is being lenient to non-
established and first-period business borrowers because it needs to entice these new
customers' and first-period lending is a loss-making exercise. Whatever the reason for the
bank being more lenient to first-term borrowers in terms of lower interest rates and
collateral requirements, the results from this and the previous chapter point unequivocally to
a hardening of collateral and interest rates in subsequent borrowing periods.
In order to sum up this chapter I have two main conclusions.
The first is that the dichotomous variable indicating whether collateral was taken or not does
not represent an adequate proxy for the level of collateral because it cannot deal with
anomalies within the collateral data which could otherwise be attenuated by using
appropriate collateral to loan levels.
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I also conclude that there is robust evidence when put in context with the results of Chapter
7 on interest rates, that the bank operates as a monopolist by charging established businesses
or established customers higher collateral requirements and interest margins respectively.
The corollary to this result that established borrowers are penalised in terms of higher
interest margins and collateral requirements, is that the bank charges first-period borrowers
lower collateral and lower interest margins than their counterparts who have established a
borrowing reputation with the bank. This same result could be interpreted in a more positive
light if it emerged that the bank is being more lenient to first-period business borrowers
because they are more fragile and are wealth constrained. Due to wealth constraints they
demand lower collateral from first-period borrowers.
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9.11 Implications of my results for other studies and suggestions for future research
My results suggest that this bank is using its information monopoly over second-period
borrowers in order to raise interest rates and increase its level of collateral from the
business. In other words, is subsidising its potentially loss-making first-period lending by
recouping these costs in subsequent periods. The only way in which the bank could afford to
implement this policy without the borrower deserting the lender for the competition, would
be in a situation where information monopolies or prohibitive exit costs would prevent the
borrower from leaving (Greenbaum et al., 1989).
My results are in line with the predictions of Sharpe (1990) when he argued that businesses
are 'informationally captured'. He argues that even though banks earn zero profits over the
life cycle of the average customer relationship, that they are not disciplined by the market in
such a way as to make them offer better-performing customers more 'competitive' interest
rates. The same reasoning applies to collateral as to interest rates in this context.
'Due to competition... .rents are competed away via lower interest rates offered to all firms
in their initial period, precisely when banks know least about firms'19.
Future research should aim to take of board Petersen and Rajan's (1995) study on the level
of banking concentration and hence banking competition when conducting studies of this
kind. Ideally, future empirical research should indicate the level of banking competition
within the lending market where the sample was obtained and interpret the results
accordingly. Therefore, while my results appear to apply to a non-competitive banking
market where information monopolies can be maintained, it is plausible that other credit
markets with fewer information monopolies may be in a position to reward customers in
subsequent borrowing periods for their good repayment behaviour. If this were the case, the
credit market would exhibit features of Diamond's learning models. If the credit market
having perfect information could be described by Diamond's (1989) multiperiod model, a
bank could retain a borrower in subsequent periods. The bank could hope to retain the
borrower because the borrower expects that the second-period loan terms extended to him
would to be more favourable if his first period performance were good (Diamond, 1989;
Diamond, 1991). Hence a borrower is rewarded for his good behaviour under perfect
competition rather than penalised for it, as we have seen when information monopolies
exist.
19
Sharpe (1990) Page 1070
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A further suggestion for future research would be to obtain data from several countries that
are known a priori to have different banking regimes. A researcher could then compare any
disparity in the terms that were offered to first-period borrowers and borrowers who are
applying for loans in subsequent periods, on a country by country basis.
Not only would a researcher select the countries on the basis of the degree of inter-bank
competition and level of small enterprises in the economy. A further possible selection
criterion would entail the cost of credit bureau data and level of co-operation among banks
regarding the risk status of their customers. With low information costs and in the presence
of shared information, information monopolies should not be as pronounced and hence
borrowers should have more bargaining power in a multiperiod lending context. This
situation would arise because borrowers' reputations would be observable to competing
banks. My hypothesis is that with low information costs, and high information availability,
the relative cost of borrowing in subsequent lending periods should be lower.
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Table 9.2 Collateral by business type
January-June
1999
Collateral
Quartiles
TS group EB group
1st quartile C < 12, 050 33.4 21.3
2nd quartile 12, 050 < C < 34, 000 26 .1 22 . 8
3rd quartile 34,000 < C < 80, 000 22 . 8 26.5
4th quartile 80, 000 < C 17 . 8 29 . 3
100 100
value df Asymp sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson chi-
square
116.779 3 ooo
July-December
1999
Collateral
Quartiles
TS group EB group
1st quartile C < 10,100 33 .3 35.1
2nd quartile 10,100 < C. < 30, 000 19 13 .9
3rd quartile 30,000 < C < 70,000 25.7 24 . 6
4th quartile 70, 000 < C 22 .1 26.3
100 100
value df Asymp sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson chi-
square
51.947 3 ooo
Table 9.3 Amount borrowed by business type
January-June 1999 July-December 1999
Borrowing <
median
Borrowing >
median
Tot Borrowing <
median
Borrowing >
median
Tot
TS group 56 . 9 43 .1 100 46 54 100
EB group 45 . 5 54 . 5 100 50.9 49 .1 100
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-
Square
37.793 1 .000 15.198 1 . 000
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; Table 9.4 Logged collateral to loan ratios by business type
January-June 1999 July-December 1999
Logged
collateral
to loan
ratio <
median
Logged
collateral
to loan
ratio >
median
Tot Logged
collateral
to loan
ratio <
median
Logged
collateral
to loan
ratio >
median
Tot
TS group 53 .3 46.7 100 43 .3 56.7 100
EB group
I.
48.3 51.7 100 53 . 6 46 . 4 100
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-
Square
7 . 501 1 .006 67 .310 1 .000
Table 9.5 Amount borrowed by business and assets (TS group only)
Business owned
assets
assets <
£60,500
£60,501-
£175, 000
assets >
£175, 001
Total
Amount
borrowed
borrowed < £40,000 53 22 25 100
£40,001-£100,000 19 61 19 100
borrowed >
£100, 001
10 21 69 100
value df Asymp sig. (2-sided)
Pearson
chi-square
36.35 4 ooo
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Figure 9.1
Composition of collateral (allcoll) for first period
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Collateral quartile s
□ TS group □ EB group
Figure 9.2
Composition of collateral (allcoll) for 2nd period
40
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Collateral quartiles
□ TS group □ EB group
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Figure 9.3 Untransformed ('tot_rat) collateral ratio (1st period 1999)
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Figure 9.4 Transformed ('ln_tof) collateral ratio (1st period 1999)
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Table9.6Varia lesaffectingdichotomouc llateraloutcom'yes_n '(b row>£1,000) July1999untilDecember1999
January2000u tilly
Variable
Std. Estimate (2)
Std. Error (3)
WaldChi- Square (4)
Pr>Chi- Square (5)
Odds Ratio (6)
Variable
Std. Estimate (2)
Std. Error (3)
WaldChi- Square (4)
Pr>Chi- Square (5)
Odds Ratio (6)
INTERCPT
.19
.00
1.00
INTERCPT
.13
2 .91
.09
;TOTAL
.24
7 .92
49.01
0.00
1.00
TOTAL
.30
5.79
139.71
.00
1.00
;TYPE
.04
.09
3.44
0.06
1.18
TYPE
.05
.06
10.17
.00
1.21
|ASSETPU
.35
.10
178.01
0 .0
3 .63
ASSETPU
.38
.07
385.71
.00
4.10
BUSPREM
.05
.16
4.18
0.04
1.40BUSPREM
.00
.11
.04
.85
.98
WORKING
-.11
.09
21.51
0.00
0 .65
WORKING
- .21
.06
141.30
.00
.47
PURCHCA
.10
.19
16.35
0.00
2.17
PURCHCA
.05
.15
11.02
.00
1.64
DEBTRES
-.05
.11
4 .82
0 .3
0 .78
DEBTRES
-.01
.09
.42
.52
.94
Intercept andco- variates
Chi square forco- variates
Intercept andco- variates
Chi square forco- variates
-2Log
3592.72
466.642 with7DF (p=.0001)
-2Log
8883.07
1703.203 with7DF (p=.0001)
Coiiaterailev lsl rexistingbusines eandCh p rN Table9.7 Variablesffectinglevofcollateral'allcoll'in period1(borrowing>£ ,000) (allcollateraltlo nr ng s)
Variablesffectinglev lofcollateral'allc ll'in period2(borrowing>£1,000) (allcollateraltloanrang s)
Noncensoredvalues=2738Leftce soredvalue 896
Noncensoredvalues=3457Leftcensoredvalue =2797
Variable
Estimate (2)
StdErr (3)
Chisquare (4)
Pr>Chi (5)
Variable
Estimate (2)
StdErr(3)
Chisquare (4)
Pr>Chi (5)
INTERCEPT
-41283.50
10056.38
16.85
.00
INTERCEPT
-237.17
3021.73
.01
.94
TOTAL
0.86
.03
1093.20
.00
TOTAL
.10
.01
69.16
.00
TYPE
20267.74
4649.37
19.00
.00
TYPE
2907.51
1304.91
4.96
.03
ASSETPU
40229.93
4972.16
65.46
.00
ASSETPU
24402.69
1565.34
243.03
.00
BUSPREM
17768.29
8274.46
4.61
.03
BUSPREM
-229.00
2438.11
.01
.93
WORKING
-15516.80
4960.27
9.79
.00
WORKING
-14148.50
1486.01
90.65
.00
PURCHCA
-1888.44
9458.29
.04
.84
PURCHCA
10089.35
3314.49
9 .27
.00
DEBTRES
-8234.13
6507.50
1.60
.21
DEBTRES
2833.88
2197.58
1.66
.20
SCALE
120752.7
1684.303Normalscalepara et r
SCALE
42703.58
562.7266Normalscalepa a eter
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Table9.8 Variables
affectinglev lofcollateral'allcoll'in
period
Variables
affectinglev lofcollateral'allcollinperiod2
1(borrowing>£1,000)
(borrowing>£1,000)
(collateraltlo n=
(allcoll/total)<2))
(collateraltol n=allcoll/total)<2))
Noncensoredvalu s=1728
Leftcensoredvalues=896
Noncensoredvalue =2528L ftcens r797
Variable
Estimate
StdErr
Chi-Sqre
Pr>Chi
Pr>Chi
Variable
Estimate
StdErr
Chi-Sqre
Pr>Chi
Pr>Chi
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Alldata (5)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Alldata (5)
INTERCPT
-45498.90
7593.63
35.90
.00|
.00
INTERCPT
-11717.80
2898.42
16.34
.00
.00
TOTAL
.76
.02
1824.21
.00j
.00
TOTAL
.22
.00
2240.05
.00
.00
TYPE
-2959.28
3509.16
.71
.40|
.15
TYPE
-838.16
1265.44
.44
.51
.00
ASSETPU
35121.95
3904.69
80.91
.00|
.00
ASSETPU
26207.40
1525.04
295.31
.00
.00
BUSPREM
8109.21
6229.41
1.69
•191
.22
BUSPREM
-304.22
2349.70
.02
.90
.65
WORKING
-18185.50
3808.86
22.80
.00|
.00
WORKING
-15555.30
1458.54
113.74
.00
.00
PURCHCA
11439.13
7039.55
2 .64
•10
.89
PURCHCA
13341.98
3063.79
18.96
.00
.47
DEBTRES
6851.38
4912.72
1.94
.16|
.83
DEBTRES
543.95
2128.48
.07
.80
.57
SCALE
76675.91
1352.836Normalscalepa a et r
SCALE
37110.97
556.5983Normalscale
parameter
Age V\5*
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Table 9.9
Variables affecting 'allcoir (TS subset) controlling for asset variable 'owned'
(all collateral to loan ranges)
Noncensored values=1551 Left censored values 1665
Variable DF
(1)
Estimate
(2)
Std Err (3) Chisquare
(4)
Pr > Chi
(5)
INTERCEPT 1 -142701.25 9596.87 221.10 .00
TOTAL 1 0.79 0.03 578.71 . 00
PREVBOR 1 50701.92 8599 . 49 34.76 .00
ASSETPU 1 50398.89 7888.55 40 . 82 .00
OWNED 1 52830.32 7510.12 49.48 .00
WORKING 1 -6025.85 7276.70 0.69 0 .41
PURCHCA 1 1109.42 13728 . 5 0.01 0.94
DEBTRES 1 49486.88 9037.34 29.98 .00
SCALE 1 171293.976 3301.414 Normal scale parameter
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10.1 Introduction
This concluding chapter aims to present and interpret all my findings in the context of the
wider picture of bank lending to small businesses. Too often the main impact of any findings
is lost in the detail of each analysis. The purpose of my concluding chapter therefore is to tie
all these main themes together and present the implications of my findings for bank lending
policy.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I first recall the initial aims of my thesis that were
laid out in Chapter 1 and indicate whether they have been addressed. I also supply the
findings of my analyses and indicate where they have added to the literature. The section
which follows that indicates the policy implications of my findings. A section giving
suggestions for future research follows this. Finally, the last section concludes this chapter.
10.2 The aims and findings of my thesis
It helps to recall the aims of my thesis here. I originally set out to construct a scorecard
based on the application characteristics of entrepreneurs applying to a major UK retail bank.
I also sought to explore some of the financial issues surrounding bank lending to small
businesses, in particular, issues relating to the level of collateral, the interest margin and the
decision to withhold credit from the borrower.
Addressing the first research question
The first primary aim was to complete a business scorecard based on the borrower's
application details. I estimated two main scorecards using the borrowers' application data
and two different definitions of default 'Bigdata960E' and 'Bigdcita960F'.
The most important finding is that the use of application data alone allows a researcher to
derive an application scorecard that is better than chance. However, it is likely that the use
of credit bureau data would have enhanced these scorecards (Chandler and Johnson, 1992).
Unfortunately, the bank did not give me access to credit bureau data. Even without credit
bureau data, the scorecards discriminate better than chance between borrowers who do and
borrowers who do not default on their repayments.
An additional result of my analysis points to the significance of liquidity in influencing
business default. Profit retention and gross profit variables are the most significant variables
that influence business default rates. The importance of profitability is borne out in the
negative correlation between gross profit and default. Furthermore, there is tentative
evidence that the levels of retained profits, if indicative of business growth, reinvestment or
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liquidity, are positively correlated with default.
Addressing the second research aim
The second research aim was to investigate some of the features of the lending contract
namely the interest margin, the decision to withhold credit from the borrower and the level
of collateral'. What connects the first and second research aims, is that a bank must make
the best decision to grant a loan of a certain size and a certain interest rate ex ante i.e. before
the creditworthiness of a first-period borrower becomes known. In other words, the bank is
making a decision under uncertainty about the borrower's creditworthiness.
Analysis of interest margins
The aim of the analysis into the first of the loan contract terms examined interest margins to
see whether the bank acts as a monopolist. A bank can operate as a monopolist if it can
retain private information about the borrower's credit status that cannot be seen by
competing banks. The aim of this chapter was to investigate the role played by
entrepreneur-bank relationships in influencing the cost of credit. An entrepreneur-bank
relationship was defined as a pre-existing relationship, that exists prior to the time in which
the entrepreneur applies for his first business loan with the bank.
No existing analysis has yet explored the impact of pre-existing entrepreneur-bank
relationships on the cost of first-period business borrowing, and so this analysis is unique.
I find that firms with existing entrepreneur-bank relationships prior to their application for a
loan, pay on average 16 basis points more for their borrowing than through-the-door
business applicants. This result may appear counter-intuitive but it agrees with models by
Sharpe (1990) and by Greenbaum et al. (1989), that banks offer first-term borrowers lower
interest rates than second-period borrowers.
An additional outcome of my analysis is that collateral and interest rates are substitutable.
An increase in the value of collateral, causes a reduction in the interest margin. This finding
suggests that firms having comparatively higher asset levels may be able to trade off higher
collateral levels against a reduction in interest margins.
Similarly, the entrepreneur can expect a reduction on his interest margin for an increase in
the amount borrowed. My finding that interest margins are decreasing in the amount
borrowed, underpins the conjecture of Petersen and Rajan (1994) that there is evidence of
1
The reason the three loan contract terms have been examined, for the most part in isolation, is in
order to simplify the research but also to follow the precedent set by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and
Wette (1982) to examine the components of lending separately.
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price embeddedness in the volume of borrowing. This suggests that interest margins are
transaction-driven.
Analysis of decision to grant credit
The second of the loan contract terms examined was the decision to withhold credit. This
analysis deals with the bank's decision to lend or otherwise to a first-period business
borrower. I set out to establish which factors affect a bank's decision to reject a request for
first-period business finance.
The uniqueness of this analysis is that up to now, only one US analysis has directly
investigated the decision to withhold credit (Cole, 1998). This is the first UK analysis of its
kind. It is also the first to include human capital variables indicating characteristics of the
entrepreneur such as his age.
I find that the loan contract variables and human capital variables are approximately equal in
importance to the explanatory power of previous borrowing relationships and credit history
and hence are important inputs in the decision process. I also find that entrepreneurs, who
have reinvested their earnings in the project or have contributed some of their own equity,
are more likely to receive finance than entrepreneurs who do not contribute their own
earnings to the business project. Additionally, I find that entrepreneurs who state on their
application forms that they see no risks lying ahead, are more likely to receive finance from
the bank. Entrepreneurs who can assure the bank that their business can continue to operate
even when the owner is sick or absent, are also more likely to receive finance. Finally,
entrepreneurs who supply more collateral or request less finance, are less likely to have their
application for finance rejected by the bank. This latter result suggests that the bank
practices some form of credit rationing. The fact that the bank is more likely to extend
finance to existing borrowers rather than 'through-the-door' applicants suggests that the
form of credit rationing that the bank practices is likely to be 'transitional' or staggered
credit rationing, of the form suggested by Jaffee and Russell (1976).
The results of the analysis dealing with the factors associated with the decision to turn down
an application for finance, provides further evidence that underpins the importance of
existing entrepreneur-bank relationships. The fact that an entrepreneur has previous
personal borrowings, is the most important explanation of the decision to turn down a loan
application on the basis of its chi-square value. It is more important than the loan contract
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terms collateral amount and loan amount and more important than the applicant
characteristics taken as a group.
This fact bears out what we have already seen in the analysis on interest margins;
behavioural information and previous track record are comparable in importance, in
informing the interest margin, to any information the bank receives from the borrower on
application. The importance of knowledge that a bank can glean from borrowers with a track
record cannot be over-emphasised when we consider that an entrepreneur with previous
borrowings is 66 percent more likely not have his loan rejected by the bank.
A limitation of the analysis on the credit granting decision
One difficulty arising with this simple analysis, that has not been addressed by either Cole
(1998) or Leonard (1992) who both used as their response variable, whether an loan was
rejected or not, is that the loan rejection can be initiated by either the bank or the small
business. There is therefore an identification problem.
However, the distortion that this would cause is conjectured to be small based on evidence
from past research and from conversations with the bank. The Aston Business School (1991)
in their discussions with 609 firms, indicates that only 20 entrepreneurs turned down the
loans that were offered to them by the bank. These 20 entrepreneurs represent a mere 3.3
percent of the total number of loans that were turned down. Conversations with the bank
corroborate this result that very few entrepreneurs turn down loan offers. Perhaps this is the
reason why Cole (1998) did not allude to the possibility of identification in his analysis.
Analysis of the level of collateral
This analysis not only investigated the level of collateral provided by entrepreneurs from
business start-ups. It also compared collateral levels for new business borrowers with the
magnitude of collateral that is provided by existing business borrowers.
This is the first empirical analysis to contrast the collateral levels required from new viz. a
vis existing borrowers. A previous analysis has investigated the likelihood that collateral is
required from businesses as a function, inter alia, of the business-bank relationship, duration
of the loan and size of the firm (Cressy and Toivanen, 2001). Other analyses have compared
the likelihood that various types of collateral are required on overdraft finance only (Berger
and Udell, 1995; Cressy, 1996a). However up to now, no analysis has directly compared the
collateral levels required on bank lending for new vis a vis existing firms respectively.
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This is also the first analysis to compare the results obtained using two different definitions
of the collateral variable; a binary variable indicating whether collateral was required or not
and a continuous variable indicating the level of collateral.
My first finding is that the dichotomous variable indicating whether collateral was taken or
not, does not represent an adequate proxy for the level of collateral because it cannot deal
with anomalies within the collateral data which could otherwise be attenuated by using
appropriate collateral to loan levels.
I also concluded that there is evidence, when put in context with the results of Chapter 7 on
interest rates, that the bank operates as a monopolist by charging established businesses or
established customers higher collateral requirements and interest margins respectively. The
corollary to this result that established borrowers are penalised in terms of higher interest
margins and collateral requirements, is that the bank charges first-period borrowers lower
collateral and lower interest margins than their counterparts who have already established a
borrowing reputation with the bank.
This same result could be interpreted in a more positive light if it emerged that the bank is
being more lenient to first-period business borrowers because they are more fragile and are
wealth constrained as suggested by Hughes (1992). Due to wealth constraints banks would
demand lower collateral from first-period borrowers.
The overall evidence suggests, that second term borrowing terms are more punitive. If
existing borrowers in the collateral analysis are analogous to second-period borrowers in the
interest margin analysis, it appears that borrowers from subsequent borrowing periods are
charged more for the borrowing in terms of collateral and interest margins than start-up or
other new borrowers2.
My overall evidence suggests that information monopolies exist.
2
However, there is another possible interpretation of this result. It is possible that the provision of
collateral is of most importance to first period loans and that it diminishes in importance in subsequent
periods, as the borrower's creditworthiness becomes known. This possible reduction in the importance
of collateral over subsequent borrowing periods, may lead to a failure to update the database.
Therefore, an artifact of the data could have driven the result that existing businesses are charged more
collateral on their borrowings. This latter qualification means that I cannot provide unequivocal
evidence of monopoly bank practice nor of the existence of 'informationally captured' borrowers.
This is because the results could be driven by anomalies within the data where collateral was not
decommissioned.
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10.3 Policy implications of my thesis
The overall outcome of my customised small business scorecard indicates disappointing
classification results on the holdout samples which have direct implications for bank policy.
The immediate implications of disappointing scorecard classification results relate to the
information regime in which banks operate.
The bank possesses information in the form of application characteristics of the borrower
but not enough to permit it correctly classify the bad applicants, without turning down many
of the good applicants and hence forfeiting much profit. Unless the cost structure of the
bank is such that it can permit such a leakage in the form of turning down potentially good
borrowers, a bank is correct in classifying first-period business borrowers as high-risk. With
this in mind, the bank could extend a small, introductory loan to the applicant in the first
period in the hope that it will discover the creditworthiness of the borrower and that second
term borrowing will be less problematic. It therefore does not forfeit the custom of the
business and at the same time minimises its exposure to the business.
Although the application characteristics of the borrower do carry weight in influencing the
response variable (credit grade), a bank would be better advised to take two alternative
options. The first option has been mentioned above i.e. the use of introductory loans to first-
period borrowers. The other policy relates to the general small business scoring practice i.e.
pooling samples and using generic data.
In Hanley (2000), I have described the practice employed by the Fair Isaac credit scoring
company of using pooled data from US retail banks affiliated to the Richard Morris group.
In so doing, they have created a substantial dataset of heterogeneous small business
borrowers. The larger sample size should help in ensuring that even small correlations
between individual explanatory variables such as marital status are detected. With a larger
number of observations, there is less chance that these relationships are random but that the
relationships are significant.
Of course the implementation of small business scorecards using pooled data, requires a
considerable amount of co-ordination among participating banks and perhaps the loss of
some competitive advantage since the results are available to all. However, pooled data
could be beneficial from a welfare perspective if it took some of the risk out of lending to
first term borrowers and therefore was reflected in larger initial loans to start-ups.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that using introductory loans or staggered finance, far
from decreasing the risk of the small business portfolio, actually increases it. Unlike a credit
card user who can scale down his desired spending until it is commensurate with his initial
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credit card balance, a small business may have to scale down 'discretionary' spending just
because it was not given its optimal level of finance. Such spending could include
advertising, the holding of inventories or hiring or temporary staff. Such a reduction in
finance could have a detrimental effect on a small business at its inception, when it needs
the finance most.
Therefore, in order to avoid the adverse consequence of using introductory loans in first-
period business lending, private sector initiatives, such as that implemented by Fair-Isaac to
pool information among banks, should be encouraged.
There is a further reason underpinning the promotion of pooled information. In my
scorecard of first time business borrowers, it was notable that none of the 930 borrowers
whose application and performance information was used in the creation of the
'Bigdata930E' and 'Bigdata930F' scorecards, had previous accounts with the bank. The
question to ask is why did they not apply to take out business loans with the same bank that
already ran their private finances? If the original lender had already turned down such
entrepreneurs for whom it had behavioural data, such new applications to the bank from
which I extracted my data would represent cases of adverse selection. If the banks agreed to
exchange information under these circumstances, such possibilities of adverse selection
would be reduced.
10.4 Suggestions for future research
Some of my findings have generated scope for future research questions that I have outlined
below.
Evolution of a firm's demand for finance over time
There is scope for future research on the basis of my results in Chapter 7 on the interest
margin, to tease out a possible relationship between the evolution of a firm's demand for
finance over time as well as the transition from loan to overdraft finance. Given the
difficulties that start-up firms experience with overtrading and financing their working
capital, it seems anomalous that they would prefer loans to overdrafts. An overdraft is better
tailored towards working capital requirements. For this reason, the fact that 'through-the-
door' applicants are less likely than firms with entrepreneur-bank relationships to receive
overdraft finance, may have more to do with supply than demand issues.
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Comparative analysis (inter-country) of banking regimes
My results suggest that this bank is using its information monopoly over second-period
borrowers in order to raise interest rates and increase its level of collateral from the
business. In other words, it is subsidising its potentially loss-making first-period lending by
recouping these costs in subsequent periods. The only way in which the bank could afford to
implement this policy without the borrower deserting the lender for the competition, would
be in a situation where information monopolies or prohibitive exit costs would prevent the
borrower from leaving (Greenbaum et al., 1989).
My results are in line with the predictions of Sharpe (1990) when he argued that businesses
are 'informationally captured'. He argues that even though banks earn zero profits over the
life cycle of the average customer relationship, that they are not disciplined by the market in
such a way as to make them offer better-performing customers more competitive interest
rates. The same reasoning applies to collateral as to interest rates, in this context.
Future research should take on board Petersen and Rajan's (1995) study on the level of
banking concentration and hence banking competition, when conducting studies of this kind.
Ideally, future empirical research should indicate the level of banking competition within the
lending market where the sample was obtained, and interpret the results accordingly.
Therefore, while my results appear to apply to a non-competitive banking market where
information monopolies can be maintained, it is plausible that other credit markets with
fewer information monopolies may be in a position to reward customers in subsequent
borrowing periods for their good repayment behaviour. If this were the case, the credit
market would exhibit features of Diamond's learning models. If the credit market having
perfect information could be described by Diamond's (1989) multiperiod model, then a bank
could hope to retain a borrower in subsequent periods. The bank could retain the borrower
because the borrower would expect that the second-period loan terms that he would be
granted would to be more favourable, if his first period performance were good (Diamond,
1989; Diamond, 1991). Hence a borrower is rewarded for his good behaviour under perfect
competition rather than penalised for it, contrary to what we have seen when information
monopolies exist.
A further suggestion for future research would be to obtain data from several countries that
are known a priori to have different banking regimes. A researcher could then compare any
disparity in the terms that were offered to first-period borrowers and borrowers who are
applying for loans in subsequent periods, on a country by country basis.
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Not only could a researcher select the countries on the basis of the degree of inter-bank
competition and the level of small enterprise activity in the economy. A further possible
selection criterion could entail the cost of credit bureau data and level of co-operation
among banks regarding the risk status of their customers. With low information costs and in
the presence of shared information, information monopolies should not be as pronounced
and hence borrowers should have more bargaining power in a multiperiod lending context.
This situation would arise because borrowers' reputations would be observable to competing
banks. My hypothesis is that with low information costs, and high information availability,
the relative cost of borrowing in subsequent lending periods should be lower.
10.5 Conclusion
If I were asked to come up with a succinct statement to summarise the findings of my
analyses, I would infer from my findings that small businesses are 'informationally
captured'. This inference is based on findings where as the level of information about the
borrower increases, so also does the cost to the borrower of his finance in terms of interest
margin and collateral.
An additional finding supports my conjecture that information about the borrower is low and
possibly asymmetric, in the initial application period. This is due to the relatively poor
performance of the business scorecards, where human capital variables alone, such as
entrepreneur's age and work experience, are not sufficient to permit a bank make
satisfactory judgements about a borrower's quality a priori.
Cressy (1996c) tests the effect of human capital variables but the aim of his analysis is
interpretative. My scorecard analysis is rigorous because it represents a more exacting test
of the usefulness of human capital variables; are they enough to permit a bank to correctly
classify borrowers? My answer to this question is no unless the costs of misclassification of
bad risks is as high as that cited by Altman (1977).
There are two possible strategies that a bank can implement to correct these information
deficiencies; the bank can offer first-period business borrowers introductory loans
(staggered lending) rather than forfeit good business (Type II error). Alternatively, it can
attempt to make better application scorecards for first-term borrowers by pooling
information with other banks.
Of the two risk reduction strategies, the latter one of pooling information has more to
recommend it because it does not lead to the adverse selection and moral hazard effects that
the rationing strategy would entail. It would allow the bank to extend the optimal amount of
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finance to first period borrowers by tapping into information on the track record of the
business supplied by a competitor bank.
The obvious drawback of applying this strategy arises if banks wish to maintain their
information monopoly. If reciprocal agreements were set up so that there were no free
riders, as with the Fair Isaac small business scorecard, the adverse effects of information
asymmetries would be reduced, with welfare gains for both small businesses and the bank's
shareholders. The welfare gains for small businesses would comprise adequate up-front
financing, with possibly higher rejection rates, but more complete financing of those
applicants that were successful in obtaining funding. The welfare gains for banks would take
the form of lower risk over its small business portfolio. Additionally there would be more
consistency and control over the process of loan sanctioning. Furthermore, in the future, the
usage of a pooled information system would enhance the automation process for small
business loans by leveraging all available information about the borrower that resides in the
banking system.
The advantage of having a pooled information system for small business loans and what
distinguishes them from larger businesses, is that such an option is feasible for smaller
businesses. With larger businesses, the ownership structure is more dispersed and as the
information on the individual partners increases exponentially, the value added of a pooled
information system is doubtful. With larger businesses the need for pooled information is
not an imperative because information is already in the public domain. Pooled information is
a potentially useful strategy that could combat the adverse effects of private information and
low sample sizes both of which make the appraisal of small businesses problematic.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
A 5.1 The location of repayment information in the form of risk bands and credit grades
A 5.2 System of extracting the repayment information
A 5.3 The reformatting of the explanatory variable tables
A 5.4 Reformatting of tables TD5FACR and TD5SECI
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A 5.1 Introduction
This Appendix maps out in detail how I extracted my data at the UK bank and supplements
Chapter 5 that provides a summary of the data extraction process.
A 5.2 System of extracting the repayment information
The two years of application data from January 1998 until January 2000 was divided into
four periods of approximately six months duration. Application data was available for each
of these four periods. The first period was from January 1998 until June 1998. The second
extended from June 1998 until December 1998. The third period comprised January 1999
until June 1999. Finally, the fourth period fell between June and December 1999.
The corresponding behavioural information for each of these periods of application data is
seen in Table A 5.1 which outlines data for risk bands where PER99T6, PER9906,
PER99012, PER98T6, PER98T12, PER98T18, PER9806, PER9812 and PER9818 represent
the tables containing risk bands once they have been rendered in flat file format. For each of
the four time periods, eleven individual tables containing application characteristics are
merged with their corresponding performance tables containing risk bands.
In the case of applicants applying in the 1st two periods (between 01-01-98 and 01-12-98),
there are theoretically 18 months of behavioural data. However, until January 1999, it was
very difficult to match the repayment information of business customers to their original
application characteristics due to a flaw in the data capture process. In January 1999, this
problem was to some extent addressed whereby branch managers were circulated an advice
memo on how to link the two at application. Very many business customers could not be
matched with their subsequent repayment performance for the first two periods for this
reason.
The risk bands were extracted in the initial stage because the researcher could not undertake
the extraction of credit grades and required extraction by authorised banking personnel and it
was possible that grades were not available. In the event, grades were available and risk
bands were not used in the analysis because they were predicted measures of likely
performance rather then observed performance outcomes.
A 5.3 The reformatting of the explanatory variable tables
For all tables that had multiple values of the linking variable for each case, decisions were
taking on how to reduce the row entries to one. Each amended table is mentioned below. The
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reasons for omitting, aggregating or creating new variable categories in order to create a flat
table are noted. These justifications are important since certain assumptions are made about
the data and constraints set up which will affect the end analysis.
The application characteristics of business borrowers are contained in the following
relational databases TD5APCU, TD5APPL, TD5BREQ, TD5BUPR, TD5BURK, TD5BUST,
TD5CUAS, TD5CULI, TD5FISU, TD50WNR, TD5SPOU, TD5FISU, TD50WNR,
TD5SPOU, TD5TRPO and TD5TRPR (Table A 5.2).
The db2 databases are all linked on the variable 'apcu_id' corresponding to the customer
application number. The extraction of these databases differs depending on whether the
relational database is already flat or is categorical. A flat table such as TD5SPOU has one
unique entry for the linking variable. A categorical table duplicates the values of the linking
variable and must be transformed into a flat table. The reason for this repetition is because
there may be several different values for variables within the table, causing the link variable
to be repeated for this customer.
Since a scorecard takes the unique application characteristics of a business as its explanatory
variables, it follows that 'apcu_id' must be unique if it is to represent a unique row of
business characteristics that can be related to the repayment behaviour of the same
businesses.
Tables TD5APCU to TD5TRPR comprise information on the customer. Tables TD5FACR to
TD5SEC1 refer to information on the application itself. These tables deliver the outcome of
the loan application and the pricing of the risk. The risk pricing refers to the terms and
conditions extended to the business customer.
What follows is a description of the variables within tables TD5APCU to TD5TRPR and
where changes have been made to variables in order to ensure a unique value for the linking
variable 'apcu_id' in each case.
Application characteristics of customers; tables TD5APCU to TD5TRPR
TD5APCU already has unique values for the link variable 'apcu_id' and therefore does not
need to be reformatted. The table TD5APCU lists whether a business has been bankrupted in
the past, the structure of the business (legal status), the occupation code of the borrower and
the date it commenced trading. It also notes the length of the business to bank relationship,
the number of employees and the date it moved to its current address. In addition to these
possible explanatory variables of risk, a possible response variable 'risk_rat' that indicates
the risk rating of the business is also included. Variables such as occupation code are not
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well populated for the first 700 cases. Where observations do occur, they appear to arise in
batches (Table A 5.2).
TD5APPL is the one table linked by the two major linking variables 'apcujd' and 'appl_id'.
Consistent with the need to extract customer application characteristics to estimate the
scorecard, the table TD5APPL was separated into the tables TD5APPLC and TD5APPLA
depending on whether the link variable was 'apcu_id' or 'appl_id' respectively.
There was no need to reformat the table as there were unique entries for the link variable
'apcu_id'. Variables included the total aggregate customer exposure, the new aggregate
exposure, other agreed loan facilities, the borrowing limit on this customer and whether the
customer has a credit card facility.
TD5BREQ was a table that needed to be reformatted as there were multiple entries of the link
variable 'apcu_id'. The three general areas requiring restructuring were borrowing purpose,
repayment method and reasons cited for taking a higher limit than in former times.
Borrowing purpose that consisted of working capital, purchase of assets, debt rescheduling,
the purchase of capital equipment and other reasons was amalgamated into two variables
'purpose1' and 'purpose2'. The reason for this restructuring was to do with multi-purpose
loans. A loan applicant could check more than one of the five options. In order to capture a
second purpose, purpose2 was defined. Of course theoretically, a customer could check all
five options but a variable 'purpose5' would not be well populated and therefore an attempt
was made to note the first two loan purposes. A further justification for this is that this
permits conciseness without too much data leakage. Relatively few applicants require a loan
with two purposes. Secondly, the categories within purpose are kept as dummies that permit
reorganisation into borrowers with certain loan purposes. For example, it may be useful to
later on identify borrowers who require finance for rescheduling their loans as these may
represent a riskier borrower type. All borrowers showing a 'Re' value would therefore be
separated from those with no 'Re' value irrespective of whether the rescheduling occurred as
'purpose 1' or 'purpose2'.
Similarly repayment method was divided into 'repay 1' and 'repay2' on the assumption that
borrowers would rarely have three methods of financing the loan. Some data leakage is
inevitable but this is outweighed by the improvement in conciseness and higher population
of the data matrix. Borrowers would repay loans based on an anticipated improvement in
profitability, on the basis of existing profitability levels or other income at their disposal. The
final miscellaneous category was 'other'.
The final transformation of the data was made in the case where borrowers stated their
various reasons for requiring a higher limit on the funds they could overdraw (referred to as
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an overdraft limit). Not all borrowers will request a higher limit and so only a subset of
borrowers will have responded to this question. The very fact that they have responded
presupposes that they have requested a higher limit and therefore may differ from borrowers
who are satisfied with their present limit. This variable could capture growth or alternatively
the more negative effects of over-trading. Borrowers could be divided between those who
respond to this question and those who do not at a later stage.
The variables 'hijml' and 'hi_lm2' were designed to capture the first two reasons cited by
the borrower. Again 'hi_lim2' as expected is not a well-populated field. The reasons for this
are twofold. Not all customers request increases of their borrowing limit and secondly not all
borrowers will cite more than one justification for the increase in the borrowing limit. The
justifications are that the previous expenditure was exceptional, that funds are forthcoming,
that the increase in due to seasonal fluctuations, that changes in credit terms were given by
the borrower to his customers and that the limit is simply higher. There is also a
miscellaneous category.
TD5BUPR is a short table indicating whether the business premises are owned or leased and
whether there has been any insolvency in the past. The insolvency variable 'any_inso' may
be collinear with the variable bankrupt from TD5APCU since they are measuring much the
same thing.
TD5BURK contains details of perceived business risk elicited in the Business Lending
Checklist does not need to be modified, as there are unique entries for the link variable. The
first six variables indicate the types of business risks the business manager perceives himself
confronted with. This could be organised into 'riskl' and 'risk2' as has been done with
TD5BREQ as described earlier. The yes/no answers would need to be codified in order to
correspond with the categories in question 23 on the Business Lending Checklist. The risk
categories comprise an increase in local competition 'inc_loca', implications of new
legislation degaljm', a change in the marketplace 'marketpl', Y2K implications 'adverse
and none lno_risk'.
The next three variables deal with labour costs followed by three variables measuring the
cost of purchases. These could capture the effects of wage bargaining in the case of the wage
cost variables and inflation or exchange rates in the case of the cost of purchases variables.
The next six variables measure the changes in the length of creditor and debtor days over a
three-year period. These are followed by three variables that measure the perceived change
in the cost of finance by the borrower.
Finally two variables estimate the amount of profit or loss retained by the borrower. 'P'
indicates whether it is a profit and 'L' whether it is a loss.
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It should be underlined that TD5BURK concerns itself with the borrower's perception of the
prevailing economic climate and how it impacts on his business.
TD5BUST deals with business strategy (Table A 5.2). 'Bus_in_l' indicates whether type of
business activity undertaken agrees with its description on the Business Financial Profile.
'Prop_val' indicates whether the business property has been valued in the last 12 months.
The level of sales income is denoted by 'salesJin' and the level of projected sales by
lproj_sal'. A difference between these two might point to borrower confidence or unrealism.
The next variables 'business' and lbusinesO' indicate cash sales and credit sales in the last 12
months and next 12 months respectively and they are taken from question 28 of the Business
Lending Checklist. Although the borrower should specify reasons for a change in the former,
these reasons are not captured on the database. The ratio between these two has a bearing on
the business cashflow. This ratio between cash and credit sales is described by the variables
lrev_inc_split_cash' and 'rev_inc_split_cred'. A dummy variable 'sales_pa' indicates
whether all sales income is paid into an account at the bank.
Local_economy_fact Clocal_ec') indicates whether the lending officer agrees or otherwise
with the borrower's prognosis about the risks which the business faces. It indicates the
veracity of the borrower's responses to business risks.
Bus_miles_from_br ('bus_mile') indicates whether the business is far from its local branch.
Cust_lacks_fin_con (lcust_lac') indicates whether in the opinion of the loan officer, the
customer seems to lack financial confidence. Like llocal_ec', this variable reflects the
opinion of the loan officer on how competent the borrower is. It is a judgmental variable.
The next five variables cite reasons for a minimum lending margin, if any, and include the
usage of a service charge, family connections, a deposit, background assets or other
mitigating factors.
Borrowing_purpose (borrowin) denotes whether the purpose of the borrowing is in line with
the normal activities of the business.
The next three variables 'vat_up_tlni_paye_\ 'tax_pay_' indicate whether the VAT,
PAYE and taxation payments of the business are up to date.
'Bus_oper' notes whether in the opinion of the lending officer, the business can operate
without the business principal. It ties in with the concept of business succession.
Finally, lins_life' and 'ins_loan' capture whether the business owner is covered by life
assurance and his loan covered by default insurance.
'Cust_set' denotes how often the customer settles VAT where '<2' is quarterly, 'AT is
monthly and W indicates whether the customer is not VAT registered. The latter category
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could be useful in order to separate out non-VAT registered customers which are
predominantly smaller (turnover below £50,000).
TD5CUAS contains a categorisation of assets owned by the customer. The amount if any of a
mortgage outstanding against these assets is also noted as well as the value of the assets. This
table required extensive reorganisation. It necessitated 83 lines of SAS programming to
render it in a flat file format.
The variable 'type' had categories 'BOA', 'SAD' and 'LP'. It was assumed that 'BOA'
corresponded to a partially mortgaged or 'bank owned' asset. The basis for making this
assumption was that there were positive values for mortgage when the dataset was filtered
for 'BOA' but none when the dataset was filtered for 'SAD'. 'SAD' therefore must represent
an asset that is solely owned by the business. LP represents a Life policy1.
It follows that any reorganisation of the asset categories must allow for mortgaged values
only in the case of BOA category assets. For all other assets, only current values are
required.
The values are then summed if unique for each value of the link variable 'apcujd'. The
reason for this approximation is that if there are multiple rows for one application customer
identity e.g. two life policies worth £10,500, the life policies are most likely just repeated. If
one of the life policies is worth £5,000 and the second £10,000, there is no duplication and
therefore the researcher is safe to sum them across the variable 'apcu_id' (application
customer identity). Although this introduces the possible error that there are in fact two life
policies of equal value, the error of double counting duplicate values outweighs this and
therefore this policy of aggregation was adopted. This is an instance of where consultation
with the bank staff was necessary in order to reformat the data.
TD5CULI describing the customer liabilities, was a table requiring some modification. The
amounts outstanding were summed across each customer to yield the aggregate variable
's_outstd'. Similarly, monthly repayments and credit limits are summed across
'customer_id' to yield the summed variables 's_mrepay' and 's_limit'. 'Timetogo' is
calculated by dividing 's_outstd' by 'sjnrepciy'. Excess_limits are denoted by 'exjim'.
TD5FISU contains summary financial variables of the business. This table required some
changes to be made. The link variable 'apcu_id' was repeated for the current and past year's
accounting information because accounting information is stored in blocks, the first block
relating to the most recent accounting information and the second relating to the accounting
information from the year before. Therefore, the extra rows needed to be pulled up and made
' Bank personnel themselves were unsure what the variable 'BOA' implied. Because of this
uncertainty, it was not used in my subsequent analysis
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into additional columns. Hence, I used the prefix 'pas' for the past year's value and 'rec' for
the recent year's value. The financial year's beginning 'pas_yrb' and end 'pasjyre' are
noted. Additional variables were sales turnover 'pas_st', gross profit and loss 'pas_gp\ net
profit and loss 'pas_pl\ pension payments 'pas_pen\ capital introduced to business during
the year in question 'pas_ic\ trade debtors 'pas_tdr', trade creditors 'pas_tcr' and the total
of the capital account. Borrowing costs 'pasjbw' and past payments 'pas_pay' are also
included in this table.
TD50WNR, the table describing the business owner, also required modification as there
were non-unique entries for the link variable. The problem is that in any one business that is
identified by one 'customer_id\ there can be several business partners. This leads to multiple
entries for 'customer_id'. The solution used here was to take the date of birth of the partner
with the largest owner stake to a separate column. This new variable is called 'dobl'. The
years this partner has spent in business are then calculated separately for this partner and
termed 'dobl_yi'. Similarly, the years this partner has spent in this particular type of
business are calculated separately and denoted by the variable 'dobl_yt'.
'Apcu_id' being the linking variable must be made unique with one row per number. The
constraint, which was agreed upon was to show entrepreneurs, which have at least 50 percent
ownership stakes. This would imply two variables in the case of two partners with equal 50
percent stakes. This constraint should allow small, self-owned businesses to be well
represented in the end sample. It would not permit large businesses where ownership is
separated from control. This way of organising the data is appropriate for an analysis of
small businesses being scored but leads to under representation of the larger players.
For the TD50WNR table below, a SAS programme was written which took the first
entrepreneur's date of birth going down the list of linking variables 'apcu_id' and also the
second entrepreneur's data of birth based on share capital ownership. This process was
described in section 5.4.2,
TD5SPOU deals with information about the entrepreneur's spouse including the spouse's
date of birth, occupation, the date his/her employment commenced and spouse's salary. This
may be interesting variable when differentiating between cases where the entrepreneur
spouse is a partner in the business and when the spouse has an independent source of
income. This variable 'spouse's income' has been used in a consumer credit study before
(Banasik et al., 1996)2.
2
Banasik J.L, J.N. Crook and L.C Thomas. 'Does scoring a subpopulation make a difference?'. The
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, April 1996
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The final tables TD5TRP0 and TD5TRPR deal with trading creditors and debtors. They were
subsumed into one table called TD5TRADE due to the interconnectedness of the variables.
This table TD5TRADE required the most reorganisation in order to render it into a flat file.
In the Business Lending Checklist gathering information on the trade creditors and debtors,
there are separate fields for debtors and creditors. Information is required from prospective
borrowers on the amounts due, from both creditors and debtors. For any debtor and creditor,
who are owed or owe amounts of at least 25 percent of the ledger, the amount is listed
separately. Lastly, amounts overdue are flagged in a separate field. For all three types of
information, both amount and count are requested.
The difficulty with tables TD5TRPO and TD5TRPR is that the answers to the above straddle
both tables and therefore it makes sense to amalgamate both tables into one. This is luckily
possible in SAS programming language although the process is involved. 229 lines of code
were required to reorganise the tables.
The total sum and count of both debtors and creditors due was calculated. These variables
were 'dr_td\ ldr_tn', 'cr_td' and 'crjtn' where the suffix dd' denoted total due and 7n'
denoted total number or the count. These variables were already summed as totals and did
not therefore require further aggregation.
In the next stage, the large indicator variables were calculated. These were denoted by a 7z"
suffix. All debtors and creditors that exceeded 25 percent of the ledger were counted and the
amounts summed. The resulting variables were ldr_n_li', idr_sm_li' for the number of large
debtors and the summed amounts respectively.
Finally, the amounts overdue were summed to give variables 'dr_sm_od' and 'cr_sm_od'
and the maximum value outstanding of debtors calculated as kdr_mx_od' and icr_mx_od'. It
is assumed that a customer is less willing to indicate where he owes large amounts of money
to a creditor than to note where amounts are owed to him. Therefore, one would expect few
entries for 'cr_nix_od' compared with 'dr_mx_od'.
A 5.4 Reformatting of tables TD5FACR and TD5SECI
This section deals with the reformatting of the three most complex tables TD5FACR and
TD5SECI. The full list of variables that I extracted is contained in Table A 5.2.
I devised a matrix to help me organise the data that is depicted in Table 5.8.
These were the most complex tables to render into a flat file format because they were linked
at loan application level and not customer application level. A customer may submit several
different applications simultaneously. For every application customer identity 'apcu_id'
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there could be several different applications each with it's own application identity
('appljd' and 'cippljuerjio'). An example of this would include an application for a
business overdraft at the same time as a term loan.
The first table TD5FACR deals with the type of the facility requested. Technically, a loan
facility can be fall under one of approximately 90 different account types. A frequency
distribution was taken of the dummy variable 'type' to see which were the most frequently
occurring business loans. About 32 percent of loans requested were for business current
accounts, 44 percent for business term loans with capital and interest repayments and a
further 9.4 percent were for other business term loans. This implied that approximately 14
percent of loan applications fell into other categories. In order to concentrate on the three
main types of application, all other loan facilities were assigned to the category of other.
The next issue was to deal with the interest rates. These broke down into about fifty-four
groups. The predominant interest rate was the base rate B with about 77.6 percent of
business owners applying for this. A further 12.9 percent qualified for the B+ rate while 1.5
percent were eligible for a managed rate MN. Finally about 1.1 percent qualified for the flat
rate FL3.
Originally the complexity of the data suggested a table like the following to deal with
interest rate and facility type relationships in a matrix format whereby the variables are first
categorised by interest rate before being further categorised by facility type. Due to very low
cell counts for the housing finance (20,21), gold cheque account and the 101 account, these
were subsequently assigned to a general other category. Loans not falling into any of the
named interest rate types or facility types and hence deemed 'else' or 'other' were
aggregated and named as 'other' category loans. The new compound variable names such as
'b40_int' for a business current account at base rate are listed in Table A 5.3 below.
The first attempt at a final dataset involved making 25 separate datasets for both accepted
and rejected loans using Table A 5.3 as a benchmark. Each separate dataset was examined
and many datasets had no observations where the interest rates and account types were
mutually exclusive. Additionally, it was discovered that the bulk of observations were
assigned base (B) or base plus (B+) interest rates. It was decided to preserve these in as
disaggregated form as possible.
However, it was seen on examination of the trial datasets, that customers are not offered both
interest rates simultaneously on parts of a loan application. Base rate and base plus rates
could therefore be incorporated into the one data column without jeopardising the flat file
3 The 'MG' rate was not described in the variable dictionary but this only applied to 3.6 percent of the
applicants and so it was eventually included in the 'other' category.
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format. It was also decided to include all base related loans as a separate category given that
they were so plentiful. Moreover it was decided to retain the distinction between business
current and business loan accounts. All other non-base related accounts were assigned to the
category of other account
The suffix D stands for the interest dummies (B, B+, MN and FL). These were eventually
dropped from the final data set as the interest type was could already be identified following
separation of the categories by the prefixes of the same. For instance 'B40_int' would
represent a base rate, business current account as signalled by the prefix B.
INT stands for the interest rate for each of these interest dummies and finally AMT represents
the amount borrowed at each interest rate and for each interest type.
The suffix D stands for the interest dummies (B, B+, MN and FL). These were eventually
dropped from the final data set as the interest type was could already be identified following
separation of the categories by the prefixes of the same. For instance 'b40_int' would
represent a base rate, business current account as signalled by the prefix B.
INT stands for the interest rate for each of these interest dummies and finally AMT represents
the amount borrowed at each interest rate and for each interest type.
The flattening of table TD5FACR yielded 8 variables, 'current_acJbase_int',
'
current_ac_base_amt\ 'current_ac_base_lim'loan_ac_base_int'loan_ac_base_lim
Toan_ac_base_amt', 'other_ac_interest' and 'other_ac_amount'.
TD5SECI represents the table listing the security amounts and values for each borrower. This
is also linked by application identity and application version number and hence is similar to
TD5FACR described above.
The datasheets were put together on a trial and error basis starting from the maximum
amount of disaggregation.
As in the case of the table TD5FACR, the last versions of the application were taken. Next a
frequency table was produced for each security type and it was concluded that land ('land'),
life policies ('Ipol') and guarantees ('guar) comprised the list of most frequently used
security. Altogether, these three security types accounted for 92.9 percent of all security
taken. Land was taken in 48.4 percent of cases, life policies in 36.7 percent and guarantees in
7.8 percent of cases between 01-01-1999 and 01-06-1999.
The original security type dummy was divided into 'land', 'Ipol' and 'guar' with an 'other'
category for any security not fitting into these categories. The linking variable 'apcu_id' was
then integrated into the dataset as this was needed in order to aggregate security by customer
application identity. It would not have been possible to aggregate security by the existing
link variables 'appl_id' and 'appl_ver' as these were at application level. The percentage
variable discount percent value as indicated by the suffix 'DP' was not summed but rather
averaged over values of the link variable 'apcu_id'. The variables discount value, indicated
by the suffix 'DV and value indicated by 'V were summed across 'apcu_id'.
This process of aggregation was carried out separately for security in the land, life policy,
guarantee and other categories before the resulting temporary data sets were merged.
15 new variables were calculated. 'Land_val', lland_dp', iland_dv' and 7and_ef' stand for
the following. 'Land_val' represents the book value of land used as collateral. 'Land_dp' the
discount percent that this book value would be devalued by in the event of the asset being
liquidated. 'Landjdv' indicates the value of this discount mark down. 'Land_ef denotes
whether the land had been used to cover existing facilities. The latter dummy variable would
not play a part in the case of start-up and transfer businesses because they would not have
existing facilities to begin with since this is assumed to be their first application.
The same variables describe the value and discount values for the other collateral types life
policies and guarantees.
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Table A 5.1 Application scorecard variables and connection risk bands
Application variables Connection risk bands
Estimation period Source tables
(for explanatory
variables)
6 mths
later
12 mths
later
18 mths
later
01-06-99 until 01-12-00
1999 2nd period
Sanfaci
Apple
Breq
Bupr
Bust
Cuas
Culi
Fisu
Ownr
Scci
burk
01-07-00
Dataset:
PER99T6
01-01-99 until 01-06-99
1999 1st period
sanfaci
apple
breq
bupr
bust
cuas
culi
fisu
ownr
seci
burk
15-01-00
Dataset:
PER9906
15-07-00
Dataset:
PER99012
01-06-98 until 01-12-98
1998 2nd period
Sanfaci 1
Apple 1
Breql
Buprl
Bustl
Cuasl
Culil
Fisul
Ownrl
Secil
Burkl
01-07-99
Dataset:
PER98T6
15-01-00
Dataset:
PER98T12
15-07-00
Dataset:
PER98T18
01-01-98 until 01-06-98
1998 1st period
Sanfaci2
Applc2
Breq2
Bupr2
Bust2
Cuas2
Culi2
Fisu2
Ownr2
Seci2
Burk2
15-01-99
Dataset;
PER9806
15-07-99
Dataset;
PER9812
15-01-00
Dataset;
PER9818
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Table A 5.2 Eventual variables used in final dataset
DB2TABLE
TD5APCU_APP_CUST
TD5APPL_APPLICATN
(TD5APPLC)
TD5BREQ_B0RR_REQT
TD5BUPR BUSPROFILE
VARIABLE LABEL
; Bankrupt_or_seques (bankrupt)
Business_structure (business)
Borrowing_since (borrowin)
\ Occupation_code (occupati)
Date_strt_trading (legalist)
Risk_rating (date_str)
j Length_of_connect (number_o)
: Act_no_employees (franchis)
Date_moved_to_addr (risk_rat)
Total_agg_exposure (total_ag)
Contingent_liabilities (continge)
RBS_CC_facilities (rbs_cc_f)
BACS_iimit (bacs_lim)
Total_amount_borr (total_am)
New_aggregate_borrowing (new_aggr)
Decision_type (decision)
Other_agreed_facilities (otherjug)
Low_risk_proc_qual (lowjrisk)
NOTES
First_loan_purpose (purpose1)
Second_loan_puipose (purpose2)
First_repayment_method (repay1)
Second_repayment_method (repay2)
First_reason_for_higher_limit (hi_lml)
Second_reason_for_higher_limit (hi_lm2)
Borrowed_amount (borrowed)
Non-borrowed_amount (nonjborr)
Business_premises_size (bus_prem)
Cust_replace_business_assets (cust_rep)
Leased_or_owned (leasedj>)
Any_insolvency (anyjnso)
Loan puipose has values;
WC = working capital
AS = Assets
Re = refinancing
Ca = capital equipment
Repayment method has
values;
P = profitability improve
E = existing profitability
levels
I = Other income
O = Other
Reason for higher limit has
values;
Except = previous
expenditure exceptional
Funds = Exceptional
receipt of funds expected
Season = seasonal
fluctuations
Credit = Change in credit
given
H_L = this is a higher limit
Other = other reason
XV
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DB2TABLE
TD5BURK_BUS_RISK
VARIABLE LABEL
Inc_local_competn (y/n) (;inc_loca)
NOTES
LegaLimplications (y/n) (legal_im)
Marketplace_resizi (y/n) (marketpl)
Adverse_comp_proj (y/n) (adverse_)
No_risk (y/n) (no_risk)
Other_risk (y/n) (other_ri)
Lab_cost_last_12m (lab_cost)
Lab_cost_next_12m (lab_cosO)
Lab_cost_NA (y/n) (labjcosl)
Cost_pur_lastl2m (cost_pur)
Cost_purch_next_12m (cost_pu2)
Cost_purch_na (y/n) (cost_pu3)
Cred_days_last_12m (cred_day)
Cred_days_next_12m (cred_da4)
Creditor_days_na (y/n) (creditor)
Debt_days_last_12m (debt_day)
| Debt_days_next_12m (debtjdA 5)
Debtor_days_NA (y/n) (debtor_cl)
Fin_cost_last_12m (fin_cost)
Fin_cost_next_12m (fin_cos6)
\ Finance_costs_na (finance_)
Retained_prof_loss (amount) (retained)
Retain_prof_or_los (y/n) (retain_p)
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DB2TABLE
TD5BUST Bug sfRAT
VARIABLE LABEL NOTES
D5CUAS_CUST_ASSET
Bus_in_line_BFP (bus_in_l)
Prop_val_last_12m (prop_val)
Sales_inc_last_12m (sales_in)
Proj_sales_next_ 12m (proj_sal)
Business_inc_cash (business)
Business_inc_cred (businesO)
Rev_inc_split_cash (rev_inc_)
Rev_inc_split_cred (rev_incl)
Sales_paid_toJRBS (sales_pa)
Local_economy_fact (local_ec)
Bus_miles_from_br (bus_mile)
Cust_lacks_fin_con (cust_lac)
M1 m_service_c harge (mlm_serv)
Mlm_family_connect (mlmJ'ami)
Mlm_deposits (mlm_depo)
Mlm_bg_assets (mlm_bg_a)
Mlm_other (mlm_othe)
Borrowing_purpose (borrowin)
VAT_up_to_date (vat_up_t)
NI_PAYE_up_to_date (ni_paye_)
TAX_pay_up_to_date (tay_pay_)
Bus_operate_withou (bus_oper)
Sickness_disabilit (sickness)
Ins_life_cover (ins_life)
Ins_loan_guard (insJoan)
Cust_settle_of_VAT (cust_set)
Sum_BOA_presentvalu (s_boapv)
Sum_SAD_presentvalu (s_sadpv)
Sum_BOA_amount (sjboamt)
I think that BOA is
acronym for business
owned assets but bank
sources were unable to
confirm. From Business
Financial Profile.
SAD from Personal
Financial Profile
TD5CULI Sum_of_amounts_outstanding(S_outstd)
Sum_of_monthly_repayments(Sjnrepay)
S um_of_c redi t_ 1 i m i ts(S_l imit)
Sum_of_amounts_outstanding/
Sum_of_monthly repayments(Timetogo)
Excess limit = Sum_of_credit_limits -
Sum_of_amounts_outstanding (Ex_lim)
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DB2TABLE
TD5FACR FACLTY _REQ
(linked with Appl_id)
Fk_faty_code
(FK_FATY_)
01 2.9%
08 3.6%
10 0.7%
101 1.4%
105 2.9%
12 2.6%
20 0.9%
21 1.7%
40 41.7%
50 5.3%
51 35%
52 1.4%
VARIABLE LABEL
Appl_id (Jk_app\_)
Fk_appl_ver_no (Fk_applO)
Prop_int_type (prop_int)
Prop_int_ratea (prop_i.nl)
Proposed_limit (Proposed)
Agreed_lim_pre_app (agreed_l)
Fk_faty_code (fkjaty_)
NOTES
Prop_int_type (prop_inl)\
B 81.4%
B+ 7.8%
MN 5.4%
D 3.1%
F 0.2%
FL 0.9%
M 0.9%
MG 1.1%
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i
1
DB2TABLE VARIABLE LABEL NOTES
TD5FISU_FINCL_SUM
Past year
Past_fin_yr_begin (pas_yrb)
Past_fin_yr_end (pas_yre)
Past_sales_turnover (past_st)
Past_yr_gross_prof (pas_gp)
Past_yr_pl (past_pl)
Past_bus_drawings (pas_bd)
Past_net_prof (pas_np)
Past_pension_pay (pas_pen)
Past_increase_cap (pas_ic)
Past_retained_profi (pas_rp)
Past_debtors (pas_tclr)
Past_creditors (pasjcr)
Tot_acc_or_nta_net
Past_borrowing_costs (pas_bw)
Past_payments (pas_pay)
Recent year
Present_fin_yr_begin (rec_yrb)
Present_fin_yr_end (recjyre)
Present_sales_turnover (rec_st)
Present_yr_gross_prof (rec_gp)
Present_yr_pl (rec_pl)
Present_bus_drawings (recjbd)
Present_net_prof (rec_np)
Present_pension_pay (rec_pen)
Present_increase_cap (rec_ic)
Present_retained_profi (rec_rp)
Present_debtors (recjdr)
Present_creditors (recjtcr)
Tot_acc_or_nta_net
Present_borrowing_costs (recjbw)
Present_payments (rec_pay)
TD50WNR Percent_ownership_ptnr I
Partnerl
Date_of_birth
Years_in_business
Years_in_type_of_business
Partner2
Date_of_birth
Years_in_business
Years_in_type_of_business
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DB2TABLE VARIABLE LABEL NOTES
TD5SECI_APP_SECJTM
(linked with Appl_id)
Appl_id (fk_appl_)
Fk_appl_ver_no (fk_applO)
Security_type (security)
Status (status)
Secures_house_purc (secures_)
Valuation_amount (vciluatio)
Discount_percent (discount)
Discount_value (discounl)
Exist_facilit_sec (existJu)
Security_type:
B&FC 1.6%
DEB 1.2%
GUAR 2.8%
LAND 32.7%
LOFP 0.6%
LPOL 58.6%
OTH 2.2%
SCRP 0.3%
Status: HLD, INC, OFD
Secures; Y/N
TD5SP0U_SP0USE Date_of_birth
Occupation
Start_with_emp_dat
Annual_salary
TD5TRP0 Tot_sum_drs_due (dr_td)
TD5TRPR_TRAD_PRNR tot_n_drs_due (dr_tn)
tot_sum_crs_due (cr_td)
tot_n_crs (cr_tn)
lrgindicator_n_drs (dr_n_li)
lrgindicator_sum_dr (dr_sm_li)
lrgindicator_max_dr (dr_mx_li)
lrgindicator_n_crs (cr_n_li)
overduedue_sum_drs (dr_sm_od)
overdue_sum_crs (cr_sm_od)
overdue_max_dr (dr_rnx_od)
overdue_max_cr (cr_mx_od)
XX
Table A 5.3 Template for reformatting TD5FACR
B
Business current
a/c
Term loan
(capital &
interest)
Term loan house(20,21) Gold
cheque a/c
101 a/c other
interest dummy B40_D B51_D B50_D Bhse_D B1 D B101_D
interest rate B40JNT B51JNT B50_INT Bhse_INT B1JNT B101 IN
T
amount B40_AMT B51_AMT B50_AMT Bhse_AMT B1_AMT B101 AM
T
B+
40 51 50 house(20,21) 1 101 other
interest dummy B+40_D B+51_D B+50_D B+hse_D B+1_D B+101_D
interest rate B+40_INT B+51JNT B+50JNT B+hseJNT B+1JNT B+101 I
NT
amount B+40_AMT B+51_AMT B+50_AMT B+hse_AMT B+1_AMT 0 1 >
MN
40 51 50 house(20,21) 1 101 other
interest dummy MN40_D MN51_D MN50_D MNhse_D MN1_D MN101_
D
interest rate MN40JNT MN51_INT MN50_INT MNhseJNT MN1JNT MN101 I
NT
amount MN40_AMT MN51_AMT MN50_AMT MNhse_AMT MN1_AMT MN101
AMT
FL
40 51 50 house(20,21) 1 101 other
interest dummy FL40_D FL51_D FL50_D FLhse_D FL1_D FL101_D
interest rate FL40_INT FL51JNT FL50_INT FLhseJNT FL1JNT FL101 IN
T
amount FL40_AMT FL51_AMT FL50_AMT FLhse_AMT FL1_AMT 0 1 >
Else
40 51 50 house(20,21) 1 101 other
interest dummy
interest rate
amount
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Appendix 5.1 Personal Financial Profile
Host table Variable name Type Length Location on
Personal
Financial
Profile
TD5APCU POSTCODE CHAR 8 CIO
TD5APCU OCCUPATION_CODE CHAR 2 CIO
TD5APCU 0CCUPAT10N_DESC CHAR 30 CIO
TD5SPOU EMPLOYER CHAR 25 CIO
TD5SP0U OCCUPATION CHAR 30 CIO
TD5SPOU ANNUAL_SALARY INTEGER 4 Cll
TD5SP0U START_WITH_EMP_DAT DATE 4 C12
TD5APCU DATE_OF_B IRTH DATE 4 C5
TD5CUAS EST_PRESENT_VALUE INTEGER 4 C59
TD5CUAS MORTGAGE_OUTSTAND INTEGER 4 C60
TD5CUAS OWNED_SOLE_OR_JOIN CHAR 1 C61
TD5CUAS PROPERTY_LET CHAR 1 C62
TD5APCU NO_OF_DEPENDENTS SMALLINT 2 CI
TD5CUAS CASH_DEPOSIT_BANK CHAR 30 C71
TD5CUAS LIFE_POLICY_DEATH INTEGER 4 C73
TD5CUAS ASSET_DESCRIPTION CHAR 30 C74
TD5APCU MARITAL_STATUS CHAR 15 C8
TD5APCU HOME_OWNER_IND CHAR 1 C9
Appendix 5.2 Business financial profile
Host table Variable name Type Length Location on
Personal
Financial
Profile
TD5APCU_APP_CUST DATE_STRT_TRADING DATE 4 D2
TD5APCU_APP_CUST DATE_MOVED_TO_ADDR DATE 4 D3
TD5APCU_APP_CUST NATURE_OF_BUSlNESS CHAR 1 D6
TD5APCU_APP_CUST NUMBER_OF_EMPLOYEE CHAR 1 D7
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Appendix 5.3 Business Lending Checklist Variables
Host table Variable name Type Length Location on
Persona1
Financial Profile
{
TD5APCU BANKRUPT_0R_SEQUES CHAR 1 B1
TD5CRSE BANKRUPT_OR_SEOUES CHAR 1 B1
TD5BREQ REPAY_PROF_IMPROVE CHAR 1 B100
TD5BREQ REPAY_OTHER_METHOD CHAR 1 B101
TD5BREQ BUS_PREMISES_SIZE CHAR 1 B102
TD5BREQ CUST_REPLACE_BUS CHAR 1 B113
TD5BREQ CUSTOMER_VALUATION CHAR 1 B126
TD5FACR PROPOSED_LIMIT INTEGER 4 B131
TD5BREQ SEASONAL CHAR 1 B132
TD5BREQ CHNGJN_CRED_GIVEN CHAR 1 B132
TD5BREQ HIGHER_LIMIT CHAR 1 B132
TD5BREQ LIM_SUFF_OTHER CHAR 1 B132
TD5FACR AGREED„LIM_PRE_APP INTEGER 4 B132?
TD5BREQ DELAY_IN_MONIES_GI CHAR 1 B133
TD5BREQ MAX_BORROW_MONTHS CHAR 15 B134
TD5BREQ MAX_N EW_BO R ROW 1N G INTEGER 4 B135
TD5BREQ NAMEJNCOME_MONTH1 CHAR 3 B136
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_1_NEXT INTEGER 4 B137
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_2_NEXT INTEGER 4 B138
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_3_NEXT INTEGER 4 B139
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_4_NEXT INTEGER 4 B140
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_5_NEXT INTEGER 4 B141
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_6_NEXT INTEGER 4 B142
TD5BREQ I NC_MONTH_7_N EXT INTEGER 4 B143
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_8_NEXT INTEGER 4 B144
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_9_NEXT INTEGER 4 B145
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_10_NEXT INTEGER 4 B146
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_11_NEXT INTEGER 4 B147
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_12_NEXT INTEGER 4 B148
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_1_PAST INTEGER 4 B149
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_2_PAST INTEGER 4 B150
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_3_PAST INTEGER 4 B151
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_4_PAST INTEGER 4 B152
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_5_PAST INTEGER 4 B153
TD5BREQ I NC_MONTH_6_PAST INTEGER 4 B154
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_7_PAST INTEGER 4 B155
TD5BREQ I NC_MONTH_8_PAST INTEGER 4 B156
TD5BREQ I NC_MONTH_9_PAST INTEGER 4 B157
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_10_PAST INTEGER 4 B158
TD5BREQ INC„MONTH_11_PAST INTEGER 4 B159
TD5BREQ INC_MONTH_12_PAST INTEGER 4 B160
TD5BURK CUST_BlGGEST_OPPOR VARCHAR 100 B162
TD5BURK INC_LOCAL_COMPETN CHAR 1 B163
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Appendix 5.3 Business Lending Checklist Variables (Ctd.)
Host table Variable name Type Length Location on
Personal
Financial Profile
TD5BURK LEGALJMPLICATIONS CHAR 1 B163
TD5BURK MARKETPLACE_RESIZI CHAR 1 B163
TD5BURK ADVERSE_COMP_PROJ CHAR 1 B163
TD5BURK NO_RISK CHAR 1 B163
TD5BURK OTHER_RISK CHAR 1 B163
TD5BURK LAB_COST_LAST_12M DECIMAL 10 B164
TD5BURK LAB_COST_NEXT_12M DECIMAL 10 LOCD£
TD5BURK LAB_COST_NA CHAR 1 B165
TD5BURK COST_PURCH_LAST12M DECIMAL 10 B166
TD5BURK COST_PURCH_NEXT12M DECIMAL 10 B167
TD5BURK COST_PURCH_NA CHAR 1 B167
TD5BURK CRED_DAYS_LAST_12M SMALLINT 2 B170
TD5BURK CRED_DAYS_NEXT_12M SMALLINT 2 B171
TD5BURK CREDITOR_DAYS_NA CHAR 1 B171
TD5BURK DEBT_DAYS_LAST_12M SMALLINT 2 B172
TD5BURK D E BT_DAYS_N E XT_ 12M SMALLINT 2 B173
TD5BURK DEBTOR_DAYS_NA CHAR 1 B173
TD5BURK RETAINED_PROF_LOSS DECIMAL 10 B174
TD5BURK RETAIN_PROF_OR_LOS CHAR 1 B175
TD5BURK RETAINED_LOSS_CUST VARCHAR 100 B175
TD5BUST SALES_INC_LAST_12M DECIMAL 10 B178
TD5BUST REV_INC_SPLIT_CASH SMALLINT 2 B181
TD5BUST REVJNC_SPLIT_CRED SMALLINT 2 B182
TD5BUST BUSINESS_lNC_CASH SMALLINT 2 B184
TD5BUST BUSINESS_INC_CRED SMALLINT 2 B185
TD5BUST SALES_PAID__TO_RBS CHAR 1 B187
TD5BUST SALES_NOT_RBS_PURC CHAR 1 B187
TD5BUST SALES_NOT_RBS_WAGE CHAR 1 B188
TD5BUST SALES_NOT_RBS_ANOT CHAR 1 B188
TD5BUST SALES_NOT_RBS_OTHE CHAR 1 B188
TD5TRPO ANY DR CR CHAR 1 B189
TD5APCU BORROWING_SINCE DATE 4 B19
TD5TRPO TOTAL_DUE INTEGER 4 B190
TD5TRP0 TOTAL_NUMBER_PARTN INTEGER 4 B191
TD5APCU CONSOLIDATION CHAR 1 B20
TD5TRP0 STATEDJNVOICE_COL SMALLINT 2 B208
TD5PLAN DEBTOR_DAYS CHAR 1 B208?
TD5TRP0 AVG_INVOICE_COLLEC SMALLINT 2 B209
TD5APCU CREDIT_CARD_PROB CHAR 1 B21
TD5TRP0 LETTER_SEEKING_PAY CHAR 1 B211
TD5TRP0 SOLICITORS_LETTER CHAR 1 B211
TD5TRP0 COURT_ACTION CHAR 1 B211
TD5TRP0 ACTION_OTHER CHAR 1 B211
TD5TRP0 TOTAL_OVERDUE INTEGER 4 B212
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TD5TRP0 TOT_AMT_BAD_DEBTS INTEGER 4 B214
TD5TRPO CURRENT_AMOUNT_BAD INTEGER 4 B215
TD5TRPO TOT_NO_BAD„DEBTS INTEGER 4 B217
TD5TRPR AMOUNT_OWEDJN_THO INTEGER 4 B219
TD5PLAN CREDITOR_DAYS CHAR 1 B229?
TD5TRPO CASH_ON_DELIVERY CHAR 1 B235
TD5TRPO REFUSAL_TO_SUPPLY CHAR 1 B235
TD5BUST VATJJ P_T0_DATE CHAR 1 B238
TD5BUST VAT_OUTSTANDING_AM INTEGER 4 B238
TD5APPL LOW_RISK_PROC_QUAL CHAR 1 B23A
TD5RMAS ACCOUNT_NO_UNVERIF INTEGER 4 B24
TD5BUST NI_PAYE_UP_TO_DATE CHAR 1 B241
TD5BUST NI_PAYE_OUTSTANDIN INTEGER 4 B241
TD5BUST TAX_PAY_UP_TO_DATE CHAR 1 B244
TD5BUST TAX_OUTSTANDING_AM INTEGER 4 B244
TD5BUST TAX_PAYABLE_NOTDUE INTEGER ■ 4 B246
Appendix 5.3 Ctd.
TD5BUST TAX_DATE_DUE_1 DATE 4 B247
TD5BUST TAX_DATE_DUE_2 DATE 4 B248
TD5BUST BUS_OPERATE_WITHOU CHAR 1 B249
TD5RMAS MIN_LENDING_MARGIN DECIMAL 6 B25
TD5BUST CLOSE_FAMILY_MEMB CHAR 1 B251
TD5BUST KEY_EMPLOYEE CHAR 1 B251
TD5BUST OTHER_PRI NCI PALS CHAR 1 B251
TD5BUST NO_PRINCIPALS_OTHE CHAR 1 B251
TD5BUST SICKNESS_DISABILIT CHAR 1 B252
TD5BUST INS_BUSINESSURE CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST INS_KEYMAN CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST INS_LIFE_COVER CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST INS_PERSONAL_PERM CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST INS_LOAN_GUARD CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST INS_BUSINESS_LOAN CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST INSURANCEJDTHER CHAR 1 B253
TD5BUST PROPRIETORS_OWNER CHAR 1 B255
TD5RMAS CUR_LENDING_MARGIN DECIMAL 6 B26
TD5FACR PROP_FACILITY_FEE INTEGER 4 B28
TD5BUST LOCAL_ECONOMY_FACT CHAR 1 B295
TD5BUST BUS_MILES_FROM_BR SMALLINT 2 B297
TD5BUST CUST_LACKS_FIN_CON CHAR 1 B299
TD5BUST MLM_SERVICE_CHARGE CHAR 1 B301
TD5BUST MLM_FAMILY_CONNECT CHAR 1 B301
TD5BUST MLM_DEPOSITS CHAR 1 B301
TD5BUST MLM_BG_ASSETS CHAR 1 B301
TD5BUST MLM_OTHER CHAR 1 B301
TD5FISU ACCOUNTING_YEAR_ST DATE 4 B37
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TD5FISU ACCOUNTING_YEAR_EN DATE 4 B38
TD5BUST PR0J_SALE_NEXT_12M DECIMAL 10 B41
TD5FISU SALES_TURNOVER_SUB INTEGER 4 B41
TD5FISU GROSS_PROF_OR_LOSS INTEGER 4 B42
TD5FISU PROF_LOSS_PRE_DRAW INTEGER 4 B43
TD5FISU NET_PROFIT_OR_LOSS INTEGER 4 B44
TD5FISU BUS_DRAW_OR_REMUNE INTEGER 4 B45
TD5FISU PENSION_CONTRIB INTEGER 4 B46
TD5FISU INCREASED_CAPITAL INTEGER 4 B47
TD5FISU RET_PROF_OR_SURPL INTEGER 4 B48
s
TD5FISU TRADE_DEBTORS INTEGER 4 B49
TD5FISU TRADE_CREDITORS INTEGER 4 B50
TD5FISU T0T_ACC_0R_NTA_NET INTEGER 4 B61
TD5BREQ WORKING_CAPITAL CHAR 1 B67
TD5FATY PURPOSE CHAR 4 B67.B90
TD5BUST BORROWING_PURPOSE CHAR 1 B67-B90
TD5BREQ WORKING_CAPITAL_ST CHAR 1 B68
TD5BREQ WORKING_CAPITAL_DE CHAR 1 B68
TD5BREQ WORKING CAPITAL CR CHAR 1 B68
TD5BREQ ASSET_PURCHASE CHAR 1 B68A
TD5BREQ DEBT RESCHEDULING CHAR 1 B78
TD5BREQ PURCH_CAP_OF_BUS CHAR 1 B83
TD5BREQ OTHER_REAS_TO_BORR CHAR 1 B87
TD5BREQ SOURCE_NONE CHAR 1 B91
TD5BREQ SOURCE_BORROWED CHAR 1 B92
xxvii
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TD5BREQ SOURCE_NON_BORROWD CHAR 1 B93
TD5BREQ BORROWED_SOURCE CHAR 30 B94
TD5BREQ BORROWED__AMOUNT INTEGER 4 B95
TD5BREQ NON_BORROWED_SOURC CHAR 30 B96
TD5BREQ NON_BORROWED_jAMOUN INTEGER 4 B97
TD5BREQ REPAY_EXIST_LEVELS CHAR 1 B98
TD5BREQ REPAY_OTHER_INCOME CHAR 1 B99
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Appendix
6.1
WOE
for
Ever
Grade
E
(Assets
and
collateral)
ODVGROUP
(OTHDV)
Missing
GE
1
Total
Goods
410
242
652
70.69
69.14
Bads
170
108
278
23.31
350
Total
580
930
gij/bij
2.411764706
2.240740741
ln(gij/bij)
0.880358723
0.806806499
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.027935274
-0.045616949
NBGROUP
(NONBORR)
Missing
LE
9,000
LE
27,000
GT
27,000
Total
Goods
358
95
95
104
652
67.29
77.87
73.08
71.23
Bads
174
27
35
42
278
32.71
22.13
26.92
28.77
Total
532
122
130
146
930
gij/bij
2.057471264
3.518518519
2.714285714
2.47619
ln(gij/bij)
0.721477687
1.258040026
0.99852883
0.906721
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.130945761
0.405616577
0.146105382
0.054298
ACLGROUP
0
LE
40000
LE
90000
GT
90000
Total
Goods
408
83
79
82
652
70.96
65.87
69.91
70.69
Bads
167
43
34
34
278
29.04
34.13
30.09
29.31
Total
575
126
113
116
930
gij/bij
2.443113772
1.930232558
2.323529412
2.411765
In(gijVbij)
0.893273362
0.657640492
0.843087328
0.880359
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.040849914
-0.194782956
-0.00933612
0.027935
LDOGROUP
Owned
Leased
Missing
Goods
153
137
362
652
71.5
71.35
69.08
Bads
61
55
162
278
28.5
28.65
30.92
Total
214
192
524
930
gij/bij
2.508196721
2.490909091
2.234567901
ln(gij/bij)
0.919564057
0.912647741
0.804047877
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.067140609
0.060224292
-0.048375572
BPVGROUP
0
LE
30,000
LE
60,000
LE
120,000
GT
120,000
Goods
314
153
39
52
94
69.16
71.83
67.24
71.23
71.21
Bads
140
60
19
21
38
30.84
28.17
32.76
28.77
28.79
Total
454
213
58
73
132
gij/bij
2.242857143
2.55
2.052631579
2.47619
2.473684
ln(gij/bij)
0.807750563
0.936093359
0.719122667
0.906721
0.905709
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.044672885
0.083669911
-0.133300781
0.054298
0.053285
WOE
for
Ever
Grade
E
(Accounting)
RYEGROUP
(RECYRE)
Missing
Accounts
available
Total
Goods
438
214
652
70.76
68.81
Bads
181
97
278
29.24
31.19
Total
619
311
930
gij/bij
2.419889503
2.206185567
ln(gij/bij)
0.883721879
0.791265037
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.031298431
-0.061158412
PYEGROUP
(PASYRE)
Missing
Accounts
available
Total
Goods
448
204
652
71.11
68
Bads
182
96
278
28.89
32
Total
630
300
930
gij/bij
2.461538462
2.125
ln(gij/bij)
0.900786545
0.753771802
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.048363097
-0.098651646
iii
PNPGROUP
(PASNP)
Missing
Negative
0
LE
100,000
GT100,000
Total
Goods
448
44
55
58
47
652
71.11
75.86
57.89
69.05
74.6
Bads
182
14
40
26
16
278
28.89
24.14
42.11
30.95
25.4
Total
630
58
95
84
63
930
gij/bij
2.461538462
3.142857143
1.375
2.23076923
2.9375
ln(gij/bij)
0.900786545
1.145132304
0.318453731
0.80234647
1.077559
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.048363097
0.292708856
-0.533969717
-0.050077
0.225135
PPLGROUP
(PASPL)
0
or
missing
LT
20000
GT
20000
Goods
429
33
48
47
53
42
70.91
58.93
77.42
64.38
68.83
73.68
Bads
176
23
14
26
24
15
29.09
41.07
22.58
35.62
31.17
26.32
Total
605
56
62
73
77
57
gij/bij
2.4375
1.434782609
3.428571429
1.80769231
2.208333
2.8
ln(gij/bij)
0.890972924
0.361013346
1.232143681
0.59205106
0.792238
1.029619
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.038549476
-0.491410103
0.379720233
-0.2603724
-0.060185
0.177196
PRPGROUP
(PASRP)
Missing
Total
Goods
439
36
116
13
48
652
71.04
70.59
66.29
54.17
77.42
Bads
179
15
59
11
14
278
28.96
29.41
33.71
45.83
22.58
Total
618
51
175
24
62
930
gij/bij
2.452513966
2.4
1.966101695
1.18181818
3.428571
In
(gij/bij)
0.897113607
0.875468737
0.676052747
0.16705408
1.232144
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.044690159
0.023045289
-0.176370701
-0.6853694
0.37972
PSTGROUP
(PASST)
Missing
0
GE
1
LT
90,000
GE
90,000
Total
Goods
108
332
92
120
652
64.29
72.33
70.77
69.36
Bads
60
127
38
53
278
35.71
27.67
29.23
30.64
Total
168
459
130
173
930
gij/bij
1.8
2.614173228
2.421052632
2.26415094
ln(gij/bij)
0.587786665
0.960947882
0.884202417
0.81719983
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.264636783
0.108524434
0.031778969
-0.0352236
PTAGROUP(PASTA)
Total
Goods
448
67
49
88
652
71.11
57.76
77.78
72.73
Bads
182
49
14
33
278
28.89
42.24
22.22
27.27
Total
630
116
63
121
930
gij/bij
2.461538462
1.367346939
3.5
2.66666667
ln(gij/bij)
0.900786545
0.312872321
1.252762968
0.98082925
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.048363097
-0.539551127
0.40033952
0.1284058
RNPGROUP
(RECNP)
Missing
Negative
LE
13,000
GT
13,000
Total
Goods
438
90
76
48
652
70.76
62.5
78.35
68.57
278
Bads
181
54
21
22
29.24
37.5
21.65
31.43
Total
619
144
97
70
930
gij/bij
2.419889503
1.666666667
3.619047619
2.18181818
ln(gij/bij)
0.883721879
0.510825624
1.286210903
0.78015856
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.031298431
-0.341597824
0.433787454
-0.0722649
RPLGROUP
(RECPL)
Missing
Negative
LE
13,000
LE
24,000
GT24,000
Total
Goods
419
27
57
51
98
652
70.9
58.7
76
63.75
71.01
Bads
172
19
18
29
40
278
29.1
41.3
24
36.25
28.99
Total
591
46
75
80
138
930
gij/bij
2.436046512
1.421052632
3.166666667
1.75862069
2.45
ln(gij/bij)
0.890376443
0.351397887
1.15267951
0.5645298
0.896088
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.037952995
-0.501025561
0.300256062
-0.2878936
0.043665
RRPGROUP
(RECRP)
Missing
Negative
LE
9,000
GT
9,000
Total
Goods
429
131
42
50
652
70.68
65.17
77.78
73.53
Bads
178
70
12
18
278
29.32
34.83
22.22
26.47
Total
607
201
54
68
930
gij/bij
2.41011236
1.871428571
3.5
2.77777778
ln(gij/bij)
0.879673369
0.626702081
1.252762968
1.02165125
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.02724992
-0.225721367
0.40033952
0.1692278
RSTGROUP
(RECST)
Missing
or
0
LE
100,000
GT
100,000
Total
Goods
430
97
125
652
70.26
68.31
71.02
Bads
182
45
51
278
29.74
31.69
28.98
Total
612
142
176
930
gij/bij
2.362637363
2.155555556
2.450980392
ln(gij/bij)
0.859778522
0.768048489
0.896488105
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.007355073
-0.08437496
0.044064656
RTAGROUP
(RECTA)
Missing
Negative
LE
16,000
GT
16,000
Total
Goods
438
64
53
97
652
70.76
57.66
76.81
74.05
Bads
181
47
16
34
278
29.24
42.34
23.19
25.95
Total
619
111
69
131
930
gij/bij
2.419889503
1.361702128
3.3125
2.85294118
ln(gij/bij)
0.883721879
0.308735482
1.197703191
1.04835045
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.031298431
-0.543687967
0.345279743
0.19592701
PGPGROUP
(PASGP)
0
or
Missing
LE
25,000
LE
50,000
LE
100,000
GT100,000
Total
Goods
478
34
45
55
40
652
69.99
70.83
66.18
73.33
71.43
Bads
205
14
23
20
16
278
30.01
29.17
33.82
26.67
28.57
Total
683
48
68
75
56
930
gij/bij
2.331707317
2.428571429
1.956521739
2.75
2.5
ln(gij/bij)
0.846600753
0.887303195
0.671168274
1.01160091
0.916291
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
-0.005822695
0.034879747
-0.181255174
0.15917746
0.063867
RGPGROUP
(RECGP)
Missing
0
LE
27,000
LE
50,000
GT50,000
Total
652
Goods
425
40
40
39
108
70.83
60.61
76.92
57.35
75
Bads
175
26
12
29
36
278
29.17
39.39
23.08
42.65
25
Total
600
66
52
68
144
930
gij/bij
2.428571429
1.538461538
3.333333333
1.34482759
3
ln(gij/bij)
0.887303195
0.430782916
1.203972804
0.29626582
1.098612
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.034879747
-0.421640532
0.351549356
-0.5561576
0.246189
PSDGROUP
(PASBD)
Missing
0
LE
15,000
LE
27,000
GT27,000
Total
Goods
442
67
52
42
49
652
71.18
62.04
68.42
72.41
73.13
Bads
179
41
24
16
18
278
28.82
37.96
31.58
27.59
26.87
Total
621
108
76
58
67
930
gij/bij
2.469273743
1.634146341
2.166666667
2.625
2.722222
ln(gij/bij)
0.903924076
0.491120553
0.773189888
0.9650809
1.001449
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638037
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.8524234
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.051500628
-0.361302896
-0.07923356
0.11265745
0.149025
WOE
for
Ever
Grade
E
(Entrepreneur)
AGEGROUP(AGEI)
Missing
18-37
LE
50
GT
50
Total
Goods
343
97
136
76
652
68.74
69.29
72.73
73.08
Bads
156
43
51
28
278
31.26
30.71
27.27
26.92
Total
499
140
187
104
930
gij/bij
2.198717949
2.255813953
2.666666667
2.714286
ln(gij/bij)
0.78787444
0.813510863
0.980829253
0.998529
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.064549008
-0.038912585
0.128405805
0.146105
DYRGROUP(DOBIYR)
Missing
LE
15
GT
15
Total
Goods
471
116
65
652
69.88
71.17
69.89
Bads
203
47
28
278
30.12
28.83
30.11
Total
674
163
93
930
gij/bij
2.320197044
2.468085106
2.321428571
ln(gij/bij)
0.841652115
0.903442589
0.84218276
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
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DPRGR0UP(D0B1
PER)
Missing
LE
75
GT
75
Total
Goods
354
169
129
652
69.28
69.26
73.71
Bads
157
75
46
278
30.72
30.74
26.29
Total
511
244
175
930
gij/bij
2.25477707
2.253333333
2.804347826
ln(gij/bij)
0.813051108
0.812410601
1.031171008
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.03937234
-0.040012847
0.17874756
DYIGROUP(DOBIYI)
Missing
1-7
GT
7
Total
Goods
460
86
106
652
68.76
70.49
76.26
Bads
209
36
33
278
31.24
29.51
23.74
Total
669
122
139
930
gij/bij
2.200956938
2.388888889
3.212121212
ln(gij/bij)
0.788892238
0.870828358
1.166931533
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.063531211
0.01840491
0.314508084
PNRGROUP
(PARTNER)
No
partner
Has
partner
Total
Goods
486
166
652
70.43
69.17
Bads
204
74
278
29.57
30.83
Total
690
240
930
gij/bij
2.382352941
2.243243243
ln(gij/bij)
0.86808863
0.807922695
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.015665182
-0.044500753
WOE
for
Ever
Grade
E
(Distance
and
Miscellaneous)
RTNGROUP
(RETAIN)
0
LE
4000
LE
10000
LE
40000
GT
40000
Total
Goods
295
93
115
125
24
652
70.41
70.99
69.28
71.84
60
Bads
124
38
51
49
16
278
29.59
29.01
30.72
28.16
40
Total
419
131
166
174
40
930
gij/bij
2.379032258
2.447368421
2.254901961
2.55102
1.5
ln(gij/bij)
0.866693791
0.895013333
0.813106496
0.936493
0.40546511
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
-0.8524234
In(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.014270342
0.042589885
-0.039316953
0.08407
-0.4469583
SINGROUP
(SALESIN)
0
LE
20000
LE
60000
GT
60000
Goods
372
46
75
159
652
71.4
74.19
65.22
68.53
Bads
149
16
40
73
278
28.6
25.81
34.78
31.47
Total
521
62
115
232
930
gij/bij
2.496644295
2.875
1.875
2.178082
ln(gij/bij)
0.914947548
1.056052674
0.628608659
0.778445
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.0625241
0.203629226
-0.223814789
-0.073979
PJSGROUP
(PROJSAL)
0
LE
25000
LE
50000
LE
90000
GT
90000
Total
Goods
208
72
89
78
205
652
71.97
64.86
71.77
69.03
69.97
Bads
81
39
35
35
88
278
28.03
35.14
28.23
30.97
30.03
Total
289
111
124
113
293
930
gij/bij
2.567901235
1.846153846
2.542857143
2.228571
2.32954545
ln(gij/bij)
0.943088925
0.613104473
0.933288308
0.801361
0.84567316
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
-0.8524234
ln(gy/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.090665477
-0.239318975
0.08086486
-0.051063
-0.0067503
BSMGROUP
(BUSMILE)
0
LE
2
LE
6
GT
6
Total
Goods
125
150
159
218
652
75.3
69.77
73.95
65.27
Bads
41
65
56
116
278
24.7
30.23
26.05
34.73
Total
166
215
215
334
930
gij/bij
3.048780488
2.307692308
2.839285714
1.87931
ln(gij/bij)
1.114741671
0.836248024
1.043552511
0.630905
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.262318222
-0.016175424
0.191129063
-0.221519
CPRGROUP
(CREDPER)
0
Missing
LE
50
LE
95
GT
95
Goods
278
134
65
45
130
652
66.35
74.86
78.31
72.58
69.52
Bads
141
45
18
17
57
278
33.65
25.14
21.69
27.42
30.48
Total
419
179
83
62
187
930
gij/bij
1.971631206
2.977777778
3.611111111
2.647059
2.28070175
ln(gij/bij)
0.678861223
1.09117731
1.284015512
0.973449
0.82448318
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
0.42638037
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
-0.8524234
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.173562225
0.238753862
0.431592064
0.121026
-0.0279403
WOE
for
Ever
Grade
E
(Exposure)
OLNGROUP
(OTH
LN)
Has
no
other
loan
Has
other
loan
Total
Goods
514
138
652
69.93
70.77
Bads
221
57
278
30.07
29.23
Total
735
195
930
gij/bij
2.325791855
2.421052632
ln(gij/bij)
0.844060564
0.884202417
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.008362884
0.031778969
NDRGROUP
(NODUR)
Has
facility
of
no
duration
Has
no
facility
of
no
duration
Total
Goods
573
79
652;
69.12
78.22
Bads
256
22
278
30.88
21.78
Total
829
101
930;
gij/bij
2.23828125
3.590909091
ln(gij/bij)
0.805708272
1.278405399
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.046715176
0.425981951
CDP_GROUP
0
or
missing
GTO
Goods
412
Total
240
652
68.9
72.29
Bads
186
92
278
31.1
27.71
Total
598
332
930
gij/bij
2.215053763
2.608695652
ln(gij/bij)
0.795276676
0.958850346
Bj/Gjln(Bj/Gj)ij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.426380368-0.852423448-0.057146773
0.426380368-0.8524234480.106426898
AGRGROUP(AGGBORR)
LE
3000
LE
30,000
LE
90,000
GT
90,000
Total
Goods
91
261
167
133
652
64.08
72.1
68.16
73.48
Bads
51
101
78
48
278
35.92
27.9
31.84
26.52
Total
142
362
245
181
930
gij/bij
1.784313725
2.584158416
2.141025641
2.770833333
ln(gij/bij)
0.579033874
0.94939989
0.761284986
1.019148117
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
'n(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
In
(gij/bij)
r
In
(Bj/Gj)
_
-0.273389574
0.096976442
-0.091138463
0.166724669
xii
CXPGROUP
(CUSEXP)
0
LE
15,000
LE
60,000
GT
60.000
Total
Goods
151
204
163
134
652
68.95
71.08
70.26
69.79
Bads
68
83
69
58
278
31.05
28.92
29.74
30.21
Total
219
287
232
192
930
gij/bij
2.220588235
2.457831325
2.362318841
2.310344828
ln(gij/bij)
0.797772132
0.899279386
0.859643696
0.837396789
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
In(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.054651317
0.046855938
0.007220248
-0.015026659
BODGROUP
(BUS_OD)
0
or
missing
LE
5,000
GT
5000
Goods
380
140
132
652
70.37
68.97
70.59
Bads
160
63
55
278
29.63
31.03
29.41
I
Total
540
203
187
930
gij/bij
2.375
2.222222222
2.4
ln(gij/bij)
0.864997437
0.798507696
0.875468737
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.012573989
-0.053915752
0.023045289
TAGGROUP(TOTALAG)
LT
4,000
LE
10,000
LE
40000
LE
100000
GT
100000
Total
Goods
109
94
188
136
125
652
66.06
73.44
70.41
69.04
72.25
Bads
56
34
79
61
48
278
33.94
26.56
29.59
30.96
27.75
Total
165
128
267
197
173
930
gij/bij
1.946428571
2.764705882
2.379746835
2.229508197
2.604167
ln(gij/bij)
0.665996191
1.016934258
0.86699411
0.801781022
0.957113
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
j
In
(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.186427257
0.164510809
0.014570662
-0.050642427
0.104689
NSMGROUP(NEWSUM)
LE
4000
LE
10000
LE
40000
LE
100000
GT
100000
i
Goods
132
105
191
134
90
652
66.33
75.54
69.2
71.66
69.77
Bads
67
34
85
53
39
278
33.67
24.46
30.8
28.34
30.23
!
Total
199
139
276
187
129
930
gij/bij
1.970149254
3.088235294
2.247058824
2.528301887
2.307692
ln(gij/bij)
0.678109303
1.127599826
0.809622172
0.927547886
0.836248
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.42638
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.174314145
0.275176377
-0.042801277
0.075124438
-0.016175
BLNGROUP
0
or
missing
LE
10000
LE
50000
GT
50000
Total
Goods
328
30
143
151
652
68.91
71.43
72.59
70.23
Bads
148
12
54
64
278
31.09
28.57
27.41
29.77
Total
476
42
197
215
930
gij/bij
2.216216216
2.5
2.648148148
2.359375
in
(gij/bij)
0.795801335
0.916290732
0.973860584
0.858396753
Bj/Gj
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
0.426380368
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
-0.852423448
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.056622114
0.063867284
0.121437135
0.005973305
Appendix
6.2
WOE
grade
F
(Assets
and
Collateral)
ODVGROUP
(OTHDV)
Missing
GE
1
Total
Goods
501
289
790
86.38
82.57
Bads
79
61
140
13.62
17.43
Total
580
350
930
gij/bij
6.341772152
4.737704918
ln(gij/bij)
1.847158249
1.555552824
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.116767726
-0.174837699
NBGROUP
(NONBORR)
Missing
or
0
LE
9,000
LE
27,000
GT
27,000
Total
Goods
451
108
110
121
790
84.77
88.52
84.62
82.88
Bads
81
14
20
25
140
15.23
11.48
15.38
17.12
Total
532
122
130
146
930
gij/bij
5.567901235
7.714285714
5.5
4.84
ln(gij/bij)
1.717018185
2.043073898
1.704748092
1.576915
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
-0.013372338
0.312683375
-0.025642431
-0.153476
ACLGROUP
0
LE
40000
LE
90000
GT
90000
Total
Goods
498
104
90
98
790
86.61
82.54
79.65
84.48
Bads
77
22
23
18
140
13.39
17.46
20.35
15.52
Total
575
126
113
116
930
gij/bij
6.467532468
4.727272727
3.913043478
5.444444
ln(gij/bij)
1.866794655
1.553348446
1.364315454
1.694596
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.136404132
-0.177042077
-0.366075068
-0.035795
LDOGROUP
Owned
Leased
Missing
Goods
184
169
437
790
85.98
88.02
83.4
140
Bads
30
23
87
14.02
11.98
16.6
Total
214
192
524
930
gij/bij
6.133333333
7.347826087
5.022988506
ln(gij/bij)
1.813738376
1.994404499
1.614025076
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.083347853
0.264013976
-0.116365446
BPVGROUP
0
LE
30,000
LE
60,000
LE
120,000
GT
120,000
Total
Goods
386
187
45
64
108
790
85.02
87.79
77.59
87.67
81.82
Bads
68
26
13
9
24
140
14.98
12.21
22.41
12.33
18.18
Total
454
213
58
73
132
930
gij/bij
5.676470588
7.192307692
3.461538462
7.111111
4.5
ln(gij/bij)
1.736329664
1.973012079
1.241713132
1.961659
1.504077
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.005939141
0.242621556
-0.488677391
0.231268
-0.226313
WOE
grade
F
(Accounting)
RYEGROUP
(RECYRE)
Missing
Accounts
available
Total
Goods
530
260
790
85.62
83.6
Bads
89
51
140
14.38
16.4
Total
619
311
930
gij/bij
5.95505618
5.098039216
ln(gij/bij)
1.784240637
1.628855998
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.053850114
-0.101534525
PYEGROUP
(PASYRE)
Missing
Accounts
available
Total
Goods
540
250
790
85.71
83.33
Bads
90
50
140
[
14.29
16.67
Total
630
300
930
gij/bij
6
5
ln(gij/bij)
1.791759469
1.609437912
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.061368946
-0.12095261
PNPGROUP
(PASNP)
Missing
Negative
0
LE
100,000
GT
100,000
Total
Goods
540
53
70
70
57
790
85.71
91.38
73.68
83.33
90.48
Bads
90
5
25
14
6
140
14.29
8.62
26.32
16.67
9.52
Total
630
58
95
84
63
930
gij/bij
6
10.6
2.8
5
9.5
In(gijTbij)
1.791759469
2.360854001
1.029619417
1.60943791
2.251292
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.061368946
0.630463478
-0.700771106
-0.1209526
0.520901
PPLGROUP
(PASPL)
0
or
missing
LT
20000
GT
20000
Goods
518
46
55
57
61
53
790
85.62
82.14
88.71
78.08
79.22
92.98
Bads
87
10
7
16
16
4
140
14.38
17.86
11.29
21.92
20.78
7.02
■
Total
605
56
62
73
77
57
930
gij/bij
5.954022989
4.6
7.857142857
3.5625
3.8125
13.25
ln(gij/bij)
1.784067124
1.526056303
2.061423036
1.27046255
1.338285
2.583998
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.053676601
-0.204334219
0.331032513
-0.459928
-0.392105
0.853607
PRPGROUP
(PASRP)
Missing
Total
790
Goods
530
44
141
19
56
85.76
86.27
80.57
79.17
90.32
Bads
88
7
34
5
6
140
14.24
13.73
19.43
20.83
9.68
Total
618
51
175
24
62
930
gij/bij
6.022727273
6.285714286
4.147058824
3.8
9.333333
ln(gij/bij)
1.795540192
1.838279485
1.422399366
1.33500107
2.233592
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.065149669
0.107888962
-0.307991157
-0.3953895
0.503202
PSTGROUP
(PASST)
Missing
Total
Goods
139
397
110
144
790
82.74
86.49
84.62
83.24
Bads
29
62
20
29
140
17.26
13.51
15.38
16.76
Total
168
459
130
173
930
gij/bij
4.793103448
6.403225806
5.5
4.96551724
ln(gij/bij)
1.567178103
1.856801896
1.704748092
1.60251747
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.16321242
0.126411373
-0.025642431
-0.1278731
PTAGROUP(PASTA)
Total
Goods
540
88
56
106
790
85.71
75.86
88.89
87.6
Bads
90
28
7
15
140
14.29
24.14
11.11
12.4
Total
630
116
63
121
930
gij/bij
6
3.142857143
8
7.06666667
ln(gij/bij)
1.791759469
1.145132304
2.079441542
1.95538889
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.061368946
-0.585258219
0.349051019
0.22499837
RNPGROUP
(RECNP)
Missing
Negative
LE
13,000
GT
13,000
Total
Goods
530
112
87
61
790
85.62
77.78
89.69
87.14
Bads
89
32
10
9
140
14.38
22.22
10.31
12.86
Total
619
144
97
70
930
gij/bij
5.95505618
3.5
8.7
6.77777778
ln(gij/bij)
1.784240637
1.252762968
2.163323026
1.91364929
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.053850114
-0.477627554
0.432932503
0.18325876
RPLGROUP
(RECPL)
Missing
Negative
LE
13,000
LE
24,000
GT
24,000
Total
Goods
507
36
68
62
117
790
85.79
78.26
90.67
77.5
84.78
Bads
84
10
7
18
21
140
14.21
21.74
9.33
22.5
15.22
Total
591
46
75
80
138
930
gij/bij
6.035714286
3.6
9.714285714
3.44444444
5.571429
ln(gij/bij)
1.797694205
1.280933845
2.273597556
1.23676263
1.717651
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.067303682
-0.449456677
0.543207033
-0.4936279
-0.012739
RRPGROUP
(RECRP)
Missing
Negative
LE
9,000
GT
9,000
Total
Goods
520
160
50
60
790
85.67
79.6
92.59
88.24
Bads
87
41
4
8
140
14.33
20.4
7.41
11.76
Total
607
201
54
68
930
gij/bij
5.977011494
3.902439024
12.5
7.5
ln(gij/bij)
1.787920693
1.361601749
2.525728644
2.01490302
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.05753017
-0.368788774
0.795338121
0.2845125
RSTGROUP
(RECST)
Missing
or
0
LE
100,000
GT
100,000
Total
Goods
525
117
148
790
85.78
82.39
84.09
Bads
87
25
28
140
14.22
17.61
15.91
Total
612
142
176
930
gij/bij
6.034482759
4.68
5.285714286
ln(gij/bij)
1.797490144
1.54329811
1.665007764
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.067099621
-0.187092413
-0.065382759
RTAGROUP
(RECTA)
Missing
Negative
LE
16,000
GT
16,000
Total
Goods
530
83
60
117
790
85.62
74.77
86.96
89.31
Bads
89
28
9
14
140
14.38
25.23
13.04
10.69
Total
619
111
69
131
930
gij/bij
5.95505618
2.964285714
6.666666667
8.35714286
ln(gij/bij)
1.784240637
1.086636098
1.897119985
2.12311661
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.053850114
-0.643754425
0.166729462
0.39272608
PGPGROUP
(PASGP)
0
or
Missing
LE
25,000
LE
50,000
LE
100,000
GT
100,000
Total
Goods
584
39
54
62
51
790
85.51
81.25
79.41
82.67
91.07
Bads
99
9
14
13
5
140
14.49
18.75
20.59
17.33
8.93
Total
683
48
68
75
56
930
gij/bij
5.898989899
4.333333333
3.857142857
4.76923077
10.2
ln(gij/bij)
1.774781133
1.466337069
1.349926717
1.56218503
2.322388
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.04439061
-0.264053454
-0.380463806
-0.1682055
0.591997
RGPGROUP
(RECGP)
Missing
0
LE
27,000
LE
50,000
GT
50,000
Total
Goods
515
54
45
51
125
790
85.83
81.82
86.54
75
86.81
Bads
85
12
7
17
19
140
14.17
18.18
13.46
25
13.19
Total
600
66
52
68
144
930
gij/bij
6.058823529
4.5
6.428571429
3
6.578947
ln(gij/bij)
1.801515644
1.504077397
1.860752341
1.09861229
1.883875
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.071125121
-0.226313126
0.130361818
-0.6317782
0.153484
PSDGROUP
(PASBD)
Missing
0
LE
15,000
LE
27,000
GT
27,000
Total
Goods
533
82
65
50
60
790
85.83
75.93
85.53
86.21
89.55
Bads
88
26
11
8
7
140
14.17
24.07
14.47
13.79
10.45
Total
621
108
76
58
67
930
gij/bij
6.056818182
3.153846154
5.909090909
6.25
8.571429
ln(gij/bij)
1.80118461
1.148622709
1.776491997
1.83258146
2.148434
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.070794087
-0.581767814
0.046101474
0.10219094
0.418044
WOE
Ever
F
(Entrepreneur)
AGEGROUP(AGEI)
Missing
18-37
LE
50
GT
50
Total
Goods
423
119
162
86
790:
84.77
85
86.63
82.69
Bads
76
21
25
18
140
15.23
15
13.37
17.31
Total
499
140
187
104
930
gij/bij
5.565789474
5.666666667
6.48
4.7777778
ln(gij/bij)
1.716638839
1.734601055
1.86872051
1.5639755
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.1772152
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
-0.013751684
0.004210533
0.138329988
-0.166415
DYRGROUP(DOBIYR)
Missing
LE
15
GT
15
Total
Goods
577
136
77
790
85.61
83.44
82.8
Bads
97
27
16
140
14.39
16.56
17.2
Total
674
163
93
930
gij/bij
5.948453608
5.037037037
4.8125
ln(gij/bij)
1.783131288
1.61681802
1.5712167
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
In(Bj.Gj)
0.052740765
-0.113572503
-0.159173823
DPRGROUP(DOBIPER)
Missing
LE
75
GT
75
Total
Goods
435
199
156
790
85.13
81.56
89.14
Bads
76
45
19
140
14.87
18.44
10.86
Total
511
244
175
930
gij/bij
5.723684211
4.422222222
8.210526316
ln(gij/bij)
1.744612691
1.486642335
2.105417028
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
rln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.014222168
-0.243748188
0.375026505
DYIGROUP(DOBIYI)
Missing
1-7
GT
7
Total
Goods
564
105
121
790
84.3
86.07
87.05
Bads
105
17
18
140
15.7
13.93
12.95
Total
669
122
139
930
gij/bij
5.371428571
6.176470588
6.722222222
ln(gij/bij)
1.681093901
1.820747006
1.905418788
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.049296622
0.090356483
0.175028265
PNRGROUP
(PARTNER)
No
partner
Has
partner
Total
Goods
595
195
790
86.23
81.25
Bads
95
45
140
13.77
18.75
Total
690
240
930
gij/bij
6.263157895
4.333333333
ln(gij/bij)
1.834684514
1.466337069
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.104293991
-0.264053454
WOE
Ever
F
(Distance
and
Miscellaneous)
RTNGROUP
(RETAIN)
0
LE
4000
LE
10000
LE
40000
GT
40000
Total
Goods
354
114
143
147
32
790
84.49
87.02
86.14
84.48
80
Bads
65
17
23
27
8
140
15.51
12.98
13.86
15.52
20
Total
419
131
166
174
40
930
gij/bij
5.446153846
6.705882353
6.217391304
5.444444
4
ln(gij/bij)
1.694909643
1.902985104
1.827350414
1.694596
1.38629436
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
-0.03548088
0.172594581
0.096959891
-0.035795
-0.3440962
SINGROUP
(SALESIN)
0
LE
20000
LE
60000
GT
60000
Goods
445
51
98
196
790
85.41
82.26
85.22
84.48
Bads
76
11
17
36
140
14.59
17.74
14.78
15.52
Total
521
62
115
232
930
gij/bij
5.855263158
4.636363636
5.764705882
5.444444
ln(gij/bij)
1.767340942
1.53393036
1.751754135
1.694596
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.036950419
-0.196460163
0.021363612
-0.035795
PJSGROUP
(PROJSAL)
0
LE
25000
LE
50000
LE
90000
GT
90000
Total
Goods
251
88
107
98
246
790
86.85
79.28
86.29
86.73
83.96
__
Bads
38
23
17
15
47
13.15
20.72
13.71
13.27
16.04
Total
289
111
124
113
293
930
gij/bij
6.605263158
3.826086957
6.294117647
6.533333
5.23404255
ln(gij/bij)
1.887866779
1.341842599
1.83961549
1.876917
1.65518393
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.157476257
-0.388547924
0.109224968
0.146527
-0.0752066
BSMGROUP
(BUSMILE)
0
LE
2
LE
6
GT
6
Total
Goods
146
179
184
281
790
87.95
83.26
85.58
84.13
Bads
20
36
31
53
140
12.05
16.74
14.42
15.87
Total
166
215
215
334
930
gij/bij
7.3
4.972222222
5.935483871
5.301887
ln(gij/bij)
1.987874348
1.603866867
1.780948553
1.668063
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.257483825
-0.126523655
0.05055803
-0.062328
CPRGROUP
(CREDPER)
0
Missing
LE
50
LE
95
GT
95
Goods
341
158
72
51
168
790
81.38
88.27
86.75
82.26
89.84
Bads
87
21
11
11
19
140
18.62
11.73
13.25
17.74
10.16
Total
428
179
83
62
187
930
gij/bij
3.91954023
7.523809524
6.545454545
4.636364
8.84210526
ln(gij/bij)
1.365974359
2.018072595
1.878770846
1.53393
2.179525
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
-1.7303905
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.364416164
0.287682072
0.148380323
-0.19646
0.44913448
WOE
Ever
F
(Exposure)
OLNGROUP
(OTH_LN)
Has
no
other
loan
Has
other
loan
Total
Goods
620
170
790
84.35
87.18
Bads
115
25
140
15.65
12.82
Total
735
195
930
gij/bij
5.391304348
6.8
ln(gij/bij)
1.68478735
1.916922612
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
'n
(gij/bij)
+
In
(Bj/Gj)
-0.045603173
0.186532089
CDP
GROUP
0
or
missing
GTO
Total
Goods
499
291
790
83.44
87.65
Bads
99
41
140
16.56
12.35
Total
598
332
930
gij/bij
5.04040404
7.097560976
ln(gij/bij)
1.617486246
1.9597512
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.112904277
0.229360678
AGRGROUP(AGGBORR)
LE
3000
LE
30,000
LE
90,000
GT
90,000
Total
Goods
125
310
198
157
790
88.03
85.64
81.15
86.26
Bads
17
52
46
25
140
11.97
14.36
18.85
13.74
Total
142
362
244
182
930
gij/bij
7.352941176
5.961538462
4.304347826
6.28
Mgij/bij)
1.995100393
1.785328579
1.459625634
1.83736998
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.26470987
0.054938056
-0.270764889
0.106979458
CXPGROUP
(CUSEXP)
0
LE
15,000
LE
60,000
GT
60,000
Total
Goods
190
250
191
159
790
86.76
87.11
82.33
82.81
Bads
29
37
41
33
140
13.24
12.89
17.67
17.19
Total
219
287
232
192
930
gij/bij
6.551724138
6.756756757
4.658536585
4.818181818
ln(gij/bij)
1.879728242
1.910543005
1.538701361
1.572396641
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
In
(g
ij/b
ij)
+
_
In
(Bj/Gj)
0.149337719
0.180152482
-0.191689162
-0.157993882
BODGROUP
(BUS_OD)
0
or
missing
LE
5,000
GT
5000
Goods
451
178
161
790
83.52
87.68
86.1
Bads
89
25
26
140
16.48
12.32
13.9
Total
540
203
187
930
gij/bij
5.06741573
7.12
6.192307692
ln(gij/bij)
1.62283097
1.962907725
1.823307827
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
-0.107559553
0.232517203
0.092917304
TAGGROUP(TOTALAG)
LT
4,000
LE
10,000
LE
40000
LE
100000
GT100000
Total
Goods
146
113
222
156
153
790
88.48
88.28
83.15
79.19
88.44
Bads
19
15
45
41
20
140
11.52
11.72
16.85
20.81
11.56
Total
165
128
267
197
173
930
gij/bij
7.684210526
7.533333333
4.933333333
3.804878049
7.65
ln(gij/bij)
2.039167643
2.019337618
1.596014892
1.336283941
2.034706
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.30877712
0.288947095
-0.134375631
-0.394106582
0.304315
NSMGROUP(NEWSUM)
LE
4000
LE
10000
LE
40000
LE
100000
GT100000
Goods
174
123
229
152
112
790
87.44
88.49
82.97
81.28
86.82
Bads
25
16
47
35
17
140
12.56
11.51
17.03
18.72
13.18
Total
199
139
276
187
129
930
gij/bij
6.96
7.6875
4.872340426
4.342857143
6.588235
ln(gij/bij)
1.940179474
2.039595633
1.583574402
1.468532459
1.885286
Bj/Gj
_
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.177215
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730391
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.209788951
0.30920511
-0.146816121
-0.261858063
0.154895
BLNGROUP
0
or
missing
LE
10000
LE
50000
GT
50000
Total
Goods
411
37
165
177
790
86.34
88.1
83.76
82.33
Bads
65
5
32
38
140
13.66
11.9
16.24
17.67
Total
476
42
197
215
930
gij/bij
6.323076923
7.4
5.15625
4.657894737
ln(gij/bij)
1.844205945
2.00148
1.640209571
1.538563573
Bj/Gj
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
0.17721519
ln(Bj/Gj)
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
-1.730390523
ln(gij/bij)
+
ln(Bj/Gj)
0.113815422
0.271089477
-0.090180952
-0.19182695
Appendix
6.3
Bivariate
correlation
matrices
of
explanatory
variables
TAGROUP
RYEGROUP
RTNGROUP
PSTGROUP
RTAGROUP
LDOGROUP
RGPGROUP
PNPGROUP
RPLGROUP
RRPGROUP
PGPGROUP
PSDGROUP
TAGROUP
1.00
RYEGROUP
0.09**
1.00
RTNGROUP
1.00
PSTGROUP
0.03
.34**
0.03
1.00
RTAGROUP
0.03
0.13**
.*
1.00
LDOGROUP
**
.07*
1.00
RGPGROUP
0.07**
0.35**
**
0.02
.15**
0.00
1.00
PNPGROUP
0.12**
.52**
.06*
.16**
1.00
RPLGROUP
0.09**
.26**
.07*
.06*
.17**
.24**
.13**
1.00
RRPGROUP
.18**
0.05
0.04
.33**
0.05
0.05
.37**
.07*
1.00
PGPGROUP
0.08**
.15**
**
0.02
.09**
.06*
.34**
.17**
10*.
1.00
PSDGROUP
.29**
0.00
.60**
o
-vl
*
.25**
.66**
.17**
.40**
.27**
1.00
DPRGROUP
BPVGROUP
CPRGROUP
LDOGROUP
AGRGROUP
DYRGROUP
PJSGROUP
ACLGROUP
BSMGROUP
NSMGROUP
OLNGROUP
ODVGROUP
DRPGROUP
1.00
BPVGROUP
0.18
1.00
CPRGROUP
-0.01
0.12**
1.00
LDOGROUP
-0.07*
-0.01
-0.08*
1.00
AGRGROUP
0.04
0.10**
0.10**
-0.02
1.00
DYRGROUP
-0.04
0.09**
-0.05
-0.12**
0.03
1.00
PJSGROUP
-0.05
0.04
0.29**
0.01
0.05
0.08*
1.00
ACLGROUP
0.03
0.06
0.11**
0.06
0.33**
0.04
0.03
1.00
BSMGROUP
-0.01
0.04
0.13**
0.01
0.04
0.06
0.15**
-0.02
1.00
NSMGROUP
0.01
0.13**
0.08*
-0.01
0.58**
-0.03
0.07*
0.31**
0.03
1.00
OLNGROUP
-0.02
-0.01
0.07*
-0.03
0.14**
-0.03
0.01
0.07*
0.02
0.17**
1.00
ODVGROUP
0.04
0.09**
0.11**
0.07*
0.25**
0.07*
0.01
0.88**
-0.01
0.27**
0.06
1.00
i
Appendix to Chapter 8
My E-T model rationalising the results of Chapter 8
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Aim of this appendix
This Appendix aims to describe a model I have derived in order to explain some of my
empirical findings that I obtained in Chapter 8.
Since it was beyond the scope of my PhD (given time and knowledge constraints) to
reformulate my Equilibrium-Transitional (E-T) credit rationing model as a mathematical
system of equations, I thought it best to describe the framework here because it may be of
interest to a reader. However, I would hope on completion of my PhD to develop this model
further since I would argue that the model manages to explain some empirical regularities in
my data and also reconcile the two mutually exclusive approaches to credit rationing
adopted in the literature.
'E-T' hypotheses
I will now attempt to interpret my empirical results by reference to an interpretative model
called the 'E-T' model. This model proposes to rationalise my results in a financial
economic framework and it draws on past theoretical work describing 'transitional' and
'equilibrium' credit rationing.
Because my choice of model is influenced by the analysis of credit constraints in Chapter 8,
I aim to interpret rather than predict my results using the 'E-T' model that describes first-
period borrowing. While aware of the weaknesses of data driven modelling in terms of its
lack of independence from the data, there is nevertheless a growing need to make the
theoretical models reflect more the reality of the lending contract. If totally divorced from
the reality of the lending situation, the model is flawed. To date there is a dichotomy
between the theoretical models and the empirical models.
The 'E-T' model attempts to describe first-period lending based on a number of inputs. I
refer to the other models by Jaffee and Russell (1976), Cressy (1996a), Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and de Meza and Southey (1996) in order to support my assumptions about how
banks lend to a first time business borrowers. However, the model is also based on the
empirical results that have already been presented as well as my understanding of the
lending situation.
While not an exhaustive model that explains all the relationships in my empirical results it
attempts to explain the fact that credit constraints are increasing in the amount borrowed
'borr , decreasing in collateral amount 'coll', relationship 'prevbor' and the credit history
variable fin_dif'. A summary of the relationships I aim to interpret using the 'E-T' model is
presented in Table 1.
Ill
The structure of this section is as follows. I first describe how the model proposes to deal
with the response variable 'con' used in the data. Then I present the model assumptions.
Following this I describe the shape of the supply and demand curves of the model before
describing how they can depict credit constraints. Finally I reformulate the model to include
interest margins.
Interpretation of the response variable 'con'
You will recall that my response variable 'con' indicated that either the business or the bank
rejected the loan. Referring back to my theoretical models, TCR representing first-period
credit rationing could be the phenomenon we observe when the entrepreneur turns down the
loan. On the other hand, ECR is perhaps the event that is observed when the bank rather
than the business rejects the loan.
It is assumed that the amount of the collateral offered influences the bank's decision to
reject the loan (ECR). Furthermore, the bank would like to minimise its exposure to first
time borrowers by lending less than the equilibrium amount until the borrower's credit grade
becomes known (TCR). It lends less than the equilibrium amount if the collateral provided
is less than the equilibrium level required. The common denominator in this synthesis of the
two types of credit rationing is the relationship between collateral level and the response
variable. Businesses with higher assets and hence collateral are more likely to receive a loan
approaching the size they requested. Businesses with higher assets are also less high risk and
consequently less likely to be turned down by a bank than asset impoverished businesses.
To sum up how I aim to interpret my response variable. My ex post rationalisation of the
statistical regularities in my data i.e. the likelihood of loan rejection increasing in borrowing
amount and risk and decreasing in collateral must combine elements of the ECR models and
the TCR models. I need to use a combination of both models in order to capture both facets
of the response variable
Like Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Cressy (1996a), I assume that the bank has a perfectly
elastic supply of deposits. The bank operates in a perfectly competitive market and does not
make monopoly profits.
The following section outlines the assumptions I make about the assets and collateral of the
business as well as the relationship between the demand schedule of the borrower to
exogenous changes in assets.
IV
Assumptions of the 'E-T' model
There are six main components or assumptions, which I will make about first-period
borrowing. I will list these below before turning to the model itself.
Assumption 1: All things equal, it is easier repay less than more
Firstly, in agreement with the conclusions of the J-R model, it is easier for the borrower to
repay a smaller loan than a larger one. I choose to ignore here the arguments of the Stiglitz
Weiss (1981) model that by lending too little, the whole portfolio of the bank is made riskier
and default rises as a result. I assume that the business has enough viability to keep itself
operating, albeit at a less than optimal rate at least in the short term. Poor risks will default
within the short run by not having enough endogenous growth to tide them through the
difficult first period.
A number of business start-ups are poor risks and will default in the short term. This means
that of the initial cohort of businesses applying for finance in the first round, a number will
have defaulted by the time the second round arrives. The short term is defined as the period
necessary for a bank to collect sufficient information on the repayment performance of the
borrower. The minimum period for the short term is one year because this is the minimum
period of time required for the collection of data, which could be used in estimating a
performance scorecard. Businesses are scored on their repayment performance in order to
receive subsequent increases to their overdraft facility etc. Even within this first year, a bank
should have generated some information on the quality of the borrower through monitoring
his money transmission accounts (MTAs). An overdraft facility is such an MTA and a
borrower who is overshooting his authorised limit is flagged immediately.
According to de Meza and Southey, quoting from Daly (1990), more than 30 percent of new
businesses in the UK close within the first three years of their operations. According to
another source of UK statistics, under 20 percent of start-ups fail in their first year of trading
and over 60 percent in the first 5 years (Barclay's Bank Information Service, 2000).
Assumption 2: 'core asset' assumption
The third assumption I make is that each borrower has one core asset to offer as collateral to
a bank. This assumption is realistic in the case of business start-ups who are in a position
offer the land on which their premises is located or the business premises itself (if they own
the business premises). Apart from this core asset Land and Buildings, they may not have
much else to offer a bank as collateral. I assume that a bank finds the administration
V
involved on a core asset comparatively easier and more efficient to administer than a
plethora of smaller, non-core assets.
In Chapter 9, I present evidence that collateral plays a more important role in first time
finance than in subsequent periods. This result is also borne out by Evans and Jovanovic
(1989). Such evidence indicates that core assets are taken as a signal of goodwill in the first
period while the level of finance is augmented in the second period, often bearing little
relation to the magnitude of the initial collateral.
In my own dataset of the 7,671 borrowers, 3,488 borrowers corresponding to 45.5 percent of
the sample had their loans collateralised. Of the 3,198 borrowers offering Land and
Buildings as collateral, only 78 offered a life policy as well. Land and buildings therefore
represent the core asset. All residual assets are referred to as non-core assets.
The core asset assumption has another additional use apart from simplifying the model. It
also helps us deal with the problem that collateral is directly observed in my data while
business assets are not.
Since the assets of the business are not observed in my dataset, these cannot be used in lieu
of collateral level as an explanatory variable. Collateral can be transformed into an
exogenous variable for the decision of the bank to lend or otherwise, if I assume the 'core
asset' assumption. By assuming that the most highly valued, non-specialised asset with the
lowest dead-weight cost is used as collateral, the problem of assets not being directly
observed while collateral is, is to some extent remedied'. By assuming that the borrower
posts all his core-assets as collateral, we no longer have a dichotomy between assets and
collateral where collateral was a subset of assets. By assuming that core assets are equal to
collateral I assume that all the collateral observed in first period lending is equivalent to the
full complement of core business assets.
By assuming that the core asset comprises the only collateral offered on a first-period loan
(core assets=collateral), the collateral becomes another determinant of the bank's decision to
grant a loan or not.
I argue that there are solid a priori reasons for applying this 'core asset' assumption,
including the high proportion of businesses in my TS group, which are secured on one asset
as I have mentioned above. Although my model takes precedence over data complexities, I
have observed regularities in my data when making my assumptions.
' The deadweight cost of collateral is defined as the differential between the asset's in-use value and its
liquidation value. In other words, the difference between its first and second best use.
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Assumption 3: Initial wealth is used to secure first-period borrowing and not the purchased
asset
I make a further assumption here regarding initial wealth. I assume that in the first period a
bank is only interested in collateralising a loan based on the starting wealth of the
entrepreneur (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).
This assumption also has an intuitive explanation. Imagine that a start-up or firm without a
track record approaches a bank for a loan. A bank could offer him a fully asset backed loan
of infinite value and be fully covered by the value of the item purchased in the eventuality of
borrower default. However, it is not likely that a bank pursues this policy in first-period
lending. Because it~is likely that the asset purchased has a high value in its first best use
relative to its liquidation value (high dead-weight loss), it can be expected that the bank will
opt for collateral which the entrepreneur already has. This existing collateral, in the form of
land and buildings or life policies, is expected to have a comparatively lower dead-weight
loss than highly specialised plant or machinery. Therefore, the bank reverts to using this
'core asset' to collateralise the loan.
Assumption 4: I assume collateral to loan value ratios of > 1 to allow slack for second
period borrowing. Also this shows conservatism in first period lending
This assumption implies that banks are more conservative in the first rather than second
lending periods. I therefore assume higher collateral to loan value ratios. In my model, this
conservatism implies that collateral divided by loan amount is greater than 1.
The empirical evidence corroborates my assumption of collateral to value ratios in excess of
unity. These ratios are typically high for small firms. Binks et al. (1993) cites a ratio of over
unity for 85 percent of UK loans.
A further reason for expected high C/L ratio is that the enterprise believes that it will survive
into the second period. The understanding is that it will have its overdraft limit or
renegotiated second-period loan, leveraged on the same core asset. In other words, there is
some in-built slack in the provision of first period collateral. Rather than pricing collateral to
risk, excess collateral will be used to secure second-period borrowing. Rather than the bank
increasing the asset requirements in the second period, therefore, it waits to see how the firm
will perform in the first period before renegotiating a higher amount of finance.
It could be argued that this understanding should be written into the loan contract. It can be
either implicit or explicitly stated in the contract that the bank takes a charge over a
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proportion of the firm's assets. In reality, default by the enterprise means the ultimate
liquidation of the whole asset where the surplus value of the asset has a lower value in its
next best use. Therefore, the bank may as well take a charge over the full asset value. It can
do this if the understanding between the bank and firm implies that first-period borrowing is
an advance on the full amount requested. The residual finance will be extended in the
second period subject to the firm meeting its repayment targets. The collateral taken in the
first period, therefore pertains to cumulative borrowing in the second period.
It is be possible that the ratio of collateral to value is non-linear with increases in firm size.
This would happen if banks imposed a requirement for collateral at a minimum loan size e.g.
all loans in excess of £1,000. Above this minimum collateralised loan, with successive
increases in loan amount, the proportion of collateral would be falling if larger loans had
lower default rates or the cost of administering the collateral exhibited lower per unit costs.
Apart from possible returns to collateral usage affecting the supply curve rather than the
demand curve, there are other factors that differentiate the supply from the demand curve.
One of these is the dead-weight costs of collateral. The dead-weight cost of collateral relates
to the asymmetric evaluation of an asset from the perspective of a banker vis a viz. an
entrepreneur. The banker must liquidate the asset in order to realise its value with resulting
loss of value while the entrepreneur values the asset more highly in its first-best use2.
The bank will be more conservative and accordingly more wary of first-period borrowing as
evidenced by Bink's empirical analysis of UK small firms, if small firms are more likely to
be younger and thence more likely to be involved in first-period borrowing.
Assumption 5: All first-term loans are secured. I examine total exposure rather than loans
and overdrafts in isolation.
A final assumption relates how I define borrowing as total exposure.
I assume that overdrafts are also collateralised on the core asset of the business where a
floating charge is taken over this asset to secure an overdraft. Although the collateralisation
of overdrafts is not as emphasised as the collateralisation of loans in the literature, I assume
that overdrafts are to a large extent collateralised for two reasons.
2
Deadweight costs should not play a large role in my data because the bank does not accept
idiosyncratic assets such as machinery or office equipment as collateral. If it were to accept such
specialised assets as collateral there would be a wide gap between the value of the collateral in their
first best vis a viz. their second best use. In other words, the deadweight costs of the collateral would
be high.
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Firstly, these are first time borrowers and are likely to be high risk irrespective of the type of
borrowing they take out. For this reason, there is a relatively high need to secure their
borrowing.
Secondly, as Berger and Udell (1992) show in their empirical analysis, 53 percent of the 872
lines of credit or L/Cs (equivalent to overdrafts) are secured by collateral. In my sample of
the 3,812 working capital loans, the number secured is 1,443 corresponding to 38 percent.
Because lines of credit and working capital loans can also be secured, I do not mean the 'E-
T' model to apply only to loan finance but to the total exposure of the firm. This
consideration of total business exposure is in line with circumstantial evidence from loan
sanctioners at the bank who viewed risk over the whole exposure of the firm.
Assumption 6: The demand of the entrepreneur for finance rises linearly with the level of
initial wealth
The assumption is that a priori wealthy firms demand a comparatively higher level of first-
period finance than demanded by asset poor entrepreneurs. A way of illustrating this
assumption is to imagine a comparatively wealthy entrepreneur having £50,000 of core-
assets and £5,000 of his own cash savings. His poor entrepreneur counterpart has £20,000 of
core assets and £2,000 cash savings. In both cases the ratio of their core asset to their own
savings is 10:1. I assume a constant describes the ratio between the value of core assets and
the savings of the owner. The poor entrepreneur is starting from a lower level than his
wealthy counterpart. Being risk adverse, where risk implies business failure and the
forfeiture of their collateral, they will not want to undertake to repay a debt they know they
cannot realistically service. I assume that the loss of £50,000 worth of collateral to the
wealthy entrepreneur is equivalent to the loss of £20,000 worth of collateral to the poor
entrepreneur. I also assume that the project is financed by a combination of bank and equity
finance where £5,000 plus a £5,000 bank loan will cover a larger initial project than a
project costing £2,000 equity plus a £2,000 loan.
Therefore, entrepreneurs operate in a rational way and tailor their expectations regarding the
amount of first-period finance they can obtain from the bank on the value of their core
assets. Put another way, it would be unreasonable for an entrepreneur with a small life
assurance policy to expect a generous first-time loan. Entrepreneurs are risk adverse agents
who know that they will forfeit any collateral they post on failing. They therefore request an
amount of finance they expect they can hope to service.
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Supply and demand curves
I now move on to the model itself. In this section, I will describe the shape of the demand
curve and compare it with the structure of the supply curve, which has already been
mentioned.
The demand curve describing the trade-off between collateral and amount borrowed is
upward sloping for the following reason. According to Assumption 6, the demand for
finance rises linearly with assets. Given assumption 2 that assets and collateral are
equivalent, it follows that larger firms, with higher levels of assets demand higher levels of
finance. However, they post all their core assets as collateral and therefore higher levels of
collateral are associated with higher levels of borrowing. You can imagine this as an upward
sloping demand schedule because as the asset level and correspondingly collateral increases,
so also does the level of borrowing. The demand curve is seen as the upwardly sloping grey
line in Figure 1. I now move on to describe the supply curve for finance.
The supply curve for finance is upwardly sloping because the bank is willing to supply more
finance in exchange for increases in collateral C. However, the bank will not supply
infinitely large amounts of finance to first-period borrowers. There is therefore a maximum
level of loan that the bank is prepared to give to a first-period commercial borrower in the
first period of his borrowing. The first-term supply curve should be asymptotic to this
maximum first-term loanable level. The first-term supply curve is also be discontinuous
above the maximum loanable level indicating that businesses demanding loans in excess of
the maximum loanable level are denied finance. No finance is supplied above the maximum
loanable amount. Up to that point, there is a positive association between collateral and the
amount loaned where larger amounts of collateral are offered larger loans.
Now I relate my description of the supply curve back to Figure 1. The first-period supply
curve Si is described by the black asymptotic function. Si is asymptotic to the first-period
maximum loanable amount Lmax. The supply schedule does not intersect with the demand
curve Di until the second lending period when the second period supply schedule S2
intersects the demand schedule D: giving an equilibrium loan L* and equilibrium collateral
level C*. The second period maximum loanable amount is Lmax2.
The other feature of the supply curve for finance is that the bank will find increasing returns
to collateral use up to a certain level. After this critical level is reached, the returns to
collateral usage are negative. For very large amounts of collateral usage, the returns to
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collateral usage are diminishing. This is because the bank has already reached its maximum
loanable amount and any additional collateral will not leverage the same increase in finance.
The returns to collateral usage can be seen in the horizontal distance between the supply Si
and demand curves respectively. The two curves converge up to a certain point C/. Up to the
point C/ increases in collateral bring the quantity supplied closer to the quantity demanded.
However increases in collateral beyond C/ are not desirable from the entrepreneur's point of
view because the horizontal distance between supply and demand grows rapidly as the
supply curve becomes progressively flatter. Entrepreneurs offering collateral C* for a loan
of L* in the first-term will be turned down by the bank because Si is discontinuous at C*. In
other words, in the first period, the bank is not prepared to lend any loan greater and equal to
L* corresponding to C* or greater on the entrepreneur's demand curve D\.
A final feature of the supply curve relates to the dead-weight costs (defined earlier) of
collateral usage (see Assumption 4). If the bank liquidates collateral, the value realised on
sale of the asset (the value in its next best use) is less than that in its first-best use. Also
disposal costs can be high and there is a cost involves in advertising the asset for sale as well
as a cost involved in recovering the value of the asset from its sale.
In my dataset the dead-weight costs of collateral are assumed to be low because the bank
does not accept idiosyncratic assets such as specialised equipment or machinery as loan
security. Idiosyncratic assets are expected to have high dead-weight costs. On the other
hand, land and buildings or life policies have comparatively lower dead-weight costs.
Nevertheless, the dead-weight cost of collateral is seen in the horizontal distance between
the 45 degree line (assuming a ratio of unity between collateral and loan value) and the
supply curve. At the equilibrium point y the distance is xy'\
First period-credit constraints; explaining borrower and bank rejection
Let us now observe both TCR and ECR in my model. I first of all take the case of
'transitional credit rationing'. This occurs when the supply of lending falls short of the
demand for funding in the first period. However, once the risk status of the borrower
becomes known, the bank will supply the full amount in the second period. Bad risks will
drop out of the market for funds by the second period. In Figure 1, for collateral amounts
3 Collateral is exogenous and loan amount is endogenous. The reason for this is as follows. The
entrepreneur stakes all he has on first-period borrowing in order to get the largest loan possible for his
given amount of collateral. Assets (corresponding to collateral in my model) are also assumed to be
exogenous in studies by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Cressy (1996a)
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less than the equilibrium level i.e. C/ < C* , the demand for finance outstrips the supply of
finance Qdj > Qsi and there is equilibrium credit rationing.
Entrepreneurs with sub-optimal levels of assets and therefore collateral are more heavily
penalised under TCR in the first period. This is seen in Figure 1. For any C < Ch the
difference between the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied is greater, the greater
the reduction in the level of C. If an entrepreneurs' utility decreases with higher absolute
differences between the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied, it follows that with
lower levels of C, an entrepreneur is more likely to reject the loan. This is because the
amount he receives falls further short of his expectations than the amount he would receive
with a higher level of collateral C.
The firm has a choice under 'transitionary credit rationing'. It can either accept the sub-
optimal loan in the first period and await further finance in the second period. Alternatively,
it can reject the amount of lending Qs offered by the bank in the first period.
If the entrepreneur decides to accept what little the bank has to offer in the first period, the
bank makes good the entire shortfall in finance in the second period by shifting the supply
curve. The firm is no longer rationed to the same extent at the level of collateral Cj < C*.
We see this shifting of the supply curve from 5/ to S2 in Figure 1 where 5/ is the first-period
supply curve and S2 the second period supply curve.
I conclude that entrepreneurs who have more collateral to offer the bank do not experience
'transitional' credit rationing to the extent as entrepreneurs who have less collateral to offer
the bank. This is because the gap between the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied
should be less, the greater the level of collateral up to a certain point. It follows that
entrepreneurs are less willing to reject a loan when it comes closer to their expectations.
Therefore, entrepreneurs with more collateral are less willing to reject a loan. Under
transitional credit rationing, the likelihood of being turned down P('con') is less for higher
levels of collateral 'coir. This is what we witnessed in the empirical results in Chapter 8.
I now turn to the other dimension of my response variable 'con', where the bank turns down
the loan because the bank perceiving the entrepreneur as being too high risk. This time the
bank initiates the action to reject the loan rather than the entrepreneur.
I assume that the bank is more inclined to turn down a loan if the entrepreneur asks for too
much finance such that the amount requested exceeds the maximum allowable amount and
falls above the discontinuity in the first period supply curve. Therefore, with equilibrium
credit rationing, the likelihood that {'con') increases with increases in the amount of finance
demanded 'borr .
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How do we interpret the positive relationship between the risk variable 'fin_dif in the
context of the 'E-T' model? We can imagine any risk variable as shifting the supply curve to
the right such that the bank will request additional collateral to cover the additional risk
involved in lending to high risk hr firms.
Figure 2 shows the supply curve shifting to the right in order to describe the increased
conservatism of the bank in lending to such firms. The amount of collateral that the bank
requires for a loan Qs increases from Cnr to Chr to reflect the heightened risk of lending to a
previous insolvent firm, a firm who has had difficulty meeting past repayments on whom
adverse information is reported following a credit bureau search.
A similar effect should be registered for firms who have had no previous borrowing
experience from the bank ('prevbor=0')• Such higher risk firms should be required to
provide additional collateral. Given that there is a greater disparity between the demand D\
and new supply curve Si under the riskier regime (greater vertical distance between the
curves measuring the loan amount supplied/demanded for a given level of collateral), it
follows that the firm is more inclined to turn down such a loan all things equal.
It may even be the case that the maximum loanable amount Lmcix also shifts down such that
there is also a higher rejection rate (equilibrium credit rationing) for higher risk firms. Firms
asking for Qd under the original risk regime nr would be rejected under the higher risk
regime hr because the amount demanded Qd lies above the new supply curve ST
Summary of my 'E-T' model
I now summarise my interpretation of first-period lending (Table 1) and relate it back to my
empirical results.
The likelihood of a borrower's loan being turned down {'con') should be decreasing in the
amount of collateral provided according to my ex post rationalisation of first-period lending.
This is because higher collateral (up to a certain point) should reduce the distance between
the supply and demand curves and bring the entrepreneur's expectations of loan size closer
to those of the bank. Therefore there is a lower likelihood that the entrepreneur will turn
down the loan. Therefore, collateral reduces 'transitionary' credit rationing. In my empirical
results presented in Chapter 8, we see that collateral does play such a role in reducing the
likelihood that the loan is rejected up to a certain point in the first period. However no
amount of finance L* is given in exchange for C* above C* because the first-period supply
curve Sj is discontinuous at C*.
The likelihood that a loan is turned down is higher, the higher the amount of finance 'borr'
demanded by the firm. As we move along the demand curve for first-period borrowing, we
see that after a certain point (maximum loanable amount which is less than the second
period equilibrium amount L*) the bank will refuse to supply any loan. The bank therefore
rejects loans that are in excess of Lmax. This is equilibrium credit rationing. In my data we
see that the likelihood that ('con') is increasing in the amount requested 'borf.
The likelihood that a loan is turned down should also be decreasing in the risk of a loan
according to my rationalisation of first-period lending. We see that this is the case where the
business risk variable 'fin_dif' is positively related to loan rejections.
Finally, borrower risk should be attenuated if the bank knows more about the entrepreneur's
credit status. Since the bank knows more about the entrepreneur's creditworthiness over the
length of a business-bank relationship, it follows that borrower risk should be negatively
related with the length of a business-bank relationship. Alternatively, entrepreneurs who
have exhibited past borrowing 'prevbor-V with the bank should have lower risk and
consequently show a lower likelihood of having their loans turned down. We see that this is
the case and my empirical results show that the variable 'prevbor' and 'prevbor=l' have
negatively signed coefficients.
Table 1 Predictions of 'E-T' model*
Collateral level 'coll' Negative
Amount requested 'borr' Positive
Risk variable 'fin_dif' Positive
Relationship variables 'prevbor', 'prevbor=l' Negative
Other control variables Negative if control variables negatively related to
risk
*A11 conjectured relationships are with the response variable 'con' measuring whether the business
loan was rejected
Figure 1 Demand and supply schedules for First-period loans
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Figure 2 Response to an increase in loan risk
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